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Back in 1986 Thomas H. Jackson published a ground-breaking work for 
insolvency literature: The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law. 
Since then, much ink has been spilled in the investigation of the foundations of 
insolvency law. Many scholars have argued for the implementation of rescue- or 
debtor-oriented practices, in order to give a “second chance” to the honest but 
unfortunate debtor, or to save a distressed but viable business. Others have 
advocated for maximising the return to creditors to protect the rights bargained 
for by the parties in solvent times. 
In other words, the debate has focused on the “logic” of this area of law and it 
has been primarily either principle or purpose-oriented. This study, on the 
other hand, focuses on the other pillar of Jackson’s literary work: the “limits” of 
insolvency law.  
Insolvency remedies can be considered as a statutory endorsement of breaches 
of contracts. Insolvency law is not a synonym of rescue law. As a result, 
insolvency rules should apply only when contractual or general law remedies 
are no longer appropriate to deal with the ailing debtor.  
The main purpose of this research is therefore to investigate when, to what 
extent and if at all statutory insolvency rules should depart from the law of 
contract in market-driven jurisdictions. As a result, this study focuses on 
selected common law jurisdictions - the United States and the United Kingdom 
(rectius, England and Wales) - to investigate the circumstances that should 
justify the enforcement of insolvency (rectius, corporate distress) rules. This 
thesis complements problem and principle-informed theories to suggest a novel 
mechanism to determine the limit of insolvency law. 
To date, practitioners, scholars and judges have not fully acknowledged this 
issue and its implications for business practice. Legal systems fail to provide 
comprehensive guidance on the matter of the co-ordination between insolvency 
rules and the enforceability of the rights negotiated by the parties in their 
contracts. The aim of this thesis is to acknowledge, critically analyse, investigate 
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and suggest solutions to this issue and, in doing so, make an original and 
significant contribution to the field.  
This work will propose an innovative solution to determine when companies 
should rely on corporate distress remedies. Nevertheless, it does not claim that 
the proposed approach is the best or optimal one. It highlights the benefit that 
the proposed conceptualisation is expected to achieve over existing statutory 
and theoretical approaches and it identifies the factors that are most likely to 
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«In exploring the dynamic interrelation between legislation and case law in this 
area,  
it is important to bear in mind the key goals of  
predictability, certainty and party autonomy  
and to ensure that these principles are not departed from without good reason»1 
 
  
                                                                    
1 JL Yap, 'Predictability, Certainty, and Party Autonomy in the Sale and Supply of Goods' (2017) 
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CHAPTER 1 - FOUNDATIONS 
«Bankruptcy law casts a long shadow.  
It is salient not only for financially distressed companies, but also for the risk 
calculations of lenders, for corporate managers who must assess the potential 
downside of their own decisions, and for creditors whose protection in bankruptcy 
law will affect the level, costs, and form of credit they extend. [It] can influence the 
decisions of corporate managers about the reorganizational and legal structure of 
a firm. […] Consequently, while bankruptcy law directly concerns only companies 




Bankruptcy is rocking, and ‘business failure has gone international’.2 
The worst financial and economic crisis in recent times forced many seemingly 
viable banks, corporations3 and municipalities to seek legal protection from 
their creditors. As happened in the Thirties, national legislators realized that 
‘the emperor ha[d] no clothes’ and that the existing statutory frameworks were 
not adequate to cope with systemic crises. Political, regional and national 
authorities were “forced” to descend into the insolvency4 arena, in order to 
control the possible domino effect that large, systemic failures would have 
caused.  
Did they only use insolvency procedures for this purpose or does the 
legislatures’ intervention prove the substantial failure of the traditionally 
                                                                    
1 BC Carruthers and TC Halliday, Rescuing Business: The Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Law in 
England and the United States (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1998) 37. 
2 RK Rasmussen, ‘A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies’ (1997-1998) 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 
1, 1. 
3 This thesis will generally adopt the terms “business”, “company” and “corporation” instead of 
“firm” because under the English tradition the latter connotes primarily a partnership.  
4 The term “bankruptcy” is frequently employed to refer to corporate insolvencies, especially 
according to the U.S. tradition. Similarly, the notion of “corporate bankruptcy” is employed as a 
synonym of “corporate insolvency”. This will not be the case of this thesis. Out of respect for the 
British tradition and considering that the research work has primarily been carried out in a 
London-based HE institution, any mention of bankruptcy can be taken to mean personal 
bankruptcy, unless in direct quotations. 
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neutral principle and purpose-driven approaches to define the scope, the limits 
and - to a lesser extent - the content of insolvency law?  
This work attempts to answer these questions. It adopts a legal perspective to 
combine theoretical, normative5 approaches with a problem-based example-
driven (i.e. doctrinal) method, thus allowing the author to test the validity of its 
conclusions on a wide spectrum of cases. 
In doing so, this thesis also tries to refute the feeling that ‘bankruptcy is a 
gloomy and depressing subject’6 and a rather ‘dry and discouraging topic’.7 This 
dismal perception has led in the past to consider insolvency law as an 
“afterthought”.8 Even today insolvency reforms neither break the news, nor 
excite the electorate. Despite that, public opinion is frequently “taken aback” by 
the frequency and consequences of large insolvencies9 and by the emergence of 
controversial restructuring10 mechanisms.11 It is high time, therefore, that the 
law steals the limelight from high-profile cases.  
                                                                    
5 See below section 1.5. 
6 C Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History (Beardbook 1935) 3. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Many examples could be made to prove the validity of this point. One of the most explanatory 
deals with the inclusion of the bankruptcy clause (Article 1, Section 8, Clause 4) in the U.S. 
Constitution.  
When the United States decided to approve a new Constitution to replace the old Articles of 
Confederation (1777), they called for a Convention in Philadelphia. This Convention lasted from 
25 May to 17 September 1787, when the bill was signed. The bankruptcy clause was first 
proposed by the delegate from South Carolina, Charles Pinckney, on 29 August. It was approved, 
almost without discussion, on 3rd September.  
9 J Rutenberg and B Vlasic, ‘Chrysler Files to Seek Bankruptcy Protection’ The New York Times 
(New York, 30 April 2009) <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/business/01auto.html> 
accessed 17 September 2018; Unnamed, ‘The Bankruptcy of General Motors: A giant falls’ The 
Economist (London, 4 June 2009) <http://www.economist.com/node/13782942> accessed 17 
September 2018. 
10 For the distinction between “rescue” and “restructuring”, see below sub-section 1.3(b). 
11 Heatedly debated is the opportunity and legality to “pre-pack”, i.e. to negotiate a sale of all or 
part of a company’s business or assets with a purchaser before filing for insolvency protection, 
with the sale taking place immediately after the appointment of an insolvency practitioner 
(administration; England) or the admission into the procedure (Chapter 11; U.S.). See, among 
others: L Haddou and J Cumbo, ‘Companies use ‘pre-packs to dump £3.8bn of pension liabilities’ 
Financial Times (London, 9 April 2017)   <https://www.ft.com/content/f3f574fa-0f2c-11e7-
a88c-50ba212dce4d?mhq5j=e3> accessed 17 September 2018; M Herman, ‘Abuse of pre-pack 
deals ‘could turn Britain into an insolvency brothel’ The Times (London, 18 January 2010) 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/abuse-of-pre-pack-deals-could-turn-britain-into-an-
insolvency-brothel-9zls9qt0xt7> accessed 17 September 2018. 
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1.1(a) Justification for the Research 
On the afternoon of 21 August 1985, A.H. Robins Company, Inc. (‘A.H. Robins’) 
filed a petition for reorganisation (commonly known as “Chapter 11”) in the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court of Richmond. A.H. Robins was a Fortune 400 Corporation, one 
of the main employers in Richmond and a profitable pharmaceutical 
enterprise.12 Its executives believed that this filing represented the most 
appropriate course of action to protect the interests of the company. In fact, the 
directors needed to shield the company and its shareholders13 from liabilities 
for injuries resulting from the use of the “Dalkon Shield” intrauterine birth 
control devices.14  
According to a statement from the president of the company, E. Clairbone 
Robins Jr., the filing was necessary ‘to protect the company’s economic vitality 
against those who would destroy it for the benefit of the few’.15 The procedure 
resulted in the company being sold to the American Home Products, Corporation 
(‘American Home’). American Home, as part of the resolution of the insolvency 
case, agreed to pay $2.3 billion to a trust responsible for covering the monetary 
disbursements arising from the claims of the injured women. According to the 
bankruptcy plan, A.H. Robins’ old shareholders received American Home stock 
worth four (!) times the pre-bankruptcy price of their A.H. Robins shares. 
A.H. Robins is a case where a profitable company filed for insolvency to 
maximise shareholders’ investment. This example reinstates the validity of 
several empirical studies which concluded that equity holders receive more 
than what they would be entitled to on the basis of insolvency rules,16 despite 
                                                                    
12 The company’s net profits after tax for the years 1980 through 1982 totalled over $118 
million. Furthermore, an affidavit filed with the A.H. Robins petition showed that the company 
realised net earnings of $35.3 million in the first six months of 1985 – after deduction of tax and 
all Dalkon Shield expenses – compared to $20 million for the comparable period in the previous 
year. See Declaration of G.E.R. Stiles, 21 August 1985, p. 14. 
13 In this thesis, the terms “shareholder”, “equity-holder” and “stockholder” are used as 
synonyms.  
14 For a detailed analysis of the A.H. Robins Chapter 11 saga: RB Sobol, Bending the Law: The 
Story of the Dalkon Shield Bankruptcy (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1991). 
15 Wall Street Journal, 22 August 1985, p. 3, col. 1. It is not clear if the term “the few” referred to 
the company’s competitors, or to the thousands of women who died or were left sterile after the 
use of the Dalkon Shield device. 
16 Among others: LA Bebchuck and HF Chung, ‘Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate 
Reorganization’ (1992) 8(2) J.L. Econ. & Org. 253.  
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the existence of statutory mechanisms designed to prevent this outcome.17 Is 
this freedom to contract out of insolvency guiding principles (absolute priority, 
collectivity and pari passu distribution) desirable?  
The frequency and magnitude of cases in which petitions for insolvency 
protection are filed for reasons other than the imminent or evident inability of 
the debtors to pay their debts have increased over the years.18 Similar 
strategies are being considered in ongoing tort cases,19 even if some 
commentators are now arguing that the companies that emerge from these 
corporate rescue cases should be held liable for pre-insolvency claims.20 Despite 
that, lawmakers have taken no meaningful legislative initiative to limit or 
otherwise control this course of action.21  
                                                                    
17 11 U.S. Code §.1129(b)(2) provides that a plan is "fair and equitable" with respect to a 
dissenting impaired class of unsecured claims if the creditors in the class receive or retain 
property of a value equal to the allowed amount of their claims or, failing that, no creditor of 
lesser priority, or shareholder, receives any distribution under the plan. 
18 Examples include Texaco (1987) to defy competitors, Continental Airlines (1983 and 1990) to 
defy rivals and break unionized workers, Johns Manville Corp. (1982) to deal with asbestos-
related claims, Wilson Foods (1983) to break unionized labour cost, Dow Corning (1995) to deal 
with injury claims filed by hundreds of thousands of women who used its silicone breast 
implants when a global settlement broke down, Turner & Newall (2001) to deal with asbestos 
liabilities and the deficit in the pension fund, General Motors (2009) to deal (in part) with the 
ignition switch scandal and its related claims, Takata (2017) to deal with liabilities associated 
with defective air bag inflators. Certain pre-insolvency sales, such as the transfer of BHS (2015) 
from its previous owner to a former racing driver and bankrupt entrepreneur, may be 
considered as strategic attempts to postpone insolvency filing, avoid director’s liability and 
secure otherwise voidable transactions.  
19 See the potential developments in the Johnson & Johnson case, where on 22 August 2017 a 
woman has been awarded $417m for it was proven that the company’s baby powder 
contributed to cause an ovarian cancer. The company was potentially aware of this risk since 
1980. N Raymond, ‘Johnson & Johnson ordered to pay $417m to woman claiming to have 
developed ovarian cancer from baby powder’ The Independent (London, 22 August 2017) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/talc-johnson-baby-powder-cancer-
woman-compensation-417-million-ovarian-california-hygiene-a7905996.html> accessed 17 
September 2018. More recently, the same company was ordered to pay $4.7bn in damages to 
twenty-two women who alleged that its talk products caused ovarian cancer: J Dye, ‘Johnson & 
Johnson hit with $4.7bn verdict in talc cancer trial’ Financial Times (New York, 13 July 2018) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/9957c984-8628-11e8-a29d-73e3d454535d> accessed 17 
September 2018. 
20 B Warner, ‘Reconciling Bankruptcy Law and Corporate Law Principles: Imposing Successor 
Liability on GM and Similar Sleight-of-Han 363 Sakes’ (2016) 32 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 537 
(arguing that those harmed by defective GM vehicles sold before the §.363 sale should have 
access to an equitable remedy via the successor liability doctrine because the insolvency case 
was a “sleight-of-hand” transaction that allowed the corporation to sell its assets to itself). 
21 In 1984, after the Johns Manville case, Congress enacted a statute which provided that 
insolvency proceedings ‘do not affect any right to trial by jury that an individual has under 
applicable non-bankruptcy law with regard to personal injury or wrongful death tort claim’ 
[Public Law 98-353, Title I, §.102(a), 28 U.S. Code §.1411(a)]. 
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Particularly telling, for the purposes of this research, is the lack of consistency 
in the statutory requirements for the filing of insolvency protection. For 
instance, in England, with reference to formal22 insolvency procedures, there is 
no obligation for a company entering into a company voluntary arrangement 
(‘CVA’) to be insolvent, while with reference to the administration procedure, 
courts may make such an order upon satisfaction that the company ‘is or is likely 
to become unable to pay its debts’.23 
Similarly, there is no insolvency requirement to file a Chapter 11 petition in a 
U.S. court. The only obligation upon the debtor is that ‘the plan has been 
proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law’.24 Creditors may 
apply to have petitions dismissed where this is not the case.25 
Furthermore, the concept of “insolvency” is controversial.26  
Finally, companies do not only extricate themselves from situations of crisis 
without the use of statutory insolvency remedies, but they also make use of 
preventive out-of-court proceedings where the boundaries between company, 
contract, procedural and insolvency laws are blurred.27 Some hybrid 
proceedings where the final arrangement is approved by the court are generally 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
This law was not applicable to pending cases, but it should have been applicable in the A.H. 
Robins saga. However, lack of coordination between this law and the principles governing U.S. 
bankruptcy law allowed Judge Merhinge (a district judge) to consolidate all civil and bankruptcy 
claims in front of him.  
In any case, such a statutory remedy is very limited in scope. As little is usually left for 
unsecured claimants at the end of any insolvency proceeding, the remedy is largely ineffective. 
22 “Formal procedures” are collective procedures, which involve all the creditors, under the 
control or supervision of a court and an independent practitioner. Debtors may retain the 
control of their assets (debtor-in-possession or ‘DIP’ procedures), but their freedom is 
significantly restricted. An automatic stay of individual enforcement actions is usually granted 
upon application. The liquidation or rescue plan is binding on all creditors, including dissenting 
ones.  
With reference to England, formal procedures include administration, administrative 
receivership, creditors’ voluntary liquidation and company voluntary arrangements. With 
reference to the U.S., they include Chapter 7 (liquidation), Chapter 9 (for municipalities), 
Chapter 11, Chapter 12 (for family farmers and fishermen), Chapter 13 (for individuals) and 
Chapter 15 (cross-border cases) of 11 U.S. Code. 
23 Insolvency Act 1986 (‘IA 1986’), Sch. B1, para 11(a), as amended by the Enterprise Act 2002 
(‘EA 2002’). 
24 11 U.S. Code, §.1129(a)(3). 
25 For instance, in SGL Carbon Corporation (200 F.3d 154), the court dismissed the company’s 
Chapter 11 case because of bad faith demonstrated by a lack of “reorganizational purpose”. 
26 See below section 5.2 of this thesis. 
27 Hess and others (eds), The Implementation of the New Insolvency Regulation: Improving 
Cooperation and Mutual Trust (Hart Publishing: Baden-Baden, 2017) 25. 
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binding on all creditors. Other out-of-court restructuring settlements are 
binding only on the parties who agree on them.28 Their use is so widespread 
that at European level the recognition of hybrid proceedings is now regulated 
by Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (recast) (‘EUIR Recast’).29 The 
Commission is promoting measures to harmonise and make more efficient 
preventive restructuring and second chance frameworks.30 
The contemporary nature of the cases mentioned above and in footnote 18, as 
well as the implications for business and turnaround practices suggest that 
defining the “proper” scope of insolvency law is not a “theoretical” and 
uninspiring topic. This issue needs to be addressed, particularly as the 
jurisdictions considered in this study are entering into a period of regulatory 
reconsideration.31 
1.1(b) Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into two blocks.  
                                                                    
28 See below sub-section 1.3(b). 
29 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of 20 May 2015 of the European Parliament and the Council on 
insolvency proceedings (recast) [2015] OJ L141/19, recital 10, which extends the scope of the 
regulation to ‘proceedings which provide for restructuring of a debtor at a stage where there is 
only a likelihood of insolvency, and to proceedings which leave the debtor fully or partially in 
control of its assets and affairs [provided that they] take place under the control or supervision of 
a court’. These proceedings should, however, be listed in Annex A of the Regulation. For a 
critical assessment of the European law in the context of the EU Europe 2020 growth strategy: G 
McCormack, ‘Something Old, Something New: Recasting the European Insolvency Regulation’ 
(2016) 79(1) M.L.R. 121. 
30 Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of 
restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU’ (22 
November 2016) COM(2016) 723 final, 2016/0359 (COD), as recently amended by the EU 
Parliament in a report published on 21 August 2018: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-
2018-0269+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN> accessed 17 September 2018. 
31 With reference to England, Ian Fletcher observed that ‘after 30 years, the time is surely 
approaching for a comprehensive review and overhaul of the Principal Act’: IF Fletcher, The Law 
of Insolvency (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2017) 24 (emphasis added). As for the U.S., the 
likelihood of a major overhaul has been voiced by many commentators and resulted in the 
American Bankruptcy Institute’s Report of the Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 – 
available at: <https://abiworld.app.box.com/s/vvircv5xv83aavl4dp4h> accessed 17 September 
2018.  
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Part I focuses on presenting the seminal theories on the framework of 
insolvency law and on de-constructing32 and questioning their validity to 
determine when insolvency remedies should be applied. The author focuses his 
analysis on autonomy-based33 (chapter two), proceduralist34 (chapter three) 
and principle-informed35 (chapter four) approaches. Upon having identified the 
qualifying elements of each approach, this thesis analyses how they work in 
practice and critically assesses them on the basis of the criteria introduced in 
sub-section 1.3(c).  
Part I of the thesis reasserts the centrality of the theoretical debate on the limits 
of insolvency law. It observes that while all of the analysed theories are 
extremely persuasive and offer guidance in some cases, none of them offer a 
procedurally fair and efficient conceptualisation of when and to what extent 
insolvency rules should derogate from contracts.  
There is therefore the need to conceptualise an alternative framework, which 
preserves the aspirational goals promoted by these approaches. These are party 
autonomy (autonomy-based theories), legal and commercial predictability 
(proceduralist theories) and inclusivity36 (principle-based theories).  
                                                                    
32 The de-constructivist approach adopted in this thesis means that theories (and concepts) are 
unpacked and reduced to their qualifying elements, which are then assessed on the basis of the 
criteria outlined in sub-section 1.3(c). The de-constructivist analysis is instrumental to 
investigate if the premises upon which these theories and concepts are based meet the criteria 
that - according to the author - a corporate insolvency framework should feature.  
33 Generally, autonomy-based approaches to corporate distress argue that there is no need for a 
discrete and mandatory system of insolvency rules. Parties could and should be allowed to 
contract out of insolvency. Companies should determine what happens in case of a general or 
technical default. “General default” occurs whenever a company misses a payment of either 
principal or interest. “Technical default” refers to any violation of a covenant other than the 
payment of principal or interest. 
34 By and large, proceduralist approaches to corporate distress argue that insolvency rules 
should be restricted to procedural provisions aimed at facilitating parties in reaching an 
agreement on the outcome (liquidation, restructuring of the company, and rescue of the 
business or sale of its assets or entities) of the case. Insolvency rules should never amend the 
rights freely negotiated by the parties in pre-insolvency times.  
35 Broadly speaking, principle-informed approaches to corporate distress argue that insolvency 
rules could amend rights freely negotiated by the parties in pre-insolvency times if and to the 
extent that it is necessary to pursue some overarching values, objectives and principles. 
36 “Inclusivity” refers to the opportunity granted to all stakeholders to exercise participation 
rights and to the expectation that the person presiding over the insolvency procedure 
represents their interest and is held accountable for the failure to do so. Whereas collectivity 
binds creditors, ‘inclusivity offers them a pro-active role in the procedure itself’’: S Frisby, ‘In 
Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) 67(2) M.L.R. 247, 250. 
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Part II marks the passage from the theoretical to the operational part of this 
work. In chapter five this thesis critically evaluates the standards (i.e. 
“insolvency”, “risk” and “common pool”) that have insofar been used to 
determine the limits of insolvency law. These standards are tested against the 
aspirational goals outlined in the previous paragraph. 
This second part of the thesis reasserts the centrality of the common pool 
debate37 in its revised dimension. Insofar common pool situations have been 
assessed only among those stakeholders that have legally enforceable claims 
against the debtor. This has promoted the use of insolvency remedies in a 
strategic manner,38 i.e. to foster the interests of some stakeholders at the 
expense of others.  
Building upon these findings, chapter six introduces a novel approach to 
determine: a) the scope and, to a more limited extent, the content of insolvency 
law; and b) the policies and objectives that should prevail in light of the 
predominant nature (maximisation of the assets or the capital) of the corporate 
distress procedure and of problems39 (solvency or revised common pool – 
‘RCP’) faced by the parties. In other words, chapter six offers a new framework 
of corporate distress law.  
The new framework assumes that insolvency procedures should be run for the 
interests of those who control the company (collectively known as “risk 
bearers”). This thesis defines these residual risk bearers as those who have 
controlling rights in the debtor by reason of the nature of their rights.40 Those 
who control the company are not simply those who own its shares or have 
proprietary or personal claims against the debtor. Statutes should ensure that 
                                                                    
37 Borrowed from the law and economics literature, the “common pool” metaphor suggests that 
the fishermen who fish at a single “pool” may fish too much and deplete the pool, if no 
agreement can be reached to the other users of the pond. It would be in the general interest of 
each fisherman to limit their fishing practice: in the long run, this would result in higher return 
for them (because fishes would be allowed to procreate and ‘multiply’). Selfish, short-term 
practices would lead to over-fishing, for fear that others will do the same. Since rational, 
distributive solutions require collective actions, insolvency law ought to pursue only this goal.  
38 A strategic filing has been described as ‘one that helps firms to implement strategic changes to 
relationships with customers, suppliers, or other trading partners in a manner that positively 
alters the likelihood of sustainable performance improvements and survival’: SD James, ‘Strategic 
Bankruptcy: A Stakeholder Management Perspective’ (2016) 69 J. Bus. Res. 492, 492. 
39 For a definition of RCP problems, see below sub-section 1.3(a). 
40 See sub-section 4.3(c) for a general definition and a non-exhaustive list. 
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all controlling stakeholders can take part and influence the outcome of 
corporate distress procedures. 
Chapter six therefore introduces and describes the theory of “wealth 
maximisation of stakeholders’ interests” (‘WMSI’). It suggests that the boundary 
between general law and corporate distress remedies should be determined 
either by the emergence of either solvency or RCP problems among the 
company’s stakeholders.  
This theory overcomes the need to establish a hierarchy of principles and 
purposes in insolvency law. It is based on a more informed understanding of the 
distinct facets of the RCP dilemma. The use of a RCP standard would produce a 
less conflicting application of corporate distress rules in cases where the rules 
derogate from contractually negotiated rights.  
This thesis suggests the implementation of regulatory reforms driven by a 
public policy concern, i.e. that the expectations of risk bearers are not 
sufficiently recognised and protected under the existing insolvency framework.  
At the same time, as evidenced in section 6.6, the author is not oblivious of the 
complications that arise from the implementation of “shake-up” proposals. 
Therefore, he recommends an evolutionary approach that would not determine 
a major overhaul of the existing Anglo-American business and insolvency 
culture. 
This thesis therefore adopts a “procedural incrementalist”41 attitude that would 
enrich the foundations of the Anglo-American corporate distress law. The 
proposed theoretical framework can be transposed into legislative measures, 
provided that it meets sufficient favour in academic, commercial and political 
communities. The thesis explores how best to promote the legislative 
implementation of the WMSI theory. 
                                                                    
41 The concept of “procedural incrementalism” was first introduced by JAE Pottow, ‘Procedural 
Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy’ (2004) 45 Va. J. Int’l L. 935. Pottow 
argued that the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency bridged the theoretical 
divide between universalists and territorialists. This thesis aims at achieving a similar objective 
with reference to the different theories on limits of insolvency law. 
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This thesis focuses on Anglo-American laws42 and proceedings, because English 
and American legal systems are highly influential in the evolution of insolvency 
law, both at European and global level.43 Nevertheless, other cases are 
considered whenever it appears that their facts or decisions have influenced the 
evolution of the law or have the potential to do so in the future. 
 
1.2 STATE OF THE ART 
Insolvency specialists have produced no shortage of good academic works 
which advocate and defend a normative vision of this area of law.44  
Neo-libertarian papers45 suggest to treat corporate insolvency rules as private 
law remedies. Based on economic analysis, they maintain that private 
negotiations should be preferred, from a standpoint of efficiency, over 
compulsory statutory rules. Furthermore, they uphold that the heuristics 
currently favoured by academics to justify insolvency law principles and its 
                                                                    
42 The United Kingdom is considered as a unitary jurisdiction even if some of the provisions 
included in the main legislation in the field (the Insolvency Act 1986) do apply only to England 
and Wales. All references to the laws applicable in England should be taken to be applicable in 
Wales also.   
43 The U.K. withdrawal from the European Union may adversely impact the role that English law 
will have for the evolution of European laws. However, at the time of writing, it is impossible to 
make a reasoned speculation on the matter. This conclusion is shared by several commentators: 
G McCormack and H Anderson, ‘Brexit and its Implications for Corporate Insolvency in the UK’ 
(2017) 7 J. Bus. Law 533 (warning about the risks that the UK withdrawal from the EU may have 
on the recognition in other European Member States of UK-sanctioned schemes involving 
European companies). 
44 K Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System (Yale University: New 
Haven, 1997); TH Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law’ (2nd edn, Harvard University 
Press: Cambridge, MA, 2001); E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (Summer 1987) 54(3) U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 775; CW Adams, ‘An Economic Justification for Corporate Reorganizations’ (1991) 20 
Hofstra L. Rev. 117; DR Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’ (May 
1991) 91(4) Col. L. Rev. 717; E Warren, ‘The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11’ (Nov. 
1992) 102(2) Yale L.J. 437. 
45 Another taxonomy for these theories is to describe them as “autonomy-based approaches”. 
Major contributors to this line of thinking include RA Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 
(Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1995); DG Baird, ‘A World Without Bankruptcy’ 
(1987) 50(2) Law & Contemp. Probs. 173 (arguing that living in a world without bankruptcy or 
any similar collective procedure is not as far-fetched or ridiculous as it might appear at first 
glance); BE Adler, ‘A World Without Debt’ (1994) 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 811 (who built upon Baird’s 
reasoning to argue that it is possible to give away not only with bankruptcy, but also with debt); 
A Schwartz, ‘A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy’ (1998) 107(6) Yale L.J. 1807 
(contending that the only mandatory rules in an insolvency system should be structural and 
that insolvency laws exist only to increase efficiency by solving the creditors’ coordination 
problem). A more comprehensive list is included in section 2.2 of this work. 
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purposes falls short of a satisfactory explanation for the autonomy of this area 
of law.  
These commentators refer to emerging trends in domestic and cross-border 
cases and the possibilities offered by alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
(such as arbitration) to deal with collective, collection and rescue issues to 
prove the validity of their theories.  
Proceduralist or Contractarian theories46 share the neo-libertarian autonomy-
oriented focus but disagree on the call for “privatising” insolvency practice. 
They argue for a proceduralist approach to the subject, in which insolvency 
rules should not amend the substantive rights negotiated by the parties before 
the commencement of the procedure. In their view, insolvency law ought to be 
reduced to a ‘narrow and purely reactive’ set of rules, which would have no need 
to be separate from general private law.47 
According to these theories, cross-border insolvency law should be understood 
as an example of “transnational law”, i.e. a common approach created by 
economic and social actors in an exercise of self-government. This law, which 
supersedes and therefore does not necessarily rely upon the authority of 
national states,48 should not affect the rights recognised by the laws governing 
the pre-insolvency transactions. Contractarians therefore argue that the 
multitude of protocols49 agreed upon by the parties whenever multi-national 
                                                                    
46 This is the very same word used by Baird to define those academics (as himself) who resist 
the inclusion of separate (re)distributive goals in insolvency law. An outcome, on the contrary, 
advocated by “traditionalists”: DG Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale 
L.J. 573. See also: MG Shanker, ‘The Abuse and Use of Federal Bankruptcy Power’ (Fall 1975) 
26(3) Case W. Res. L. Rev. 3 (who believed that rules valid only in front of bankruptcy courts are 
a tension-creating situation); TH Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlement, and the 
Creditor’s Bargain’ (1982) 91 Yale L.J. 857 (who argued that insolvency law should deal only 
with inter-creditor questions on the basis of the creditors’ bargain model). A more 
comprehensive list is included in section 3.2 of this work. 
47 BE Adler, ‘The Law of Last Resort’ (2002) 55(6) Vand. L. Rev. 1661, 1662. 
48 P Zunbansen, ‘Transnational Law, Evolving’ in Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative 
Law (2nd edn, EE Publishing: Cheltenham 2012). 
49 The use of protocols in cross-border insolvency cases dates back to the collapse of Maxwell 
Communications empire: Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 8000 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).  
Since then, they had been used in a variety of cross-border procedures including, in more recent 
times: Calpine Corp. (2007), Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (2009), Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc. (2009) and Nortel Networks Inc. (2009). For a literature on the subject 
see, among others: SL Bufford and others, International Insolvency (Federal Judicial Center 
2001); B Wessels, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency Agreements: What are they and are they here to 
stay?’, in Faber and others (eds), Insolventie en Overeenkomst (Wolters Kluwer: Alphen aan den 
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corporations file for insolvency protection prove that parties have a 
proceduralist understanding of insolvency law.  
Traditionalist or Communitarian models50 sit at the other end of the spectrum. 
According to these theories, insolvency should be understood as an 
autonomous set of rules, capable of treating with fairness and justice the honest 
but unfortunate debtors, who are no longer capable of paying their debts as 
they fall due.  
Unlike proceduralists, traditionalist scholars argue that insolvency rules ought 
to alter the rights legally recognised to the parties in solvent times because the 
law affects constituent interests that are not protected under general private 
law. Insolvency law is seen as ‘an attempt to reckon with a debtor’s multiple 
defaults and to distribute the consequences among a number of different actors’.51 
It should intervene to prevent the negative externalities that would result from 
the mechanic pursuit of creditors’ wealth maximisation. 
Some scholars ‘incorporate communitarian philosophies and take on board 
distributive rationales’52 in part due to the difficulty of explaining what 
constitutes the public interest in insolvency law.53 In their multiple value or 
eclectic views,54 insolvency law should include (re)distributive goals, a premise 
which may sometimes lead to conflicting outcomes. They therefore recognise 
that it may sometimes be challenging if not impossible to provide consistent, 
valid-for-all answers to policy and framework questions.55  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Rijn, 2012); ED Flaschen and RJ Silverman, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation Protocols’ 
(1998) 33 Texas Int’l L.J. 589; B Leonard, ‘The Development of Court-to-Court Communications 
in Cross-Border Cases’ (2008) 17 Journal of Bankruptcy Law & Practice 619; J Altman, ‘A Test 
Case in International Bankruptcy Protocols: The Lehman Brothers Insolvency’ (2010) 12 San 
Diego Int’l L.J. 463. 
50 Prominent contributors to this line of thinking include DR Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and 
the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’ (1992) 71 Tex. L. Rev. 541; K Gross, ‘Taking 
Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay’ (1994) 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 1031. A 
more comprehensive list is included in section 4.2 of this work. 
51 Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (n 44), 781. 
52 V Finch and D Milman, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (3rd edn, CUP: 
Cambridge, 2017) 40. 
53 A Keay, ‘Insolvency Law: A Matter of Public Interest?’ (2000) 51 N.I.L.Q. 509. 
54 Major contributors to this line of thinking include: Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (n 44); and 
Korobkin (n 44) in the U.S.; Finch and Milman (n 52) in the U.K. 
55 This brief categorization of the standpoints taken by the commentators to justify the role of 
insolvency law is far from exhaustive. For instance, Korobkin (contractarian model) argued that 
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Not all communitarians adopt the same approach to the analysis of this area of 
law. American commentators concentrate on the analysis of the goals of the law. 
On the contrary, European and English scholars focus their attention on the 
principles and values (such as expertise, accountability, technical efficiency, 
transparency and fairness) that should guide the definition of the scope and the 
evolution of insolvency law.56  
Overall, communitarian scholars offer several justifications of the normative 
commitments which should underlay their particular vision of insolvency law.57 
However, lesser effort had been placed on trying to explain how and why the 
law should take this distinctive shape, what is and should be its proper scope. 
Additionally, it is not clear how should judges and practitioners deal with 
conflicting principles, both within (preferences and priorities vs pari passu 
distribution, etc.) and outside (e.g. freedom of contract58 in contract law and 
priority of liens in admiralty law vs principle of collectivity in insolvency law, 
etc.) this area of law. 
There have been, of course, significant exceptions and the analysis of ‘the 
political determinants of (…) [such a] significant piece of legislation’59 has been 
carried out.60 Previous authors have evidenced the role that interest groups 
(creditors, lawyers and judges), political ideologies, individuals and even 
external factors (e.g. economic crises) have played in shaping and modifying the 
law.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
the main goal of insolvency law should be to deal with financial distress in an inclusive and 
rational way, not necessarily to recover debt [Korobkin (n 44)].  
56 Among others: RM Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell: 
London, 2011); Finch and Milman (n 52); R Bork, Principles of Cross-Border Insolvency 
(Intersentia: Oxford, 2017).  
57 DR Korobkin, ‘The Role of Normative Theory in Bankruptcy Debates’ (1996) 82 Iowa L. Rev. 
75, 76. 
58 On limitations to freedom of contract, see generally MA Eisenberg, ‘The Bargain Principle and 
its Limits’ (1982) 95 Harv. L. Rev. 741. On the justifications for the enforceability of contracts, 
see: MR Cohen, ‘The Basis of Contracts’ (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 562: ‘a regime in which 
contracts are freely made and generally enforced gives greater scope to individual initiative and 
thus promotes the greatest wealth of a nation’.  
59 EA Posner, ‘The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978’ (1997) 96 Mich. L. 
Rev. 47, 47. 
60 Carruthers and Halliday (n 1); DA Skeel, Jr., Debt’s Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in 
America (Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 2001); S Block-Lieb, ‘Congress’s Temptation 
to Defect: A Political and Economic Theory of Legislative Resolutions to Financial Common Pool 
Problems’ (1997) 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 801.  
  46 
These studies have contributed to the investigation of the complex relationships 
between stakeholders.61 However, they rarely questioned the scope of 
insolvency law. The primary reason for lack of doctrinal investigation on this 
subject has been attributed to the theoretical nature of the above-mentioned 
questions. Cases like A.H. Robins (described in sub-section 1.1(a)) suggest why 
this may represent a distorted view of an otherwise significant research topic. 
Finally, there have been scholars who, in their studies, specifically investigated 
the interaction between insolvency rules and contract law.62 Their theories 
have been highly influential in guiding the author’s analysis. However, it 
appears pertinent not to introduce these theories at this stage, but to discuss 
and assess them only after the author has introduced his own theory on the 
matter.63 
 
1.3 KEY CONCEPTS AND EVALUATIVE CRITERIA 
1.3(a) The “Common Pool” Narrative (Revised) 
This research revolves around a comprehensive notion of “common pool” that 
departs from the traditional literature in the field.  
The common pool notion adopted in this thesis includes both anti-common and 
semi-common situations and it is defined as “revised common pool” (‘RCP’) to 
distinguish it from the traditional notion. The reason for this choice is the 
                                                                    
61 If not otherwise specified, in this doctoral thesis the term “stakeholders” is used to refer to 
the following group of people: judges, insolvency and legal practitioners, law-makers, debtors 
and creditors, tort claimants, society at large and any other group of people who have a 
different set of interests against the debtor. 
62 M Balz, ‘Insolvency Proceedings and Preventive Frameworks’ in WF Ebke and others (eds), 
Unternehmensrestrukturierung im Umbruch?! (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2017); M Schillig, 
‘Corporate Insolvency Law in the Twenty-First Century: State Imposed or Market Based?’ 
(2014) 14 J. Corp. L. Stud. 1; S Paterson, ‘Rethinking Corporate Bankruptcy Theory in the 
Twenty-First Century’ (2016) 36(4) OJLS 697; H Eidenmüller, ‘What is an Insolvency 
Proceeding’ (2018) 92 Am. Bankr. L.J. 53; S Madaus, ‘Leaving the Shadows of US Bankruptcy 
Law: A Proposal to Divide the Realms of Insolvency and Restructuring Law’ (2018) 6 EBOR L. 
Rev. 1; S Paterson, ‘Rethinking the Role of Corporate Distress in the Twenty-First Century’ LSE 
Law, Society and Economy Working Paper No. 27/2014 (2014) 
<https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2014-27_Paterson.pdf> accessed 17 
September 2018; H Eidenmüller, ‘What is an Insolvency Proceeding?’ ECGI Working Paper No. 
335/2016 (2016) 
<http://www.ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/SSRN-
id2712628.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018. 
63 This critical assessment will be carried out in section 6.5 of this thesis. 
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author’s belief (which is further investigated in chapters five and six) that 
common, anti-common and semi-common situations are intrinsically connected 
and feature prominently in all formal and hybrid corporate distress procedures. 
- 
A (traditional) 
common pool (TCP) 
dilemma usually arises 
whenever a company is 
unable to pay its debts 
as they fall due or when 
it appears from the 
company’s books that it is hopelessly insolvent.64 Such a “dilemma” or 
“situation” exists when there are not (or there will not be in the near future) 
enough assets to meet the creditors’ claims. These participants know that they 
would be better off if they managed to grab the assets when there are still some 
left. However, individual (ir)rational actions would result in lower overall 
returns to creditors on the whole and would cause disparities of treatment 
among similarly ranking claimants. This two-fold dilemma may develop into a 
problem whenever parties fail to co-ordinate their actions in order to maximise 
their collective benefit.  
In legal terms, the TCP dilemma has been defined as the problematic which 
arises when self-interested actions of individuals fail to achieve a socially 
optimal result.65 As such a definition is applicable to several economic 
disequilibria, some economists claim that a TCP dilemma exists when negative 
production or consumption externalities caused by the use of exhaustible 
resources cannot be resolved by the definition of property rights.66 
                                                                    
64 See, among others: Jackson (n 44); JL Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default’ 
(2000) 98(7) Mich. L. Rev. 2276. 
65 Jackson (n 44) 10; 12-14. 
66 HR Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach (9th edn, W.W. Norton & Co.: 
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The existence of TCP dilemmas has been questioned. In an article published in 
the Yale Law Journal,67 two eminent law and economics scholars argued that, 
since creditors do not share the same interests and priorities, it is fallacious to 
conclude that this prisoner’s dilemma exists. Other authors, on the other hand, 
have questioned the existence of such a problem only with reference to limited 
sectors of the economy.68 Additionally,69 it has been observed that common 
pool and collectivist approaches fail to recognise the interests of non-
contractual creditors70 and focus on non-efficiency objectives.71 
This thesis argues that, whenever a company faces both financial and economic 
distress,72 a common pool (albeit “revised”) problem among stakeholders may 
arise.  
This problem has traditionally been described as “allocative”. Allocative issues 
arise whenever disputes among stakeholders may hinder the overall recovery 
rate and when distribution of resources among claimants occurs in an 
inefficient way. As too much money is spent to recover and sell the debtor’s 
assets, insolvency procedures should be designed to enhance the factor of 
efficiency in the process of allocating the assets. 
This requires addressing not only questions of external allocation of capital, i.e. 
the way in which money is spent or resources are distributed among claimants, 
                                                                    
67 DG Baird and RK Rasmussen, ‘Antibankruptcy’ (2010) 119(4) Yale L.J. 648. 
68 J Franks and others, ‘The Privatization of Bankruptcy: Evidence from Financial Distress in the 
Shipping Industry’ (22 November 2016) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2880751> accessed 17 
September 2018. 
69 Finch and Milman (n 52) 30. 
70 These critiques are numerous and voluminous: Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (n 44); Korobkin 
(n 50); Gross (n 50); F Mucciarelli, ‘Not Just Efficiency: Insolvency Law in the EU and Its Political 
Dimension’ (2013) 14 EBOR L. Rev. 175, 179. For an overview, see: Finch and Milman (n 52) 28-
33. 
71 Korobkin (n 57). 
72 Financial distress occurs whenever a company cannot meet or has difficulties in paying off its 
financial obligations but its business (i.e. the products or services that it offers to the market) is 
still sound. In other words, if a company is in economic distress its business plan is not working, 
while if it is in financial distress it faces liquidity problems: G McCormack, Corporate Rescue Law 
– An Anglo-American Perspective (Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, 2008) 9. On the 
distinction and its usefulness, see generally: G Andrade and SN Kaplan, ‘How Costly is Financial 
(No Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed’ 
(1998) 53 J. Fin. 1443; Baird (n 46) 580-583. 
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but also internal allocation issues, i.e. the use of capital to further the interests 
of selected parties.73 
It would be inaccurate, however, to overlook the existence of (re)distributive 
issues. These occur when the statutory ranking of claimants is questioned and 
the absolute priority rule (‘APR’)74 bypassed, for instance where shares of the 
newco are given to oldco shareholders when some of the debtor’s creditors 
have not yet been fully repaid.  
(Re)distributive issues are related to the notion of distributive justice, which 
concerns the nature of a socially “just” allocation of goods among those who are 
entitled to them and in line with (re)distributive75 values.76  
Allocative and (re)distributive common pool issues do not cover all the issues 
faced by stakeholders in corporate distress procedures. If a person or company 
uses their contractual or statutory prerogatives to prevent the adoption of a 
course of action that appears in the collective interest of the creditors, a holdout 
situation emerges. This condition, which is neither allocative nor 
(re)distributive, has been described as an anti-common situation.  
Anti-common issues occur whenever the use of a resource for the 
stakeholders’ best interest is prevented by the veto power exercised by a 
minority of players.77 These issues are frequent in restructuring and rescue 
                                                                    
73 Paterson (n 62). 
74 The ‘absolute priority’ principle mandates that unless creditors are to be paid in full, or unless 
each class of creditors consents, the company’s old shareholders are not entitled to receive or 
retain any interest in the rescued business: see sub-section 3.2(a)(iii). This principle is 
reinstated in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide and it is a fundamental element of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code. While not expressly mentioned in the EC Recommendation on a new 
approach to business failure and insolvency [C(2014) 1500 final, 12 March 2014], Recital 22 of 
this document requires that insolvency priorities should be respected. Equally, comparative and 
empirical works in the area have proven that, while this principle is not incorporated in the 
insolvency statutes of European Member States, courts are required to indirectly consider it 
whenever they are required to address the overall fairness of a reorganisation plan: see G 
McCormack and others, European Insolvency Law (Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, 2017) 
253. 
75 Throughout this thesis, the words “distributive” and “(re)distributive” are used as synonyms. 
76 E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World’ (Nov. 1993) 92(2) Mich. L. Rev. 
336. 
77 MA Heller, ‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets’ (1998) 111(3) Harv. L. Rev. 621; LA Fennell, ‘Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons’ 
University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 261/2009 (2009) 9-16 
<https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065&context=public_law
_and_legal_theory> accessed 17 September 2018; RJ de Weijs, ‘Harmonisation of European 
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procedures designed to make an efficient use of the existing resources. Anti-
common practices may lead to underuse or sub-optimal use of the assets. The 
emergence and growth of new financial instruments such as credit default 
swaps (‘CDS’), collateralised debt obligations (‘CDO’) and covenant lite loans 
(‘CLL’) have resulted in heightened debt fragmentation and decoupling. This 
fragmentation increases the likelihood that parties will hold out, as it is more 
challenging to reach an agreement over a preferred course of actions when 
parties are many and with competing interests.  
Finally, TCP and anti-common issues are complemented by semi-common 
situations, a notion conceptualised by Smith78 that refers to the issues which 
may arise from the interaction between private and common property. 
Semi-common situations have been conceived with reference to medieval 
farming and grazing arrangements, where pieces of farmland were individually 
owned but the land as a whole was shared for grazing purposes.79 Other 
authors have suggested that semi-common structures are found in other 
sectors.80  
The distinctive element of semi-commons is that they ‘encompass the tragedies 
of both the commons and the anticommons’.81 If a party defects, he or she 
proportionately harms every member of the group, including himself or herself. 
Additionally, any reform of the existing arrangements requires the consent of 
the parties affected, a situation which bears many similarities with the anti-
common dynamic.  
This research is expected to prove that RCP dilemmas exist in every sector of 
the economy and can address not only issues of distributive justice and 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Insolvency Law and the Need to Tackle Two common Problems: Common Pool and 
Anticommons’ (2012) 21 Int. Insolv. Rev. 67. 
78 HE Smith, ‘Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields’ (2000) 29 J. Legal 
Stud. 131. 
79 Ibid 132. 
80 RA Heverly, ‘The Information Semicommons’ (2003) 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1127 
(information); HE Smith, ‘Governing the Tele-Semicommons’ (2005) 22 Yale J. on Reg. 289 
(telecommunications); LP Loren, ‘Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: 
Enforcement of Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment Copyright’ (2007) 14 
Geo. Mason. L. Rev. 271 (creative works); HE Smith, ‘Governing Water: The Semicommons of 
Fluid Property Rights’ (2008) 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 445 (water); LA Fennell, ‘Homeownership 2.0’ 
(2008) 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1047 (neighbourhoods and metropolitan areas).  
81 Fennell (n 77) 17. 
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allocative efficiency, but also holdout and semi-common matters. A proper 
understanding of the RCP notion would therefore clarify the scope of corporate 
distress law and what to expect from its provisions. As Warren argued,  
[m]any of the people who are angry with the bankruptcy system, are 
angry because they have not received what they had every right to 
expect: payment on time, a safe working environment, a steady job 
at a fair wage, and a management team that made thoughtful 
decisions and brought prosperity to the business. Those problems, 
however, are not bankruptcy problems.82  
- 
  
                                                                    
82 E Warren, ‘The Untenable Case’ (n 44), 478. 
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Defining the scope of 
corporate distress law is 
the first step to avoid unfair 
criticism over corporate 
distress practice and its 
outcomes. The RCP notion83  
is central for the purposes 
of this thesis. This work will 
prove that corporate distress procedures shall begin with a simple recognition 
of one fact: that proprietary, personal and risk bearer claims84 against a debtor 
can no longer be satisfied under general private law because of the existence of 
RCP problems. The existence of RCP problems is one of the two conditions (the 
other being the existence of solvency problems) that justify the use of collective 
over individual strategies.  
1.3(b) “Rescue” and “Restructuring” 
In order to cope with a situation of distress, the company and its management 
can opt for out-of-court workouts or judicially sanctioned procedures. Similar 
to other works,85 this thesis shares the view that all of these procedures could 
be aimed at liquidating the debtor’s assets or at turning around the company or 
its business. If the turnaround is successful,86 it is usually argued that the 
company has been rescued or restructured. 
                                                                    
83 The RCP notion will be used mainly in the second part of this thesis (chapters five to seven). 
In the first part – except where otherwise mentioned – the author uses the common pool 
definition as a synonym of common pool situations only, in accordance with the traditional 
literature on the subject. To distinguish the two notions (revised from traditional), the latter is 
labelled as “traditional” common pool or ‘TCP’ and it refers to allocative and (re)distributive 
common pool situations.  
84 For the distinction between these notions, see sub-section 4.3(a) of this thesis.  
85 Paterson (n 62). The author proposed a new taxonomy where the creditors’ wealth 
maximisation goal advocated by law and economics theorists remains valid only for the portion 
of the law (named “insolvency law”) which deals with the distribution of the debtor’s assets. On 
the other hand, “restructuring law” (which is in that paper intended as the other half of 
insolvency law) should promote rescue and facilitate the reallocation of resource in the 
economy to best use. 
86 On what counts as a success and when should success be judged, see: A Belcher, Corporate 
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In insolvency treaties, the words “rescue” and “restructuring” are frequently 
used as synonyms. This is not the case for this work, for the reasons explained 
below.  
Belcher has observed that ‘if rescue is defined simply as the avoidance of distress 
and failure, all management activity can be thought as a constant and repeated 
rescue attempt’.87 This notion captures the complexity and nuances associated 
with any turnaround procedure. Yet, it is not sufficiently specific for the 
purposes of this work.  
In this thesis, both rescue and restructuring are defined as ‘a major intervention 
necessary to avert eventual failure of the company’.88 However, the term “rescue” 
is here employed only with reference to formal or hybrid insolvency 
proceedings, i.e. those proceedings that are mandated and regulated by 
corporate distress law. By the end of this work it will become apparent that only 
in rescue cases it is admissible to use corporate distress remedies. In 
accordance with Burdette and Omar,  
‘corporate rescue is now associated with what is termed the revival of 
companies on the brink of economic collapse and the salvage of 
economically viable units to restore production capacity and 
employment, as well as the continued rewarding of capital and 
investment’.89 
This thesis therefore includes within the notion of “rescue” also those hybrid, 
secret and upstream procedures that whilst commenced as informal workouts 
require a judicial sanction to produce their effect.90  
Rescues lead to the emergence of a “rescue culture”, ‘a philosophy of 
reorganising companies so as to restore them to profitable trading and enable 
                                                                    
87 Ibid 12. 
88 Ibid 12. See also: D Brown, Corporate Rescue: Insolvency Law in Practice (John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc.: Chichester, 1996) ch. 1; RW Harmer, ‘Comparison of Trends in National Law: The Pacific 
Rim’ (1997) 23 Brook. J. Int’l L. 139, 143 (observing that there seems to be some real difficulty 
in the meaning or definition of “rescue”).  
89 D Burdette and P Omar, ‘Why Rescue?’ in J Adriaanse and JP van der Rest, Turnaround 
Management and Bankruptcy (Routledge: London, 2017) 230. 
90For a divergent view: Eidenmüller (n 62) 71 (arguing that a proceeding can be characterised 
as an insolvency proceeding and therefore fall within the realm of insolvency law only if it 
‘restricts, in one form or another, the enforcement of all individual creditor rights’). 
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them to avoid liquidation’.91 Nevertheless, ‘the mere survival of a company […] 
does not necessarily indicate that a successful rescue has occurred’92 if the 
company continues to operate as a “zombie” entity.93 Additionally, rescue does 
not necessarily result in the rehabilitation or the preservation of a corporate 
shell,94 as the main goal of a rescue framework is the preservation of income-
producing businesses by means of a reduction, rescheduling or extinction of 
corporate debt.95 
The term “restructuring” refers to all those procedures or contractual workouts 
negotiated “in the shadow” of a formal or hybrid rescue regime. These occur (or 
should occur) outside the realm of corporate distress law and do not (or should 
not) derogate from the general law of contract unless with the preliminary 
agreement of all of the affected parties.  
“Restructuring” is used in the context of this work as a synonym of “turnaround 
management”, i.e. a process dedicated to corporate renewal which uses analysis 
and planning to save troubled companies and return them to profitability. 
Restructuring should always be the preferred option for companies in mild 
trouble (i.e. declining market position and significant yet manageable losses, but 
still with a strong balance sheet) or with moderate liquidity issues (i.e. at least 
one year of losses and the prospect of a downward trend in profits, market 
shares and revenues).96  
Restructuring procedures belong to the domain of commercial, general law, 
hence the rules governing these processes should not affect contractual rights 
unless with the agreement of all of the parties. 
                                                                    
91 Goode (n 56) para.11-03. See also: M Hunter, ‘The Nature and Functions of a Rescue Culture’ 
(1999) J. Bus. Law 491, 198-499 (arguing that it is a multi-aspect concept characterised by a 
positive and protective role, and a corrective and punitive one).  
92 Finch and Milman (n 52) 198. For what amounts as a “successful” rescue, see: Belcher (n 86); 
V Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue Processes: the Search for Quality and the Capacity to Resolve’ (2010) 
6 J. Bus. Law 502. 
93 A “zombie” company is any corporation that uses its cash flow to repay the interests of 
existing debt, with little or no prospective of repaying the principal loan or creating added value 
for its stakeholders.  
94 This, in fact, has never been the main goal of English corporate rescue procedures: R Stevens, 
‘Security after the Enterprise Act’ in J Getzler and J Payne (eds), Company Charges: Spectrum and 
Beyond (OUP: Oxford, 2006) 153, 155; McCormack (n 72) 75; Goode (n 56) 330.  
95 Harmer (n 88) 146-147. 
96 J Adriaanse and JP van der Rest (eds), Turnaround Management and Bankruptcy (Routledge: 
London, 2017). 
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1.3(c) A Pragmatic, Value-Bereft Framework of Insolvency Law 
As it will be clarified in sub-section 6.3(b), rescue should occur only in formal or 
hybrid corporate distress procedures.97 What procedures should be regulated 
by corporate distress law? 
Courts described insolvency as the area of law that provides mechanisms ‘of 
collective execution against the property of the debtor by creditors whose rights 
are admitted or established’.98 This law should therefore mainly enforce but not 
create rights,99 while (insolvency) courts have to determine the existence of 
these rights (but not create new ones) if they are challenged in the course of the 
procedure.100 
Insolvency/Corporate distress law should therefore be understood as the area 
of law that deals with the distress, liquidation and rescue of ailing companies. It 
should include the discipline of any statutory mechanisms that have the effect of 
giving to either the debtor or their legal representative the power to unilaterally 
accept, disclaim or amend existing contracts to collectively pursue the interests 
of the debtor’s “risk bearers”. 
As a result, this area of law should include the majority of the procedures 
currently labelled as insolvency remedies such as liquidation, administration 
and company voluntary arrangements in England and Wales and all statutory 
procedures mentioned in the 11 U.S. Code in the United States.  
Additionally, corporate distress law should include any other mechanism which 
may or may not be designed to tackle the debtor’s distress that produce 
deviations from contractual rights. These mechanisms may include the schemes 
of arrangements101 (in England currently regulated by part 26, §§.895 - 901 of 
                                                                    
97 These terms are used as synonyms in this introductory chapter. Chapters two to five will 
mainly refer to the notion of corporate insolvency law, as this is the most widely accepted 
definition used by scholars and practitioners to describe the set of rules that deal with 
corporate distress. Chapter six explains why it is preferable to adopt the notion of corporate 
distress law as opposed to insolvency law.  
98 Cambridge Gas Transport v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holding plc 
[2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 AC 508 [14]. 
99 Ibid [15]. 
100 Re Lines Bros (in liq.) [1983] Ch. 1, (CA). 
101 This suggestion is in line with current judicial practice, as recognition and enforcement of 
schemes of arrangement sanctioned by British courts has become commonplace in Chapter 15 
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CA 2006), despite their sometimes-dubious collective nature,102 the possibility 
of being used by solvent debtors and the English government’s deliberate 
attempt to leave them outside the boundaries of insolvency law to promote 
their use by foreign companies.103 The decision to include them in the list of 
formal procedures is consequential if we consider that pursuant to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency104 as ratified in Great Britain 
by means of the Cross Border Insolvency Regulations 2006,105 English courts can 
recognise and give effect to foreign schemes of arrangement of distressed 
debtors. 
This definition may embrace out-of-court workouts only in those cases where 
the courts’ involvement or special statutory or regulatory privileges would 
grant the debtor the power to unilaterally, directly or indirectly modify existing 
contracts (i.e. hybrid procedures). Even preventive restructuring mechanisms, 
whose collocation among corporate or insolvency law remedies is currently 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
cases in the United States: Re Avanti Commc'ns Grp. Plc, 582 B.R. 603 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018), 
where Glenn J held that scheme of arrangement brought under English law constituted a 
“foreign (insolvency) main proceeding” and could be recognized as such. 
102 G McCormack, ‘Reforming the European Insolvency Regulation: A Legal and Policy 
Perspective’ (2014) 10 J. Priv. Int’l. L. 41, 48 (ftn 23) stating that schemes are not necessarily 
collective. 
103 Schemes of arrangement are public, collective proceedings that entail certain limitations of 
the debtor and creditors’ rights and can be used to deal with the company’s distress. Therefore, 
they should fall within the scope of EUIR Recast, as they meet all of the requirements set out in 
art. 1(1) EUIR Recast. Art. 1(1) defines the characteristics that insolvency procedures should 
have to fall within the scope of the regulation. Schemes meet all of them, apart from the 
condition that the procedure should be regulated by a ‘law relating to insolvency’. Additionally, 
schemes are not listed in Annex A and recital 16 EUIR Recast holds that the regulation does not 
apply to ‘proceedings that are base) on general company law not designed exclusively for 
insolvency situations’ (emphasis added). As a result, schemes do not fall within the scope of the 
EUIR Recast: Bariatti and others, ‘I. The Scope of the Regulation’ in Hess and others (n 27) 87-
93. 
The choice not to include schemes among insolvency procedure is probably justified by the 
need to circumvent the COMI requirement that applies to all insolvency procedures under the 
EUIR Recast and facilitate the filing by foreign corporations in England. It is still contentious, 
however, if the recognition of English schemes in the EU falls within the scope of the Brussel I 
bis Regulation (Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012), the Rome I Regulation (Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 593/2008), the Member’s State private international law or the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
On this topic, see: J Payne, ‘Cross-Border Schemes of Arrangement and Forum Shopping’ (2013) 
14(4) EBOR L. Rev. 563, 581-586 and the decision in Re Rodenstock GmbH, [2011] EWHC 1104 
(Ch), [2011] Bus. L.R. 1245 where Briggs J took the view that judgments sanctioning schemes 
involving solvent companies fall within the remit of the Brussels I bis Regulation.  
104 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with 
Guide to Enactment and Interpretation’, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2 (2014), 
<https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013-Guide-
Enactment-e.pdf> accessed 17 September2018. 
105 SI 2006/1030. 
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debated, would find a home within the realm of this area of law. In fact, these 
are rescue proceedings. 
The second step is to determine which vision or approach better defines the 
scope of corporate distress law. In order to achieve this aim, this thesis 
conducts a de-constructive analysis of the existing theoretical frameworks. The 
desirability of each of these visions is tested on the basis of pre-determined 
evaluative criteria.  
This is, by no means, a novel attempt. A framework for analysing the rationale 
of insolvency law has been proposed by several authors, including Finch.106 The 
British scholar recommended the adoption of an “explicit value” approach built 
upon the studies undertaken by Stokes107 to legitimate the distinctiveness of 
company law. Finch in particular developed her theory on insolvency law by 
combining Stoke’s communitarian/traditionalist criticism towards previous 
arguments for legitimation of company law with contractarian assumptions.  
Finch’s theory had the benefit of viewing both company and insolvency law not 
simply as restraints or limitations of discretionary or contractual powers. The 
criteria she adopted to legitimise insolvency statutes (efficiency, expertise, 
accountability and fairness) were ‘not offered as values plucked from the sky but 
as values that would be endorsed by parties of differing political persuasions […] 
albeit on their own precise terms’.108  
One of the problems of Finch’s approach is that it fails to offer an alternative 
theoretical vision.109 Additionally, and this is in the author’s view the main 
reason for concern, the use of the suggested criteria requires the acceptance not 
only of a multi-value vision of insolvency law, but also of “shared” values. In 
reality, these values end up being the ethical standard recommended and 
supported by the author herself.110  
                                                                    
106 Finch and Milman (n 52) 41. 
107 M Stokes, ‘Company Law and Legal Theory’ in William Twining (ed.), Legal Theory and 
Common Law (Blackwell: Hoboken, NJ, 1986). 
108 Finch and Milman (n 52) 45. 
109 Ibid. 
110 To be fair, Finch acknowledged (but dismissed) this problem by claiming that ‘trade-offs 
between different rationales do remain a problem but, unless a single vision of the just society is 
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More recently, Anderson tried to account for English corporate insolvency law 
by identifying ‘a rational explanation for the form that the rules and institutions 
of the modern law take or, where there is no other obvious explanation, at least 
the history which has resulted in the present position’.111 
While apparently less ambitious than Finch’s attempt, Anderson’s work is 
nevertheless extremely valuable in investigating the purpose and function of 
corporate distress rules. However, where Finch’s approach is theoretical in 
nature, Anderson’s study is predominantly doctrinal, its main focus being the 
analysis of existing rules and cases to inform consideration of future 
developments of English insolvency law. 
To combine the best of both visions, the author recommends the adoption of a 
pragmatic and more neutral approach based upon two pillars: procedural 
efficiency - criterion (i) below - and procedural fairness - criteria (ii) to (iv) 
below. These evaluative criteria conform to the approach recommended by 
other studies, aimed at fostering cooperation in cross-border insolvency 
cases.112 
Value-driven considerations (as in the case of Finch’s work, where the same 
criteria are employed in their substantive rather than procedural 
understanding)113 are rejected due to their unpredictability, the challenge to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
assumed, the absence of easy answers has to be accepted when dealing with processes whose 
essence is the balancing of multiple objectives’ (Ibid 50). 
111 H Anderson, The Framework of Corporate Insolvency Law (OUP: Oxford, 2017) 1. 
112 These are the ‘ALI/NAFTA Principles’, the Fletcher and Wessels’ ‘Global Principles’, the EU 
‘CoCo Guidelines’ and the ‘EU JudgeCo Principles and Guidelines’. The ALI/NAFTA Principles 
presented the outcome of the American Law Institute’s Transnational Insolvency Project and 
are published in American Law Institute, Principles of Cooperation Among the NAFTA Countries 
(Philadelphia 2003). The black letter of the Global Principles is published in: IF Fletcher and B 
Wessels, ‘A Final Step in Shaping Rules for Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases’ 
(2012) 9(5) Int. C.R. 283. The European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-
Border Insolvency (commonly known as ‘CoCo Guidelines’) can be found here: 
<https://www.insol.org/INSOLfaculty/pdfs/BasicReading/Session%205/European%20Comm
unication%20and%20Cooperation%20Guidelines%20for%20Cross-
border%20Insolvency%20.pdf> accessed 23 May 2018. Finally, the EU JudgeCo Principles and 
Guidelines are published in: B Wessels (ed.), EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court 
Cooperation Principles (Eleven International Publishing, Utrecht 2015). The proposed principles 
promote the adoption of cooperation practices capable of dealing with cross-border cases in an 
effective, efficient and timely manner while ensuring their just administration.  
113 Other authors argue that insolvency law should promote the substantive goal of fairness. See, 
among others: RJ Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application (OUP: Oxford, 2005) 
24-25; I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps 
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agree on common standards and their dependency on the sensibility of the 
commentator. At the same time, pragmatic views (as in the case of Anderson’s 
work) could be employed for evaluative, not simply explanatory purposes (as in 
the case of this research).  
The value-bereft criteria are:  
(i). Promotion of procedural efficiency114;  
(ii). Protection of entrepreneurialism and maximisation of shareholders’ 
return;  
(iii). Protection of market integrity and creditors’ expectations;  
(iv). Protection of vulnerable stakeholders.115  
The inclusion of the criterion of “procedural efficiency” can be explained by the 
need to address the problem of paucity of resources in insolvency. The notion 
usually comes into consideration with reference to two distinct matters: 
allocation of resources (within and outside the rescue proceedings) and 
management of the rescue case.   
The meaning of efficiency (when provided)116 varies between jurisprudential 
contexts. It is possible to categorise efficiency as a substantive (ends-efficiency) 
or procedural (means-efficiency) goal.117 A substantive goal of the law is the 
particular end that the law seeks to achieve and which justifies the existence 
and the mechanics of the statute. On the other hand, procedural goals are the 
benchmarks used to assess if a particular mechanism achieves its substantive 
goal in the desired manner (i.e. efficiently). 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
(OUP: Oxford, 2017) 6; DA Farber, ‘What (if Anything) Can Economics Say about Equity?’ (2003) 
101 Mich. L. Rev. 1791, 1821. 
114 The notion of ‘procedural efficiency’ differs from the definition of ‘allocative efficiency’ 
introduced in sub-section 1.3(a). 
115 This thesis adopts a particularly narrow definition of “vulnerable stakeholders”. It includes 
only those claimants or third parties who are negatively affected by the debtor’s failure and 
have no contractual protection or statutory right to influence the rescue or liquidation of the 
company. As a result, the notion includes tort claimants and the society at large (for instance, in 
cases of environmental polluters), but not employees.   
116 For instance, neither the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997) and the 
Guide to Enactment (2014), nor the EUIR recast specify the meaning of this notion.  
117 Mokal (n 113) 24-26. 
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It is extremely controversial whether (economic) “efficiency” should represent 
the sole, substantive goal of insolvency law.118 Unsurprisingly, much of the 
controversy between contractarian and communitarian scholars can be 
explained by the rejection from the latter of an economic-oriented approach to 
efficiency.   
For this reason, this thesis embraces the notion of procedural rather than 
substantive efficiency to test the validity and soundness of the theories 
introduced in the following chapters. However, procedural efficiency is a 
concept often associated with achievement of policy goals (e.g. rescue or 
liquidation),119 quickness of the procedure120 and reduction of costs.121 This is 
not the case in this thesis. In this context, to determine if an insolvency regime 
is efficient, the author discusses whether the proposed regime determines 
when, to what extent and if at all statutory corporate distress rules should apply 
and should depart from the common law of contract.  
As for “procedural fairness”, this thesis assumes that this criterion is met 
whenever parties are given timely notice of the rescue proceedings, the 
opportunity to influence the outcome of the case and they are treated equally. 
Since “equality” is a relative concept, procedural fairness is tested 
autonomously with reference to the distinct players potentially involved in any 
                                                                    
118 Even the International Monetary Fund recognises that ‘economic efficiency is not the only 
consideration when designing insolvency laws’: Legal Department of the International Monetary 
Fund, Orderly & Effective Insolvency procedures: Key Issues (Washington D.C. 1999), 
“Rehabilitation Procedures” <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orderly/> accessed 17 
September 2018. 
119 It has been suggested that an insolvency procedure is not efficient if it employs the resources 
of a company where alternative uses would have proven more valuable: M White, ‘Does Chapter 
11 Save Economically Inefficient Firms?’ (1994) 72 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1319. 
120 UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004), 12[8]; Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for 
a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring 
frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency 
and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU’ (22 November 2016) 
COM(2016) 723 final, 2016/0359 (COD) 5. 
121 See, among others: Legal Department of the International Monetary Fund, Orderly & Effective 
Insolvency procedures: Key Issues (Washington D.C. 1999), “Rehabilitation Procedures” 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orderly/> accessed 17 September 2018 (“Efficiency”); 
World Bank, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems 
(Washington D.C. 2005) 6 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/191201468315535668/pdf/481660WP0FINA
L10Box338887B01PUBLIC1.pdf > accessed 17 September 2018; K Cork, Report of the Review 
Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) Cmnd 8558, 54 para 198(e). 
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rescue case: the debtor, its contractual creditors and other vulnerable 
stakeholders.  
Procedural fairness stands on three pillars. The first one concerns protection 
(and promotion) of entrepreneurialism, as well as maximisation of 
shareholders’ return. It facilitates a fresh start for the insolvent debtor and it 
incentivises the role of entrepreneurs as agents of growth. The second pillar 
protects contractual creditors’ legitimate expectations, while the third one 
factors in the rights, interests and expectations of non-contractual claimants.  
The pragmatic nature of this work requires the introduction of a further step, 
i.e. the need to assess the: 
(v). Acceptability of the proposed solution(s) in light of the current legislative 
and cultural framework, with reference to both domestic and cross-border 
cases. 
These criteria are not immune from criticism, primarily since conflicts between 
criteria are still possible and uniform, “easy answers” are all but within reach. 
They have been preferred because they do not require the acceptance of shared 
values by the participants in the corporate distress game. 
 
1.4 RATIONALE OF THE THESIS 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to define the limits of insolvency law by 
reassessing the centrality of the common pool narrative in the form of the RCP 
notion. Reference to this notion (and to the complementary concept of 
“insolvency”) would determine under which conditions insolvency rules should 
prevail over conflicting paradigms.  
Previous works failed to fully appreciate ‘the fault lines between mandatory, 
state-imposed regulation and contractual, market-based 
solutions’.122Additionally, insufficient investigation has been carried out to 
explore the rationale underpinning the common pool concept, as well as the 
potential implications for the insolvency practice.  
                                                                    
122 Schillig (n 62) 2. 
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The author aims at verifying if a problem-based, example-driven approach to 
corporate distress law is capable of better respecting the peculiarity of this area 
of law than more traditional principle or purpose-based approaches. He also 
wants to investigate if such an approach may result in a steadier definition of its 
scope, as well as in fewer controversies in cross-border or cross-subject123 
cases. 
This thesis identifies the alternative conditions that could justify the 
commencement of a formal or hybrid corporate distress procedure. Nowadays, 
several countries make the opening of these proceedings contingent upon the 
proof that the ailing company is insolvent or in some significant distress. Where 
this is not the case – such as, for instance, in the Anglo/American schemes – 
debtors make use of rescue procedures to restructure their business and 
disregard contractual obligations. 
Conditioning the opening of collective procedures to the existence of insolvency 
or RCP problems would affect neither the determination of the course of action 
(liquidation or rescue of the business or the company), nor the choice of the 
mechanism. Stakeholders would still be entitled to make their own decisions on 
the basis of the nature of the existing and expected problems (common, anti-
common or semi-common), as well as on the nature and degree of the distress 
(financial, economic or both) that the debtor is experiencing.  
Furthermore, this work tries to raise awareness. This thesis demonstrates the 
influence that large insolvency proceedings and their key stakeholders have on 
the evolution of the law and, to a lesser extent on the economy and on society at 
large.124 It also demonstrates the bias towards maximisation of creditors’ return 
pursued by the key and most influential stakeholders in this arena. As a result, it 
                                                                    
123 “Cross-subject” cases are procedures where the definition of controversial aspects of the 
dispute requires the application of principles and rules from different areas of law, such as 
contract law, admiralty law, etc. Examples of controversial questions that arise from the 
intersection of different areas of law are: “Is the ipso facto clause of this particular contract 
enforceable in this case?”; “Can the creditor arrest the vessel if he/she has an enforceable 
maritime lien against the insolvent debtor?”; etc.  
124 For the purpose of investigating how the socioeconomic (‘behaviourism’) and ideological 
(‘attitudinalism’) background of each of these stakeholders affects their behaviour in insolvency 
cases, as well as their influence on practice and on the law, this doctoral thesis refers to some 
key concepts conceived by legal empiricists.  
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recommends a novel approach to determine what principles should apply on 
the basis of the nature and purposes of corporate distress proceedings. 
A disclaimer is also appropriate. It is proper to acknowledge the author’s 
background. Legal writings which adopt a theoretical narrative inevitably 
reflect the writer’s assumptions and beliefs.125 Despite aspirations to be 
scientific and objective, the author recognises that his opinions influence and 
sometimes distort the way he sees (and reads) “reality”.126 Nobody lives in an 
ivory tower and, in the case of legal scholars, observers are frequently active 
players in the observed. This is not the best premise for an impartiality plead. 
The researcher’s largely pragmatic but not necessarily pro-deregulation 
attitude and his general preference for the principle of “comply-or-explain” 
point to a broad rejection of any “one-size-fits-all” approach. In the author’s 
opinion, where equitable or contractual remedies are available, states should 
refrain from legislating.127 However, when states do legislate, they should aim at 
correcting the inequalities created by a de-regulated market on the basis of 
neutral, preferably scientifically and empirically tested evaluations. 
Market participants should not rely upon the state to sort out problems that 
they themselves could remedy. Insolvency law may be public, but management 
of risk is intrinsically private and statutes should acknowledge this boundary.  
Decision makers, therefore, should be careful to limit their intervention to cases 
in which the market would not deliver solutions compatible with the theoretical 
underpinnings of this area of law. Equally, they should ensure that their 
                                                                    
125 On the importance of being honest about the writer’s relevant ethical premises: M Pendleton, 
‘Non-empirical Discovery in Legal Scholarship - Choosing, Researching and Writing a 
Traditional Scholarly Article’ in M McConville and others (eds), Research Methods for Law 
(Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, 2012) 164. The author argues that ‘the ethical and 
normative major premises on which an argument is advanced, or indeed the rejection of such a 
concept, should be apparent and made transparent at the beginning of a piece of scholarly 
writing’. 
126 The existence of this “aspiration to impartiality” has been questioned by many legal scholars. 
Arthur S. Miller observed that ‘[t]he assumption apparently is that the person who labors in 
Academia has some sort of special credentials and operates in a kind of special medium that 
permits him to transcend the very human limitations of his brethren in private practice or on the 
bench or in government. This I doubt. I think the proposition is untenable’: AS Miller, ‘The Myth of 
Objectivity in Legal Research and Writing’ (1968) 18 Cath. U. L. Rev. 290, 291. 
127 According to the founding father of legal realism, ‘[l]egislation must learn the same lesson as 
case law. It must deal chiefly with principles; it must not be over-ambitious to lay down universal 
rules’: R Pound, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action’ (1910) 44 Am. L. Rev. 12, 34. 
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intervention corrects these inequalities and does not simply support the 
conventional autonomy-based narrative. 
While acknowledging the non-absolute objectivity128 of this study, the author at 
least claims to adopt an unbiased approach to this research. In particular, the 
structure of the research and its legal analysis should prove that the author has 
tried to develop logical deductions from major premises and not from the 
expected or desired conclusions. 
1.4(a) Main Research Questions 
The main purpose of this research is to investigate when, to what extent and if 
at all statutory “insolvency” (rectius, corporate distress) rules, principles and 
judicial and business practices should depart from the common law of contract. 
In order to achieve this outcome, it tries to answer three main queries: 
1. Should insolvency law be concerned with providing remedies to RCP 
problems? 
2. Should insolvency law interfere with the established nature (allocative 
or (re)distributive) of creditors’ entitlements?129 
3. How should an insolvency system look like assuming it is designed to 
promote specific goals (maximisation of assets or capital) while 
respecting the natures (common, anti-common or semi-common) of the 
underlying RCP problem? 
To investigate these main research questions, this thesis is structured in 
chapters, which will attempt to answer the following ancillary queries: 
1. Have the existing theoretical frameworks of corporate insolvency law 
provided procedurally efficient and fair guidance on when to file for 
corporate distress remedies (chapters two, three and four)? 
2. What is the current understanding of the common pool narrative and of 
the other requirements most commonly used to determine when 
                                                                    
128 “Objectivity” is here used to refer to any research and writing about legal matters in which 
the writer’s value judgments do not permeate at all in the written text.  
129 This question implies that ignoring the true nature of a claimants’ claim is equal to 
interfering in the claimants’ rights, expectations and, ultimately, entitlements. 
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companies should file for insolvency? What are their strengths and 
shortcomings (chapter five)? 
3. Is the common pool narrative central for the definition and scope of 
insolvency law, or should other eligibility standards be preferred 
(chapters five and six)? 
1.4(b) Research’s Findings 
Currently, neither in the U.S. nor in England and Wales admissibility to a 
corporate distress procedure is subject to an eligibility test that considers the 
effect on the controlling stakeholders (i.e. risk bearers) of the decision to 
enforce insolvency remedies. The risk bearer130 interests of the stakeholders 
affected by the decision and the relative relevance of their claims is generally 
neglected.  
The RCP standard represents the first attempt to introduce such evaluation. The 
de-constructivist analysis carried out in this thesis shows that the standard has 
the potential to improve the existing normative framework. 
This thesis observes that the enforceability of corporate distress remedies and 
the adoption of a particular course of action (i.e. assets’ or capital maximisation) 
should depend on the nature and characteristics of the RCP dilemma faced by 
the debtor and its creditors rather than on the need to promote specific policy 
goals. It therefore argues that whenever parties face a RCP dilemma but are able 
to negotiate an agreement that pursues the best interest of all stakeholders (by 
means of consensual winding-ups, informal workouts or other restructuring 
procedures) there should be no derogation from general contract law 
principles.  
In hybrid procedures (such as pre-packs, schemes of arrangement or CVAs), 
statutory intervention and derogation from the general law of contract should 
be kept to a minimum. Vice versa, when parties are incapable of reaching an 
agreement in the best interest of all stakeholders (a situation described as a 
RCP problem) or when the company is insolvent, the theory proposed in this 
                                                                    
130 For a definition of this notion, see sub-section 4.3(a) of this thesis.  
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thesis justifies the adoption and mandatory enforcement of corporate distress 
remedies that derogate from the general law of contract. 
 
1.5 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology of this thesis is designed to define the conditions by means of 
which corporate distress statutes may affect contractual freedom.  
As this represents a normative question that seeks to shape insolvency policy 
and law-making and which is influenced by public policy considerations, the 
legal approach adopted in this thesis is more theoretical than doctrinal.131 In 
other words, the thesis does not focus much on the exposition of specific rules, 
the analysis of their relationships and the study of possible difficulties that arise 
from their implementation, although reference to insolvency provisions is 
constant throughout this study. It is more concerned with the analysis of a 
pivotal concept: the RCP dilemma and the effect that a more complete 
understanding of this notion, both in theory and practice, would have on the 
focus and evolution of corporate distress. 
Apart from desk-study and archival research, this thesis adopts primarily an 
applied doctrinal methodology,132 since it is an internal inquiry on the 
meaning of the law. This methodology is commonly accepted in law. Legal 
research in insolvency law is still primarily doctrinal,133 with authors mainly 
concerned with examining judicial decisions and identifying matters of interest 
for their audience. 
                                                                    
131 For a detailed analysis of the distinction between doctrinal, reform-oriented and theoretical 
legal research: D Pearce and others, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission, vol. III (Australian Government Publishing 
Service 1987), vol. 2, para. 9.15. 
132 In accordance with the taxonomy of legal research styles proposed by Arthurs in 1983: HW 
Arthurs, Law and Learning: Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada by the Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law (Information Division, 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada: Ottawa, 1983). 
133 For a defence of doctrinal methodologies: HT Edwards, ‘The Growing Disjunction between 
Legal Education and the Legal Profession’ (1992) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 (arguing that while links to 
other social sciences - such as economics and psychology - open new opportunities to legal 
scholars, the latter should, nevertheless, remain primarily concerned with the analysis of cases, 
the law, and their implications); DL Rhode, ‘Legal Scholarship’ (2002) 115(5) Harv. L. Rev. Ass. 
1327; NJ Duncan and T Hutchinson, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research’ (2012) 17(1) Deakin L. Rev. 83. 
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Theory is often viewed in sharp contrast to practice and, consequently, either 
ignored or discarded. This work assumes that ‘the influence of theory cannot be 
cavalierly discarded’.134 Accordingly, it tries to combine doctrinal and case-
related methods with theoretical approaches to design a new corporate 
framework for the jurisdictions studied in this volume. 
Primarily expository and explanatory research (chapters two to four) aimed at 
understanding “what the law is” has been complemented by evaluative 
considerations, which represent the predominant method in the second block of 
the thesis (chapters five and six).  
Purely doctrinal methodologies have not been considered appropriate to 
investigate the policy implications arising from the implementation of a new 
eligibility criterion to file for corporate distress remedies and the changes to the 
existing statutory framework. 
Black letter lawyers and practitioners may turn their nose up to legal theory 
blaming its lack of practical use. Nevertheless, theoretical approaches are best 
suited to design legal frameworks135 and theory-building is one of the goals of 
this thesis. 
This doctoral thesis endorses the generalized call for more scientific albeit not 
necessarily empirical work, since it is believed that theories should be proven to 
work in a realistic setting. Their acceptance or rejection should not depend on 
whether they are conceived in a perfect market – zero transaction cost (‘PM-
ZTC’)136 environment. Additionally, example-driven analysis can help bridge the 
gaps between different jurisdictions and laws.137  
                                                                    
134 DH Culmer, ‘The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat and Customary International Law: Is It 
Ripe Yet?’ (1994) 14 Conn. J. Int’l L. 563, 564.  
135 Similar approaches have been adopted by other scholars with reference to under-regulated 
areas, such as the discipline of pre-packs in England: P Walton, ‘When is Pre-Packaged 
Administration Appropriate? – A Theoretical Consideration’ (2011) 20 Nott. L.J. 1. 
136 LM LoPucki, ‘Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors Baird and 
Rosenzweig’ (Oct. 1992) 92(1) Mich. L. Rev. 79. 
137 T Sullivan and others, ‘The Use of Empirical Data in Formulating Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 
50(2) Law & Contemp. Probs. 195, 197. 
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While ‘one cannot derive the normative from the positive’,138 reality cannot 
simply be treated as a nuisance in a world of perfectly balanced, yet unrealistic 
premises. One of the goals of this work is to conceive ‘practical solutions on a 
pragmatic basis’139 which can provide tentative answers to the highlighted 
queries and ‘in which legal concepts and rules become our tools rather than our 
masters’.140  
By adopting this combined approach, this work embraces a sui generis legal 
realist perspective141 focused on the legal and societal notion and 
understanding of the common pool concept. It recognizes that real-world 
constraints and events bind insolvency policy and that policy discussions can be 
meaningful only when this circumstance is acknowledged.142 As Elizabeth 
Warren puts it, ‘[t]he basis for bankruptcy policy is so deeply rooted in market 
imperfections that any attempt to discuss such policy in a perfect market is a zen-
like exercise’.143 
This research is also based on the following assumptions. The first axiom is 
that corporate distress law results in derogation from established contractual 
rules and practices. The second axiom follows from the previous premise and 
                                                                    
138 DG Baird, ‘Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren’ (Summer 
1987) 54(3) U. Chi. L. Rev. 815, 817. The same view is shared by P Shuchman, ‘An Attempt at a 
“Philosophy of Bankruptcy”’ (1973-1974) 21 UCLA L. Rev. 403. These authors criticize 
conventional approaches and methods to study insolvency law, because they consider that 
extrapolating a philosophy from existing rules, principles and cases is inadequate for most 
purposes beyond technical consistency and logical validity. 
139 G Moss, ‘Group Insolvency - Forum - EC Regulation and Model Law Under the Influence of 
English Pragmatism Revisited’ (2014) 9 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 179, at 196.   
140 Ibid 196. 
141 A “new” legal realist perspective moves from the analysis of judicial decisions to the study of 
law in action and the living law. This means that new legal realism considers the behaviour of all 
stakeholders in all activities that affect the evolution of the law. These include pre-trial and out-
of-court activities, as well as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. These are all topics 
covered in this work. The author describes his work as a “sui generis” legal realist study because 
new legal realism is a species of empirical legal studies but this thesis is not empirical in nature.  
On the concept of new legal realism: H Erlanger and others, ‘Foreword: Is It Time for a New 
Legal Realism’ (2005) Wis. L. Rev. 335; S Macaulay, ‘The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: 
“Things Ain’t What They Used To Be”’ (2005) Wis. L. Rev. 365; LG Trubek, ‘Crossing Boundaries: 
Legal Education and the Challenge of the “New Public Interest Law”’ (2005) Wis. L. Rev. 455; S 
Macaulay, ‘Contracts, New Legal Realism, and Improving the Navigation of The Yellow 
Submarine’ (2005) 80 Tul. L. Rev. 1161; TJ Miles and CR Sunstein, ‘The New Legal Realism’ 
(2008) 75(2) U. Chi. L. Rev. 83; MC Suchman and E Mertz, ‘Toward a New Legal Empiricism: 
Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism’ (2010) 6 Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science 555; H Dagan and R Kreitner, ‘The New Legal Realism and the Realist View of Law’ 
(2018) 43(2) Law & Soc. Inquiry 528. 
142 Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (n 44), 778. 
143 Ibid 379. 
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considers that insolvency remedies should be used only when contractual or 
general law mechanisms prove unfit to deal with ailing debtors.  
Insolvency law may result in the liquidation or the rescue of the company or the 
business, as well as in the rehabilitation of the debtor. Nevertheless, corporate 
distress law is a set of statutory rules and established practices and 
interpretations that define a ‘system of collectivized debt collection’.144 Corporate 
distress rules (and their informing principles) should therefore be appropriate 
to deal with the nature of the underlying common pool problems and the 
purposes (rescue, rehabilitation or liquidation) of the proceedings.  
- 
Back in 1996, Donald R. Korobkin classified insolvency scholarship into four 
main categories: observational (to establish facts - empirical research), 
normative (to evaluate theories), standard reform (to make use of empirical 
evidence to propose legal reform) and critical reform (to make use of normative 
claims to propose legal reform).145  
While being primarily normative, this work escapes from this classification, for 
its focus (the scope, rather than the purposes of this area of law), the use of legal 
methods (e.g. observation is not limited to case law, but also to the way in which 
stakeholders behave and influence the evolution of insolvency practice and law) 
and its scope (predictive, rather than normative).  
In other words, with reference to the methodology, the originality of this work 
does not lie in the methods used, but in the way in which established methods 
are used.  
This thesis combines a theoretical approach with an example-driven narrative 
because the author believes that conceptualisations built on metaphors and 
empirically-untested assumptions can be harmful, as they can lead to results 
substantially different from those presumed to be likely. Reference to real cases 
can also help to investigate and appreciate how stakeholders shape and re-
shape the situations in which they face coordination problems. By considering 
                                                                    
144 Jackson (n 44) 7. 
145 Korobkin (n 57) 83. 
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these cases, the proposed framework will not yield analytical, simple and clear 
predictions but it will offer and debate solutions that might feature closer 
approximation to reality than pure, theory-driven approaches.  
 
1.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
No existing theory provides a consistent explanation for how and why some 
stakeholders are generally able to extricate themselves from RCP dilemmas 
without the use of statutory remedies and why the existing Anglo-American 
statutory system protects these privileges. Equally, no theory explains why the 
laws imposed by the Anglo-American governments should fail to give the 
opportunity to other stakeholders to intervene early and avert the downward 
spiral that may transform a RCP dilemma into a problem.  
This thesis attempts to develop a series of reasoned conjectures about the 
circumstances according to which the stakeholders should promote their 
collective interest. It does not rely on the use economic indicators to proactively 
determine the moment in which a distressed business should file for corporate 
distress protection. 
The issues addressed in this thesis may strike many readers as technical, if not 
arcane. The author tried to demonstrate the originality and opportunity to 
undertake this research with constant reference to corporate cases. Many of the 
complexities, however, arise from the fact that there is no easy road to address 
these issues. It is hoped that this study will shed some light on some of the 
questions that should be addressed to make the Anglo-American corporate 
distress framework more procedurally fair and efficient for the benefit of all 
stakeholders.   
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CHAPTER 2 - THE LIMITS OF INSOLVENCY LAW IN AUTONOMY-BASED 
FRAMEWORKS 
«Perhaps the most remarkable characteristic of bankruptcy scholarship is the 
absence of consensus on the appropriate answers to what would seem to be the 
two most basic questions in its domain: should there be a separate system of debt 
resolution […]? And, if such a system is established, what should be its goals?»1 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Do we need insolvency law? Is there a rationale for an independent insolvency 
regime? These questions are more problematic than they seem and the 
permanence on the cusp of the academic debate for such a lengthy period2 
testifies the centrality of the matter.  
No uniform answers have been reached in the academic community. For 
instance, neo-libertarian insolvency scholars3 argue that corporate insolvency 
procedures should be governed by private law remedies agreed either by the 
parties in their negotiations or identified by the debtor in the company’s articles 
of association. Based on economic analysis, they believe that privately-
                                                                    
1 RV Butler and SM Gilpatric, ‘A Re-Examination of the Purposes and Goals of Bankruptcy’ 
(1994) 2 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 269, 269. 
2 The current debate began with TH Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and 
the Creditors’ Bargain’ (1982) 91 Yale L.J. 857, where the author argued that grab-law, 
individual remedies were inefficient, thus justifying the existence of a collective and statutory 
insolvency system. 
3 Major contributors of this line of thinking include: RA Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex 
World (Harvard University Press: Harvard, 1995); DG Baird, ‘A World Without Bankruptcy’ 
(1987) 50(2) Law & Contemp. Probs. 173 (demonstrating that living in a world without 
bankruptcy or any similar collective procedure is not as far-fetched or ridiculous as it might 
appear at first glance); M Bradley and M Rosenzweig, ‘The Untenable Case for Chapter 11’ 
(1992) 101 Yale L.J. 1043; RK Rasmussen, ‘Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate 
Bankruptcy’ (1992) 71 Tex. L. Rev. 51; BE Adler, ‘Financial and Political Theories of American 
Corporate Bankruptcy’ (1993) 45 Stan. L. Rev. 311; BE Adler, ‘Finance’s Theoretical Divide and 
the Proper Role of Insolvency Rules’ (1994) 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1107; BE Adler, ‘A World Without 
Debt’ (1994) 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 811 (who built upon Baird’s reasoning to argue that it is possible 
to give away not only with bankruptcy, but also with debt); BE Adler, ‘A Theory of Corporate 
Insolvency’ (1997) 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 343; A Schwartz, ‘A Contract Theory Approach to Business 
Bankruptcy’ (1998) 107(6) Yale L.J. 1807 (arguing that the only mandatory rules in an 
insolvency system should be structural and that insolvency laws exist only to increase efficiency 
by solving the creditors’ coordination problem); SL Schwarcz, ‘Rethinking Freedom of Contract: 
A Bankruptcy Paradigm’ (1999) 77 Tex. L. Rev. 515; A Schwartz, ‘Bankruptcy Contracting 
Reviewed’ (1999) 109 Yale L.J. 343; A Schwartz, ‘A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy’ 
(2005) 91 Va. L. Rev. 1199. 
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negotiated remedies should be preferred to compulsory statutory rules from an 
efficiency standpoint.  
These theories have been challenged in the past4 and this chapter is concerned 
with the de-constructing5 them. It seems like a reasonable approach to 
investigate the strengths, shortcomings and characteristics of those theories 
that deny the autonomy of this branch of law before addressing the issue of the 
content and limits that should characterise it.  
- 
Late Sixties: England and France. 
Passengers were starting to use planes for their travels. Much as today, 
passengers could buy their tickets from the airline company itself, even if the 
flight was not or only partially operated by that company. Nevertheless, the 
company that materially provided the service deserved to be compensated if it 
was different from the company to which the passenger paid the fare.  
A daily or individual payment of inter-company liabilities would have been 
massively unpractical and would have generated high administrative costs. 
Therefore, many companies joined the International Air Transportation 
Aviation (‘IATA’), a Canadian-incorporated entity that operated a clearing house 
system with the purpose of avoiding the necessity of making numerous 
payments among its members.  
Basically, each IATA participant agreed to determine at the end of each month 
its balance of liabilities towards all the other members of this corporation. In 
case of overall negative net liabilities, that participant had to pay the 
corresponding amount to IATA, which would use it to compensate those other 
members who had a positive balance of liabilities. 
                                                                    
4 LM LoPucki, ‘Bankruptcy Contracting Revised: A Reply to Alan Schwartz’s New Model’ (1999) 
109(2) Yale L.J. 365; S Block-Lieb, ‘The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy’ (2001) U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 503; JL Westbrook, ‘The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy’ (2004) 82 Tex. L. Rev. 795; E 
Warren and JL Westbrook, ‘Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention’ (2005) 
118 Harv. L. Rev. 1197. 
5 See chapter one, ftn 32. 
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The system made commercial sense. As observed by Morris of Borth-y-Gest LJ, 
‘[t]here was no trace in the scheme of any plan to divert money in the event of 
liquidation’.6 It seemed therefore that when parties entered into contracts in 
good faith as part of their usual business, the validity of this and similar 
contracts should be upheld against any office-holder who afterwards took 
control of the company.  
However – and this was the majority view in the case of British Eagle7 – such an 
arrangement replaced a relationship of creditor to debtor between the IATA 
members with a tri-lateral agreement. That tri-lateral agreement resulted in 
contractual set-offs where English insolvency rules would have imposed: a) to 
British Eagle’s IATA net debtors an obligation to pay to the insolvent estate the 
money owed to the company at the date of liquidation; and b) to British Eagle’s 
IATA net creditors a right to share rateably as unsecured creditors in the 
distribution of the proceeds.  
In other words, if IATA rules applied, British Eagle would have been a net 
debtor towards IATA for £44,771. Vice-versa, if English insolvency rules 
applied, British Eagle could have recovered from fourteen IATA members 
£27,025 while fifty-three other members would have to prove in liquidation 
claims totalling £71,796.8 
 
                                                                    
6 British Eagle International Airlines Ltd v Compagnie Nationale Air France [1975] 1 WLR 758 
(HL) [763C]. 
7 Ibid. 





Visual representations of the commercial transactions agreed by IATA members (black 
arrows) and the revised relationship imposed upon them by the House of Lord’s 
judgment in British Eagle (dashed, orange arrows) 
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As a general rule, if contracts are not entered into by the parties with the 
purpose of circumventing the principles underpinning insolvency law, there 
should be no reason why they should be binding only upon the contracting 
parties but not on the office-holders. However, the House of Lord concluded 
that whenever any claimant is able to demonstrate the existence of a 
relationship of creditor to debtor, the contracting parties are not allowed to 
“contract out” of the insolvency legislation as such behaviour would be contrary 
to public policy.9 
This judgment seems a gravestone to any discussion about contracting out of 
insolvency law: according to English judges, it is simply not possible. What if, 
however, it is argued – as neo-libertarian, autonomy-based theorists do – and 
proved that there is no autonomous justification for a discrete system of 
insolvency rules? In that case, the right question to ask would be: “Why should 
the legislator derogate from (i.e. contract out of) the general contract law 
principle of party autonomy?”. 
To investigate if there is an autonomous justification for insolvency law, section 
2.2 de-constructs and reviews the suggestions to repeal statutory insolvency 
rules altogether [neo-libertarian proposals]. This section does not provide a full 
assessment of autonomy-based theories as it is concerned with highlighting the 
features of these conceptualisations that are relevant for the debate on the 
limits of insolvency law. Sub-sections 2.2(a) and (b) test the validity of these 
theories by referring to real cases which apply some of the arguments 
suggested by “no-insolvency scholars”. 
Section 2.3 describes the peculiarities of asset-segregated industries and it 
addresses the claim that their intrinsically different nature makes them perfect 
candidates for being insolvency de-regulated. Section 2.4 challenges the 
normative assumptions upon which all these theories are based and it 
investigates whether autonomy-based solutions are procedurally efficient and 
fair. Section 2.5 concludes that neither the market alone nor limited 
amendments to other branches of law provide comprehensive solutions to the 
                                                                    
9 Ibid [780H]. 
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issue that lies at the basis of insolvency law: the common, anti-common and 
semi-common nature of the RCP dilemma. 
From a terminology point of view, this chapter is not concerned either with 
attempts made by insolvent debtors to evade the system (known as ‘evasive 
behaviour’10) or with creditors’ abusive demands of excessive credit terms and 
preferential treatment on the eve of insolvency. This behaviour has long been 
recognised as being contrary to the collective interests of insolvency 
participants11 and it is curtailed by mandatory provisions enabling the 
avoidance of abusive transactions. 
 
2.2 AUTONOMY-BASED SOLUTIONS TO INSOLVENCY LAW 
In order to make a case for insolvency law, it must be demonstrated that it 
addresses issues neglected by the other fields of law. Additionally, it is crucial to 
prove either that stakeholders are not able to agree on contractual and inclusive 
solutions absent statutory guidance, or that autonomy-based regimes are non-
desirable for policy or cultural reasons.  
The branches of law which share the most with insolvency law are commercial 
and contract law. The latter includes provisions about remedies for breach of 
contracts.  
Despite the existence of a vast spectrum of remedies to contractual breaches, 
both laws fall short of addressing specifically the systemic failure of a 
contracting parties. The starting points of commercial/contract and insolvency 
law differ: failure to meet an obligation on one hand, systemic failure on the 
other. These considerations suggest that at least limited adjustments are 
needed to apply commercial law remedies to corporate demise cases. 
With these limited adjustments, commercial and contract law remedies could 
prove effective in addressing the systemic failure of the debtor, thus rendering 
redundant the creation of a separate system of rules governed by autonomous 
                                                                    
10 R Parry and others, Transaction Avoidance in Insolvencies (3rd edn, OUP: Oxford, 2018) 3. 
11 Avoidance provisions have formed part of debt enforcement and insolvency laws in England 
since 1376: Ibid 4. 
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principles. This is the position of the commentators whom I would classify as 
neo-libertarians.12  
Autonomy-based solutions and neo-libertarian views rely upon two 
assumptions.13 
The first, prominent premise is the contractual heuristic of the firm,14 according 
to which “everything is negotiable”. Under this approach, corporations are 
understood simply as a nexus of contractual relationships, the proper function 
of corporate law being uniquely to provide a set of default rules that govern 
their life and dissolution. As a result, parties (primarily managers and 
investors) should be able to freely modify the content of their relations unless 
this would cause detrimental effects (i.e. negative externalities) to third, non-
contracting actors. 
The second, consequential premise is that insolvency law does not deal with 
any issue, which has not previously been addressed in other areas of law.15 
Since there is nothing peculiar in insolvency, there is no need for separate rules. 
It is only ‘[a] misapprehension of financial economics [that] gives rise to the 
intuition that a proper insolvency system must screen firms that should live from 
those that should die’.16 
These assumptions had been criticised in the past, when it was contended that 
‘[i]magining the world without bankruptcy law gives us an opportunity to identify 
precisely what it is that bankruptcy law adds to our legal regime and hence what 
bankruptcy policy is or should be’.17 
                                                                    
12 For a comprehensive list of these scholars and their works, see section 3.2 of this thesis. 
13 For a general definition of autonomy-based theories, see above section 1.2, ftn 33. The two 
terms (autonomy-based and neo-libertarian) are used to describe those theories that argue for 
the use of private, contractual remedies to address the issues raised by the distress of any 
corporate entity. 
14 The ‘strong’ form of the contractual theory has been conceived in the U.S. in the 1980s. The 
most prominent articles on the subject are: FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, ‘Corporate Control 
Transactions’ (1982) 91 Yale L.J. 698; Macey, ‘From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of 
the Rules Against Insider Trading’ (1984) 13 Hofstra L. Rev. 9; FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, 
‘Close Corporations and Agency Costs’, (1986) 38 Stan. L. Rev. 271; Haddock and Macey, ‘A 
Coasian Model of Insider Trading’ (1986) 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1449. 
15 Adler, ‘A World Without Debt’ (n 3). 
16 Adler, ‘A Theory’ (n 3) 344. 
17 Baird (n 3).  
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[1] Based upon these assumptions, it is not surprising that the most persuasive 
autonomy-based theories advocate for the abolition of debt altogether.18 Where 
Baird proved that allocation issues gave rise to TCP problems (an assumption 
which will be disputed later section 5.4 of this work), Adler demonstrated that 
it is possible (at least in theory) to repeal the allocation deadlock with the 
“chameleon equity” corporation.19 Its structure would prevent parties from 
collecting individually against the distressed corporation [dilution mechanism]. 
He argued that ‘creditor inability to act collectively may not be a problem, but a 
solution’.20 
Adler and other authors argue that contracts alone could solve the fabled TCP 
problem that is the primary justification for insolvency law.21 They explain in 
their “public choice theory” that the perseverance of inefficient laws is only the 
result of a pressure on the legislature to retain the existing system.22  
Adler’s reasoning is persuasive, but only with respect to the allocative side of 
the TCP problem, i.e. the risk of an inefficient individual race to the debtor’s 
assets by its creditors. Additionally, it is based upon considerations tested (and 
applicable) to a limited subset of insolvency cases.23 Similar proposals24 suffer 
                                                                    
18 Adler, ‘A World Without Debt’ (n 3). 
19 The chameleon equity corporation is a company, which issued differently ranked debt to its 
creditors. Because creditors have no right to act individually against the company, should the 
debtor be unable to meet all of its fixed obligations, the lower class (equity) will be wiped out 
and the next-higher class will become the equity group. This solution, however, does not work 
with reference to non-contractual claimants and it underestimates the windfalls that may result 
from fluctuations in the market value of the debtor. See Adler, ‘Financial and Political Theories’ 
(n 3).  
20 Adler, ‘A Theory’ (n 3) 346. 
21 Adler, ‘A Theory’ (n 3) 346; Adler, ‘Financial and Political Theories’ (n 3). 
22 Adler, ‘Finance’s Theoretical Divide’ (n 3). This conclusion has been challenged by other 
authors. For a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of U.S. bankruptcy law and the behind-
the-scene explanations of some of its relevant features, see: PJ Coleman, Debtors and Creditors in 
America (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1974); DA Skeel, Jr., Debt’s Dominion: A 
History of Bankruptcy Law in America (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2001) who, while 
adopting the same public choice approach, identifies three eras in the evolution of U.S. 
bankruptcy law on the basis of the ability of key interest groups to influence Congress’ 
legislative production. Skeel concludes that it is unsatisfactory to explain the evolution of the 
law only as a by-product of lobby pressures.  
23 Adler himself recognizes, in ftn 3 - Alder, ‘A World Without Debt’ (n 3) - that his argument 
applies only to selected corporate debtors. It was tested on public corporations that filed for 
Chapter 11 protection and had issued fixed obligations to a large number of investors. The 
narrow scope of its analysis affects the relevance of his conclusions. 
24 Bradley and Rosenzweig (n 3). After having proven the inefficiencies of Chapter 11 in 
particular and reorganisation procedures in general, the authors propose to abolish court-
supervised reorganisations by reassigning the failing (but not failed) company’s property rights 
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the same shortcomings. Other scholars, current legislative provisions and real 
cases25 demonstrate that TCP issues have a (re)distributive nature as well. A 
solution which addresses only part of the problem is unsatisfactory. 
[2] Similarly flawed in the sense that it addressed only one of the aspects of the 
TCP problem (this time, the (re)distributive side) is Bowers’ theory,26 which 
relies entirely on the debtor’s ability to maximise the assets of his company.  
(Re)Distributive insolvency rules are based on the fundamental policy of 
insolvency law that all creditors (at least, those of the same class) are equal and 
should be treated in the same manner. Even assuming that the morality of equal 
treatment is not disputed, Bowers observes that the existing bankruptcy policy 
is incomprehensible. If creditors were equal to each other, debtors would have 
no need to prefer or disfavour any of them and there would be no need for 
statutory rules that prescribed equality of treatment. Yet, in the British Eagle 
case, IATA companies would have been favoured over non-IATA members. 
At the same time, those same rules that should promote equality in reality 
encourage practices that favour differential treatment among similar creditors. 
For instance, if a supplier is deemed essential for the debtor, payments towards 
this company can remain current throughout the pre- and post-insolvency 
period even if other similarly-ranking creditors are paid little or nothing.  
Bowers argues that rules that allow for differential treatment among creditors 
are not wrong as ‘nonequality is the only distributional standard which is wealth 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
to its claimants. In their view, creditors are those with the best incentives to allocate the 
company’s resources efficiently, because they are the ones who risk to lose the most from an 
under-valuation of these assets. Residual claims would be sold (fixed price auctions) and, absent 
purchasers or a market for them, the business’ claimants would relinquish their claims to the 
business net cash flow. 
25 See below in this and the following chapters. 
26 JW Bowers, ‘Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy’s Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the 
Elementary Economics Failure’ (June 1990) 88(7) Mich. L. Rev. 2097. By applying the Murphian 
theory of failing behaviour, the author argues that systematic attempts to explain insolvency 
law - such as the creditors’ maximisation heuristic - are inadequate. He also argues that both 
solvent and insolvent debtors faced with losses are the best-placed actors to manage their 
assets in optimal ways. He concludes that ‘debtors will use [private property rights] either to 
minimize the impact of losses, without harming their creditors, or to pay creditors in advance for 
any harm creditors may suffer by the exercise of that power’ (at 2141). See also: JW Bowers, 
‘Rehabilitation, Redistribution or Dissipation: The Evidence of Choosing Among Bankruptcy 
Hypotheses’ (1994) 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 849. 
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maximizing’.27 He might be right in demonstrating that Jackson and Baird’s 
approach to bankruptcy is based on unsound economics and that collective 
procedures do not ameliorate the “vulture problem”.28 In the end, however, he 
simply proved the need to reform existing procedures, while he fell short of 
making a case for their full repeal.29  
[3] It has been advocated that some of the issues raised by the above-
mentioned party autonomy-enhancing solutions may be overcome if third, 
independent parties such as courts adopted a supervisory position over the 
liquidation or reorganisation process. Their intervention or, even better, the 
threat of their intervention, would ensure that creditors dealt with deadlocks in 
a timely manner and that sales and reorganisations would happen without 
distortions and abuses. 
Such an approach was first advocated by Roe30 [partial-float proposal]. He 
argued that the resulting reorganisation would be fast, inexpensive and result in 
a sound capital structure for the new corporation. Courts should intervene only 
when creditors are hindered by ‘a basic form of the prisoner’s dilemma: [when] 
the aggregation of individualistic, “rational” decisions lead to an inferior 
collective result’.31 
Leaving aside the apparently simple but practically cumbersome mechanics of 
this proposal,32 its fundamental deficiency lies in its assumption that markets 
are sufficiently mature and efficient to value companies and drive their 
restructuring efforts.  
Who would buy a mom-and-pop store if not the current owner(s)? What if the 
value of a company is seriously compromised by external factors, such as 
                                                                    
27 Bowers, ‘Groping and Coping’ (n 26) 2103. 
28 Where Jackson used the metaphor of the fishermen overfishing in a pond, Bowers uses the 
image of a flock of vultures trying to satisfy their appetite over a thin dying critter: Bowers, 
‘Groping and Coping’ (n 26) 2105-07. 
29 A circumstance further substantiated by the narrow scope of Bowers’ sample, since his 
analysis applied to Chapter 11 cases filed by corporations listed on the New York or American 
Stock Exchanges.  
30 MJ Roe, ‘Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization’ (Apr. 1983) 83(3) 
Col. L. Rev. 527. 
31 Ibid 544. 
32 Basically, Roe suggested creating a reorganised corporation and selling a portion of its stock 
(10%) on the market, to determine the value of the insolvent assets and distribute the shares 
and the proceeds to existing creditors according to the APR. 
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temporary fluctuations in the market? What about the treatment of secured 
creditors, or multi-party reorganisations? What about those periods of time in 
which there is no liquid market, such as during the 2007-2010 financial crisis? 
Real cases suggest that this theory may work, but only for a limited spectrum of 
debtors, i.e. those which trade in the stock market or for which investors may 
determine the market value with little effort and cost. As the author recognizes, 
in all other cases ‘jamming the market valuation into the context of an ongoing 
reorganization would risk re-creating the very problems that an objective market 
valuation might eliminate: delay and judicial inexpertise’.33   
[4] In an attempt to make Roe’s proposal more “palatable” to a wider audience 
and a larger set of cases, Bebchuk34 conceived a new method for dividing the 
reorganisation pie among creditors [option proposal].  
Under her suggestion, insolvency filings would result in the cancellation of all of 
the company’s debts and their conversion into equity. Junior claimants would 
then be given the opportunity to buy shares in the new company. Proceeds 
would be used to repay (more) senior creditors and, if they proved insufficient, 
shares in the reorganised corporation would be allocated to them according to 
the amount still owed. If nobody exercised their purchase rights, the company 
would be allocated to most senior creditors. 
Despite its merits over Roe’s proposal and further refinements from other 
authors,35 this theory still does not address the fundamental criticism that 
markets may not be capable of assessing the reorganised corporation. 
Furthermore, some claimants (e.g. MSMEs, consumers, tort creditors) are 
unlikely to bid for the new corporation even when they believe that it is worth 
more than the amount owed to secured creditors.  
                                                                    
33 Roe (n 30) 601. 
34 LA Bebchuk, ‘A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations’ (1988) 101(4) Harv. L. Rev. 775. 
35 P Aghion and others, ‘The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform’ (Oct. 1992) 8(3) J.L. Econ. & Org. 
523. The authors advocated for non-cash bids, such as shares or securities on the bidder’s assets 
or - following a reorganisation - on the distressed debtor. According to this proposal, upon 
insolvency, the company’s debts would be cancelled, former creditors would receive all the 
equity of the distressed company (now, new, all-equity company) and these creditors (as new 
owners) would decide whether to liquidate or reorganise the company. The judge would 
supervise the procedure and allow non-cash bids. Bids should be submitted within three 
months from insolvency and the new owners would vote for the best bid. See also: AJ Casey, 
‘Auction Design for Claims Trading’ (2014) 22 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 133. 
  81 
Even if shares in the newco could be bought without monetary disbursements 
(i.e. promise of future work in the company; concession of patent or intellectual 
rights; etc.), this would only ‘intensify the auctioneer’s incentive problem, since 
non-cash bids are inherently more difficult to evaluate than cash’.36 Nobody 
questions that Bebchuk’s proposal may work with reference to institutional 
creditors of medium and large companies with multiple claimants, where 
information is largely available, there is a market for the newco stock and 
creditors are willing to bid. Unfortunately, we are left in the dark about the 
authors’ claim that the scheme ‘may also have a role to play in case of small 
companies’,37 or why other categories of creditors would not be worse off than 
under alternative, statutory solutions. 
The trouble is, therefore, that this scheme may result in windfalls for 
institutional and sophisticated creditors. It ‘would reach a fair result, and would 
be cost effective, [primarily] if the corporation’s going concern value was lower 
than the senior debt, and the senior creditors wanted to operate the former 
corporation’s business themselves’.38 
[5] Some authors, inspired by the work of Rasmussen and Schwartz,39 
recommended the implementation of an ex-ante restructuring mechanism. 
They do not criticise the mandatory nature of the insolvency system, but the 
prohibition of conceiving contractual, negotiated alternatives. They argue that 
parties would be better off in dealing with the “coordination problem” (i.e. the 
allocative side of the TCP problem) if they were able to choose their preferred 
bankruptcy system by contract.40 This is more or less what parties had in mind 
in drafting the IATA agreement. 
                                                                    
36 J Armour, ‘The Law and Economics of Corporate Insolvency: A Review’ (ESRC Centre for 
Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 197, 2001) 23 
<http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-
research/downloads/working-papers/wp197.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018. 
37 P Aghion and others, ‘Improving Bankruptcy Procedure’ (1994) 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 849, 871 
38 CW Adams, ‘An Economic Justification for Corporate Reorganizations’ (1991) 20 Hofstra L. 
Rev. 117, 156. 
39 Rasmussen (n 3); Schwartz, ‘A Normative Theory’ (n 3). 
40 ‘Viewing bankruptcy through the lens of contract theory reveals bankruptcy’s anachronistic 
character: bankruptcy is a government enterprise. The state runs the postal system and the 
bankruptcy system and restricts competition with both by law’: Schwartz ‘A Contract Theory’ (n 
3) 1851. 
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These authors challenge the frequently unquestioned assumption that 
insolvency law should aim at ex-post efficiency, either in its allocative or 
(re)distributive understanding. They argue that insolvency law should look at 
ex-ante efficiency, i.e. at reducing the cost of capitals for companies.41 
The authors’ rejection of the common pool analysis is not entirely convincing. It 
rests on the premise that debtor and creditors could structure their allocation 
rights without mandatory rules, but it ignores the position of other risk-takers42 
such as involuntary claimants. 
Furthermore, for the purposes of this study, these ex-ante restructuring 
proposals do not undermine the premises of the insolvency system, but only its 
exclusivity claim. They do not question the opportunity of structural, 
mandatory rules. As a result, they do not question the rationale for the existence 
of insolvency as a separate branch of law.   
[6] A partially different position was expressed by LoPucki43. His team 
production theory is based on one hand on the original “team production 
theory of corporate law” introduced by Blair and Stout in 199944 and, on the 
other, on the contractarian, hypothetical bargain approach suggested by 
Korobkin and Baird. While the latter authors do not question the distinct and 
unique role of insolvency law, LoPucki considers corporate reorganisation as ‘a 
contract term by which creditors and shareholders agree to subordinate their 
legal rights to the preservation of the going concern’.45 
Under the team production theory, the corporation is not “owned” by the 
shareholders or by the creditors (upon insolvency). The corporation is seen as a 
function, whose membership is given to all individuals who make firm-specific 
                                                                    
41 This conclusion is shared by other authors who consequently adopt the same ex-ante 
maximisation approach. See, among others: LM LoPucki, ‘A Team Production Theory of 
Bankruptcy Reorganization’ (2004) 57(3) Vand. L. Rev. 741. 
42 The word “risk-taker” is used as a synonym of “risk bearer” throughout this work. 
43 LoPucki (n 41). 
44 MM Blair and LA Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ (1999) 85 Vand. L. Rev. 
247. Under the team production theory of corporate law, any corporation is a ‘team’ of 
members. These members - who include stockholders, creditors, executives but also employees, 
suppliers, customers, local governments, regulatory agencies and others - delegate the board of 
directors to act for the benefit of the company. Because they own the company, they are entitled 
to something more than simply compensation for their work.  
45 LoPucki (n 41) 743. 
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investments. When an insolvency event occurs, the directors would be left in 
full control, and if reorganisation was possible, they would be required to share 
the entitlements of the ailing corporation to all its members. The directors 
would act as trustees and share the company’s assets according to the 
entitlements of each interested party. 
This proposal suffers from a primary deficiency: its scope. It is conceived for 
large companies and it can operate primarily among sophisticated players. 
Critics also challenged its (re)distributive focus (shared by Rasmussen and 
Schwartz’s theory), since it would expose ‘the interests of non-participating 
creditors to the redistributional impulses of the active, knowledgeable 
participants’.46 
Furthermore, some authors concluded, albeit indirectly, that we already live in 
a world where ‘bankruptcy (i.e. insolvency law) is a backup’,47 since the leading 
creditors could opt for pre-pack or auction procedures (either inside or outside 
a statutory rescue framework) whenever they perceive the latter are in their 
best interest. 
Finally, it was highlighted that in a market where companies finance themselves 
from several sources (which is especially true for large corporations), debtors 
have to deal with manifold (categories of) creditors, who seldom have uniform 
expectations when a company fails the repayment of its loans. Negotiating ex-
ante with all or the majority of them may prove very expensive and ultimately 
utopian.  
These observations prove that ‘[t]he case in which Schwartz’s proposed solution 
fails is not some rarity; it is the norm’48 (and the same goes for LoPucki’s 
considerations). Nevertheless, these theories might have leverage as ‘if there is a 
possibility that free contracting over bankruptcy systems would increase welfare, 
and if there otherwise is nothing wrong with free contracting, then free 
contracting should be permitted’.49 It is not surprising, therefore, that other 
                                                                    
46 LM LoPucki, ‘Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz’ (1999) 109(2) Yale L.J. 317, 342. 
47 FH Easterbrook, ‘Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?’ (1990) 27 J. Financ. Econ. 411, 416. 
48 LoPucki (n 46) 329. 
49 Schwartz, ‘Bankruptcy Contracting’ (n 3) 344. 
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authors tried to combine “the best” aspects of these approaches.50 However, as 
for Rasmussen and Schwartz’s proposals, what is challenged is only the 
exclusivity, not the existence of the insolvency framework. 
2.2(a) Autonomy-Based Remedies in Domestic Cases 
Law in practice differs from printed statutes. This sub-section investigates if 
and to what extent autonomy-based proposals work in practice. The goal is to 
determine if these proposals may present a comprehensive alternative to an 
insolvency system characterised by discrete and mandatory rules that deviate 
from contract law tenets.  
The linkage between insolvency and contracts is not restricted to procedures 
involving companies operating in certain sectors of the economy or within or 
across jurisdiction. Therefore, this thesis carries out an analysis of autonomy-
based remedies in a wide array of situations, starting with domestic cases.51 The 
following sections will extend the scrutiny to cross-border cases and asset-
segregated industries. 
- 
Several studies have been carried out to demonstrate if and to what extent 
debtors can sidestep the mandatory nature of insolvency law.52 These studies 
                                                                    
50 See the proposal for a contextual model by K Gross, Failure and Forgiveness - Rebalancing the 
Bankruptcy System (Yale University Press: New Haven, 2009). According to her proposal, 
insolvency law should be based upon three pillars (debtor, creditors and community), who 
would not compete or dominate each other’s. The author concludes that insolvency law shall be 
treated as a ‘vehicle for social change. […] Many suggest that bankruptcy should not be the 
panacea for all social ills. Let the bankruptcy resolve just the allocation of limited resources among 
creditors. […] But the law can, and frequently is, a vehicle for social change. […] We should not let 
the opportunity to intervene slip by’ (249). 
51 “Domestic cases” are insolvency procedures with no cross-border implications. A procedure 
has a cross-border implication not only when the debtor’s assets are spread in more than one 
jurisdiction, but also when its contracts are subject to all but the lex concursus. The 
circumstance that the debtor’s creditors are foreign may not affect the nature of the procedure, 
which may still be governed by the substantive and procedural rules of a single jurisdiction. In 
the latter case, we are in front of a domestic insolvency procedure.   
52 See, among others: Roe (n 30); Bebchuk (n 34) (proposing a new method to divide the 
reorganisation pie among the participants in rescue procedures);  Bowers, ‘Groping and Coping’ 
(n 26) (stating that insolvency law can never be made to work as it is supposed to and can never 
be fixed); Rasmussen (n 3); Bowers, ‘Rehabilitation’ (n 26) (arguing that nobody has yet offered 
a persuasive set of reasons to alter or overturn the set of property and contract rights granted 
by general law); A Schwartz, ‘Contracting About Bankruptcy’ (1997) 13(1) J. L. Econ. & Org. 
1227 (arguing that the prohibition on contracting for preferred bankruptcy procedures should 
be lifted because it exacerbates underinvestment); Schwartz ‘A Contract Theory’ (n 3) 
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generally conclude that debtors (and creditors) can rely on a multitude of 
contracting-out mechanisms,53 and that courts are prepared to recognize their 
enforceability.54 However, the same studies prove that these remedies are 
frequently used to refinance or restructure existing indebtedness, rather than to 
contract out of insolvency law.  
One of the best known and most widely accepted mechanism to forgo strict 
observance of insolvency law is represented by “stay waivers”, contractual 
covenants (generally imposed by secured lenders) which nullify the automatic 
stay (as it is referred to in the U.S.) or the moratorium (as it is called in the U.K.) 
on creditor enforcement actions during Chapter 11 or administration 
procedures.55  
These provisions are particularly common in the U.S. In the past, they were 
generally deemed unenforceable.56 However, nowadays courts adopt a case-by-
                                                                                                                                                                                               
(proposing a contract-based bankruptcy system where the debtor would need to negotiate 
changes only with the most recent creditor); BE Adler and I Ayres, ‘A Dilution Mechanism for 
Valuing Corporations in Bankruptcy’ (2001) 111(1) Yale L.J. 83 (introducing and testing a new 
“dilution” approach for valuation of companies in formal insolvency procedures); DG Baird and 
RK Rasmussen, ‘The End of Bankruptcy’ (2002) 55(3) Stanford L. Rev. 751 (arguing that the 
ability to sell entire corporations and divisions as going concerns on the market eliminates the 
need for a collective forum where players agree on a reorganisation effort); BE Adler, ‘A 
Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization After Chrysler and General Motors’ (2010) 18 Am. 
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 305 (arguing that legal reform is required to ensure that creditors are 
granted the protection bargained in their contracts). 
53 While this thesis mentions only ‘stay waivers’ and ‘contractual standstills’, parties have 
conceived a variety of mechanisms that share with them the contractual nature and 
deregulatory purpose. These include among others amendments, participations, debt buy-
backs, inter-creditor agreements, and make-whole provisions. For a detailed analysis of their 
enforceability in the Anglo-American context, see J Bromley and others, ‘Arriving at a 
Compromise with, and Identifying Key Stakeholders (…)’ in C Mallon and other (eds), The Law 
and Practice of Restructuring in the UK and the US (2nd edn OUP: Oxford, 2017). 
Due to their level of sophistication, they have been defined as ‘keyhole surgery alternatives to the 
more radical procedures […]. For some companies, they will be all that is required to enable a 
return to full health’, 132. 
54 The attitude of courts towards contractual opt-outs is much debated. For a rather sombre 
look of current judicial practice: LM LoPucki, Courting Failure: How Competition for Big Cases is 
Corrupting Bankruptcy Courts (Michigan University Press: Ann Arbor, 2006). For a more 
positive analysis: DA Skeel, Jr., ‘Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on 
Delaware’ (1998) 1 Del. L. Rev. 1; DA Skeel, Jr., ‘What’s So Bad about Delaware?’ (2001) 54 Vand. 
L. Rev. 309.  
55 S.362 11 U.S. Code and Sch. B1, para 43 IA 1986. 
56 Re Weitzen, 3 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1933); accord. Continental Ins. Co. v Thorpe Insulation Co. 
(Re Thorpe Insulation Co.), 671 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2012), where the 9th Circuit held that ‘public 
policy prevents a debtor from waiving the prepetition protection of the Bankruptcy Code’ (1026). 
With a similar approach: Bank of China v Huang (Re Huang), 275 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 
2002); Nat'l Hockey League v Moyes, No. CV-10-01036-PHX-GMS, 2015 WL 7008213 (D. Ariz. 
Nov. 12, 2015).  
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case valuation and set specific standards for the recognition of their validity.57 If 
waivers have been negotiated as part of forbearance agreements58 or a failed 
renegotiation plan,59 their validity is generally upheld by the courts.  
Stay waivers are usually complemented by less controversial provisions, such 
as contractual standstills (also called “forbearance agreements”). These 
clauses prevent the signatory parties from accelerating the crisis of the 
distressed debtor by filing for insolvency proceedings. In the standstill period, 
the debtor tries to negotiate a set of permanent amendments or a full balance 
sheet restructuring with the borrowers.  
These provisions cannot be characterised as contractual remedies to 
insolvency, since they only temporarily affect the right of a party to file: they do 
not waive that right. Accordingly, their validity is usually upheld both in 
England and in the U.S., provided that they have not been unilaterally imposed 
but agreed after exhaustive negotiations and that they contain safeguards 
against an abuse of minority stakeholders.60 
                                                                    
57 For instance, in Re Bryan Road, Llc, 382 B.R. 844 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008), the court held that it 
would consider the following factors before deciding if a stay relief agreement could be 
enforced: (i) sophistication of waiving party; (ii) consideration for waiver, including creditor’s 
risk and length of time covered by waiver; (iii) whether other parties are affected; and (iv) 
feasibility of debtor’s plan. The court recognised the enforceability of the waiver in this case. It 
concluded that courts should look ‘to totality of circumstances in each particular case in deciding 
whether “cause” exists to grant relief from automatic stay’ by reason of 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(d)(1), at 
854. 
In Re Alexander SRP Apartments, Llc, No. 12-20272, 2012 WL 1910088 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Apr. 20, 
2012), Lamar J held that “appropriate circumstances” may justify a waiver. He concluded that, in 
the case in front of him, these circumstances were proven since (1) the waiver was not inserted 
in the initial loan documents, and in renegotiating the original terms of the agreement 
significant concessions were granted by the lender. Additionally (2), the borrower was a 
sophisticated, knowledgeable, and experienced developer, and (3) there was no fact attendant 
to the transaction which revealed fraud, mistake, coercion, or any other factor where public 
policy would negate the waiver. Finally (4), no other creditors or parties in interest have 
objected to the motion for stay relief, despite the fact that they could be harmed by its approval.  
58 Re BGM Pasadena, Llc (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2016), where the court held that waivers that are 
approved after notice and an opportunity for hearing in the context of an earlier bankruptcy 
case are enforceable. Followed by Re Triple A&R Capital Inv. Inc., 519 B.R. 581 (Bankr. D.P.R. 
2014). 
59 This is a plan negotiated as part of an informal, private workout where the debtor attempted 
and managed to persuade the creditors to accept an amendment of the original conditions of the 
contracts that regulated their relationship on the promise of higher payoff.  
60 This risk surfaces whenever these clauses recognise standstill rights to a qualified majority. 
To protect the rights of dissenting lenders, the legislator introduced some safeguards in the law: 
see, for instance, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. s. 77(b) (2010). Under common law, 
the courts established that this right can be exercised only in good faith and for the purpose for 
which it was conferred (Redwood Master Fund Ltd v TD Bank Europe Ltd [2002] EWHC 2703 
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As a matter of fact, courts still follow a critical, presumptively negative 
approach towards the enforceability of pre-bankruptcy waivers only in cases 
involving single asset debtors,61 even though in these cases the presumption is 
rebuttable by the creditor who holds the waiver. 
Even more striking in their effect is the resort to pre-package rescue 
procedures. First introduced in practice in England,62 they have quickly gained 
the favour of the industry and practitioners.63 Henceforth, they have rapidly 
spread to several western jurisdictions, despite the lukewarm reaction of 
several insolvency academics64 and insistent calls for regulation or, at least, 
prevention of their abusive use.65 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
(Ch), [2006] 1 BCLC 149) and only if it is in the interest of the creditors on a whole (see British 
America Nickel Corp Ltd v MJ O’Brien Ltd [1927] AC 369 (PC)).  
61 Re DB Capital Holdings, Llc, 454 B.R. 804 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2011); Re Intervention Energy 
Holdings, Llc, 553 B.R. 258 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016). 
62 In reality, pre-packaged deals have been a common feature of commercial practice in 
continental Europe since the 18th century. See D de Ruysscher, ‘Business Rescue, Turnaround 
Management, and the Legal Regime of Default and Insolvency in Western History (Late Middle 
Ages to Present Day)’ in J Adriaanse and JP van der Rest (eds), Turnaround Management and 
Bankruptcy (Routledge: London, 2017) 35.  
63 Among others: N Crouch and S Amirbeaggi, 'Pre-packs: A Legitimate Means to Phoenix an 
Insolvent Company' (2011) 23(1) Australian Insolvency Journal 30. 
64 Pre-pack administration has been much criticised in some quarters in recent years. 
Opponents of the process have said that it lacks transparency, with deals negotiated in secret 
behind closed doors. Allegations have been made that the process does not result in the best 
value being achieved for businesses. See, for instance: J Moulton, ‘The Uncomfortable Edge of 
Propriety – Pre-packs or Just Stitch-ups? (2005) Recovery 2; M Ellis, ‘The Thin Line in the Sand’ 
(2006) Recovery 3; P Walton, ‘Pre-packaged Administration — Trick or Treat?’ (2006) 19 
Insolv. Int. 113. But: R Singh, ‘Jon Moulton Makes U-Turn on Pre-Packs’, Accountancy Age (18 
June 2010); C Bowes, ‘Pre-packs: A Solution for Struggling Businesses?’ Real Business (30 
January 2012) <http://realbusiness.co.uk/article/10382-pre-packs-a-solution-for-struggling-
businesses> accessed 17 September 2018; B Scott, ‘Private Equity Defends Pre-packs’ Real 
Business (30 January 2012) <http://realbusiness.co.uk/article/10392-private-equity-defends-
pre-packs> accessed 17 September 2018.  
Concern around pre-packing in the mid-2000s led to the creation of a statement of insolvency 
practice devoted to it (SIP 16): <https://www.icaew.com/en/technical/insolvency/sips-
regulations-and-guidance/statements-of-insolvency-practice/statements-of-insolvency-
practice-sips-england> accessed 17 September 2018.   
65 Calls for reform have been pressing even in England and Wales where in 2014, the Secretary 
of State for Business, Innovation and Skills commissioned a report on pre-package 
administration. This report - T Graham CBE, Graham Review into Pre-Pack Administration: 
Report to The Rt Hon Vince Cable MP (The Insolvency Service, 16 June 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/graham-review-into-pre-pack-
administration> accessed 17 September 2018, known as “Graham Review” - was designed to 
have a more objective picture of the situation, as well as to promote trust and transparency in 
the use of pre-packs. It concluded that, while there still is place for pre-packs in the UK’s 
insolvency landscape, there is also a need for some major improvements to how they are 
administered. 
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Pre-pack sales consist of informal workouts with selected creditors rendered 
enforceable to the totality of the cohort thanks to a rubber-stamp approval by 
the competent court. In other words, pre-pack sales mean ‘[a]rranging the sale 
of all or part of a company’s undertaking before formal insolvency is entered, with 
the sale to be executed at or soon after the appointment of an administrator’.66 
Given to the magnitude of the debate on pre-packs, it is pertinent to restrict the 
analysis to a less debated, but potentially even more contentious exception to 
the enforceability of statutory rules: ipso facto or termination clauses. 
Ipso facto is a Latin phrase, directly translated as "by the fact itself", which 
means that a certain phenomenon is a resultant effect of the action in question, 
instead of being brought about by a previous action. It is a term of art used in 
philosophy, law and science.  
In contractual practice, ipso facto clauses are negotiated to determine the 
automatic default and termination of an agreement due to a company's 
bankruptcy, insolvency or shaky financial condition. They operate in the 
interest of the non-defaulting party. 
The enforceability of ipso facto clauses is particularly controversial in 
insolvency cases. Should debtors wish to reorganise their activity, the 
disappearance of key suppliers would present the final blow to their hopes. If a 
supply contract included an ipso facto clause, the non-defaulting party (i.e. the 
creditor) could rely on it to prevent any future performance under that contract 
unless certain conditions (such as payment of outstanding balance and 
provision of additional warranties for future performance) were met. The 
suppliers could therefore hold the rescue procedure to ransom, thus giving rise 
                                                                    
66 Graham Review, at [5.15]. According to SIP 16, pre-packs are ‘an arrangement under which the 
sale of all or part of the company’s business or assets is negotiated with a purchaser prior to the 
appointment of an administrator and the administrator effects the sale immediately on, or shortly 
after, appointment’: R3, ‘Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 – Version 3’ (effective from 1st 
November 2015) <https://www.r3.org.uk/what-we-do/publications/professional/statements-
of-insolvency-practice/e-and-w/sip-16-list> accessed 17 September 2018. 
Some authors, however, tried to explain their success. Particularly convincing is Skeel’s 
observation that - unlikely purely out-of-court alternatives to insolvency law - pre-packs 
require the involvement of legal practitioners, as well as a (limited) contribution from courts. 
Therefore, both judiciary and lawyers’ lobbies are willing to turn a blind eye on some of their 
most striking abuses - see Skeel (n 22) 228. The author argued that while ‘bankruptcy lawyers 
find true waivers pernicious’, the same could not be said for pre-packs.  
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to anti-common-type situations. This prompted calls to prevent their 
enforceability, at least whenever the distressed company is operating as a going 
concern in a formal insolvency procedure.67 
However, creditors counter-argue that freedom of contract is paramount68 and 
that they could not be forced to supply goods for free. In addition, terms and 
conditions negotiated by the parties in solvent times affect the transaction 
price. A sudden change of these terms to favour only one of the parties in the 
deal appeared unjust and unfair. 
More pro-debtor69 laws tend to ban the enforceability of ipso facto clauses, at 
least when the company operates as a going concern in a formal insolvency 
                                                                    
67 Recent studies also demonstrated that in almost half (49%) of the surveyed cases, key trade 
suppliers demanded ransom payments or attempted to renegotiate contract terms as a 
condition of continuing to supply in trading insolvencies: R3: Association of Business Recovery 
Professionals, ‘Membership Survey - Termination Clauses’ (London, 2013), 
<https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/policy/research_reports/R3_Membership_Survey_
Termination_Clauses_09_August_2013.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018. 
68 Freedom of contract represents a pivotal, public policy principle especially in England. In 
Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1874-75) LR 19 Eq. 462, at 465 Ct of 
Chancery, Sir George Jessel, the Master of the Rolls, stated that ‘[…] if there is one thing more 
than another public policy requires it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall 
have the utmost liberty of contracting, that their contracts when entered into freely and 
voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of Justice. Therefore, you have this 
paramount public policy to consider – that you are not likely to interfere with this freedom of 
contract’. More recently, in Prime Sight Ltd v Lavarello [2013] UKPC 22, [2014] AC 436 [47], 
Toulson LJ held that ‘parties are ordinarily free to contract on whatever terms they choose and 
court’s role is to enforce them’. 
69 The distinction between pro-debtor and pro-creditor jurisdictions comes from PR Wood, 
Principles of International Solvency (Sweet and Maxwell: London, 1995). While the partition he 
proposed may no longer be actual, the offered criteria are still valid. In particular, the author 
classifies as ‘pro-creditor’ any insolvency jurisdiction whose main focus is to ‘help the creditor 
escape the debacle, e.g. by recognizing a wide security or a set-off’, while ‘pro-debtor’ insolvency 
jurisdictions seek to ‘aggrandize the debtor’s estate, e.g. by restricting security, refusing 
insolvency set-off, […]’ (36). For a challenge to the standard characterization as U.S. law being 
‘pro-debtor’ and U.K. law being ‘pro-creditor’, see: G McCormack, ‘Apples and Oranges? 
Corporate Rescue and Functional Convergence in the US and UK’ (2009) 18 Int. Insolv. Rev. 109. 
It is acknowledged that these labels tend to over-simplify an otherwise very complex 
classification problem. As a general rule, pro-creditor systems tend not to infringe significantly 
on the rights bargained by creditors in solvent times. On the opposite end of the spectrum, pro-
debtor systems erode those rights whenever it appears to be appropriate to achieve the 
rehabilitation of the distressed business. Among others: M Pomerleano and W Shaw, Corporate 
Restructuring. Lessons from Experience (The World Bank: Washington D.C. 2005) 308. More 
recently, it was observed that traditional pro-debtor countries such as the U.S. tend to have a 
legislation that protect the interests of managers and shareholders to a wider extent and in a 
more comprehensive manner that pro-creditor jurisdictions such as the U.K. At the same time, it 
was observed that secured creditors enjoy a similar level of protection in both pro-creditor and 
pro-debtor countries, even if the form of the protection is different: G McCormack, Corporate 
Rescue Law – An Anglo-American Perspective (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 2008) 288, 292-298. 
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procedure. This approach is being followed, among others, in the U.S. and 
Canada. 
Under Canadian insolvency legislation ipso facto clauses are unenforceable. 
Section 34 of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act provides that a person 
may not terminate, alter agreements or claim accelerated payment or forfeiture 
of the term under any agreement solely because insolvency proceedings were 
commenced or the company went insolvent.70  
A similar approach is followed in the United States, where §.365(e)(1) of the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code makes it illegal for a party to terminate an executory 
contract on the basis of insolvency of the counterparty alone. The U.S. narrative 
is further analysed below in sub-section 2.2(a)(i). 
Pro-creditor countries tend to adopt a more cautious approach when it comes 
to restricting the enforceability of clauses freely negotiated between the parties. 
They often have a widespread belief that ‘[t]he freezing or stay on self-help 
termination is unquestionably one of the most draconian and controversial of all 
stays, because of its massive impact on transactions’.71 Nevertheless, even in the 
country where sanctity of contract is the paramount principle of commercial 
law [the United Kingdom],72 certain carve-outs have been introduced by the 
law.  
A similar approach was followed in Australia, where there were no restrictions 
on creditors or third parties exercising rights of termination under executory 
contracts. Specifically, there was no such restriction for corporate failures, since 
Australian bankruptcy law rendered those clauses void if the relevant obligor 
                                                                    
70 s. 34 Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (R.S.C., 1985, c.C-36). 
71 Wood (n 69). See further: R Suchak, ‘Corporate Rescue Proceedings and the Enforcement of 
Ipso Facto Termination Clauses: A Comparison of the English and US Approaches’ (2011) 8(2) 
Int. C.R. 131. 
72 Associated Japanese Bank (Int’l) Ltd v Credit du Nord SA [1989] 1 WLR 255 (HC/QB) 257 
where Steyn J held that ‘[t]hroughout the law of contract two themes regularly recur – respect for 
the sanctity of contract and the need to give effect to the reasonable expectations of honest men’. 
Similarly, in Re Collins' Application [1975] 30 P&CR 527, 531 the Lands Tribunal (Mr Douglas 
Frank QC) - in weighting the balance between public interest and private rights - considered 
that ‘for an application to succeed on the ground of public interest it must be shown that that 
interest is so important and immediate as to justify the serious interference with private rights and 
the sanctity of contract’. 
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becomes insolvent.73 Only essential services,74 leases and rents could not be 
interrupted should an insolvency event arise.  
Australia has, however, recently experienced a period of regulatory 
reconsideration. This has led to the adoption, by means of the Treasury Laws 
Amendment (2017 Enterprise Incentives No. 2) Act 2017 (Cth), of “pro-debtor” 
solutions similar to those currently implemented in the U.S. and Canada. 
Changes to the discipline of ipso facto clauses apply to all contracts signed on or 
after 1st July 2018 and the English government is also exploring the opportunity 
to introduce a general ban on the enforceability of ipso facto clauses in 
insolvency.75 
More liberal approaches are, on the other hand, advocated and followed in 
Singapore, where restrictions on the enforceability of ipso facto clauses in 
formal or hybrid insolvency procedures were deemed unnecessary by the 
government. The evolution of the laws in all these three countries (England, 
Australia and Singapore) is further analysed in sub-section 2.2(a)(ii). 
                                                                    
73 §.301(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1996 (Cth). 
74 S.600F of the Corporations Act, according to which ‘if (a) a relevant authority of an eligible 
company requests, or authorises someone else to request, a person or authority to supply an 
essential service to the company in Australia; and (b) the company owes an amount to the supplier 
in respect of the supply of the essential service before the effective day; the supplier must not: (c) 
refuse to comply with the request for the reason only that the amount is owing; or (d) make it a 
condition of the supply of the essential service pursuant to the request that the amount is to be 
paid’. According to the section, essential services include provision of electricity, gas, water and 
a carriage service within the meaning of the Telecommunications Act 1997. 
75 Insolvency Service, Insolvency and Corporate Governance: Government Response (26 August 
2018) 60 at [5.97] 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_d
ata/file/736163/ICG_-_Government_response_doc_-
_24_Aug_clean_version__with_Minister_s_photo_and_signature__AC.pdf> accessed 17 September 
2018. 
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2.2(a)(i) Pro-Debtor Laws and Carve-Outs: The 
Case of the United States 
Under §.365(e)(1) 11 U.S. Code, 
notwithstanding any provision in a contract, 
lease or other law: 
an executory contract or unexpired lease 
[…] may not be terminated or modified […] 
at any time after the commencement of the 
case solely [emphasis added] because of a 
provision in such contract or lease which is 
conditioned on: 
- The insolvency or final condition of the 
debtor; 
- The commencement of a case under this 
title; 
- The appointment or taking possession by 
a trustee […] or custodian. 
The only cases in which ipso facto clauses are 
legitimate are when: (1) the applicable law 
excuses a party from accepting performance 
from or rendering performance to the trustee 
or the assignee and the party does not consent 
to assumption; or (2) the contract is to make a 
loan, extend debt financing or financial accommodation to the debtor or to issue 
security of the debtor.  
The “ipso facto” principle is reflected in §.541(c)(1) and §.545 11 U.S. Code with 
respect to statutory liens. Nevertheless, the Code does not interfere with the 
validity of restrictions that apply both inside and outside of insolvency: only 
those which apply specifically by reason of an insolvency event are made void.  
THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE CASE 
Membership in the Chicago 
Board of Trade was restricted to 
people, upon payment of a $25k 
fee. Corporations could trade 
only if two of their directors 
were CBoT members.  
A bankrupt member of CBoT 
wanted to sell its membership 
for profit. While he was not 
indebted towards CBoT 
members, he was also personally 
responsible for the debt of its 
corporation towards the CBoT. 
The other members, therefore, 
objected to the transfer 
according to the CBoT’s articles 
of incorporation. They wanted to 
be paid before agreeing on the 
transfer. 
The bankrupt’s trustee opined 
that such a clause breached 
federal insolvency rules. If 
enacted, CBoT creditors (of the 
corporation) could enforce their 
claims in preference over the 
bankrupt’s creditors (or block 
the sale).  
The Supreme Court reversed the 
lower courts’ rulings by holding 
that this limitation did not 
represent a breach of U.S. federal 
insolvency rules.  
In other words, rules of exchange 
that did not apply only by reason 
of insolvency are not ipso facto 
clauses under U.S. federal law. 
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This principle has been set out in the Chicago Board of Trade,76 where the 
Supreme Court held that restrictions on the sale of a “seat” in the Chicago Board 
of Trade which apply outside bankruptcy were valid also in formal insolvency 
procedures.  
Notwithstanding their unenforceability, ipso facto clauses still abound in 
formbooks and pre-printed contracts. This is not only because they were 
enforceable before the 1978 amendments, but also because they often appear in 
conjunction with other clauses (e.g. reference to state insolvency proceedings) 
that might still render them enforceable in case of insolvency. 
This appears to be the case with reference to the second exception mentioned 
above, traditionally referred to as a “safe harbor” for financial contracts, swaps, 
repurchase agreements (“repos”) and similar transactions.77 Justifications for 
such exceptions, however, have proven controversial. 
It has been argued that the main purpose of limited-in-scope safe harbor 
provisions was to preserve liquidity and minimize volatility in the marketplace 
in the event that the counter-party to such transactions might become a debtor 
under the Bankruptcy Code. It is also intended that Congress wanted to protect 
the derivative markets from both the disruptive effect of bankruptcy 
proceedings (systemic risk)78 and cherry-picking practices that would allow the 
out-of-money party to retain favourable derivatives, while rejecting 
unfavourable contracts. Safe harbors were enacted to promote stability in 
financial markets.79  
If an automatic stay applied to financial contracts, it would fundamentally alter 
the terms of trade by giving the debtor the ability to gain an advantage from 
                                                                    
76 Chicago Board of Trade v Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924). 
77 Safe-harbor provisions refer to 11 U.S. §§.362(b)(6). 362(b)(7), 362(b)(17), 546, 556, 559, 
560 and 561. They present a set of bankruptcy rules that provide more beneficial treatment to 
counterparties of certain financial and commodity contracts. The benefits include: (a) the 
enforceability of the contractual right to terminate, liquidate or accelerate the contract (ipso 
facto clauses); (b) exceptions from the automatic stay with regard to rights of netting and set-
off; and (c) exemptions from the trustee’s powers to avoid certain transactions.  
78 P Marchetti, ‘Amending the Flaws in the Safe Harbors of the Bankruptcy Code: Guarding 
Against Systemic Risk in the Financial Markets and Adding Stability to the System’ (2014-2015) 
31 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 305, 308. 
79 ER Morrison and others, ‘Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors’ (2014) 69(4) Bus. Law. 1015, 
1016. 
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favourable price movements, while limiting its liability for unfavourable ones 
(cherry-picking). The problem arises in particular with reference to 
“systemically important corporations”,80 whose principal assets include large 
bundles of financial contracts (e.g. Lehman Brothers).  
Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(‘BACPA’) 2005 and the Financial Netting Improvement Act (‘FNIA’) 2006 – 
despite suggestions that safe harbors should be repealed81 – extended the scope 
of safe harbor protections. These laws broadened the definitions of certain safe 
harbor agreements, created greater uniformity and clarity and tried to reduce 
systemic risk in the marketplace by minimizing the risk of disruption in the 
event of one party’s insolvency.  
It is therefore possible to argue that, in the financial sector, the enforceability of 
ipso facto clauses represents the rule, rather than the exception.   
Nevertheless, the majority of commentators find the justifications behind the 
recognition of safe harbors only partially satisfactory. They observe that ‘the 
unique nature of such financial and derivative transactions did not significantly 
harm the debtor or unnecessarily deprive it of a valuable asset needed for 
reorganization’.82 Moreover, if safe harbors allowed the derivative markets to 
                                                                    
80 There is no such definition in the literature. However, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision relies on selected criteria (size, interconnectedness, complexity, lack of 
substitutability and global scope) to describe “globally systemically important banks” (‘G-SIBs’). 
G-SIBs are so large and unique that their collapse would cause negative externalities, spill-over 
risks and competitive distortions. As a result, the Committee suggests that they should not be 
allowed to fail: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Globally Systemically Important 
Banks: Updated Assessment Methodology and the Higher Loss Absorbency Requirement’ (Bank 
for International Settlements, July 2013) 3 <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs255.pdf > accessed 
17 September 2018. It is argued that the same criteria and methodology could be used to 
determine what corporations are systemically important at a global, regional or domestic level 
in other sectors of the economy. 
81 FR Edwards and ER Morrison, ‘Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special 
Treatment?’ (2005) 22 Yale J. on Reg., 91; SJ Lubben, ‘Derivatives and Bankruptcy: The Flawed 
Case for Special Treatment’ (2009) 12 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 61; BG Faubus, ‘Narrowing the Bankruptcy 
Safe Harbor for Derivatives to Combat System Risk’ (2010) 59 Duke L.J.  801; SJ Lubben, ‘Repeal 
the Safe Harbors’ (2010) 18 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 319; SJ Lubben, ‘The Bankruptcy Code 
Without Safe Harbors’ (2010) 84 Am. Bankr. L.J. 123; MJ Roe, ‘The Derivatives Market’s 
Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accellerator’ (2011) 63 Stan. L. Rev. 539; DA Skeel, Jr. and 
TH Jackson, ‘Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy’ (2012) 112 Col. L. 
Rev. 152.   
82 EH Gilbane, ‘Testing the Bankruptcy Code Safe Harbours in the Current Financial Crisis’ 
(2010) 18 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 241, 244. Against: P Paech, ‘The Value of Insolvency Safe 
Harbors’ (2016) 36 Oxford J. of Legal Stud. 855 (arguing that the safe harbors increased the 
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function without jeopardizing the stability of the financial system, it is not clear 
why companies like AIG or banks like Northern Rock and Lloyd’s required a 
bailout. This led some commentators to conclude that safe harbors are likely to 
increase systemic risk ‘by fostering a run on the bank’83 and make derivative 
markets more vulnerable in times of systemic crises.84 
They consequently called to repeal85 or at least to limit the scope86 of these 
exceptions. Additionally, they observed that – despite Congress’ efforts – the 
piecemeal approach followed in recognizing these safe harbor provisions has 
led to legal uncertainties. There remain ambiguities about the rights, contracts 
and parties that are protected by these provisions, as well as whether the 
statutory goals are achieved.87 
These scholars argued that some liquidation cases (notably, the AIG case) could 
have been avoided if the safe harbor provisions were narrower in scope.88 They 
considered that safe harbor provisions allowed the beneficiaries either to take 
assets out of the estate or to stop cash flow that would otherwise have been 
beneficial to the distressed company.89  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
efficient use of regulatory capital, because banks were allowed to calculate their capital on the 
basis of net, rather than gross, credit risk exposures).  
83 Lubben, ‘Repeal’ (n 81) 323. 
84 K Ayotte and DA Skeel, Jr., ‘Bankruptcy or Bailouts?’ (2010) 35 J. Corp. L. 469; AJ Levitin, ‘In 
Defense of Bailouts’ (2011) 99 Geo. L.J. 435; AE Wilmarth, Jr., ‘Turning A Blind Eye: Why 
Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall Street’ (2013) U. Cin. L. Rev. 1283; SJ Lubben, ‘Subsidizing 
Liquidity or Subsidizing Markets? Safe Harbors, Derivatives, and Finance’ (2017) 91(3) Am. 
Bankr. L.J. 463. 
85 Edwards and Morrison (n 81); Lubben, ‘Derivatives and Bankruptcy’ (n 81); Lubben, ‘Repeal’ 
(n 81); Lubben, ‘The Bankruptcy Code’ (n 81); CW Mooney, Jr., ‘The Bankruptcy Code’s Safe 
Harbors for Settlement Payments and Securities Contracts: When Is Safe Too Safe?’ (2014) 49 
Tex. Int’l L.J. 245. 
86 F Partnoy and DA Skeel, Jr., ‘The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives’ (2007) 75 U. Cin. L. 
Rev. 1019; M Simkovic, ‘Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008’ (2009) 83 Am. Bankr. L.J. 
253; Roe (n 81); Morrison and others (n 79). 
87 Gilbane (n 82) 246. Against, see: R D’Aversa, Jr. and others, ‘Bankruptcy Code Safe-Harbor 
Protections for Parties to Financial Contracts’ (2006) 22(2) Review of Banking and Financial 
Services 7 (arguing that the reforms introduced by BACPA 2005 and FNIA 2006 presented a 
victory for the capital markets; increased liquidity and promoted stability; and eliminated many 
of the ambiguities under the pre-amendment Bankruptcy Code); MD Sherrill, ‘In Defense of the 
Bankruptcy Code’s Safe Harbors’ (2015) 70(4) Bus. Law. 1007 (arguing, however, that although 
derivative markets may occasionally be the forum for abusive practices, they were likely a net 
positive to American society and safe harbor provisions guarantee their efficient operation).  
88 Lubben, ‘Repeal’ (n 81). 
89 In Lubben’s words, they are considered as ‘windfall gifts to the financial industry and avenues 
for abuse’ (Ibid 321). 
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Recently Jackson called to adopt some form of short stay that would apply to 
the non-defaulting party’s right to terminate and set-off its derivative 
contracts.90 Other commentators advocated for repealing safe harbor 
provisions in relation to payment suspension clauses, flip clauses and walkaway 
clauses91 based on the consideration that markets need clarity and their 
doubted enforceability results in more litigation and less focus (and resources) 
on reorganisation. 
The latter position appears to be more radical and enjoys less support since – 
even if safe harbors were repealed – financial markets are unlikely to return to 
the pre-1978 situation. Legitimate concerns of financial institutions need to be 
addressed. While alternative solutions have been envisaged,92 it seems that the 
Congress intended to extend rather than limit party autonomy to exclude 
certain contracts and clauses from the scope of insolvency law, thus therefore 
enforcing the feeling that the statutory ban on the enforceability of ipso facto 
clauses is more apparent than real.  
This debate over the enforceability of ipso facto clauses and safe harbour 
provisions in the U.S. shows that autonomy-based remedies may in some cases 
lack theoretical justification. In these instances, mandatory insolvency rules that 
deviate from negotiated clauses should be preferred to contractual solutions. 
2.2(a)(ii) Pro-Creditor Laws and Carve-Outs: The Cases of England, Australia 
and Singapore 
Recent reforms and proposals for reform in England and Australia seem to 
suggest the emergence of a more debtor and rescue-friendly approach to 
financial distress in “pro-creditor” countries. This can potentially affect the 
treatment of ipso facto clauses in the law. On the other hand, other pro-creditor 
                                                                    
90 TH Jackson, ‘Building on Bankruptcy: A Revised Chapter 14 Proposal for the Recapitalization, 
Reorganization or Liquidation of Large Financial Institutions’ (Hover Institution, Stanford 
University 2014) <http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/rp-14-july-9-tom-jackson.pdf> 
accessed 17 September 2018. This proposal was part of the “Resolution Project”, a think-tank of 
experts established in Spring 2009 as part of the Hoover Institution’s Working Group on 
Economic Policy who was producing research in the field of bankruptcy law, with the purpose 
of making failure more tolerable <http://www.hoover.org/research-teams/economic-policy-
working-group/resolution-project> accessed 17 September 2018.  
91 Marchetti (n 78) 373-374. 
92 Lubben, ‘Repeal’ (n 81). 
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countries such as Singapore seem to stick to their established set of rules and 
values, while not rejecting a priori pro-rescue approach to insolvent debtors. 
- 
While as a matter of fact ipso facto clauses are enforceable in England,93 even if 
explicitly triggered by an insolvency event, the Insolvency Act 1986 (‘IA 1986’) 
has restricted this right for essential suppliers.94 Additionally, English statutes 
have to be construed according to the established rules and judicial 
interpretation. As reiterated in recent cases, the cohort of creditors is protected 
by the operation of the anti-deprivation principle.95 
Lately, the British government decided to further extend this restriction to the 
autonomy of parties.96 This is to ensure that insolvency practitioners rescuing 
struggling businesses were able to secure the continuation of supplies that are 
essential for the business.97  
Pursuant to s.233 of the Act, the listed suppliers cannot compel future 
performance to the payment of debts incurred before the commencement of the 
insolvency proceeding.98 A further restriction applicable to essential suppliers 
                                                                    
93 For a more detailed review see: C Cooke, ‘National Report for England’ in D Faber (eds), 
Treatment of Contracts in Insolvency (OUP, Oxford 2013); E Vaccari, ‘National Report for 
England’ in J Chuah and E Vaccari (eds), Treatment of Executory Contracts in Insolvency Law: A 
Transnational Study (EE Publishing: Cheltenham, 2019) Manuscript submitted for publication. 
94 s.233 IA (1986). 
95 For a more detailed description of the notion and scope of the anti-deprivation principle in 
common law jurisdictions other than the U.S. see below sub-section 2.2(a)(iii). 
96 The Insolvency (Protection of Essential Supplies) Order 2015 SI 2015/989, which amended 
s.233 and introduced s.233A to the Act. These provisions apply only to contracts entered into on 
or after 1 October 2015. For an analysis, see: V Finch and D Milman, Corporate Insolvency Law: 
Perspectives and Principles (3rd edn, CUP: Cambridge, 2017) 515; IF Fletcher, The Law of 
Insolvency (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2017) 554-555; S Leslie, ‘Changes Made to 
Insolvency Legislation on 1st October 2015’ (2015) 5 C.R. & I. 210. 
97 Proposals to further extend the scope of the definition of external suppliers were included in 
a recent consultation: Insolvency Service, A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework: A 
Consultation on Options for Reform (London, May 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/525523/A
_Review_of_the_Corporate_Insolvency_Framework.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018. For an 
analysis, see: A Gallagher and others, ‘Review of U.K. Corporate Insolvency Framework, the 
Proposals: Is the U.K. Going U.S.-Style?’ (2016) 35(10) Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 26; R Paterson, ‘Winds 
of Change: Corporate Insolvency and Proposed Reform’ (2018) 1 C.R. & I. 17.  
98 Sections 372 and 372A IA 1986 extend this framework to individual voluntary arrangements 
(IVAs). On the powerful position of suppliers of strategic raw materials, see Leyland DAF Ltd v 
Automotive Products Plc [1993] BCC 389 (CA) 400, where the Court of Appeal held that an 
unpaid seller who refuses to supply further goods (with the exception of those listed in s.233 of 
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has been introduced by s.233A of the Act. According to this provision, any 
insolvency-related term of a contract for the supply of essential goods and 
services that seeks to either terminate or vary the terms of the contract where 
the customer entered into a CVA or administration procedure is rendered 
automatically void. 
Even if the case law is not particularly favourable to the suppliers’ 
entitlements,99 the government is keen to promote reforms that assist with 
corporate rescue and ensure higher levels of inclusivity and participation 
among stakeholders.100  
However, the changes introduced in recent laws may be less radical than they 
appear at first glance. For instance, with reference to the recent amendments 
currently introduced to the IA 1986 in England, while the list of suppliers has 
extended since previous iterations and new provisions were added for 
administration and company voluntary arrangements,101 creditors still benefit 
from significant protections.102 Additionally, while courts could void insolvency-
                                                                                                                                                                                               
the Act) to the company until the company meets its debts was not abusing a dominant position 
within the Treaty of Rome 1957, Art. 86. 
99 For instance, in Laverty v British Gas Trading Ltd [2014] EWHC 2721 (Ch), [2015] 2 All E.R. 
430 the court held that suppliers are not entitled to priority for the supply of gas and electricity 
under deemed contract. The supplier sent a notice of termination to the debtor upon his filing 
for administration, which was not disputed by the subsequently appointed liquidators. 
However, the supply company was forced to continue to supply fuel under the Gas Act 1986 and 
the Electricity Act 1986. Despite this circumstance, the court concluded that these expenses did 
not rank as expenses of the administration but were unsecured provable debts under the 
Insolvency Rules 1986 r.13.12. In addition to that, English courts reserved for themselves the 
right to issue orders based on s.233 IA 1986 even if the supplier was incorporated in another 
country - see Re Sahaviriya Steel Industries UK Ltd [2015] EWHC 2726 (Ch), [2016] BCC 450. 
100 See the recent consultations on insolvency and corporate governance (Insolvency Service, 
Insolvency and Corporate Governance (London, 20 March 2018) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_d
ata/file/691857/Condoc_-_Insolvency_and_Corporate_Governance_FINAL_.pdf> accessed 17 
September 2018) and on tax abuse and insolvency (Insolvency Service, Tax Abuse and 
Insolvency: A Discussion Document (London, 11 April 2018) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_d
ata/file/698173/Tax_Abuse_and_Insolvency_A_Discussion_Document.pdf> accessed 17 
September 2018).  
101 s.233A IA 1986. 
102 Under s.233(2) of the Act, suppliers can still make it a condition of the giving of the supply 
that the office-holder personally guarantees future (but not pre-petition) payments. Pursuant to 
s.233A of the Act, termination is still possible: (1) if the cause of the termination is an event that 
occurred after the commencement of the insolvency procedure; (2) if charges incurred after the 
company entered into administration or CVA are not paid for a period exceeding 28 days after 
when the first payment was due; (3) if the office-holder does not provide a personal guarantee 
for the payment of essential supplies received after the commencement of the procedure; (4) 
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related contractual terms to charge higher prices or terminate the contract by 
reason of the debtor’s insolvency filing for administration or company 
voluntary arrangement, the supplier can still: 
a) Rely on other, non-insolvency-related contractual terms for the purpose 
of terminating the contract (similar to what happens under U.S. law). 
Examples may include changes in consumption, or downgraded credit 
rating; 
b) Rely on insolvency-related terms insofar as they relate to other 
insolvency (such as bankruptcy or liquidation) and restructuring (e.g. 
currently schemes of arrangements) procedures. 
Despite that, things are not settled in England, which still seems to be looking to 
a more U.S., pro-debtor approach to achieve a higher ranking in the World 
Bank’s “Resolving Insolvency” Reports.103 Arguably, in 2016104 and 2018105 the 
Insolvency Service launched new consultations aimed at improving the 
corporate insolvency framework and at making this country one of the best 
places in the world to start a business.  
With reference to the determination of which contracts are “essential” (with the 
effect that ipso facto clauses would be null and void), the position of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
when the office-holder or the court consent to the termination (the latter usually in case of 
undue hardship).  
103 Because of a change in methodology in 2014, the U.K. passed from being ranked 7th in the 
2014 Report to 13th in the 2015 and 2016 iterations and 14th in 2017 and 2018: 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/united-kingdom> accessed 17 
September 2018. The Doing Business Report has been criticised for its U.S.-centric methodology, 
for being too concerned with the ‘the law on the books’ rather than on the application of 
statutory rules and for granting higher scores to jurisdictions that favour autonomy-based, out-
of-court solutions and de-regulation practices over statutory ones: G McCormack and R Bork 
(eds), Security Rights and the European Insolvency Regulation (Intersentia: Cambridge, 2017) 
64-66. 
104 Insolvency Service (n 97). The review suggested to: (a) extend the use of statutory 
moratorium (similar to the automatic stay in the U.S.) outside administration procedures to 
allow debtors to develop a rescue plan free from enforcement actions and the need to agree on 
contractual standstills; (b) extend the right of the debtor to protect and maintain essential 
supply contracts; (c) introduce a new flexible rescue plan; and (d) recognise preferential nature 
to rescue finance.  
105 Insolvency Service, Insolvency and Corporate Governance (n 100). This consultation aims at 
introducing new laws that enhance directors’ accountability, reduce the risk of value extraction 
schemes and strengthen corporate governance in pre-insolvency situations. The purpose of the 
consultation, therefore, is not to increase the chances of successful turnaround of distressed 
debtors but to reduce the risks that viable companies are made insolvent by the unethical or 
unprofessional behaviour of its directors and their advisers.  
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government is that their scope should be further widened (despite the latest 
changes which became enforceable on 15 October 2015).106 While not as far 
reaching as introducing a U.S.-style ipso facto ban, that proposal would have 
nevertheless extended the existing exemptions to freedom of contract laid 
down in ss.233 and 233A of the Act to any type of contract for the provision of 
goods and services.  
Interestingly, this position was supported, albeit with a narrow margin, by 
respondents.107 However, 41% of them disagreed with the criteria proposed by 
the government to identify essential contracts as they were deemed too 
“debtor-friendly”, while others argued that provisions of finance and financial 
services should be excluded from the proposals.108  
The majority of the respondents also observed that the government’s proposal 
did not offer “sufficient safeguards” to suppliers. They further questioned 
whether courts were the proper place to challenge the designation as 
“essential” of a specific contract and they warned about the risks of increased 
litigation, costs and delays in insolvency procedures.109  
The only essential suppliers (‘Bristol Wessex Billing Services Ltd’) who 
submitted an opinion to the Insolvency Service110 argued for the extension of 
the scope of the definition. However, Bristol Wessex Billing Services Ltd would 
not be impacted by any reform in the area (since the services it provides are 
already considered “essential”).111  
                                                                    
106 Insolvency Service (n 97). 
107 Insolvency Service, Summary of Responses: A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework 
(London, September 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555939/S
ummary_of_responses_-_final.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018. 
108 Mirroring the statutory treatment of these contracts under U.S. law, described above in sub-
section 2.2(a)(i). 
109 Insolvency Service (n 107) 8. 
110 Bristol Wessex Billing Services Ltd and RWE npower. Other respondents were primarily large 
businesses (3), law firms (13), universities (5, either as institutions or as individual professors) 
and trade bodies (16).  
111 For a more in-depth analysis of the treatment of executory contracts in English law, see 
Cooke (n 93). For a more detailed analysis of the impact of recent reforms and proposals for 
reform on the subject, see Vaccari (n 93). 
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Recently, the government published a combined response112 to both this and the 
2018 Insolvency and Corporate Governance113 consultation. Rather surprisingly, 
in an audacious move which – if enacted – would represent a significant step 
towards the adoption of a pro-rescue, debtor-oriented approach to corporate 
insolvency, the government stated that it no longer intended to require the 
designation of essential suppliers by the debtor or its office-holder. Instead, it 
wanted to legislate: 
‘to prohibit the enforcement of ‘termination clauses’ by a supplier in 
contracts for the supply of goods and services where the clause allows a 
contract to be terminated on the ground that one of the parties of the 
contract has entered formal insolvency’.114 
This is a very bold proposal, especially for England where freedom of contract 
has always represented a pivotal principle115 and previous attempts to 
introduce such a ban – such as in the standing committee stage of the EA 2002 – 
failed spectacularly.116 
If this proposal was enacted, England would join Australia in implementing a 
U.S.-style general ban on the enforceability of termination clauses. To sum up, 
even with reference to pro-creditor countries, consideration for party 
autonomy has never justified a full carve-out from insolvency rules and existing 
proposals for reform seem to further restrict the contractual power to sidestep 
statutory insolvency remedies. 
The same evolution in the law can be observed in Australia. While traditionally 
labelled as a pro-creditor jurisdiction, the country is trying to embrace a more 
pro-debtor and pro-rescue attitude. There has long been a view that to 
encourage rescue, ipso facto clauses should not be allowed to operate in 
insolvency. The Harmer Report117 recommended that these clauses be void 
                                                                    
112 Insolvency Service (n 75). 
113 Insolvency Service, Insolvency and Corporate Governance (n 100).  
114 Insolvency Service (n 75) 60. 
115 See above ftn 68. 
116 F Toube and J Rumley, ‘A Brave New World? Should the UK Ban Ipso-Facto Clauses in Non-
Executory Contracts?’ (2018) 31(3) Insolv. Int. 78. 
117 Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘General Insolvency Inquiry - Report No. 45’ (Canberra, 
1988). 
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against a liquidator or an administrator. However, this recommendation was 
not implemented in the subsequent legislative bills.  
The Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (‘CAMAC’) considered this 
matter in 1998 (in its report Corporate Voluntary Administration)118 and in 
2004 (in its report Rehabilitating Large and Complex Enterprises in Financial 
Difficulties).119 On both occasions, CAMAC opposed any change to the current 
law. While CAMAC recognised the advantages of restrictions on ipso facto 
clauses when a company is in voluntary administration, it gave greater weight 
to countervailing commercial considerations. Only the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services in its 2004 Report Corporate 
Insolvency Laws: A Stocktake120 was more responsive to concerns about ipso 
facto clauses. 
On the other hand, ARITA and other commentators121 considered the 
enforceability of ipso facto clauses to be inconsistent with the overall purpose of 
Australia’s insolvency legislation and, in particular, with the objective of 
promoting corporate rescue and rehabilitation. As Benson observed,  
‘[w]here such clauses are effective, a company often finds itself without 
key suppliers or, worse still, losing control of its enterprise through the 
appointment of receivers and managers by a secured creditor. This 
potentially erodes any enterprise value that may have been preserved 
through an appropriate deed of company arrangement’.122 
                                                                    
118 Legal Committee of the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, ‘Corporate Voluntary 
Administration - Report’ (Canberra, 1998) 
<http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byheadline/pdffinal+reports+1998/$file/corpor
ate_voluntary_administration_final_report,_june_1998.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018. 
119 Corporations and Market Advisory Committee, ‘Rehabilitating Large and Complex 
Enterprises in Financial Difficulties’ (Canberra, 2004) 
<http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byheadline/pdffinal+reports+2004/$file/large_
enterprises_reporr_oct04.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018. 
120 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, ‘Corporate 
Insolvency Laws: a Stocktake’ (Canberra, 2004) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/committee/corporations_ctte/completed_inquiries/
2002-04/ail/report/ail.pdf> accessed 21 May 2018. 
121 N Mirzai, ‘Ipso facto clauses: should they be enforceable under Pt 5.3A?’ (2011) 19(4) Insolv. 
L.J. 4. 
122 M Benson, ‘Promoting a Culture of Corporate Restructuring in Australia: Some Suggestions’ 
(2015) 12(2) Int. C.R. 104. 
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Recently the Productivity Commission was asked to conduct a broad ranging 
review of the existing system to specifically investigate, analyse and propose 
recommendations: 
a) On the nature and the scale/extent of barriers to enter and exit the 
market for businesses and their impact on economic performance; and 
b) On identifying appropriate options for reducing these entry- and exit-
barriers, including personal/corporate insolvency regimes on business 
exits. 
The Productivity Commission issued an Inquiry Report (7 December 2015) on 
the topic.123 In the Draft Report (21 May 2015),124 the Commission did not find 
the commercial concerns raised by CAMAC convincing. It considered that ipso 
facto clauses could severely constrain the ability of a business to continue 
trading during a rescue process, prevent the sale of corporate businesses as 
going concerns, and reduce or even eliminate returns to creditors in an ensuing 
liquidation. 
This position was backed by ARITA and other commentators such as the law 
firm Ashurst,125 which suggested that – should the suspension be introduced 
into the law: 
 It should not be applied to contracts aimed at extending new debt 
financing or at granting financial accommodation (a solution 
substantially equivalent to the U.S. position); 
 It should extend the personal liability rules to external administrators in 
relation to credit sale contracts entered into during his or her office; and 
 It should not interfere with the current right of a creditor with a security 
interest over the whole or substantially the whole of the property of the 
company to take enforcement actions. 
                                                                    
123 Productivity Commission, ‘Business Set-up, Transfer and Closure - Final Report 75’ 
(Canberra, 2015) <http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/business/report/business.pdf> 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
124 <http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/business/draft> accessed 17 September 2018. 
125 <file:///C:/Users/acnp426/Downloads/Trending%20in%20Restructuring%20-
%2022%20September%202015.pdf> accessed 21 May 2018.  
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Accordingly, Recommendation 14.5 of the Final Report reads that: 
The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) should be amended such that ipso 
facto clauses that have the purpose of allowing termination of 
contracts solely due to an insolvency event are unenforceable if the 
company is in voluntary administration or the process of forming a 
scheme of arrangement. Amending legislation should make clear that 
the party experiencing the insolvency is in no way absolved of any 
other contractual obligations. External administrators should be given 
the ability to apply to the Court to require continued performance of a 
contract where the Court is satisfied that the supplier is attempting to 
avoid this moratorium, and that the continuation of the contract is in 
the best interests of the creditors as a whole. In circumstances where 
this moratorium could lead to undue hardship, suppliers should be able 
to apply to the Court for an order to terminate the contract.126 
In December 2015, the government issued an “Innovation Statement”, which 
included a proposal to ban ipso facto clauses that terminated a contract solely 
by the occurrence of an insolvency event.127 In April 2016, a proposal paper was 
released setting forth the proposed model to constrain party autonomy.128  
Submissions were sought and the reply from the industry and practitioners was 
generally welcoming.129 The government analysed the feedback and released a 
long-awaited130 new bill on 28 March 2017.131 Under the proposed reform, 
which was passed by the Parliament and came into force (for the part on ipso 
                                                                    
126 Productivity Commission (n 123). 
127 Australian Government, ‘National Innovation & Science Agenda’ (Canberra, 2015) 7 
<http://www.innovation.gov.au/system/files/case-
study/National%20Innovation%20and%20Science%20Agenda%20-%20Report.pdf> accessed 
17 September 2018. 
128 Australian Government, ‘Improving bankruptcy and insolvency laws Proposal Paper’ 
(Treasury, April 2016) < https://static.treasury.gov.au/uploads/sites/1/2017/06/C2016-
017_pp_NIS_insolvency_measures.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018. 
129 This is not surprising, given the long support of the insolvency profession and the general 
business community for the introduction of this reform. See, among others: H Anderson and 
others, ‘Corporate Insolvency. The Productivity Commission, Corporate Insolvency and Phoenix 
Companies’ (2015) 33 CSLJ 425. 
130 Academics voiced for quite a while the opportunity to undertake a comprehensive reform of 
Australian insolvency framework. See, among others: G McCormack and A Hargovan, ‘Australia 
and the International Insolvency Paradigm’ (2015) 37(3) Sydney L. Rev. 389. 
131 Exposure Draft, Treasury Laws Amendment (2017 Enterprise Incentives No. 2) Bill 2017 
(Cth). 
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facto clauses) on 1 July 2018,132 the enforcement of ipso facto clauses is stayed 
during a formal rescue procedure, subject to exceptions ‘where ipso facto clauses 
are inherently necessary to the operation of a contract’.133  
Formal rescue procedures include schemes of arrangement (where that scheme 
is for the purpose of avoiding insolvent liquidation), administration or any 
other procedure where a managing controller is appointed over all or 
substantially all of the property of the company.134 The suspension of the 
enforceability of these clauses is subject to exceptions, including for the 
contracts specified in forthcoming regulation or Minister declaration.135 Insofar, 
ministerial declarations have been forthcoming in the area of finance 
arrangements.136 In any case, courts retain an overarching discretion to 
override any stay and to grant interim orders with reference to the cases where 
the enforcement of ipso facto clauses is banned.137 No guidance has yet emerged 
on how courts will interpret the reforms and apply the discretion.138 
Among the pro-creditor countries, only Singapore seems to adhere strictly to 
the original approach to the enforceability of ipso facto clauses.139 In this 
country, the lack of compulsory and binding rules on formal insolvency 
procedures aimed at rescuing a company means that most debt restructurings 
are contractual and, therefore, must be agreed by all creditors. As to date, there 
is no guidance from the Singapore Government or its monetary authorities on 
the conduct of contractual rescues. 
In December 2010, the Ministry of Law of Singapore appointed the Insolvency 
Law Review Committee (‘ILRC’) to review the existing legislation in the field, 
both corporate and personal, since not much has been done since the Company 
Legislation and Regulatory Framework Committee (‘CLRFC’) submitted its 
                                                                    
132 The Treasury Laws Amendment (2017 Enterprise Incentives No. 2) Act 2017 (Cth). 
133 Explanatory Memoranda, Treasury Laws Amendment (2017 Enterprise Incentives No. 2) Bill 
2017 (Cth), 2.8. 
134 Ibid [2.24] - [2.26]. 
135 Ibid [2.24] - [2.26]. 
136 Corporations (Stay on Enforcing Certain Rights) Declaration 2018 (Cth). 
137 Ibid. 
138 E Streten, ‘National Report for Australia’, in J Chuah and E Vaccari (eds), Treatment of 
Executory Contracts in Insolvency Law: A Transnational Study (EE Publishing, Cheltenham 2019) 
Manuscript Submitted for Publication. 
139 For a more detailed analysis, see Streten (n 138). 
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conclusions in 2002.140 In response, in October 2013, the ILRC submitted a Final 
Report.141 
In debating the opportunity to introduce statutory restrictions on the 
enforceability of ipso facto clauses in insolvency, the Committee noted that only 
few jurisdictions (U.S., Canada and France) included a general, legislative ban 
albeit with significant exceptions on their validity. On the other hand, others 
countries (such as England and Australia at that time, but also Japan, China, 
Germany and Hong Kong) did not impose general limits on their enforceability. 
The same report, however, recognized that some restrictions may apply in 
relation to essential contracts where the distressed company is trying to 
turnaround its operations. 
The Committee also considered that, if freezing or invalidity of ipso facto clauses 
was declared, counterparties should be allowed to apply to court to object the 
stay and ask for the enforcement of the clause ‘on the basis that they are unduly 
prejudiced’,142 thus increasing litigation (and costs) in insolvency cases.  
These considerations brought the Committee to conclude that - despite the 
changes recently implemented in England and Australia - there was not a strong 
case for the introduction of statutory restrictions on the enforcement of ipso 
facto clauses. This conclusion was not challenged or otherwise objected by the 
parties who submitted their feedback to the final version of the proposal for a 
legislative reform.143 As a result, the Companies (Amendment) Act 2017144 
which contains major changes to Singapore’s rescue and insolvency law does 
                                                                    
140 Report of the Company Legislation and Regulatory Framework Committee (Singapore, 2002) 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan034487.pdf > 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
141 Final Report of the Insolvency Law Review Committee (Singapore, 2013) 
<https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/Revised%20Report%20of%20t
he%20Insolvency%20Law%20Review%20Committee.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018. 
142 Ibid 122. 
143 Ministry of Law, ‘Summary of Feedback from the Public Consultation on the insolvency Law 
Review Committee (ILRC) Report and Minlaw’s Response’ (Singapore, 2014) 
<https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/MinLaw%20Response%20to%
20Feedback%20on%20ILRC%20Report.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018. 
144 
<https://www.acra.gov.sg/uploadedFiles/Content/Legislation/Companies%20(Amendment)%
20Act%202017%20gazette.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018.  
  107 
not restrict the operation of contractual carve-outs (such as ipso facto clauses) 
where a scheme is proposed or a moratorium is granted.145 
It is therefore possible to conclude that, while pro-creditor countries uphold the 
enforceability of contractual remedies to the highest possible extent, the laws of 
these countries also restrict the enforceability of autonomy-based solutions 
such as ipso facto clauses. Similar to what has been observed for the U.S., 
mandatory insolvency rules that deviate from negotiated clauses are sometimes 
preferred to contractual solutions. In other words, no system currently allows 
parties to entirely contract out of insolvency. 
2.2(a)(iii) Carve-Outs and the Role of the Judiciary 
This digression on the treatment of ipso facto clauses around the globe also 
proves that differences in the law may be less marked than the separation 
between pro-creditor and pro-debtor families seems to suggest. The tendency 
to recognise the enforceability of autonomy-based carve-outs (and party 
autonomy) is always limited to promote potentially conflicting goals such as the 
rescue of distressed yet viable businesses. 
Parties can insulate numerous contracts from the effect of insolvency law. 
Additionally, nothing in the U.S. or Canadian insolvency laws should prevent a 
party from stepping away from a contract if the right is not triggered by 
insolvency alone,146 but by circumstances that significantly modify the 
assessment of risk upon which the contract was negotiated.147  
While businesses (and, primarily, creditors’ lobbying groups) seem to welcome 
the preservation of contractually negotiated carve-outs in insolvency, the same 
                                                                    
145 For a critical analysis of the new Singaporean law: G McCormack and W Yee Wan, 
‘Transplanting Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code into Singapore’s Restructuring and 
Insolvency Laws: Opportunities and Challenges’ (2018) J. Corp. L. Stud. (1473-5970) 1. In 
particular, the authors argue (at 9) that both in England and Singapore, the enforceability of ipso 
facto clauses in schemes affect the debtor’s ability to use these procedures as rescue 
mechanisms. This is because suppliers can unilaterally terminate or modify existing contracts 
upon the opening of formal insolvency procedures or whenever certain events occur. 
146 For instance, §.365(e) 11 U.S. Code states that ‘an executory contract […] may not be 
terminated or modified […] solely because a provision in such contract […] that is conditioned on 
[…] the commencement of a case under this title’ (emphasis added).  
147 See the Supreme Court’s ruling in Chicago Board of Trade (n 76). 
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cannot be said for other stakeholders who may rely on courts to protect their 
rights and expectations.  
Unfortunately, no uniform views exist in the courts on the enforceability of 
these carve-outs. This conclusion emerges distinctly if we compare English and 
U.S. case law.148  
As shown in cases such as BNY,149 Ballyrock150 and Metavante,151 U.S. judges 
tend to deny the enforceability of such clauses even when they are negotiated 
by sophisticated parties and as part of complex financial agreements. This is not 
because they do not appreciate the importance of the principle of freedom of 
contract: they simply value more the enforceability of the automatic stay in 
insolvency cases. 
On the other hand, English courts in cases like Belmont Park,152 Mayhew v 
King153 and Lomas154 observed that counterfeited transfers of assets triggered 
                                                                    
148 As for the U.S., this thesis looked in particular at the decisions from the federal bankruptcy 
courts of the Southern District of New York and of Delaware, due to their influential role.  
149 Lehman Brothers Financing Inc. v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited 422 B.R. 407 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
150 Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v Ballyrock ABS-CDC 2007-1 Limited No. 09-10132 
(JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011).  
151 Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v Metavante Corporation, No. 08-13555 (JMMP) 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2009). The Southern District of New York recently reinstated this 
interpretation in Re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 533 B.R. 476 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016), when 
Chapman J held that priority provisions of swap agreements, which had effect of flipping this 
priority based on event of default that occurred upon filing of bankruptcy petition by debtor 
and related entity, were prohibited ipso facto clauses (but note the new focus on the effects of 
the provisions, rather than on the language of the clause).  
152 Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services [2011] UKSC 38, [2012] 1 
AC 383.  
The same principles were reinstated in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Football League 
Ltd [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch), [2012] Bus. L.R. 1539 where the court observed that the Football 
League’s article 77 - which conditioned the payment of any sum to the clubs to the fixture of any 
obligation for the relevant season - did not present a breach of the anti-deprivation principle 
since an insolvent claimant cannot be deprived of what it has not yet acquired into its 
possession. Had the debtor not fulfilled its obligation, the Football League would have not been 
bound to pay any sum to the club. However, the ipso facto termination was not determined by 
the insolvency of the club. As a result, the court correctly concluded that there was no breach of 
the anti-deprivation rule. 
153 Chaucer Insurance Plc v Towergate Stafford Knight Co Ltd (t/a Folgate London Market Ltd) 
[2010] EWHC 1121 (Ch), [2010] 2 BCLC 440 where the Court held that a contract, which 
granted an indemnity to a company, but also provided that the indemnity would cease upon the 
company's insolvency, offended the principle of anti-deprivation as it deprived the company's 
administrators of an asset which could have been distributed to creditors. 
154 Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson Inc. [2010] EWHC 3372 (Ch), [2011] 2 BCLC 120 and [2012] EWCA 
Civ 419, [2012] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 1076. In particular, the Court of Appeal observed that the 
indefinite suspension of the payment obligation of the non-defaulting party might on one view 
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by the insolvency filing could not be withheld in light of the anti-deprivation 
rule.155  
The starting point of their analysis was remarkably similar to those of their U.S. 
and Canadian colleagues. However, English judges also considered the 
complexity of the cases, the highly skilled nature of the parties and the intention 
as objectively manifested during the negotiation.156 They concluded that some 
of the litigated clauses did not breach the anti-deprivation standard. 
Consequently, in Belmont Park and Lomas they held that clauses that had been 
classified as ipso facto terms in other jurisdictions, would not gain the same 
qualification in England. The validity of autonomy-based remedies was upheld. 
This has led some commentators to observe that ‘England and the US are two 
countries united by the common law but divided by their approach to anti-
deprivation principles’.157 Upholding the validity of these clauses has the effect 
of allowing the beneficiaries to contract out of insolvency law. This seems to be 
at odds with the words of Lord Collins SCJ in Belmont: 
The anti-deprivation rule and the rule that it is contrary to public 
policy to contract out of pari passu distribution are two sub-rules of the 
general principle that parties cannot contract out of the insolvency 
legislation.158 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
be criticised as imperfect but it could not be said to be uncommercial (and, therefore, it could 
not be considered non-compliant with the anti-deprivation rule). 
Also, in Belmont Park (n 113) Collins J clarified that the anti-deprivation rule does not apply to 
‘bona fide commercial transactions which do not have, as their predominant purpose, or one of the 
main purposes, the deprivation of the property of one of the parties on bankruptcy’ at [104]. 
155 The anti-deprivation rule is that ‘no person possessed of property can reserve that property to 
himself until he shall become bankrupt, and then provide that, in the event of his becoming 
bankrupt, it shall pass to another and not his creditors’ - Witmore v Mason (1861) 2 J & H 204, 
212 per Sir William Page Wood V-C. It has been argued that this principle marked the 
separation between ‘the individualistic, private law model of freedom of contract on the one hand, 
and the collectivist, public law model of insolvency law on the other’ as it presents a prohibition to 
avoid insolvency legislation: R Bork and M Voelker, ‘The Anti-deprivation rule as an Anti-
avoidance Rule’ (2016) 29(5) Insolv. Int. 65, 74. 
156 In Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, [2011] 1 WLR 2900, the Supreme Court 
held that the ultimate aim of interpreting a provision - especially one of contractual nature - is 
to determine what the parties mean by the language they used. See also HHY Luxembourg Sarl v 
Barclays Bank Plc [2010] EWCA Civ 1248, [2011] 1 BCLC 336. 
157 G Moss, ‘Anti-deprivation, flip clauses, ipso facto rules and the Dante inferno’ (2017) 30(2) 
Insolv. Int. 24, 24. 
158 Belmont Park (n 113), at [1]. 
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Lord Collin’s decision is questionable. The anti-deprivation rule applies at the 
outset of both liquidation and administration proceedings. In anti-deprivation 
cases, English courts try to determine if the contested clause or agreement has 
been intended from the outset to contract out of insolvency law. The pari passu 
principle, on the opposite, comes into consideration only once the formal 
insolvency procedure is under way. 
Additionally, it may be an overstatement to claim that the anti-deprivation 
principle is expression of the general rule that parties cannot contract out of 
insolvency. If that was the case, to challenge the enforceability of contracts or 
clauses in breach of the anti-deprivation principle it should be sufficient to 
demonstrate that the contested clause or agreement has the effect of 
contracting out of insolvency.159 This is not the case, as English courts focus on 
the good faith and intention of the parties as objectively discerned from their 
contracts.  
English courts have consistently recognised the validity of clauses that prevent 
the application of insolvency statutory remedies. For instance, creditors can 
enter into “non-petition agreements” whereby they bind themselves not to 
trigger formal insolvency proceedings and thus rendering the debtor 
“bankruptcy remote”.160 
This “substance-focused” approach has been recently reiterated in other cases, 
irrespective of the sector of the industry in which the parties operated. For 
instance, in Cavedish161 the Supreme Court - overruling established case law on 
the subject162 – upheld the enforceability of the withholding and forfeiture 
                                                                    
159 This proof would be sufficient if a party challenged a clause or agreement for breaching the 
pari passu principle of distribution. See, for instance, British Eagle (n 6) [780G], where Cross LJ 
considered that the existence of good business reasons was irrelevant to determine the validity 
of ‘clearing house’ arrangements which had the effect of altering the rules for the distribution of 
the assets of the insolvent estate. 
160 Re Colt Telecom Plc (No 2) [2002] EWHC 2815 (Ch), [2003] BPIR 324; BNY Corporate Trustee 
Services v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc [2013] UKSC 28, [2013] 1 WLR 1408. For a comprehensive 
analysis of the cases in which parties can contract out English insolvency law: H Anderson, The 
Framework of Corporate Insolvency Law (OUP: Oxford, 2017) 270. 
161 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2016] AC 1172. 
162 Jobson v Johnson [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1026 (CA) Civ. 
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clause163 challenged in the case, by advocating the need for overcoming 
artificial categorizations.  
The Supreme Court is unwilling to provide parties with a clear test, capable of 
determining ex-ante if a clause breaches the anti-deprivation principle or not. 
Their “pragmatic reasoning”164 is increasingly focused on the substance of the 
contract (not its qualification) and on the effect it has on the parties.  
At first instance, it may seem that courts are protecting the parties’ right to 
contract out of insolvency. In reality, they are protecting party autonomy and 
good faith. It would be inappropriate, therefore, to conclude that these decisions 
suggest that the judiciary supports autonomy-based solutions to strike out 
insolvency rules.  
- 
The previous paragraphs described the law and the judicial approach to ipso 
facto clauses in selected common law jurisdictions. What seems to emerge is 
that courts – irrespective of their location, the enforceable laws, the level of 
sophistication of the parties and the applicable precedents – are unlikely to 
withhold the validity of autonomy-based clauses that are primarily and 
purposefully designed and have the effect of avoiding insolvency legislation.165  
Despite the English court’s attitude to preserve the validity and enforceability of 
freely negotiated clauses, there is a widespread judicial and legislative 
inclination to strike out clauses purposefully designed to contract out of 
insolvency law both by pro-debtor and pro-creditor cultures.166  
                                                                    
163 The withholding and forfeiture clause mentioned in the text is in fact a default clause 
operating in a joint operating agreement subject to the English law. Such a clause is quite 
common in oil and gas industry contracts and results in the defaulting party under a share 
purchase agreement to re-transfer the purchased shares at a set price. For a more detailed 
description of the case and its implications: J Aldersey-Williams and others, ‘Default Clauses in 
Joint Operating Agreements: Recent Guidance from the English Courts’ (2016) 2 I.E.L.R. 36. 
164 Bork and Voelker (n 155) 75. 
165 A conclusion shared by other commentators: R Bork and M Voelker (ibid). Even if their 
conclusions are drawn from the Belmont Park case, similar considerations are applicable to the 
other jurisdictions mentioned in this sub-section, since the reported case laws evidence a 
common inclination to swift from formal to substantive analysis of the effects of the clauses, 
whose validity is questioned in court. 
166 Moss (n 157) 27. 
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2.2(b) Autonomy-Based Remedies in Cross-Border Cases 
Due to the increased global nature of commerce, insolvency cases often present 
cross-border elements. The degree of involvement of foreign authorities and 
courts depends not only on the location of the assets of the debtor, but also on 
other factors (e.g. corporate structure, sector of the economy in which the 
company operates, etc.). 
Nowadays, part of the complexity determined by the cross-border nature of an 
insolvency case has been reduced thanks to the implementation of uniform 
conflict of law rules and principles.  
On the one hand, the 1997 UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
(‘UNCITRAL Model Law’) and its 2014 Guide to Enactment and Interpretation 
(‘UNCITRAL Guide’)167 determine the application of common rules on access, 
recognition, relief, assistance and cooperation for cases opened in some forty-
four countries (including Australia, Singapore, the U.K. and the U.S.) and forty-
six jurisdictions, which have transposed and implemented the Model Law into 
their national legislation.168 Nevertheless, not even the U.K. and the U.S. 
implement and interpret these soft law provisions (as enacted in their statutes) 
in the same manner.169 
On the other, all European Member States (with the exception of Denmark) 
have to comply with the EUIR Recast.170 This binding regulation provides a set 
of conflict of law rules applicable to any insolvency proceedings concerning 
debtors based in the European Union and with operations in more than one 
                                                                    
167 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with 
Guide to Enactment and Interpretation’, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2 (2014), 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013-Guide-
Enactment-e.pdf> [https://perma.cc/T9Y3-NR8B]> accessed 17 September 2018. 
168 <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html> 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
169 G McCormack, ‘US Exceptionalism or UK Localism? Cross-Border Insolvency Law in 
Comparative Perspective’ (2016) 36(1) Leg. Stud. 136. 
170 European Member States have been subject to a uniform set of conflict of law rules since the 
enactment of the Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, which came 
into force on 31 May 2002, now replaced by Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of 20 May 2015 of the 
European Parliament and the Council on insolvency proceedings (recast) [2015] OJ L141/19. 
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Member State. There are also proposals to deepen this co-operation and 
promote the adoption of harmonized rules in the area.171 
At national level, the U.S. adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law as Chapter 15 of 
the 11 U.S. Code as part of the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act (’BAPCA’).172 The UNCITRAL Model Law was then implemented 
in Great Britain by the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (‘CBIR 2006’). 
In this country, the UNCITRAL Model Law applies alongside with the EUIR 
Recast and s.426 IA 1986. The latter provides for particular relief and assistance 
in insolvency proceedings commenced in some Commonwealth countries and 
former British colonies. Finally, a number of prominent decisions by the House 
of Lords, the Supreme Court and the Privy Council have reasserted the 
centrality of common law principles on recognition, enforcement and assistance 
in foreign insolvency proceedings.173 
Can therefore negotiated solutions prevail over insolvency rules in cross-border 
cases? Some authors174 have argued that this could and should be possible 
thanks to a consensual but binding dispute resolution mechanism: arbitration.  
                                                                    
171 Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of 
restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU’ (22 
November 2016) COM(2016) 723 final, 2016/0359 (COD), as recently amended by the EU 
Parliament in a report published on 21 August 2018: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-
2018-0269+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN> accessed 17 September 2018. 
172 Before the adoption of the Model Law, recognition, enforcement and assistance in cross-
border insolvencies were regulated by s.304 11 U.S. Code. This statute relied on the discretion 
of the judges to apply the principles of comity and respect for the laws and rulings of other 
countries in the U.S. Because of the commonality in approach with the Model Law, much of the 
common law that was developed before the enactment of Chapter 15 still guides courts’ 
analysis. 
173 Some of these decisions, like Re HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd [2008] UKHL 21, 
[2008] 1 WLR 852 and Cambridge Gas Transport v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of 
Navigator Holding plc [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 AC 508 promoted a universalist attitude 
towards cross-border cases. A revised, “modified” version of this approach has been endorsed 
in more recent rulings, such as Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 465, [2013] 1 AC 236 and 
Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2014] UKPC 36, [2015] AC 1675. 
174 AN Gropper, ‘The Arbitration of Cross-Border Insolvencies’ (2012) 86 Am. J. Bankr. L. 201; K 
Karadelis, ‘BVI Judge Considers Benefits of Arbitrating Cross-Border Disputes’ Global 
Restructuring Review (London, 15 November 2016) 
<http://globalrestructuringreview.com/article/1076309/bvi-judge-considers-benefits-of-
arbitrating-cross-border-insolvency-disputes> accessed 17 September 2018.  
Other authors adopt a more cautious position and seem to suggest that arbitration could only be 
used for certain insolvency-related disputes, or as a non-binding or semi-binding solution: E 
Sussman and JL Gorskie, ‘Capturing the Benefits of Arbitration for Cross Border Insolvency’ in 
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This alternative dispute resolution mechanism could represent a viable 
alternative to achieve uniformity and cooperation in cross-border insolvency 
disputes,175 despite its intrinsic shortcomings.176 These include the fact that 
there are no uniform views across jurisdictions on whether arbitration 
agreements made prior to insolvency are enforceable upon the commencement 
of a formal or hybrid procedure. Equally, it is not clear if all insolvency issues 
can be subject to arbitration or if arbitral awards can be enforced pending or 
after insolvency. The list of issues could go on and there is no shortage of legal 
literature which discusses the effects of insolvency on arbitration (and vice 
versa)177 and the enforceability of arbitration clauses in insolvency cases.178 
This sub-section investigates if arbitration, as an autonomy-based procedure,179 
can replace statutory rules in insolvency cases.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
AW Ravine (ed), Contemporary Issues in international Arbitration and Mediation (Martinus 
Nijhoff: Leiden, 2013).  
To prove the actuality of the matter, it has been reported that proposals for a better 
coordination of insolvency and arbitration proceedings have been submitted to UNCITRAL: C 
Simson, ‘UN To Take On Murky Intersection of Arbitration & Insolvency’ Law360 (6 December 
2016) <https://www.law360.com/articles/868600/un-to-take-on-murky-intersection-of-
arbitration-insolvency> accessed 17 September 2018. 
175 Against: PK Wagner, ‘Insolvency and Arbitration: A Pleading for International Insolvency 
Law’ (2011) 5(2) D.R.I. 189, 200 (observing that ‘the parties’ choice of certain applicable laws, 
either direct or indirect, are not an appropriate starting point to finding the applicable law 
governing the effects of the insolvency on arbitration’, since ‘there is no possibility for one party to 
contract out of the procedures provided by the applicable insolvency law’). 
176 Confidentiality as opposed to the need to reach binding solutions for all parties involved in 
the insolvency proceedings; consensual, private nature of arbitration as opposed to mandatory 
nature of insolvency law; doubts on the enforceability of ‘insolvency’ awards. These are only 
some of the issues that arbitration of insolvency dispute raises: K Maxwell, ‘Arbitrating 
Insolvency Disputes: An Imperfect Solution? (Practical Law Arbitration Blog, 29 November 
2016) <http://arbitrationblog.practicallaw.com/arbitrating-insolvency-disputes-an-imperfect-
solution/> accessed 17 September 2018. 
177 D Baizeau, ‘Arbitration and Insolvency: Issues of Applicable Law’ in C Muller and A Rigozzi 
(eds), New Developments in International Commercial Arbitration 2009 (Schulthess: Zurich, 
2009) 97; L Lévy, ‘Arbitration and Bankruptcy: Bankruptcy or Arbitration?’ (2011) 5 D.R.I. 103; 
R Millet, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency and Arbitration: A Collision of Spheres?’ (2011) 5 D.R.I. 113; 
Wagner (n 175); JL Westbrook, ‘International Arbitration and Multinational Insolvency’ (2011) 
29(3) Penn St. Int’l L. Rev. Article 12. 
178 F Neufeld, ‘Enforcement of Contractual Arbitration Agreements Under the Bankruptcy Code’ 
(1991) 65 Am. Bankr. L.J. 525; AN Resnick, ‘The Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in 
Bankruptcy’ (2007) 15 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 183; PF Kirgis, ‘Arbitration, Bankruptcy, and 
Public Policy. A Contractarian Analysis’ (2009) 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 503; A Albertini, 
‘Arbitration in Bankruptcy: Which Way Forward?’ (2016) 90 Am. Bankr. L.J. 599; J Ellis, ‘A 
Comparative Law Approach: Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements in American Insolvency 
Proceedings’ (2018) 92 Am. Bankr. L.J. 141. 
179 Arbitration is considered an “autonomy-based procedure” despite the existence of statutory 
rules that govern the arbitral procedure and the recognition of the award because its 
  115 
A key question to determine if arbitration can be used as a restructuring or 
collection mechanism is to verify if “core insolvency issues” like the negotiation 
of a rescue plan are matters ‘capable of settlement by arbitration’180 (at least in 
the jurisdictions considered in this research). In other words, it is necessary to 
determine the objective arbitrability181 of insolvency matters.  
Due to the public nature of insolvency law as opposed to the private nature of 
arbitral remedies, many courts and jurisdictions are unwilling to defer to 
arbitration disputes that arise from the operation of their insolvency provisions, 
even if parties included them in the scope of the arbitration agreement.182 This 
is a likely outcome in civil law countries, where insolvency law belongs to the 
public law domain and issues of public law are traditionally viewed as non-
arbitrable.183 
In the Anglo-American world, this may be less of a problem. For instance, in the 
U.S. the Federal Arbitration Act and the Bankruptcy Code are considered 
statutory schemes bearing equal dignity.184 Determination of whether 
centralised solutions of disputes should prevail over the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements could not be determined solely according to the law.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
commencement and content is determined by mutual agreements of the parties involved in the 
procedure. 
180 Under article V.2 of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
(New York, 1958), the enforcement of an international arbitral award may be refused if, under 
domestic law, the subject matter is not capable of arbitration. 
181 See below ftn 183. 
182 This is, for instance, the position adopted in Singapore: A Chan and others, ‘Cross-Border 
Insolvency and Its Impact on Arbitration’ (2014) 26 SAcLJ 999, 1033. 
183 Questions of objective arbitrability arise when states reserve certain matters for the 
exclusive jurisdiction of their municipal courts. 
The principle of equality of creditors has been considered to form part of the ‘public policy’ of a 
country, namely France. As a result, French courts are not allowed to enforce an award which 
may affect the validity of this principle: see Cour de Cassation, Société Saret v SBBM, (1992) 38 
Revue de l’Arbitrage 663. 
This position is refuted by some authors: CS Gibson, ‘Arbitration, Civilization and Public Policy: 
Seeking Counterpoise Between Arbitral Autonomy and the Public Policy Defense in View of 
Foreign Mandatory Public Law’ (2009) 113 Penn. St. L. Rev. 1227; S Bufford, ‘International 
Insolvency Law and International Arbitration: A Preliminary Perspective’ (Penn State Law, 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2-2015) 24. 
184 Re Spectrum Info. Tech., Inc., 183 B.R. 360, 362 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995): ‘[T]he issue as to 
whether or not a bankruptcy court should allow a dispute to be resolved by an arbitration forum 
to which the parties agreed implicates the clash of two federal statutes’.  
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To provide some guidance, in McMahon185 the Supreme Court overruled the 
precedent of Zimmerman186 and held that the party opposing arbitration should 
prove that the Congress would want the matter to be decided in a collective 
forum. In any case a presumption in favour of judicial remedies operates only 
with reference to substantive core insolvency matters.187 Despite this, the 
courts have long recognised that bankruptcy courts should be the sole forum to 
resolve all disputes concerning the debtor’s assets.188  
The solution has been criticised for lacking adequate guidance in “hard cases”, 
thus promoting legal uncertainty and litigation. Some scholars have therefore 
suggested that arbitration clauses should be treated as severable executory 
contracts, thus giving the office-holder the power to deny or enforce this clause 
over any type of claim.189  
Cross-border insolvency disputes usually end up being hard cases. In cross-
border procedures the law of the centre of main interest (‘COMI’),190 which in 
the majority of cases is the place of incorporation, typically determines the rules 
                                                                    
185 Shearson/American Express Inc. v McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). McMahon however has not 
been uniformly applied: A Leventhal, ‘Competing Efficiencies: The Problem of Whether and 
When to Refer Disputes to Arbitration in Bankruptcy Cases’ (2016) 24 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 
133, ftn 8. 
186 Zimmerman v Continental Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1983), according to which the 
enforcement of arbitration clauses in insolvency cases should have been determined by the 
“sound discretion” of the judge (at 59-60).  
187 Substantive insolvency matters are all those issues that deal with the definition of the rights 
of the parties in the insolvency procedure. They are opposed to procedural insolvency rules, 
which deal with how these rights can be exercised in a formal or hybrid insolvency procedure. 
Substantive issues include – among others – the rules on ranking of claims and order of 
priorities in the insolvency process; directors’ liability and disqualification as well as on the 
appointment of insolvency practitioners; avoidance and adjustment actions. 
188 Elscint, Inc. v First Wis. Fin. Corp. (Re Xonics, Inc.), 813 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1987), 131: ‘the 
bankruptcy jurisdiction is designed to provide a single forum for dealing with all claims to the 
bankrupt’s assets’; Re Matter of Imp. & Mini Car Parts, Ltd., Inc., 97 F.3d 1454 (7th Cir. 1996) at *1; 
Napleton Enterprises, Llc v Bahary, No. 15 C 3146, 2016 WL 792322 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2016) at *7. 
189 JL Westbrook, ‘Coming Encounter: International Arbitration and Bankruptcy’ (1982) 67 
Minn. L. Rev. 595, 623; JS Brookner and MS Blacker, ‘The Rejectability of Arbitration Clauses’ 
(2007) 26 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 1, 77; Albertini (n 178) 621. 
190 There is a good amount of literature, albeit in varying depths, on the notion of ‘centre of main 
interest’ (‘COMI’). On this concept, see: Finch and Milman (n 96) 675-678; G McCormack, ‘COMI 
and Comity in UK and US insolvency Law’ (2012) 128(1) L.Q.R. 140.  
To determine a foreign debtor's COMI, courts look to certain nonexclusive factors: location of 
debtor's headquarters; location of those who actually manage the debtor; location of debtor's 
primary assets; location of majority of debtor's creditors or of majority of creditors who would 
be affected by case; and/or jurisdiction whose law would apply to most disputes. 
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applicable to the insolvency of the company191 and their interaction with 
arbitration. Therefore, the arbitrability of core insolvency issues largely 
depends on the law of the COMI legal system, i.e. the lex concursus.192  
There are however exceptions, such as when the insolvency procedure is 
triggered after the commencement of an arbitration procedure. This was the 
case in Syska v Vivendi, where the arbitral tribunals in the U.K. and Switzerland 
were asked to rule on their competence.  
When Elektrim filed for bankruptcy in Poland, the appointed supervisor (Mr. 
Syska) tried to dismiss the arbitration procedures on the basis that art. 142 of 
the Polish bankruptcy law renders void all arbitration agreements when a party 
files for bankruptcy protection and that art. 4.2(e) of the European Insolvency 
Regulation193 (‘EIR’) (now art. 7.2(e) EUIR Recast) requires that the effect of the 
opening of insolvency proceedings on current contracts is determined by the 
law of the State of the opening of proceedings (lex concursus).  
While the Swiss court agreed with the proposed rationale, their English 
colleagues194 relied on art. 15 EIR (art. 18 EUIR Recast), which provides that the 
effects of insolvency proceedings on pending proceedings (including 
arbitrations) shall be governed by the law of the Member State where the 
lawsuit (rectius, proceeding) was pending. That law was English law, which 
does not feature any automatic stay or vis attractiva of the arbitral dispute to 
                                                                    
191 Nevertheless, complications arise in respect of companies which are subject to insolvency 
proceedings outside their place of incorporation. See, for instance Rubin (n 173). 
192 However, the majority of scholars observe that ‘the perceived wisdom in arbitration is that 
only pure or core bankruptcy issues will fall outside the scope of arbitral jurisdiction’: S Nadeau-
Séguin, ‘When Bankruptcy and Arbitration Meet: A Look at Recent ICC Practice’ (2011) 5(1) 
D.R.I. 79, 92. 
193 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings [2000] OJ 
L160/1. 
194 Jozef Syska (acting as administrator for Elekrim SA (in bankruptcy)) v Vivendi Universal SA 
[2009] EWCA Civ 677, [2009] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 891. For a comment, see: E Sjostrand, ‘Effects of 
Insolvency proceedings in the Context of the EC Insolvency Regulation’ (2009) 2(6) C.R. & I. 249 
(noting the difference between a situation where arbitration proceedings were merely 
contemplated and one in which the proceedings were pending or had commenced); J Chuah, 
‘Resolving Unresolved Relationship Problems – the Case of Cross Border Insolvency and 
Pending Arbitrations’ (2011) 8(4) E.C.F.R. 423 (conducting a comparative analysis on the way in 
which different jurisdictions have addressed the conflicts arising from a lack of co-ordination 
between the law governing the insolvency procedure and the law applicable by virtue of the 
arbitration agreement); D Draguiev, ‘The Effect of Insolvency on Pending International 
Arbitration: What Is and What Should Not Be’ (2015) 32(5) J. Int. Arb. 511. 
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the insolvency court. Hence, they decided in favour of Vivendi: the arbitrators 
could issue an award on that dispute. 
The decisions in McMahon and Syska v Vivendi allow the arbitrability of key 
insolvency matters. This approach is consistent with the pro-arbitration 
attitude of the general law,195 despite the fact that arbitration and insolvency 
law may ‘present a conflict of near polar extremes’.196 This pro-arbitration 
attitude led some authors197 to claim that it is possible to arbitrate core 
insolvency issues,198 provided that the parties are contractually and 
consensually entitled to do so.  
It is now appropriate to investigate if the characteristics of an insolvency 
procedure (either formal or out-of-court) are compatible with the arbitration 
procedure. 
Insolvency procedures are collective and binding on all parties, including 
dissenting ones. Therefore, in England the admission of the defendant into 
formal insolvency proceedings determines a moratorium over the ongoing 
arbitration proceeding against that party.199  
Is the stay on enforcement actions necessary to preserve the collective 
character of the insolvency procedure? Under U.S. law, the arbitration would 
not be automatically stayed if the debtor is trying to recover money from the 
defendant. Nothing in the law prevents the office-holder in England or the 
debtor in the U.S. to continue the arbitration proceeding if that is in the interest 
of the insolvent estate. Furthermore, some courts have claimed that they have 
                                                                    
195 In the U.K., s.9(4) of the Arbitration Act 1996 provides that unless an arbitration agreement 
is ‘null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed’, the Court shall grant a stay of 
proceedings brought in respect of a matter which is subject to an arbitration agreement.    
196 Fotochrome, Inc. v Copal Co, Ltd, 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir 1975). 
197 Gropper (n 174). 
198 Core matters are rights that arise under the insolvency law or in the insolvency case. If they 
arise “under” the law, they have a substantive nature. Examples include the right to avoid a 
preference or a fraudulent transfer that would not otherwise exist under the general law. If a 
core matter arises “in” the insolvency case, it has primarily a procedural nature. This includes 
the right to file a petition to remove an office-holder.  
199 Under s.43(6), Sch. B1 IA 1986, ‘No legal process (including legal proceedings, execution, 
distress and diligence) may be instituted or continued against the company or property of the 
company except (a) with the consent of the administrator, or (b) with the permission of the court’. 
S.130(2) IA 1986 applies a similar rule for liquidation. The judiciary clarified that “legal 
process” includes arbitration proceedings: see Bristol Airport Plc v Powdrill [1990] Ch. 744 (CA). 
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discretion to dismiss a winding up petition when the most prominent debt is 
disputed and the parties included in their contracts an arbitration clause.200 
However, if the claimant is trying to recover from the insolvent debtor, the 
latter enjoys the protection granted by the automatic stay201 or by the 
moratorium. This is because both countries apply the UNCITRAL Model law 
which prevents the commencement and continuation of individual proceedings 
against the debtor when foreign main proceedings are recognised under 
national law.202 
The consensual nature of arbitration makes this procedure unsuitable to 
achieve the best interest of all affected parties. Arbitration awards are binding 
only for the parties that signed an arbitration agreement. Several stakeholders 
in an insolvency procedure (such as tort claimants or governmental entities) 
could not give their consent in advance. It is equally doubtful that all 
stakeholders would agree ex-post, after the commencement of the formal 
procedure.  
This clearly emerged in a recent cross-border insolvency procedure. In the 
Nortel saga,203 despite the urgency from the insolvency courts to refer to 
arbitration to solve competing claims between creditors, the parties have not 
acceded to do so.  
This case evidences that the consensual nature of arbitration may present an 
insuperable obstacle for the consistent use of this mechanism in insolvency 
practice. Restrictions on party autonomy that stem from the collective nature of 
the insolvency procedure ‘are likely to be a source of potential conflict with any 
arbitration agreement or pending arbitration proceedings to which the insolvent 
party is connected’.204 
                                                                    
200 Eco Measure Market Exchange Ltd v Quantum Climate Services Ltd [2015] EWHC 1797 (Ch), 
[2015] BCC 877. 
201 In case of cross-border procedures, the administrator of the insolvent estate should obtain 
the recognition of the domestic insolvency procedure pursuant to §.1515 11 U.S.C. After that, all 
pending proceedings in the U.S. - including arbitration proceedings - will be stayed by virtue of 
§.1520 and §.362 11 U.S.C. 
202 Article 20 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. ‘Individual actions’ include arbitration: see 
UNCITRAL Guide, para 145. 
203 Re Nortel Networks, Inc., 737 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2013).  
204 W Kühn, ‘Arbitration and Insolvency’ (2011) 5(2) D.R.I. 203, 208. 
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This conclusion is reiterated in a dated International Chamber of Commerce 
(‘ICC’) case where the arbitrators concluded that, while the mere fact that one of 
the parties is subject to insolvency proceedings does not render the dispute 
non-arbitrable per se, the disputes ‘which have a direct link with the bankruptcy 
proceedings’ are excluded from the jurisdiction of the tribunal.205 
As mentioned at the beginning of this sub-section, the list of issues that affect 
the interaction between arbitration and insolvency is voluminous. Even if the 
matter was arbitrable, it is yet to be determined if the counterparty lost his or 
her capacity to arbitrate by entering into insolvency proceedings [subjective 
arbitrability].206 Equally, it is to be investigated if the award would be 
recognised and enforced by all the states which ratified the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958) (‘New York 
Convention’), since the signatory countries may rely on the exceptions listed in 
art. V(2) (including the public policy exception) to prevent enforcement and 
recognition of the award.207  
This was the legal issue raised in Victrix Steamship,208 where the Second Circuit 
refused to enforce an award for damages rendered against an insolvent estate 
because it would ‘conflict with the strong public policy of ensuring equitable and 
orderly distribution of local assets of a foreign bankrupt’.209  
Suggesting that insolvency procedures could be decided by arbitration 
overlooks the fact that the basic principles of arbitration and insolvency law are 
barely reconcilable: party autonomy and consent of the parties on one hand, 
binding and collective enforcement of decisions on the other.210  
Arbitration can support insolvency proceedings, but it cannot replace this 
statutory collection procedure. Even if the mere fact that a core insolvency 
                                                                    
205 ICC case No. 6697 (1990). 
206 The prevailing school of thought argues that the capacity should be assessed at the time of 
the conclusion of the arbitration agreement. See: V Lazic, Insolvency Proceedings and 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International: Alphen aan den Rijn 1999).  
207 For a summary of the issues that tribunals have to address in insolvency-related cases: PK 
Wagner, ‘When International Insolvency Law Meets International Arbitration’ (2009) 3(1) D.R.I. 
56. 
208 Victrix Steamship Co., SA v Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1987). 
209 Ibid, 714. 
210 Bufford (n 183) 2. 
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matter had been decided in arbitration proceedings is not, in itself, a valid 
reason for denying recognition and enforcement to the resulting award, it is the 
consensual nature of arbitration which prevents a widespread use of this 
remedy to settle and administer cross-border insolvency cases.211 Arbitration 
fails to represent a viable autonomy-based solution in cross-border insolvency 
cases.  
 
2.3 MARKETIZATION OF INSOLVENCY LAW IN ASSET-SEGREGATED INDUSTRIES 
Does systemic failure to meet payments (“insolvency”) determine the need for 
statutory rules in autonomous and generally de-regulated industries?  
Asset-segregated industries are sectors of the economy where special rules 
derogate from general contract law tenets on securities and sanctity of contract. 
The reason for a discrete system of law lies in the ex-territorial nature212 of the 
assets traded in these sectors. These industries include the financial and (to a 
lesser extent) insurance sectors, the oil and mining industry as well as the 
aviation and shipping industries.  
Generally speaking, asset-segregated industries are characterised by a lesser 
influence of the law and higher exposure to market forces. This exposure to the 
market forces influenced the content and development of the law 
(“marketization”). As a result, market players may agree on and enforce among 
themselves contractual solutions that disregard some of the statutory rules and 
principles that govern not only contract, but also insolvency law.  
Taking the financial and insurance industries as an example, both in England213 
and in the United States,214 the regulators have introduced discrete statutory 
                                                                    
211 Needless to say, the same considerations apply with reference to the use of arbitration in 
domestic cases. The fact that – to the best knowledge of the writer - no author has proposed to 
make use of this dispute resolution mechanism for purely domestic cases is telling of the 
difficulties that arise from gathering sufficient consensus among the creditors to follow this 
path.  
212 An asset has an ex-territorial nature whenever its discipline is determined by a multitude of 
applicable laws either because of its ownership structure or because of its movements across 
the globe.  
213 The rules which deal with the distress of financial institutions and insurance companies are 
largely derived from the E.U. law. In particular, the discipline is regulated by the Credit 
Institutions (Reorganisation and Winding Up) Regulations SI 2004/1045, the Insurers 
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remedies in case of financial distress. A consideration of the rescue and 
restructuring of financial institutions and insurance companies is beyond the 
scope of this research.215 The systemic importance of the financial sector makes 
the latter an inappropriate candidate for an extended analysis of the nature of 
its autonomy-based mechanisms. This is because the introduction of some of 
these autonomy-based remedies in the financial sector (such as the safe harbors 
mentioned in sub-section 2.2(a)(i)) may be justified by the need to protect this 
sector of the economy from systemic risks and domino effects in case of failure 
of one of its participants.  
However, in recent years some law and economics scholars have conducted 
extensive empirical research in other de-regulated industries to determine the 
real need for insolvency rules in these areas. One of the industries is the 
shipping sector.  
Beside the large availability of data, several other considerations made the 
shipping industry a perfect candidate for these studies. On the one hand, assets 
(i.e. vessels) frequently have a multi-territorial or ex-territorial nature, thus 
rendering the application of domestic insolvency rules particularly problematic, 
due to the preliminary need to solve a conflict of laws conundrum. On the other 
hand, the de-regulated nature of this branch of law resulted in the development 
of widely accepted - albeit partially domestically regulated - remedies for 
breach of contract. These include maritime liens216 and arrest procedures.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
(Reorganisation and Winding Up) Regulations SI 2004/353, and the Banking Act 2009, each of 
them transposing an E.U. directive at the domestic level. 
214 In the U.S., under the McCarran-Ferguson Act 15 U.S.C. ss.1011-1015, rehabilitation and/or 
liquidation of insurance companies are matters of state law. Substantial similarities exist among 
the procedures enacted by the states. Banks and thrift institutions are subject to a specialised 
insolvency regime under sections 11 and 13 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, if their 
deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (‘FDIC’). 
215 On this topic, see: D Faber and N Vermunt, Bank Failure: Lessons from Lehman Brothers (OUP: 
Oxford, 2017). 
216 Maritime liens are special privileged claims upon sea-connected properties, which remain 
valid despite changes in the ownership of the vessel. The law of the ship’s nationality governs 
the existence and priority of maritime liens, but certain characteristics - such as their priority 
over non-maritime liens and the preponderance of the right of the most recent lienholder - are 
common, since they stem from the enforcement and recognition of the 1952 Convention on the 
Arrest of Seagoing Ships. 
Maritime liens arise by operation of the law out of services rendered to, or injuries caused by, a 
maritime property. They do not require neither the prior consent of the debtor, nor to be filed 
or recorded for perfection, since they attach the rem simultaneously with the cause of action. 
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This sub-section addresses the main 
arguments advocated by these commentators: 
(1) insolvency law remedies are more 
expensive and less efficient than industry-
specific ones; and (2) TCP issues do not arise 
in these sectors because of the peculiar nature 
of both the players and the rules applicable to 
these industries. The overall goal of this sub-
section is to investigate if autonomy-based 
approaches can be justified at least with 
reference to asset-segregated industries. 
2.3(a) The Nature of Autonomy-Based 
Mechanisms 
Commentators who advocate for autonomy-
based mechanisms in de-regulated, asset-
specific industries claim that they are more efficient - both economically and 
procedurally - than insolvency ones. The case seems particularly persuasive for 
the shipping industry, where the ex-territorial nature of the traded assets has 
determined a more tenuous link with insolvency rules.  
In a particularly well documented paper by Franks, Sussman and Vig217 it was 
argued that there is no reason to rely on insolvency mechanisms if two 
conditions are met. The first is that creditors may, and frequently do make use 
of maritime remedies to deal with the distressed debtors. The second is that 
these mechanisms should not, and do not result in coordination failures, higher 
costs and fire sale discounts. 
With reference to the first condition, these authors claim that ‘the rule of law has 
been established: it is largely private, decentralised, highly differentiated, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Maritime liens (and the threat of their enforcement over the debtors) are potentially disruptive 
for insolvency cases, since they allow the holders of this “nuclear weapon of maritime law” to 
leapfrog the ordinary order of payment of creditors in insolvency. 
217 J Franks and others, ‘The Privatization of Bankruptcy: Evidence from Financial Distress in the 
Shipping Industry’ (22 November 2016) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2880751> accessed 17 
September 2018. 
O.W. BUNKER CASE 
On 7 November 2014 O.W. 
Bunker A/S, the parent company 
of a global network of traders 
and physical suppliers of fuel 
bunkers, filed for bankruptcy 
protection in Denmark upon the 
discovery of a massive fraud and 
unsupervised trading which 
resulted in losses of about $275 
million. This forced nearly all of 
its subsidiaries to file for 
bankruptcy in their respective 
countries of incorporation. 
O.W. Bunker A/S collapse 
triggered a plethora of 
insolvency-related litigations 
around the world. These cases 
aimed at determining if the 
physical suppliers of the fuel 
bunkers sold by O.W. Bunker and 
its subsidiaries to their clients 
had a maritime lien for 
necessaries over the 
purchasers/vessels.   
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competitive, and adaptable’.218 This law is based upon the private mechanism of 
the maritime lien (described in footnote 216), on the recognition of a 
preferential treatment to the crew members,219 on the particular structure of 
the industry220 and on the peculiarity of “double mortgage” contracts.  
Not all of these observations, however, should go unquestioned.  
In particular, recent cases prove that shipping is far from being a sector in 
which the rule of law has been established and where creditors have reasonable 
expectations to enforce private remedies.  
For instance, in the O.W. Bunker case, courts around the world reached 
remarkably discordant conclusions on the common legal question of whether 
physical suppliers of fuel bunkers were entitled to maritime liens for 
necessaries over the supplied vessels.221  
Other considerations suggest that autonomy-based remedies might not be of 
immediate use in case of crisis. For instance, with reference to the crew 
preference, its undisputed nature is known to the distressed debtor, as well as 
                                                                    
218 Ibid 2. 
219 Under maritime law, in all jurisdictions crew claims are made senior to any other claims, 
including those of secured creditors. This results in the crew having a strong incentive in co-
operating with the creditors, when their employer is in arrears with their payments.  
220 Similar to what happens in other commercial sectors such as real estate, and oil and mining, 
operators are organized as holding companies, with each asset (e.g. vessel, building, mine or oil 
well) owned separately by a different subsidiary. This allows creditors to double-mortgage both 
the assets and the shares of the subsidiary, which means that they could repossess the 
mortgaged asset without taking physical possession of it in a port and without the need of a 
lengthy and expensive court procedure.  
221 In England and Singapore, courts ruled that physical suppliers are not entitled to any 
maritime liens: PST Energy 7 Shipping Llc v O.W. Bunker Malta Ltd [2016] UKSC 23, [2016] AC 
1034 with reference to the first jurisdiction, Precious Shipping Public Co Ltd v O.W. Bunker Far 
East (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2015] 4 SLR 1229 [54] for the latter. On the other hand of the 
spectrum, Canadian federal judges are inclined to recognize the validity of such a remedy: 
Canpotex Shipping Servs. Ltd. v Maritime Petrobulk Ltd 2015 F.C. 1108 (Can.). Finally, U.S. courts 
still have to adopt a uniform position on the subject matter: while they generally dismiss 
physical suppliers’ claims to a maritime lien, they adopt an ambivalent position over the 
intermediary’s request for the same statutory protection: Barcliff, Llc v M/V Deep Blue, Imo No. 
9215359, 2016 WL 5660934 (S.D. Al. Sept. 28, 2016) and Clearlake Shipping PTE Ltd v O.W. 
Bunker (Switzerland) SA, 2017 WL 78514 (S.D. N.Y. January 9, 2017), where this remedy was 
recognised, as opposed to ING Bank N.V. v M/E Temara, 2016 WL 6156320 (S.D. N.Y. October 21, 
2016), where O.W. Bunker’s claim was dismissed. 
For an analysis of the decisions in common law countries: E Vaccari, ‘OW Bunker: A Common 
Law Perspective on Multilateral Co-operation in Insolvency-Related Cases’ (2017) 7 I.C.C.L.R. 
245. 
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to the creditors. The crew employer, therefore, will do everything in its power 
to keep their payments flowing.  
Should a delay be experienced, it does not necessary follow that the crew will 
agree on the requests of the other creditors. The debtor may promise payment 
upon delivery of the cargo, while the other creditors cannot ensure either a 
swift payment or a future job to the disgruntled workers.  
In other words, a significant period of time may pass between when the debtor 
shows the first signs of distress and the moment in which contractual claimants 
and crew agree on autonomy-based solutions to address their joint problems. A 
period of time in which, on the other hand, insolvency remedies may be 
triggered by any one of these players.  
Similar concerns affect other asset-segregated industries, such as the oil and 
mining sector. This is a highly de-regulated industry, where parties make heavy 
use of unincorporated joint ventures to purse common projects. Due to the 
nature of their relationships, the same parties rely on de-regulated contracts to 
define their duties and liabilities, as well as the consequences, should one of the 
parties breach them. 
However, even if we limit our analysis to a single jurisdiction (i.e. the U.K.) 
traditionally renowned for the value and protection granted to the principles of 
freedom and sanctity of contract,222 some commentators, as well as part of the 
judiciary, question the enforceability of some clauses223 commonly included in 
these agreements that have the same effect of contracting out insolvency rules. 
As shown in Pan Ocean, despite the recognition of the Korean rehabilitation 
proceedings as foreign main proceedings pursuant to the Cross-Border 
Insolvency Regulations 2006, the English court refrained itself from issuing an 
                                                                    
222 Recently, courts have re-asserted that in the English system, parties are free to agree 
whatever terms they choose to undertake in their relationships and that they can do that in a 
document, by word of mouth or by conduct: Globe Motors, Inc. v RTW Lucas Varity Electric 
Steering, Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 396, [2017] 1 All. E.R. (Comm) 601, Beatson LJ at [100]. 
223 For instance, in an article Aldersey-Williams (n 163) and other authors questioned whether 
the pro-contractual approach showed in recent decisions in Cavendish v Makdessi (n 121) and 
Belmont Park (n 113) would be sufficient to secure the enforceability of forfeiture provisions. 
Provisions that, among others, are included in model forms of joint operating agreements used 
in the oil and gas industry, and provided by established associations, such as ‘Oil and Gas UK’ 
(2009 form) and the ‘Association of International Petroleum Negotiators’ (2012 form).   
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injunction restraining Fibra from terminating the contract when the recognising 
court (i.e. the English one) could not itself have made such an order (i.e. 
invalidating the ipso facto clause) in its own domestic proceedings.224 In other 
words, the relevant termination provisions being invalid "as a matter of Korean 
law" was irrelevant: it was the English anti-deprivation principle, not any 
Korean law rule, which should govern the validity of the termination 
provisions.225 
As one commentator observed, ‘[t]he recent English cases on ipso facto clauses 
confirm “how" English law will determine the validity of such clauses, but, for 
cross-border transactions, it is unclear "when" English law should apply’.226 This 
seriously jeopardizes the validity of Franks’ claim that in cross-border shipping 
cases ‘the rule of law has been established’.  
With reference to the latter condition and, in particular, to the alleged enhanced 
economic efficiency of private mechanisms over insolvency law remedies, this 
thesis does not refute their conclusions. It refutes, however, their relevance. 
Franks, Sussman and Vig may have demonstrated that autonomy-based, 
discrete remedies are at least as efficient as insolvency law procedures in 
dealing with distressed debtors. Similar considerations apply to the 
enforceability of ipso facto clauses in asset-segregated industries. However, 
these observations are in themselves insufficient to claim that autonomy-based 
remedies should be preferred over statutory ones. At best, they simply 
demonstrate the need for more efficient insolvency procedures. 
- 
This sub-section has proved that, while the second condition generally 
advocated by commentators to plead a case for autonomy-based solutions in 
                                                                    
224 Re Pan Ocean Co. Ltd [2014] EWHC 2124 (Ch), [2014] Bus LR 1041. The applicant, the 
administrator of a company which has filed for insolvency relief in South Korea, sought an order 
to refrain the counter-party from terminating a contract which included an ipso facto clause and 
was subject to English law. Such a clause would not have been enforceable under Korean law. 
Distancing themselves from the U.S. approach in Re Condor Insurance Co. Ltd (2010) 601 F 3d 
319, the court refused to issue such an order. 
225 R Matthews, ‘Tough Choices: Ipso Facto, the Anti-Deprivation Principle and Choice of Laws’ 
(2015) 30(2) J.I.B.L.R. 62, 63. 
226 Ibid 62. 
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asset-segregated sectors of the economy may be valid, this is not necessarily the 
case. Even more problematic is the observation that autonomy-based 
mechanisms may not always be available to creditors.  
Nevertheless, this lack of procedural or economic efficiency of these 
mechanisms over insolvency ones may not represent a major obstacle, if these 
commentators are right in claiming that in these industries there is no TCP 
problem. 
2.3(b) The Lack of a TCP Problem 
As highlighted in sub-section 1.3(a) and as it will be discussed further in section 
5.4, TCP dilemmas occur whenever competing, contracting parties are unable to 
allocate their rights over the debtor and its assets in an orderly way, because 
the debtor’s existing and potential assets are unable to cover the creditors’ 
existing and potential claims. 
Some authors claim that in the maritime world, TCP problems do not arise. This 
is primarily because creditors have specific claims on the goods of the debtors 
and, upon default, they can repossess the goods and put into practice value-
enhancing actions for the satisfaction of their claims.  
To prove valid, such a statement should be statistically significant. At least with 
reference to the shipping industry, it is based on the widespread adoption of the 
“double mortgage” contract227 in commercial transactions.  
If we assume, as many of these authors seem to do, that commercial 
transactions are bi-lateral in nature and that “double mortgage” contracts are 
the rule rather than the exception, we may observe that security-holders do 
benefit from a fast and effective repossession mechanism. Surely, there is little 
co-ordination failure between the secured creditor and the debtor. However, 
the relationships between creditors are much more complicated. 
                                                                    
227 “Double mortgage” contracts can be entered into by holding companies, whose vessels are 
owned separately by a different supplier. This allows creditors to take a security interest not 
only over the vessel (which may also be recognised by operation of the law), but also over the 
shares of the subsidiary. As a result, upon default, the creditor is able to become the sole owner 
of the distressed debtor and sell the vessels for its satisfaction. 
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The collapse of Eastwind Maritime Inc. (‘Eastwind’) represents a thought-
provoking case study as it featured a conflict between participants from 
different asset-segregated industries (i.e. the maritime industry and the 
financial sector).  
Eastwind was a Marshall Islands domiciled company, which filed for liquidation 
(Chapter 7) alongside with more than fifty (50) affiliates in the Southern 
District of New York at the end of June 2009.228 The filing came a day after 
Nordea Bank (‘Nordea’) took over twelve (12) subsidiaries (each of which 
owned one vessel) and sold them to Samama’s Draften Shipping. It also followed 
a number of setbacks for Eastwind, including vessel arrests, lawsuits and the 
loss of a major management contract. 
Proponents of autonomy-driven approaches might argue that this case did not 
feature any TCP problem. This is because the main creditor (Nordea) was able 
to appoint new directors for the entities for which it held a security line and sell 
their shares before a corporate bankruptcy procedure was triggered. 
This narrative, however, overlooks the fact that Nordea was not the only 
creditor of these distressed subsidiaries. While the sale was in its own interest, 
all other creditors were left out-of-money (with the exception of crew 
members). Tax claimants, suppliers, shareholders and bondholders received 
nothing from this sale, to the point that Nordea had to pay $750k to settle a 
litigation with the trustee of the bankrupt holding company.229  
To sum up, rather than proving the absence of any TCP problems, Eastwind 
proves the modernity of this concept. It equally highlights the inability of 
autonomy-based remedies to consider the conflicting interests of other 
stakeholders in asset-segregated industries, thus paving the way for the use of a 
RCP notion that considers also their rights and expectations.  
 
                                                                    
228 Re Eastwind Maritime, Inc., No. 09-14047 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 24 June 2009). 
229 Franks and others (n 217). 
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2.4 NORMATIVE, EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS 
It is not infrequent that radical views are either generally praised and cheered 
or hosed down by a torrent of counter-arguments (or both, not necessarily in 
any specific order). As for the theories described in the previous sections, the 
latter approach has proven prevailing in the insolvency cohort. There is a 
burgeoning literature that tries to prove the autonomy of insolvency law and 
the need for mandatory rules with different degrees of success.  
Parties have always included contractual clauses in their agreements aimed at 
regulating their relationships should one of them default on their obligations 
without the need to rely on insolvency law. The existence of statutory limits to 
their implementation, as well as the lack of uniform approaches at national and 
international level in the judiciary, may demonstrate that markets are incapable 
per se to address all the nuances of insolvency cases. Additionally, even the 
contracting parties do not fully trust their enforceability.230 
However, the theoretical proposals de-constructed in this chapter should not be 
dismissed simply because they have not been tested in practice231 or because 
markets may be inefficient. Additionally, some of the criticisms may be 
excessive,232 as mechanisms (such as standardization of clauses) could be 
deployed to address the most striking inequalities and issues. 
From a normative standpoint, stay waivers and ipso facto clauses do not 
question the opportunity, scope and purpose of insolvency law; they simply 
affect the formation of the insolvency estate. When the opportunity to rely on 
statutory mechanisms is questioned (such as with recourse to arbitration), the 
consensual and private nature of the alternative, autonomy-based remedy 
makes it unsuitable for generalised application. 
                                                                    
230 This, at least, is what the case laws mentioned in this section suggests with reference to 
insolvency procedures. Outside insolvency, however, these clauses retain their validity and 
enforceability. A circumstance, which explains their inclusion in standard forms and in 
negotiated agreements.   
231 Even though the previous sub-sections proved that, when carve-outs and procedural 
remedies are translated into practice, several problems arise, thus suggesting that these 
theories are also inefficient when dealing with real-case scenarios. 
232 Is it true that the majority of creditors, both in size and number, are frequently mis- or non-
adjusting? Should we build a system around or for them, or should we reduce the chances of 
abuse in a system designed to achieve other purposes, e.g. maximise creditors’ return and the 
opportunity of viable but financially distressed companies to re-enter into the market?  
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With reference to asset-segregated industries, this chapter has proven that the 
discrete rules that govern their affairs are unable to acknowledge the issues 
that the cohort of creditors faces when their common debtor files for 
bankruptcy protection. These rules simply result in sidestepping insolvency 
practices and principles, such as the pari passu principle of distribution of assets 
among equally ranked creditors. 
Historical arguments have also been made to counteract autonomy-based 
proposals. Some authors, for instance, observed that, when parties were 
unrestrained in the content of their contracts, they did not negotiate for 
insolvency remedies, thus prompting the legislator to adopt nation-wide 
remedies.233 These arguments, however, have a reverse side. Insolvency law has 
emerged from commercial practice and the first statutes simply replicated the 
procedures and practice of workout agreements.234 
More convincing, but still not entirely persuasive criticisms contested the 
validity of these theories on the basis of empirical unsoundness and their very 
specific focus. As Bufford put it, ‘it would be foolhardy to develop bankruptcy 
policy or to revise bankruptcy law based on such a thin slice of bankruptcy life’.235  
Autonomy-based alternatives may prove enticing for certain companies (e.g. 
publicly listed corporations) or industries (e.g. financial or maritime sectors), 
but this does not justify the general repeal of insolvency statutes.  
From a pragmatic standpoint, the following considerations are based on the 
distinctive features of autonomy-based theories. All the above-mentioned 
visions have the following elements in common: 
1) Faith in the Market (substantive efficiency). Corporations are either 
conceived as nexuses of contractual relationships where everything is 
negotiable (Adler) or functions whose membership is given to all the 
individuals who make company-specific investments (LoPucki). Markets 
                                                                    
233 SL Bufford, ‘What is Right About Bankruptcy Law and Wrong About its Critics’ (1994) 72 
Wash. U. L.Q. 829, 842. 
234 Among others: de Ruysscher (n 62). 
235 Bufford (n 233) 840. 
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are sufficiently mature and efficient to maximise the value of the 
distressed company and support their restructuring efforts; 
2) Contract Law is all that is needed. Contracts entitle the creditors to take 
control of the debtor on the basis of the hierarchy of priorities 
recognised by the general law. There is no space for “priority claim 
holders”, that is for claimants that enjoy a preferential treatment only in 
insolvency and by reason of the financial distress of the debtor; 
3) Contractualism replaces Collectivism. Autonomy-based procedures are 
driven by the debtor under the supervision of the “in-money” creditors, 
even if sometimes the assistance from courts or turnaround 
professionals may be envisaged. Intervention from third parties is 
restricted to cases where the incumbent management is not able to deal 
with the prisoner’s dilemma or when it has lost any credibility to restore 
value to the original levels; 
4) Procedural Efficiency. Costs of consensus in autonomy-based procedures 
are always lower than the direct and indirect costs associated with 
mandatory rescue or liquidation procedures;236 
5) Pre-determined Exit Strategies. Irrespective of the mechanism 
considered, all contractual parties have a reasonable expectation from 
the onset of their negotiations that, in case of financial difficulties, a pre-
determined autonomy-based procedure will apply; 
6)  Focus on “in-money” Creditors. There is no need to recognise the same 
rights and privileges to all claimants. Since contractual solutions require 
consensus, it is only appropriate to demand approval solely to the 
parties that have an interest in the procedure. When a creditor holds a 
claim, whose residual value is even in case of a successful turnaround 
zero or close to zero, this creditor can have no right to obstruct or 
otherwise delay the autonomy-based process.   
                                                                    
236 Direct costs include all the expenses associated with running a formal or hybrid insolvency 
procedures, including administrative and professional fees, as well as negative externalities 
associated with delay. Indirect costs include loss of customers, unfavourable payment terms, 
key employees leaving the company, and similar negative externalities associated with the same 
procedures.  
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These characteristics show that in a remarkable discordance with common 
wisdoms, autonomy-based remedies promote a high level of procedural 
efficiency. As seen before, sophisticated contractors do rely on ipso facto 
clauses, despite the conflicting rulings and approaches in the Anglo/American 
system. This faith in autonomy-based remedies means that mechanisms such as 
chameleon equity or option proposals could be implemented in a liquid market.  
Just as the market participants do not have difficulties in understanding the 
proposed, autonomy-based mechanisms - on the contrary, they would probably 
find them of more immediate comprehension than existing legal structures 
governing insolvency procedures -, shareholders and contractual creditors are 
likely to structure their relations on the basis of the proposed autonomy-based 
mechanisms, especially in purely domestic cases. Entrepreneurialism and 
market integrity do not seem to be negatively affected by autonomy-based 
proposals.  
Vulnerable stakeholders, however, might argue that there is no mechanism to 
deal with their concerns and claims, as debtors and contractual creditors are 
the only parties involved in the process. Judicial, civil or criminal remedies 
would be ineffective to address the claims of this group of stakeholders, since 
autonomy-based theories do not question the “principle of finality” of contract 
law. The company purchasing the assets of the debtor, merging with that, or 
otherwise emerging from rescue proceedings is not generally liable for the 
debts of the original entity. There will therefore always be a need for a law as an 
option for those stakeholders who did not enter into a contract with the 
debtor.237  
The biggest hurdle to overcome for autonomy-based visions is their 
acceptability in light of the current legislative and cultural framework. A 
piecemeal implementation of these proposals may result in some countries 
refusing to enforce the effects of autonomy-based restructurings for public 
policy concerns. Equally, the discussion on the desirability of ipso facto clauses 
                                                                    
237 S Paterson, ‘Rethinking the Role of Corporate Distress in the Twenty-First Century’ LSE Law, 
Society and Economy Working Paper No. 27/2014 (2014) 27 
<https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2014-27_Paterson.pdf> accessed 17 
September 2018. 
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has evidenced that many players have a lukewarm attitude towards autonomy-
based remedies, since they are frequently perceived as the mechanism 
sophisticated parties use to achieve higher returns or additional protections at 
the expense of less sophisticated ones. Finally, theories which rely primarily on 
current management to turnaround the business (or liquidate it on the market) 
seem to ignore the circumstance that ‘most company problems are internally 
generated by management deficiencies’.238  
Not surprisingly, society as a whole may complain about autonomy-based 
mechanisms since they do not maximise overall benefits. They are designed to 
maximise the return to the sophisticated stakeholders.  The claims of vulnerable 
stakeholders and society at large are barely considered, and no safeguards are 
envisaged to address these concerns.  
 
2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
For quite a long time the generally unchallenged position was that insolvency 
law should promote equity and fairness between claimants. This view has 
informed the evolution of statutory rules in this area of law, with the result that 
the existence of statutory mechanisms to deal with corporate and individual 
distress has never been seriously challenged. It was only when a young faculty 
member at Stanford Law School described insolvency law as the solution to a 
collective problem (i.e. the common pool problem) that the first cracks in the 
equity-and-justice granitic façade began to appear. 
The starling characterization of insolvency law as a collective action mechanism 
opened the floodgates to serious critiques of its claimed autonomy from other 
areas of law, notably contract law. However, this chapter has proven that 
autonomy-based theories may not withstand comprehensive theoretical 
criticism. Their implementation raises concerns with reference to procedural 
fairness and acceptability from the society at large. 
                                                                    
238 D Bibeault, ‘Turnaround Strategies. Practical Insights From a 47-Year Career’ in J Adriaanse 
and JP van der Rest (eds), Turnaround Management and Bankruptcy (Routledge: London, 2017) 
147. 
  134 
Additionally, several authors have proven that the existence of statutory 
insolvency mechanisms may help achieve one of the fundamental goals of no-
insolvency approaches, i.e. to reduce the cost of capital.239 This is because 
funders may prove more willing to grant credit to businesses in jurisdictions 
and environments where they are aware of the rules, principles, mechanisms, 
remedies and risks that they face, should the borrowers default on their 
payments.  
A statutory framework of insolvency law can contribute to enhance the legal 
predictability of the system. As a side effect, it can also promote autonomy-
based, out-of-court workouts as both parties that are bargaining in the shadow 
of the law are fully aware of their rights in a formal insolvency scenario.240  
Despite that, autonomy-based theories shatter the conviction, shared by many 
proceduralist and principle-based scholars, that the only way to solve TCP 
situations raised by insolvency cases is by means of a regulatory intervention of 
the state. It is not always the case that institutional arrangements imposed by 
external authorities will prove more successful than autonomy-based solutions 
in promoting the interests of the participants to the insolvency procedure. 
There are circumstances in which the parties affected by the debtor’s corporate 
demise can autonomously act and implement decisions which are in the best 
interest of the majority of stakeholders. 
The weak spot of these proposals is that they assert that regulation is neither 
needed nor necessary. Cases like British Eagle, Nortel, O.W. Bunker and Eastwind 
have proven that this assumption is erroneous. Regulation is needed, 
admittedly sometimes only as a last-resort ‘system of collectivized debt 
collection’,241 to deal with those cases in which participants act independently 
and are motivated by selfish and opportunistic aims. A legal framework without 
                                                                    
239 Among others: JF Weston, ‘Some Economic Fundamentals for an Analysis of Bankruptcy’ 
(1977) 41 Law & Contemp. Probs 47, 59. 
240 V Finch, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law or Shadowy Bargains?’ (2006) J. Bus. Law 568. 
241 TH Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law’ (2nd edn, Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, MA, 2001) 7. Against: de Ruysscher (n 62) 22 (arguing that if insolvency was 
intended as a “means of last resort” it would focus only on fraud and expropriation of assets, 
thus preventing reorganisation and continuity of business). 
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specific procedural and substantive rules that deal with insolvency disputes 
may prove insufficient. 
Insolvency theoretical frameworks (and rules) should not, however, assume 
that parties are always incapable of communicating and acting for the common 
good. Autonomy-based theories have the merit of re-asserting the centrality of 
the principle of party autonomy in the insolvency context. They have adduced 
that any theoretical framework of insolvency law (including those that deal 
with the limits of this area of law, including this study) should consider, protect 
and promote the autonomy of the stakeholders involved in the procedure.  
Autonomy-based methods caution against the extensive disregard of private 
negotiations, especially in a business context. The following chapters 
investigate if other seminal approaches promote a procedurally fair and 
efficient system of rules that address when companies should file for 
insolvency. 
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CHAPTER 3 - THE LIMITS OF INSOLVENCY LAW IN PROCEDURALIST 
FRAMEWORKS 
«Bankruptcy [law] reflect the kind of contract that creditors would agree to if 
they were able to negotiate with each other before extending credit»1 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of neo-libertarian theories suggested that insolvency law should 
remain a discrete area of law. However, this does not imply that insolvency 
rules should be substantially dissimilar to contractual remedies. On the 
contrary, their scope could be restricted to procedural instructions aimed at 
binding parties and facilitating the solution of the common pool dispute by 
means of an agreement.  
This view has been advocated in several works by scholars collectively known 
as “proceduralists”. Proceduralists or contractarians2 share the neo-libertarian 
market-oriented focus of the theories described in chapter two. However, they 
disagree with neo-libertarians on their call for transforming insolvency rules in 
private law remedies. They argue for a procedural approach to the subject, thus 
giving rise to the criticism of those who observe that this “procedure” would be 
de facto reduced to an “afterthought”, to a ‘narrow and purely reactive’ set of 
rules, which would have no need to be separate from general, private law.3 
- 
 
                                                                    
1 TH Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (2nd edn, Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, MA, 2001) 17 (ftn 22). 
2 As Baird defines those academics (as himself) who advocate for a proceduralist approach to 
insolvency law and resist inclusion of separate (re)distributive goals which, on the contrary, are 
advocated by “traditionalists” - see DG Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 
Yale L.J. 573. Other contributors to this line of thinking include MG Shanker, ‘The Abuse and Use 
of Federal Bankruptcy Power’ (Fall 1975) 26(3) Case W. Res. L. Rev. 3 (arguing that rules valid 
only in front of bankruptcy courts are a tension-creating situation); TH Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, 
Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain’ (1982) 91 Yale L.J. 857 (arguing that 
insolvency law should deal only with inter-creditor questions on the basis of the creditors’ 
bargain model). 
3 BE Adler, ‘The Law of Last Resort’ (2002) 55(6) Vand. L. Rev. 1661, 1662. 
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2012: Detroit, Michigan.4  
At the beginning of 2012 Detroit, the largest city of Michigan with a population 
of nearly 700,000 people,5 found itself the brink of collapse. Decades of 
industrial decline,6 economic downturn,7 social and racial strife, financial 
mismanagement,8 municipal disarray,9 and political corruption brought the city 
on the verge of a liquidity crisis.10  
Before taking the books in court, the city and the state looked for consensual 
solutions with creditors, first by means of a state fiscal oversight over the city 
expenses (April 2012), and then by the appointment of Jones Day restructuring 
attorney Kevyn Orr as the city’s emergency manager (hereinafter, EM) on 14 
March 2013.11 The unsuccessful outcome of this attempted “haircut” on 
Detroit’s debt has resulted in the most controversial municipal bankruptcy of 
recent times.  
                                                                    
4 For this portion of the thesis, the author relied on the research that he conducted at earlier 
stages of his doctoral studies and that resulted in the publication of the following article: E 
Vaccari, ‘Municipal Bankruptcy Law: A Solution Which Should Not Become a Problem’ (2017) 5 
NIBLeJ 02. Part of the wording is taken from that paper.  
5 In its heydays in the 50s, Detroit was the hometown of more than 1.8 million people. Source: 
<http://historydetroit.com/statistics/> accessed: 17 September 2018.  
6 Michigan and Detroit industries have always heavily relied on the auto sector. However, the oil 
crisis of the 70s and the emergence of Japanese and Korean automakers in the U.S. car market 
found the “Big Threes” (GM, Ford and Chrysler) ill-prepared to meet these new challenges. 
Automation of the industry meant that fewer workers were needed in factories, while the 
neglected municipal teaching system was incapable of educating skilled workers.  
7 Michigan backtracked a revenue-sharing agreement negotiated with the city in 1998. 
Furthermore, the 2008 financial crisis also affected the money that state and federal lawmakers 
could devote to city budgets.  
8 While many commentators blame mayor Coleman Young for the city’s economic collapse, a 
great deal of responsibility is to be charged also on mayor Kwame Kilpatrick, and not simply for 
the corruption scandals that resulted in his twenty-eight-year conviction in a federal prison. See 
below sub-section 5.2(d). 
9 In 2012, city’s violent crime rate was five times higher than national average, police took on 
average thirty minutes to arrive on the scene of a high-priority call and only 39 out of 344 
murders were solved in 2011. In addition, 40% of the city streetlights were not working and a 
study conducted in 2014 estimated that in Detroit area there were at least 84,000 blighted or 
vacant structures: N Bomey, Detroit Resurrected: To Bankruptcy and Back (W.W. Norton & Co., 
Inc.: New York, 2016).  
10 See generally: M Binelli, The Last Days of Detroit: Motor Cars, Motown and The Collapse of an 
Industrial Giant (The Bodley Head: London, 2013); TJ Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: 
Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton University Press: Princeton 2014); C LeDuff, 
Detroit: An American Autopsy (Penguin Books: London, 2014); HK Lennox and others, ‘Panic in 
Detroit: Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Process from Soup to Nuts’ (2015) ABI Working Paper 
<https://abi-org-corp.s3.amazonaws.com/materials/PanicInDetroit_0.pdf> accessed: 17 
September 2018. 
11 City of Detroit, Proposal for Creditors (14 June 2013) 
<http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/EM/Reports/City%20of%20Detroit%20Proposal
%20for%20Creditors1.pdf> accessed: 17 September 2018. 
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Detroit filed for Chapter 9 in the US Bankruptcy Court of the Eastern District of 
Michigan on 18 July 2013 at 4:06 p.m.12 However, the city was declared 
“eligible” for bankruptcy only on 3 December 2013.13 It was this second ruling, 
which paved the way for real negotiations between the creditors and the city. 
With the support of a mediator (Chief Judge Gerald Rosen), EM's staff 
negotiated with major creditors over a reduction of the outstanding liabilities.  
Detroit had debt in excess of $18 billion. While a portion was secured, the 
majority was not. Among unsecured creditors, the most problematic positions - 
for different reasons - were those of pension and healthcare liabilities,14 and 
those of bondholders (primarily, UBS and Merrill Lynch) and their insurers 
(primarily, Syncora and FGIC). While ranking at the same level,15 bankruptcy 
officials tried (and managed) to secure a significantly better treatment for the 
retirement funds:16 in the battle between citizens and bondholders, the former 
fared remarkably better.17 
                                                                    
12 Bankruptcy Petition, Re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (E.D. Mich. July 18, 2013). 
13 For a description of the activity in Detroit’s bankruptcy in the pre-eligibility-trial period: MB 
Jacoby, ‘The Detroit Bankruptcy, Pre-Eligibility’ (2014) Fordham Urb. L.J. 849. 
14 The city was required to distribute payments to some funds, to ensure that retirees’ monthly 
benefits were paid, and their health expenses covered. By the time Detroit filed for bankruptcy, 
it experienced a shortfall towards these creditors equal to $9.2 billion (i.e. nine times the city’s 
annual core budget). Source: Bomey (n 9) 48. 
15 Chapter 9 grants senior status to debts secured by the pledge of specific revenues (e.g. the 
water and sewer system bonds secured by utility bill payments).  
16 According to an agreement signed in April 2014 and then approved by their members, police 
officers and firefighters - due to the better conditions of their retirement funds - did not 
experience cuts to their monthly pensions, but only in the annual cost-of-living-adjustment 
(COLA) increases. General municipal pensioners agreed to a 4.5% cut in their monthly 
payments, and the elimination of COLA increases. Health care cuts were drastic, but nothing in 
comparison to what the bondholder insurers agreed on: 13 cents on the dollar in cash, plus the 
opportunity to develop existing properties in metro area. 
17 While this work is critic on that outcome, not all commentators appear to be equally troubled. 
For instance, Gillette argued that bondholders should bear the greater losses because they are 
better placed to monitor the city’s behaviour over its citizens and because they can demand ex 
ante compensation for their loans [C Gillette, ‘Bondholders and Financially Stressed 
Municipalities’ (2012) 39 Fordham Urb. L.J. 639]. Schragger concurs by claiming that since 
economic crises have a political nature, it makes sense for courts or legislatures to prioritize 
citizens over creditors [RC Schragger, ‘Citizens Versus Bondholders’ (2012) Fordham Urb. L.J. 
787, 803]. Despite how persuasive the arguments, in the author’s opinion these comments 
present a fundamental flaw: law or contracts, not praiseworthiness, should determine creditors’ 
ranking. Also, according to Goode [RM Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2011)], equality of creditors is one of the pivotal principles of 
bankruptcy law and it should not be easily displaced.   
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The final plan of adjustment - subject to state’s oversight -, included a significant 
financial support from the “Great Bargain”,18 as well as minor contributions 
from the state budget. This was approved by all classes of creditors and 
confirmed by Rhodes J. on 7 November 2014.  
The plan's goals were achieved at the expense of some of the most fundamental 
axioms of insolvency law: respect for pre-insolvency relative rights and the 
principle of rateable distribution among similarly placed creditors. The 
politically-informed nature of the governance prevailed over the procedural 
constraints of the Code. Proceduralist theories suggest that this should never be 
the case and that their understanding of the purpose and limits of insolvency 
law would have resulted in an entirely divergent outcome.   
After having discussed the main suggestions and arguments from proceduralist 
theorists (section 2), this chapter de-constructs19 the main proceduralist 
theories to investigate their normative validity, as well as their compatibility 
with the pragmatic benchmarks laid out in sub-section 1.3(c). Similar to chapter 
two, this section does not provide a full assessment of proceduralist theories as 
it is concerned with highlighting the features of these conceptualisations that 
are relevant for the debate on the limits of insolvency law. The overall purpose 
of this chapter is, accordingly, to determine if and to what extent these theories 
can help to define the limits of insolvency law. 
 
3.2 PROCEDURALIST SOLUTIONS IN INSOLVENCY LAW 
A comprehensive investigation of all proceduralist theories20 relating to 
insolvency law falls outside the scope of this thesis. To collect appropriate 
evidence for our de-constructivist analysis, the following section provides a 
glance at the pivotal characteristics of the most widely accepted ones to assess 
their normative value and their practical implications.  
                                                                    
18 The “Great Bargain” is the colloquial term used to designate the contributions to pension 
funds made available by a series of foundations as part of a comprehensive settlement to 
preserve city-owned art at the Detroit Institute of Art for the benefit of the local residents and 
the region.  
19 For a definition of a de-constructivist approach, see section 1.2, ftn 32. 
20 For a general definition of proceduralist theories, see section 1.2, ftn 34. 
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At the end of this analysis it will become apparent that proceduralist solutions 
may fall short of providing a normative explanation of the insolvency corporate 
framework as they do not withstand the scrutiny of the procedurally fair and 
efficient criteria employed in this work. Nevertheless, proceduralists have 
shown that markets value a system of insolvency rules capable of promoting an 
efficient management and ensuring a predictable outcome of corporate rescue 
or liquidation cases. This finding will be taken into consideration by the author 
in chapters five and six, where he outlines his alternative conceptual 
framework. 
- 
[1] An understanding of insolvency law as being primarily procedural is 
supported by scholars (such as Shanker and Adler), who believe that rules 
valid only in front of bankruptcy courts are a tension-creating situation. If a 
problem is solved only in bankruptcy, they argue, ‘[t]hat ‘solution’ is a cure 
which is probably worse than the disease. Indeed, it can be hardly classified as a 
solution at all’.21 
Highlighting the procedural nature of insolvency law results in restricting its 
scope to a last-resort mechanism.22 If insolvency law does not amend 
substantive rights, parties (debtors and creditors together) would be 
encouraged to reach an agreement outside of insolvency. At the same time, they 
would know that, should they fail to cooperate, any of them could always 
commence an insolvency procedure, which would preserve the ‘relative value of 
particular non-bankruptcy entitlements instead of the rights themselves’.23  
In other words, whenever the TCP dilemma could not be solved with 
contractual agreements, any interested party could eventually trigger an 
insolvency procedure. Collectivity, the binding nature of insolvency and the 
                                                                    
21 Shanker (n 2) 9. 
22 Ibid 22: ‘The function of bankruptcy law is not to derogate from the general debtor-creditor 
law; rather, to support it. Bankruptcy’s unique function is to provide a forum of last resort’. 
Against, see Adler (n 3), who argued that ‘bankruptcy must resolve inconsistent obligations and 
may serve other functions, such as provisions of a fresh start to individuals, but bankruptcy need 
not provide a collection-action process’ (at 1698). 
23 Jackson (n 1). 
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preservation of the pari passu principle would prevent any strategic use of 
insolvency remedies.  
The idea behind this reasoning is that, if the insolvency system does not affect 
the rights recognised by general law, parties, left alone, would act in their 
collective best interest. They would negotiate a satisfactory, swift arrangement 
at the lowest cost.  
The proponents of this line of thinking argue that sale of assets and business for 
market value eliminates for both large and MSMEs the need of reorganisation 
procedures such as Chapter 11. They contend that ‘Chapter 11 can play its 
traditional role only in environments in which specialized assets exist, where those 
assets must remain in a particular firm, where control rights are badly allocated, 
and where going concern sales are not possible’.24  
They basically argue that the need for collective procedures may be restricted 
to periods of cyclical, economic downturns. However, it is not clear why the 
utility of a procedure should depend on the global economic context, rather 
than on the soundness of its foundations. 
Additionally, practice,25 theoretical studies26 and comments from the 
proponents themselves27 undermine the validity of this conclusion and, hence, 
the overall soundness of the proposal. In particular, it is frequently 
acknowledged that corporations are nexuses of relationships, not simply 
collections of contracts.28 Their value is represented by the people who work 
for them as much as by their contracts for the sale or supply of goods. If all 
stakeholders are not equal, deviations from generally enforceable rules can be 
in the interests of all players, as in the case of Detroit.   
Shanker and Adler’s vision addressed only allocative issues without providing 
guidance on how to assess the creditors’ conflicting rights and expectations. 
                                                                    
24 DG Baird and RK Rasmussen, ‘The End of Bankruptcy’ (2002) 55(3) Stan. L. Rev. 751, 788. 
25 Cases like Nortel (see sub-section 3.2(b)) and Detroit (see sub-section 5.4(c)), among others. 
26 As Shuchman observed, purely “law and economics” methodologies tell us something about 
economics, but very littles about the problems of bankruptcy: P Shuchman, ‘Theory and Reality 
in Bankruptcy: The Spherical Chicken’ (Autumn 1977) 41(4) Law & Contemp. Probs. 66. 
27 Baird and Rasmussen (n 24). 
28 LM LoPucki, ‘The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen’s ‘The 
End of Bankruptcy’ (2003) 56(3) Stan. L. Rev. 645. 
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[2] Other law and economics scholars such as Jackson,29 Baird30 and Scott31 
[creditors’ bargain theory] also contended that insolvency law should deal 
with allocative disputes among creditors.  
In other words, insolvency law’s central goal should be to collectivize the 
process by which a debtor’s assets are made available to its claimants whenever 
an (allocative) TCP problem emerged. It should be a derivative and facilitative 
system of rules, with very little interference on party autonomy.  
Bankruptcy law is or should be the set of procedures that can come into 
play when multiple party withdrawal rights are triggered and the 
exercise of these rights by individual investors is costly and interferes 
with the deployment of the firm’s assets.32 
These authors assume that, for the state-directed insolvency law procedure to 
exist, those with rights to the assets of a company should agree ex-ante, in the 
negotiation phase, on such a need. Parties would agree on limitations to their 
rights only if that resulted in a maximisation of the debtor’s assets. As a result, 
insolvency law should allocate rights among claimants to particular assets, but 
it should not interfere with distributional issues since it should aim at ex-post 
maximisation of the returns to creditors.33  
To illustrate this point, Jackson discussed the options available to him and a 
Stanford professor in the theoretical case that their common debtor would fail 
to repay his debt and had insufficient assets to pay both of them. Jackson 
concluded that he and his Stanford colleague would agree ex-ante on a 
collective, pro rata distribution because it was impossible to devise an 
                                                                    
29 Jackson (n 2); TH Jackson, ‘Translating Assets and Liabilities to Bankruptcy Forum’ (Jan. 
1985) 14(1) J. Legal Stud. 73. 
30 DG Baird, ‘The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations’ (Jan. 1986) 15(1) J. Legal Stud. 
127. 
31 TH Jackson and RE Scott, ‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and 
the Creditors’ Bargain’ (1989) 75 Vand. L. Rev. 155. 
32 Baird (n 30) 131. 
33 Contractarian/creditors’ wealth maximisation theorists assume that the shareholders own 
the debtor (agency theory) and that the company is merely a ‘pool of assets’. Accordingly, when 
the company faces insolvency, the ownership shifts to the creditors, who are then entitled to 
grab and distribute its assets according to non-insolvency entitlements. The insolvency 
procedure should serve the owners’ interests, hence the interests of third parties (e.g. 
employees, suppliers, customers, and communities) should be considered only to the extent 
that they have a valid claim under non-insolvency law against the debtor. 
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alternative mechanism that made both him and the Stanford professor better 
off.34  
Nevertheless, while emphasizing the value of retaining out-of-insolvency rights, 
the proponents of this line of thinking recognize that there may be a ‘need to 
adjust non-bankruptcy attributes to unique bankruptcy procedures’.35 In other 
words, they recognise that non-insolvency rights could be amended by 
(insolvency) law to achieve the goals of the system.  
Accordingly, the main deficiency of this line of thinking is that it fails to consider 
adequately (re)distributive issues.36 Not every relationship among creditors 
could be regulated according to rights recognized under the general law.37  
This is best illustrated by referring to cases in which insolvency laws have been 
exploited by one party to extract profit or avoid losses.38 This happened 
because those parties who made a strategic use of insolvency rules considered 
                                                                    
34 Jackson (n 1) 30/31. 
35 Jackson (n 29) 73; DG Baird, ‘Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to 
Warren’ (1987) 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815, 823: ‘The only point Jackson and I make is that the 
priorities that exist under nonbankruptcy law should run parallel to priorities in bankruptcy. To 
the extent that these priorities generate bad distributional consequences, they should be changed 
in both settings’.  
36 This concern was clearly expressed by E Warren in ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (Summer 1987) 54(3) 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 775. Warren argued that bankruptcy should answer the question ‘How Shall the 
Losses be Distributed?’, but Baird - Baird (n 35) - replied that how losses should be borne is a 
question of general law.  
37 Jackson, for instance, recognized that certain notions, such as that of “claim”, should be wide 
enough to include future tort claimants (e.g. asbestos claimants). He tried to nullify the risk of 
abusive use of insolvency law by arguing that limits to the determination of the claim are valid 
only if they exist outside insolvency.  
38 Re Texaco Inc., 76 B.R. 322 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987), where the company filed for bankruptcy 
protection when it had a net worth close to $25 billion to avoid the consequences of a pending 
trial, in which it was later sentenced to pay $10.53 billion to Penzoil for unfair commercial 
practices [Pennzoil v Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987)]. In summary, the company filed for 
bankruptcy protection to frustrate corporate rivals: KJ Delaney, Strategic Bankruptcy: How 
Corporations and Creditors Use Chapter 11 to their Advantage (2nd edn, University of California 
Press: Los Angeles, 1992) 126-159; BG Carruthers and TC Halliday, Rescuing Business. The 
Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Law in England and the United States (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 
1998) 2. 
See also Re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005), 200, where it is acknowledged that 
some entities within the group were created to limit liability concerns with respect to asbestos. 
Similarly: Tronox, Inc. v Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (Re Tronox, Inc.) 450 B.R. 432 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2011), which detailed how the company separated its oil and gas assets from the rest of the 
holdings to reduce its liability risks.  
Other notorious cases include the insolvencies of Continental Airlines (see section 6.2) and 
Wilson Foods, where Chapter 11 was used to break labour contracts with a unionized workforce. 
On the contrary, in the insolvency cases of Manville Corp. and A.H. Robins (see above sub-section 
1.1(a)), Chapter 11 was used to control mass tort damages.  
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the insolvency framework as a powerful and efficient mechanism to solve 
contractual or tort, rather than insolvency or common pool issues.39  
It follows that if the legislation fails to even consider the possibility that 
(re)distributive issues might arise because of the insolvency of a debtor, certain 
debtors would have an incentive to use the statutory provisions in a strategic 
way and the courts would lack appropriate remedies to counteract this misuse 
of the law. 
[3] Building on these concerns, some authors tried to mitigate the most striking 
consequences of the creditors’ bargain heuristic40 by conceiving yardsticks that 
would make risk-sharing acceptable.41 
These scholars argued that the creditors’ bargain heuristic, while powerful and 
illuminating, was only partially successful because it projected a single vision of 
insolvency. Their ‘analytic and thematic clarity is eroded by the authors’ aversion 
to the declarative sentence and the proliferation of conceptually simplistic and 
distracting problems’.42 
Accordingly, they attempted to harmonize individual (maximisation of insolvent 
debtors’ assets) and common (distributional equality among claimants) goals. A 
far from unproblematic purpose, since ‘any re-distributional effects of 
bankruptcy reduce the relative attractiveness of security to creditors’.43 
                                                                    
39 Delaney (n 38), covering the emblematic cases of Continental, Texaco and Manville; DM Flynn 
and M Farid, ‘The Intentional Use of Chapter XI: Lingering Versus Immediate Filing’ (1991) 
12(1) SMJ 63; WN Moulton and H Thomas, ‘Bankruptcy as a Deliberate Strategy: Theoretical 
Considerations and Empirical Evidence’ (1993) 14(2) SMJ 125; J Evans and AL Borders, 
‘Strategically Surviving Bankruptcy During a Global Financial Crisis: The Importance of 
Understanding Chapter 15’ (2014) 67(1) J. Bus. Res. 2738; SD James, ‘Strategic Bankruptcy: A 
Stakeholder Management Perspective’ (2016) 69J. Bus. Res. 492. 
40 In Jackson’s words, insolvency law is ‘a system designed to mirror the agreement one would 
expect the creditors to form among themselves were they to negotiate such an agreement from an 
ex-ante position’ [Jackson (n 2) 860]. 
41 RE Scott, ‘Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors’ Bargain Heuristic’ (Spring 1986) 53(2) U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 690. The author argues that risk-sharing (and, as a consequence, statutory 
distributive rules) could be justified whenever it has the potential of increasing the value of the 
company as a going concern, compared to the value of the assets in case of a liquidation sale. 
Similarities with the law of admiralty suggest when it was possible to depart from pre-
bankruptcy entitlements. See also: Jackson and Scott (n 31). 
42 Ibid 693. 
43 Ibid 707. 
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In order to achieve both goals without disregarding the creditors’ bargain 
heuristic, these scholars advocated for introducing the common disaster 
vision in insolvency law.  
The “common disaster vision” is based upon the “general average rule” 
conceived in the field of the law of admiralty. Its premise is that the managers of 
a company in financial distress share a lot of similarities with the captain of a 
ship facing a shipwreck. Like the captain, the manager is the agent of all parties 
participating in the venture. When the perilous situation arises, it is in the 
interest of all participants that the captain/manager takes all interests equally 
into account.  
Similarities with the law of admiralty suggest when it is possible to depart from 
pre-bankruptcy entitlements. This should occur when: (1) an imminent 
common danger exists; (2) part of the cargo or the company must be jettisoned 
to attempt saving the remainder; and (3) the attempt to avoid the common peril 
should look - from an ex-ante perspective - more likely than not to succeed.44 
Under this perspective (later supported even by the proponents of the original 
version of the creditors’ bargain model),45 risk sharing and general average 
contribution were justified in insolvency only if they ‘improve[d] the prospects 
for a successful reorganization and increase[d] the value of the enterprise 
whenever going-concern value exceeds the value of a piecemeal liquidation’.46  
In order to support this heuristic, “common disaster” scholars observe that 
insolvency law has never purported to grant absolute recognition to pre-
bankruptcy entitlements. On the contrary, insolvency law should only ensure 
respect of substantial state-created rights to the extent they did not conflict 
with federal policy and equitable principles. Furthermore, the risk-sharing 
model helps to explain the rationale of those insolvency rules that depart from 
purely procedural practice. 
                                                                    
44 This vision is justified by reference to the principle of general average, conceived in the field 
of the law of admiralty. According to it, when the ship is on the brink of disaster (shipwreck), 
the captain ceases being the main purveyor of the employer’s priorities and tries to adopt the 
best possible course of actions to save the boat, the goods and the life at stake (or at least as 
much as possible of them). 
45 Jackson and Scott (n 31). 
46 Scott (n 41) 704. 
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In theory, the common disaster conceptualisation provides a richer and more 
textured framework for the ex-ante bargain. Unfortunately, substantial 
difficulties mar any attempts to accommodate maximisation and distributional 
goals in insolvency while following this approach.47 The definition of the precise 
moment in which the captain/manager should start considering a wider variety 
of interests is highly disputable and could lead to judicial litigation. Additionally, 
the assumption that captains/managers should not act from the beginning in 
the interest of all stakeholders has been challenged by corporate governance 
scholarship.48 
Should the reader find these criticisms unpersuasive, it is worth observing that 
the revised creditors’ bargain heuristic actually supports one of the key features 
of this thesis, i.e. the need for insolvency laws to address common pool issues 
(albeit in their traditional form) that are both allocative and (re)distributive in 
nature.49 This may lead to the conclusion that proceduralist visions (at least in 
the common disaster iteration) have the potential to determine the dividing line 
between contract and insolvency law.  
The next sections therefore investigate if the practical implementation of 
proceduralist tenets in domestic and cross-border cases produces procedurally 
fair and efficient outcomes. Should this be correct, then the thesis’ quest for a 
dividing line between contract and insolvency law could be considered 
concluded. Unless, of course, principle-based theories produce equally fair and 
efficient outcomes and address the potential shortcomings of proceduralist 
conceptualisations.  
3.2(a) Procedure-Based Insolvencies 
To preserve the sanctity of contracts and restrict to the highest possible extent 
the cases in which the law created rights valid only in the insolvency context, 
proceduralists argue that insolvency law should aim at auctioning the estate or 
                                                                    
47 Jackson and Scott (n 31) 202. 
48 This matter is debated extensively in section 4.3 of this thesis. 
49 See above sub-section 1.3(a). 
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its assets and the APR should be strictly enforced.50 In any case, insolvency law 
should not alter the bargain reached by the parties in solvent times or the 
reliance on laws that are valid outside insolvency. 
Two recent judicial decisions on each side of 
the Atlantic seem to support the view that 
insolvency rules should not alter the rights 
recognised to the parties by the general law, 
and the parties’ reliance on them. It has also 
been argued that their implications may go 
beyond the international context of the cases, 
thus potentially affecting the interplay 
between contract and insolvency rules in 
domestic cases.51 These cases are Bakhshiyeva 
in London and Sun Edison in New York.  
In Bakhshiyeva52 the court was required to 
determine if the recognition of foreign 
insolvency proceedings could prevent the 
creditors from exercising their rights under an 
English law contract if these rights were 
contrary to the terms of the insolvency 
proceeding approved by a (foreign) court. The 
                                                                    
50 WH Meckling, ‘Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State’ (1977) 41 
Law & Contemp. Probs. 13; MJ While, ‘Public Policy toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and Other 
Priority Rules’ (1980) 11 Bell J. of Econ. & Man. 550; Baird (n 30). 
51 JL Westbrook, ‘The End of Bankruptcy’ Credit Slip (29 May 2018) 
<http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2018/05/the-end-of-bankruptcy-
.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+creditslips%2F
feed+%28Credit+Slips%29> accessed 17 September 2018. The argument does not seem 
persuasive to the author of this paper. The possibility to exercise substantive rights that are in 
contrast with the content of the insolvency procedure has not been portrayed as a general rule. 
It is subject to the limits set out in Antony Gibbs & Sons v Societe Industrielle et Commerciale des 
Metaux [1890] 25 Q.B.D. 399 (CA). Gibbs applies only if English law rights are affected by a 
foreign procedure and the creditors have not submitted to that jurisdiction. This exception 
could not be invoked in a purely domestic case.  
52 Re OJSC Int’l Bank of Azerbaijan (aka Bakhshiyeva v Sberbank of Russia) [2018] EWHC 59 (Ch), 
[2018] BPIR 287. For a critical analysis of the case: Hardwicke, ‘Bakhshiyeva v Sberbank of 
Russia’ (2018) 11(2) C.R. & I. 67. 
THE CASE OF BAKHSHIYEVA 
Ms Bakhshiyeva, the foreign 
representatives of an Azerbaijan 
bank, OJSC Int’l Bank of 
Azerbaijan, sought to extend the 
moratorium on enforcement 
actions against the bank. 
The bank had commenced 
insolvency proceedings in 
Azerbaijan. These proceedings 
were recognised as foreign main 
proceedings under the CBIR 
2006 and a moratorium was 
granted. The restructuring plan 
was approved by the creditors 
and the court, but the debtor 
needed an extension of the 
moratorium. 
The respondents objected to the 
request. They believed that, as 
their debt was governed by 
English law and they did not 
submit to Azerbaijan law, they 
could rely on Gibbs and retain 
the substantive right granted by 
the contract.  
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court relied on Gibbs53 to conclude that a debt governed by English law could 
not be discharged by foreign insolvency proceedings unless the debtor 
submitted to the foreign insolvency proceedings. This is because, as evidenced 
in Pan Ocean54, Rubin55 and Agrokor,56 the UNCITRAL Model Law and the CBIR 
2006 are concerned with procedural matters and could not affect the existence, 
exercise or enforcement of substantive rights.57 As a result, the choice of law in 
a contract could trump the collective and substantive nature of the (foreign) 
insolvency proceedings. 
In SunEdison58 the plaintiff (SMP) was a debtor under Korean bankruptcy law 
(since May 2016) while the defendant (SunEdison) was an entity subject to a 
Chapter 11 proceeding in the U.S. (since April 2016). 
In 2011, the parties entered into a supply and license agreement (‘SLA’) which 
contained an ipso facto clause that permitted either party to terminate the 
contract if the other filed for bankruptcy or became unable to pay its debts as 
they became due. The SLA was governed by New York and U.S. federal law. 
Under Korean law (the law governing the SMP’s insolvency procedure) the ipso 
facto provision would be unenforceable, while under New York law the clause 
was enforceable.59 
SunEdison sent a termination notice to SMP in March 2017. The Korean 
procedure was recognised as a foreign main proceeding under Chapter 15 of 
the U.S. Code after SunEdison issued the termination notice to SMP (15 June 
2017).60  
                                                                    
53 Gibbs (n 51). See: IF Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (5th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2017) 
961 at [30-061]. The same author has criticised the rule as ‘insular and xenophobic in the 
extreme, and is plainly guilty of maintaining dual standards with regard to the principle of 
universality in bankruptcy’ (923-924 at [29-067]). 
54 Re Pan Ocean Co. Ltd [2014] EWHC 2124 (Ch), [2014] Bus. L.R. 1041. 
55 Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236 at [143]. 
56 Re Agrokor DD [2017] EWHC 2791 (Ch), [2018] Bus. L.R. 64 [115]. 
57 OJSC (n 52) [137], citing Morgan J in Pan Ocean (n 54) at [111]. 
58 Re SunEdison, 577 B.R. 120 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
59 If the debtor (SMP) had entered into an insolvency procedure, §.365(e)(1) applies. According 
to the federal law, termination is prevented if justified solely on an ipso facto clause which relies 
on the inability to pay the debts as they fall due or the commencement of an insolvency 
procedure by the debtor.  
60 Re SMP Ltd., Case No. 17–11192 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) (SMB). Outside insolvency scenarios, 
ipso facto clauses are enforceable under New York law absent fraud, collusion or overreaching: 
Murray Realty Co. v Regal Shoe Co., 265 N.Y. 332, 193 N.E. 164, 165 (1934); W.F.M. Rest., Inc. v 
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If SunEdison's termination was valid, SMP could no longer use the intellectual 
property, which had been in the meanwhile bought by GLC. This would have 
maximised the assets of the American debtor while impoverishing the 
prospects of the reorganising Korean entity.61 If, however, SunEdison was 
limited to rejecting the SLA, SMP could continue to use SunEdison's intellectual 
property without its consent.62  
Similarly to Bakhshiyeva, Bernstein J concluded that the choice of law made by 
sophisticated commercial parties should have been upheld. As a result, the 
judge applied a New York substantive contract rule and not the Korean 
substantive insolvency provision to determine the validity of the termination 
notice as this was subject to New York and not Korean law.  
Bakhshiyeva and SunEdison show that judges are willing to adhere to 
proceduralists’ tenets and disregard any attempt to modify insolvency rights 
negotiated by the parties in solvent times.  
The next sections discuss some cases with no or little (re)distributive 
implications63 and report on auction-based procedures with (re)distributive 
issues.64 Attention is paid to the current understanding of the APR.65 This rule is 
meant to protect the substantive entitlements negotiated by the parties outside 
a formal insolvency procedure. If proceduralist theories are implemented in the 
Anglo-American insolvency framework, there should be few deviations from 
this rule both in the law and practice. 
Sub-section 3.2(b) investigates the proceduralist mechanisms in cross-border 
insolvencies (i.e. cross-border insolvency agreements or ‘CBIAs’) to determine 
to what extent they represent a comprehensive solution to cross-border 
corporate distress. Section 3.3 highlights the defining characteristics of 
proceduralist approaches in insolvency law and determines their compatibility 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Austern, 35 N.Y.2d 610, 364 N.Y.S.2d 500, 324 N.E.2d 149, 150, 153 (1974); First Nationwide 
Bank v Brookhaven Realty Assocs., 223 A.D.2d 618, 637 N.Y.S.2d 418, 421 (1996). 
61 Westbrook (n 51). 
62 SunEdison (n 58). 
63 Sub-section 3.2(a)(i). 
64 Sub-section 3.2(a)(ii). 
65 Sub-section 3.2(a)(iii). 
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with the benchmarks introduced in sub-section 1.3(c) before drawing some 
concluding remarks for this chapter. 
3.2(a)(i) Auction-Based Insolvencies without (Re)Distributive Implications 
As explained in the previous section, the existence of some factors such as a 
small group of controlling creditors, working markets and lack of company-
specific assets tend to favour sales of single items, estates and businesses over 
complex and expensive statutory reorganisation procedures.  
If these assumptions were true, market rules should inform insolvency practice 
and prove sufficient to preserve the going-concern surplus of the distressed 
debtor. Baird made this point by comparing the insolvency case of an asset-
heavy modern telecommunication technology (Global Crossing)66 with the 19th 
century cases that involved railway companies. While in both cases the 
companies defaulted over the repayments of loans for the construction of a 
(tele)communication network, Baird observed that Global Crossing 
reorganisation plan within a Chapter 11 procedure was essentially a sale to the 
best bidder. As a result, he concluded that: 
 Creditors of insolvent businesses no longer needed a substitute for a 
market sale, since the ability to sell both small and large corporations as 
a going concern eliminates the need for a collective forum; 
 Chapter 11 was no longer a substitute to a sale, but the forum where 
these sales took place.67 
However, the rapid sale of asset-heavy companies is not the only option in 
today’s insolvency arena, as the Abengoa case suggests. That company first filed 
for insolvency protection in November 2015. Under Baird’s theory the 
preferable solution would have been a sale of the profitable assets in 
satisfaction of the creditors.  
                                                                    
66 Re Global Crossing, 295 B.R. 726 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
67 Baird and Rasmussen (n 24) 753: ‘Chapter 11 can play its traditional role only in environments 
in which specialized assets exist, where those assets must remain in a particular firm, where 
control rights are badly allocated, and where going concern sales are not possible’; DG Baird, ‘The 
New Face of Chapter 11’ (2004) 12 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 69, 71. 
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This course of action would have been wise and appropriate, especially 
considering that at the end of 2015 the consequences of the 2008-2009 
financial crisis were lessening. In other words, there was a liquid market and 
there were potential investors for the company’s profitable assets, including 
Abengoa’s New York-listed subsidiary that owned and ran water and power 
plants in the U.S. Also, it might be argued that this should have been the 
preferable course of action, considering the number (in the thousands) of 
creditors, the cross-border nature of the business and the high number of 
employees (in excess of 24,000). 
Nevertheless, the Spanish practitioners and advisers, supported by their 
American and English colleagues,68 opted for a consensual debt-for-equity 
swap. Under the agreement, 70 per cent of the pre-existing debt was converted 
into 40 per cent of Abengoa’s new share capital, current shareholders retained 
around 5 per cent of the shares in the new company and additional funds were 
secured for the future.69  
For the purposes of this thesis, it is sufficient to observe that the conditions of 
the deal marked a significant improvement over the creditors’ expectations in a 
sale-oriented procedure. According to the available data in the negotiated debt-
for-equity agreement, existing creditors faced a 97 per cent haircut on their 
loans. By preserving and turning around the existing business,70 its synergies 
and economies of scale and the company’s expertise in renewable energy 
technology, the creditors who consented to the swap faced “only” a 70 per cent 
haircut. 
                                                                    
68 Abengoa’s failure was managed by means of two Spanish “homologaciones” - which have been 
recognised around the world as the main procedures since the company was incorporated in 
Spain - an English CVA and a U.S. Chapter 11. 
69 According to Global Turnaround (March 2017, issue 206), under the terms of the deal agreed 
in May 2016 and published at the beginning of 2017, Abengoa will receive 1.17 billion euro in 
funds made up of fresh investment as well as the rollover of existing credit facilities, while 
another 1.2 billion euro of new money will come from non-bank, private equity funds.  
70 Abengoa has committed itself to a more ‘focused’ approach. Since the beginning of the 
procedure, the company sold its non-core stakes, some photovoltaic plaints in Spain and a wind 
farm in Uruguay. Additionally, the rescue plan specifies that Abengoa will concentrate its 
business on designing, building and servicing renewable energy plants for outside owners. 
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Similar considerations may be unfolded with reference to the Agrokor crisis.71 
Agrokor is clearly a case where the business was sound. The financial distress 
was the result of the rapid growth of the company and its exponential increase 
in liabilities. Failure to refinance some of its notes at the end of 2014 resulted in 
the holding company being unable to repay its debts as they fell due. 
Since Agrokor was a company with substantial assets, under Baird’s narrative 
creditors would have been better off if the company entered into an auction-
based insolvency procedure. However, this course of action would have 
resulted in the termination of all of the ongoing executory contracts with 
existing suppliers. Additionally, the default on the outstanding promissory 
notes would have determined the crisis and probably the distress of many of 
them, with the result that the going-concern value of the company (i.e. its 
network of contracts) would have been lost. 
While the case is still ongoing, it appeared from the beginning that the main 
creditors (i.e. the lending institutions) were not willing to push the company 
into liquidation. They agreed on a standstill and on new money injections. Only 
when it became clear that the need for more radical restructuring could not be 
consented in an informal workout, the creditors sought the support of the 
Croatian government. As a result, the legislator adopted the Law for the 
Extraordinary Administration for Companies with Systemic Importance for the 
Republic of Croatia72 (dubbed as “Lex Agrokor”). 
This law introduced a new insolvency procedure for large companies in Croatia. 
It provided a workable moratorium on creditors’ actions, resulted in the 
appointment of an emergency management commissioner upon petition of a 
company that met the eligibility criteria and aimed at rescuing the distressed 
business. Additionally, it provided protection for new financing.  
While it is not demonstrated that the Abengoa and Agrokor debt-for-equity 
swaps and turnaround plans will succeed, these cases prove that rescue 
                                                                    
71 Agrokor was a private group of companies which run its business primarily in Croatia. The 
company had a turnover of $6 billion, 15 per cent of Croatia’s GDP. Despite being incorporated 
in the Croatian state, it directly employed 60,000 people in Croatia and in other Balkan 
countries such as Slovenia, Bosnia and Serbia. 
72 Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia nr. 32/2017, 6 April 2017. 
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procedures can be used to preserve the going-concern value of distressed 
debtors. These proceedings can ameliorate the allocative issues in cross-border 
cases and promote (re)distributive policies, even for the benefit of the old 
equity-holders.  
Formal, procedural insolvency mechanisms may prove insufficient or ill-suited 
to achieve the same results. These considerations do not apply only to large 
corporations. Take, for instance, the case of a “human capital firm” in which the 
company and the person running it are indistinguishable.73 Proceduralist 
theorists would argue that there is equally no need to undertake a procedure 
designed to rescue the company. However, it is difficult to see how an auction-
based procedure could maximise the value of a company that has no marketable 
asset.  
The goal of a proceduralist system should be to facilitate the distressed debtor 
to leave an unsuccessful entrepreneurial experience behind and start afresh, 
possibly in the same field. A person who has been an electrician or a travel 
agent for all their lives is likely to continue to work in the same field, provided 
that there is still a market for its expertise and skills.74  
Because proceduralists assume that what debtors need is either to wind-up a 
company or to sell the profitable portion of their business for the satisfaction of 
their creditors, insolvency law should be primarily procedural. However, if 
these entrepreneurs want to start afresh, they may benefit from the retention of 
the network of suppliers and clients that they developed in their previous, 
unsuccessful business experience.  
While rescuing these businesses may raise concerns over “phoenix trading”,75 it 
also offers some continuity for both suppliers and employees and – when 
restricted to MSMEs – it raises minimum competition concerns. It is not 
                                                                    
73 Baird (n 67) 87. 
74 Ibid. The author reached this conclusion after having studied the data from ninety-nine 
Chapter 11 cases filed in 1999 in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 
Eastern Division. 
75 According to a briefing paper edited by Lorraine Conway for the House of Commons, Phoenix 
Trading and Liability of Directors (No. CPB 4083, 28 March 2017), phoenix trading occurs when 
‘the assets of an insolvent business are re-acquired (often at less than their full value) by its former 
directors (or closely connected parties) who then set-up a new company involved in the same or 
similar business’, 3. 
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surprising, therefore, that legislators did not prevent this practice altogether. 
On the contrary, they only opted to introduce procedural and substantive 
safeguards – sometimes by means of soft law instruments – for the sales of 
businesses in pre-pack insolvencies.76 
Leaving aside the frequently voiced concern that auctions are incapable of 
generating accurate value for distressed corporations,77 a concluding remark 
might be that the evolution of the industry and the financial sector puts some 
pressure on “traditional” statutory rescue mechanisms. However, as highlighted 
by other commentators, this circumstance does not ‘signal the end of its old uses, 
that corporate reorganizations no longer exist’.78  
This sub-section has demonstrated that the use of procedural remedies 
underestimates the complexities of business practice and ignores the 
(re)distributive implications that arise from business failure. It is to be 
determined, however, if procedural remedies designed to cope with 
(re)distributive issues are capable of providing satisfactory and comprehensive 
solutions to corporate failures. This will be the purpose of the following sub-
section. 
3.2(a)(ii) Auction-Based Insolvencies with (Re)Distributive Implications 
Can parties use formal bankruptcy procedures that do not affect the nature of 
their contractual rights to address (re)distributive issues? This theory, 
advocated by Shanker and Adler (section 3.2) has been recently tested in the 
Chrysler case.79 
                                                                    
76 For instance, in England s.216 IA 1986 aims at protecting the public from being misled into 
dealing with the new business which operated in the old premises and with the same or a 
similar name than the failed company. Additionally, despite being applicable on a voluntary 
basis, insolvency practitioners usually follow the guidelines included in the SIP 16, which 
provides some additional checks and controls in pre-pack procedures.   
77 However, some authors observed that ‘[c]ompetition leads to decent (though not perfect) 
pricing [and that] in any contest of real prices (in auctions) against hypothetical prices (in courts), 
real prices will be more accurate’: FH Easterbrook, ‘Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?’ (1990) 
27 J. Financ. Econ. 411, 413. 
78 AM Dickerson, ‘The Many Faces of Chapter 11: A Reply to Professor Baird’ (2004) 12 Am. 
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 109, 109. 
79 By common account, Chrysler has been an exceptional case, hence it might be inappropriate to 
draw general conclusions on the validity of procedural remedies from this case: see, among 
others, MJ Roe and Joo-Hee Chung, ‘How the Chrysler Reorganization Differed from Prior 
Practice’ (2013) 5(2) J. Legal Analysis 399. 
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When Chrysler faced liquidation at the end of 2008, the U.S. government 
clarified that it would have backed a rescue of the company only if its 
management was able to conceive a long-term solution with reasonable 
probability of success.80 Unlike the Agrokor (2017) or Parmalat (2005) cases, 
there was no support in Capitol Hill for a bail-out or legislative intervention 
tailored to the needs of the automotive industry. Additionally, the government 
stated that any new funds would have been granted at market rate. The 
government agreed to act as a reluctant lender only due to the dire state of the 
U.S. financial system, which was dealing with the systemic consequences of the 
collapses of Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
In this context, it appeared from as early as the beginning of 2009 that Chrysler 
had only two options: 1) a Chapter 7 liquidation of its assets; or 2) a §.363(b) 
sale81 of all or substantially all the company under Chapter 11 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code. A lengthy Chapter 11 reorganisation procedure would not 
have been feasible due to two main reasons: lack of funds and the opinion – 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
This author, however, shares Baird’s view that this perception is wrong. Chrysler (and GM) 
reorganisations were not significantly affected by the government’s intervention as they 
followed a pattern substantially similar to other large reorganisations occurred in recent years: 
BA Berringer, ‘“It’s All Just a Little Bit of History Repeating”: An Examination of Chrysler and GM 
Bankruptcies and their Implications for Future Chapter 11 Reorganizations’ (2010) 7 N.Y.U. J. L. 
& Bus. 361 (arguing at 363 that Chrysler is part of an established line of cases that date back to 
nineteen century equity receiverships where influential creditors and managers take control of 
the procedure, and the government is unable to protect the interests of less powerful creditors); 
DG Baird, ‘Car Trouble’ (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 551, 
2011); DG Baird, ‘Lessons from the Automobile Reorganizations’ (2012) 4(1) J. Legal Analysis 
271.  
On the same line of thinking, see also: SJ Lubben, ‘No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler cases in 
Context’ (2009) 83(4) Am. Bankr. L.J. 531 (maintaining that ‘the bankruptcy academics’ criticism 
of the automotive bankruptcy cases does not stand up to careful scrutiny’, at 547); ER Morrison, 
‘Chrysler, GM, and the Future of Chapter 11’ (Columbia University School of Law, Working Paper 
No. 365, 2009), arguing that GM and Chrysler are ‘cautionary tales about Chapter 11, not about 
government intervention’, at 1.  
80 The Obama Administration’s valuations were supported by the findings and work of the 
Automotive Task Force, an ad hoc group of United States cabinet-level and other officials that 
was formed in February 2009 to deal with the financial bailout of automakers Chrysler and GM. 
81 §.363(b) 11 U.S.C. authorizes a debtor to sell any or all its assets shortly after the filing for 
insolvency. Upon request of the debtor, the court shall grant approval after notice and a hearing. 
Usually, the debtor files for insolvency after having agreed (i.e. pre-negotiated) the conditions 
for the sale of the company or substantially all of its assets to a “stalking horse”. The court’s 
approval usually includes the terms and conditions for presenting competing bids. The issues 
raised by §.363(b) sales are the same as pre-package reorganisations: lack of transparency and 
risk of abusive behaviour by the leading creditors and the existing management. However, they 
are generally praised as a fast, efficient and reasonably inexpensive mechanism to restructure a 
distressed business. 
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shared by the majority of commentators – that Chrysler was too small and too 
U.S.-centred to survive as an autonomous automaker.82 
In the United States, thanks to the strict observance of the APR (see below sub-
section 3.2(a)(iii)) and to the procedural nature of §.363(b) sales, the Chrysler 
old stakeholders should have figured out with reasonable certainty the outcome 
of the insolvency procedure during the pre-insolvency negotiation phase. 
Creditors should have predicted that, if a buyer was found, consideration would 
have been paid and distributed in satisfaction of the old creditors and pursuant 
to the APR. The capital structure of the new company would have mirrored this 
agreement, with its ownership being distributed to the buyer and the 
institutional creditors of the old company. While it would not had been possible 
to determine in advance the debt-to-equity ratio, the stakeholders expected that 
no voting and ownership rights would have been recognised to existing 
shareholders as they were “out of money”.83 Chrysler therefore was a perfect 
case to test if stakeholders considered the procedural remedies provided by the 
law as adequate and if they relied on them to sort out their (re)distributive 
issues. 
Procedural rules, however, largely ignore the side effects that their 
implementation has on the communities and on certain categories of unsecured 
creditors such as employees, pension and health funds.  
However, for a company like Chrysler to survive, it was essential to retain a 
motivated, efficient and cost-effective (albeit leaner) workforce as well as a 
network of dealers. If the payments towards the “strategic” employees and 
dealers were not kept current, the company would have lost all of its going 
concern value.  
                                                                    
82 Against: DA Skeel, Jr., ‘Competing Narratives in Corporate Bankruptcy: Debtor in Control vs. 
No Time to Spare’ (2009) Mich. St. L. Rev. 1187, according to whom Chrysler and in particular 
General Motors were obvious candidates for a debtor-in-control treatment, as opposed to the 
Lehman Brothers case (which, in the opinion of the author, was a ‘true’ no-time-to-spare case). 
83 At the time, Chrysler was controlled by the private investment company Cerberus Capital 
Management which, along with other investors, purchased a majority stake in 2007. It was not a 
family-run company and there were little reasons to suggest that either the preservation of the 
current management or the recognition of a minority share to the current owners would have 
increased the chances of success of the ‘rescued’ company. 
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As a result of these conflicting interests and the inability of the law to force 
parties to agree on an acceptable solution outside a formal insolvency 
mechanism, Chrysler filed for Chapter 11 protection on 30 April 2009,84 after 
having negotiated a memorandum of agreement with a potential bidder, Fiat 
S.p.A.85 
Due to the circumstances of the case, the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern 
District of New York was willing to recognise restrictive covenants against 
competing bids.86 As a result, some of the assets of the old Chrysler were sold to 
a newco for $2 billion, a remarkably low figure for the number of properties, IP 
rights and trademarks that were being transferred. More strikingly, however, 
the newco was not formed by the new bidder and the old creditors, as a 
“traditional” debt-for-equity swap would have suggested. On the contrary, new 
Chrysler agreed to assume $5.3 billion on trade debt (thus preferring these 
unsecured creditors to secured ones) and to recognise a 55 per cent share of the 
newco, as well as a $4.6 billion note to Chrysler retirees for their healthcare 
                                                                    
84 Re Chrysler Llc, 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
85 One of the issues in Chrysler (and GM) bankruptcy cases was whether they presented illegal 
sub rosa plans, i.e. de facto rescue plans designed to scheme around the statutory protections 
afforded to creditors pursuant to s.1129 of the Bankruptcy Code. This claim has been rejected 
by the courts, and it has been extensively debated in other articles: R Brubaker, ‘The Chrysler 
and GM Sales: §.363 Plans of Reorganization?’ (Sept. 2009) 20 Bankr. L. Letter No. 9 (who 
concluded that it was not a sub rosa plan); Lubben (n 79) (equally against the sub rosa theory); 
BE Adler, ‘A Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization After Chrysler and General Motors’ 
(2010) 18 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 305; MJ Roe and DA Skeel, Jr., ‘Assessing the Chrysler 
Bankruptcy’ (2010) 108 Mich. L. Rev. 727 (both in favour of the sub rosa explanation). This 
debate however falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
86 For a more critical explanation of the strict covenants, see Adler (n 85) according to whom 
‘[t]he sale restrictions served the government’s desire to assure continuation of the company and 
to protect the union’s interest, but it is not apparent that the sale was designed to maximise the 
return to the bankruptcy estate’, at 308. Unfortunately, this statement is not supported by 
evidence. Additionally, while it may be true that the sale was not designed to maximise the 
return to the estate, other commentators argued that it was designed to enhance the return to 
all stakeholders and to minimise the impact on the communities and the society at large: Skeel 
(n 82); AJ Warburton, ‘Understanding the Bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors: A 
Primer’ (2009) 60 Syracuse L. Rev. 531; R Brubaker and CJ Tabb, ‘Bankruptcy Reorganizations 
and the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM’ (2010) 5 U. Ill. L. Rev, 1375; SMD Solomon, 
‘Uncomfortable Embrace: Federal Corporate Ownership in the Midst of the Financial Crisis’ 
(2011) 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1733; K Korres, ‘Bankrupting Bankruptcy: Circumventing Chapter 11 
Protections Through Manipulation of the Business Justification Standard in § 363 Asset Sales, 
and a Refined Standard to Safeguard Against Abuse’ (2011) 63 Fla. L. Rev. 959; M Kahan and EB 
Rock, ‘When the Government is the Controlling Stakeholder’ (2011) Faculty Scholarship Paper 
316 
<https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.co.uk/&
httpsredir=1&article=1315&context=faculty_scholarship> accessed 17 September 2018. 
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benefits.87 In other words, ‘a judge approved a transfer of a debtor’s assets to 
favoured creditors under circumstances where holders of other claims were 
denied basic safeguards’.88 
The Chrysler case therefore proves that procedural remedies are neither apt to 
force parties to negotiate out-of-court restructurings, nor sufficient in 
themselves to address the (re)distributive issues arising in these cases. Some 
commentators observed that the Chrysler (and GM) cases ‘foretell […] the literal 
death of the fundamental distributive principles that are the essence of 
bankruptcy law and that have been the bedrock of bankruptcy reorganizations for 
at least a century’.89 The case of Detroit reported at the beginning of this chapter 
is another example of this trend. 
A creditor-driven liquidation would have potentially resulted in marginally 
higher returns for secured creditors, but only at a high price for the U.S. 
economy, its industry and workers.90  
Chapter 11 proposals may fail to guide the choice of the parties affected by the 
debtor’s insolvency.91 Nevertheless, deviations from proceduralist tenets have 
been encountered in practice because these theories fail to properly consider 
the most relevant interests of the parties affected by the debtor’s insolvency. 
  
                                                                    
87 Roe Skeel (n 85) 733.  
88 Adler (n 85) arguing that the sale of Chrysler was irregular and inconsistent with the 
principles that undergird the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 
89 Brubaker and Tabb (n 86) 1376. The authors, in particular, criticised the implications of the 
GM insolvency procedure. Against this analysis: Berringer (n 79). 
90 According to the Automotive Task Force, the costs of liquidating the automakers would have 
been greater than providing assistance (at autonomy-based terms). See SL Rattner, Overhaul: An 
Insider Account of the Obama Administration’s Emergency Rescue of the Auto Industry (HMH 
Publishing Company: Boston, 2010). 
91 This same conclusion has prompted some authors to propose amendments to §.363(b) sales 
to avoid what they define the “ice cube bluff”, i.e. the false or exaggerated claim that the 
company is on the brink of dissolution and that it needs a fire sale to rescue its business - see 
MB Jacoby and EJ Janger, ‘Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy’ (2014) Yale L.J. 862. 
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3.2(a)(iii) More on Proceduralist Insolvencies 
Beside substantially liquid markets and 
competitive (and cheap) auctions, procedural-
based solutions to financial and economic 
distress require a strict observance of the 
absolute priority rule (‘APR’).92 Under its 
application, insolvency practitioners or 
debtors-in-possession (‘DIP’) are prevented 
from distributing money to a class of lower-
priority creditors or shareholders before 
higher-priority classes are paid in full. 
Stringent compliance with the APR at best 
does not encourage the participation from 
shareholders, who have usually nothing to 
gain from the insolvency procedure. At worst, 
it may result in blocking or delaying practices 
aimed at obtaining some consideration from 
the other stakeholders. 
As a result, pre-pack sales, debt-for-equity 
swaps and schemes of arrangement are 
usually employed to secure shareholders’ 
cooperation, which is sometimes required to 
ensure the success of the turnaround.93 The rescue of the British Energy Group 
in 2004 proves the advantages in proceeding with such a scheme, as well as the 
                                                                    
92 The APR prevents direct or indirect distribution of proceeds to junior claimants if seniors are 
not fully paid. In the United States, if was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Case v Los 
Angeles Lumber Products Co. Ltd., 308 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 1, 84 L.Ed. 110 (1939), when it was held 
that such a rule is a corollary of any “fair and equitable” plan. Congress in 1978 incorporated the 
notion in the U.S. Code. As for today, §.1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) precludes a holder of a junior claim or 
interest, such as an existing equity holder, from receiving any distribution under a non-
consensual Chapter 11 plan on account of its claim or interest, unless all objecting senior 
creditors are paid in full. 
93 Not only shareholders’ support may ensure that goodwill is preserved and costs and time of 
the procedure are reduced to a minimum. Shareholders may be key suppliers, part of the 
existing management team, or key employees. Additionally, they may be among the few people 
willing to invest in the ailing business. Accordingly, ensuring their cooperation is in the interest 
of all parties involved in the turnaround process. 
THE CASE OF BRITISH ENERGY  
British Energy, the then largest 
electricity generation company 
in the U.K., entered into financial 
difficulties in 2002 due to a 
slump in wholesale energy 
prices, a failure to obtain 
relaxations on the Climate 
Change Levy and renegotiations 
of its back-end fuel costs with 
BNFL, as well as issues with a 
number of its reactors. 
At that time, the company 
approached the government for 
financial aid. However, the 
government conditioned its 
support to the agreement on a 
consensual rescue plan. 
To secure the approval from 
bondholders, creditors and 
shareholders, the company 
negotiated a “Creditor 
Restructuring Agreement” which 
granted to existing creditors 
97.5% of shares in the 
restructured company. However, 
to secure old shareholders’ 
approval, they were to receive 
2.5% of the issued share capital 
in the new company, with 
warrants to subscribe for further 
new shares equal to 5%. This 
despite senior creditors’ 
contributions had not been paid 
in full. 
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propensity of English players to accept a breach to the absolute priority 
principle if that appears for the good of the company or the business.  
However, not even in the United States is servile adherence to the absolute 
priority standard recognized either by the law94 or by the judiciary.95 Serious 
criticisms have been raised to its most rigid interpretation in the academic 
context. Some scholars demonstrated that it may be in the interest of 
bondholders themselves to sidestep a rigid application of this rule.96 
As for the law, in the United States proponents of a reorganisation plan are 
required to honour the APR only with respect to classes that voted against the 
plan.97 Furthermore, the judiciary has recently approved “rescue” plans where 
this obligation has been displaced (Chrysler: see above 3.2(a)(ii)). Finally, 
empirical evidence demonstrates that - on certain occasions - senior creditors 
agreed on reorganisation plans, which included more beneficial payments to 
junior creditors than the strict observance of the APR would have implied. This 
is because the creditors had the legitimate impression that courts would have 
approved the reorganisation plan despite their opposition (Detroit: see below 
5.4(c)).  
Detrimental for the absolute priority paradigm is the widespread recognition of 
‘new-value’ exceptions, a judicially developed exemption to the APR paradigm. 
                                                                    
94 Substantially all insolvency systems recognize a preferential treatment to selected creditors 
only during formal insolvency proceedings.  
95 For instance, in Re Global Garden Products Italy S.p.A. [2016] EWHC 1884 (Ch), [2017] BCC 
637 Snowden J sanctioned a scheme of arrangement - which is not even, technically, a formal 
insolvency procedure - for an Italian incorporated and domiciled company where only 76.34% 
by value of all scheme creditors entitled to vote approved the plan. This despite the objection of 
dissenting creditors, according to whom the circumstance that some creditors received either 
“work fees” or “co-ordination fees” should have recommended their inclusion in a different 
class.  
The Court revisited the issue of consent fees or other inducements to creditors to vote in favour 
of a scheme and confirmed that, provided that such fees are disclosed, offered to all relevant 
creditors and not so large as to influence a vote in a particular manner, there is nothing 
objectionable in them: Re Public-Joint Stock Company Commercial Bank “PrivatBank” [2015] 
EWHC 3299, [2015] WL 6966229 followed. In this case, co-ordination fees were set at 
€22,500/month. 
96 Daigle and Maloney demonstrated that such a solution would mitigate some of the agency 
costs, in particular when the assets of the distressed company are particularly “malleable”. 
Deviation from a strict interpretation of the APR would give bondholders the opportunity to 
share some of the benefits that would otherwise be privately assumed by the shareholders 
before filing for insolvency protection: KH Daigle and MT Maloney, ‘Residual Claims in 
Bankruptcy: An Agency Theory Explanation’ (Apr. 1994) 37(1) J.L. & Econ.157. 
97 11 U.S.C., §.1129(b). 
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In the U.S., for instance, debtor’s shareholders are permitted to retain an 
interest in the newco even though senior creditors (essentially, all creditors) 
are not paid in full and even if one class of them has voted against the plan.  
The thresholds for the recognition of these new-value exceptions are extremely 
narrow. In Bonner Mall, the 9th Circuit held that, for the old equity holders to 
retain a share in the new company, five requirements had to be met. 
Particularly, the added value shall be ‘1) new, 2) substantial, 3) money or 
money's worth, 4) necessary for a successful reorganization and 5) reasonably 
equivalent to the value or interest received’.98 
The Supreme Court adopted a similar conclusion in Ahlers99 and it expanded it 
in 203 North LaSalle.100 In both cases, the Supreme Court rejected the debtor’s 
request for the recognition of the new value exception. However, it further 
specified the requirements needed to judge in favour of the existence of such an 
exception. In other words, if the debtor promises to contribute with something 
else than simple labour and if other parties are given the opportunity to 
contribute, such an exception may apply.  
Bankruptcy courts, however, have adopted a cautious approach in recognizing 
new-value exceptions. For instance, in Re Castelton Plaza LP101, the 7th Circuit 
reversed a first instance decision and held that where an insider proposed a 
new-value exception (because all the shares of the reorganised company would 
have been allocated to the wife of the debtor), competitive bidding through an 
auction process was essential. In NNN Parkway102 the bankruptcy court of the 
Central District of California held that courts must evaluate on a case-by-case 
basis whether there has been sufficient “market testing” of the new value that 
equity holders propose to contribute in exchange for retention of their interests 
                                                                    
98 Bonner Mall Partnership v U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. (Re Bonner Mall Partnership), 2 F.3d 899, 
911 (9th Cir. 1993). 
99 Northwest Bank Worthington v Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988). 
100 Bank of America National Trust Savings Association v 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 
119 S.Ct. 1411 (1999), where Justice Souter held that debtor's pre-bankruptcy equity holders 
could not, over the objection of a senior class of impaired creditors, contribute new capital and 
receive ownership interests in reorganised entity if other senior creditors were not allowed to 
compete for that equity or to propose competing reorganisation plans. 
101 Re Castleton Plaza, LP, 707 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 2013). 
102 Re NNN Parkway 400 26, Llc, 505 B.R. 277 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2014). 
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in the reorganised Chapter 11 debtor. Finally, in Iridium103 the 2nd Circuit 
recognised that one of its most fundamental duties was to assess whether a pre-
plan settlement's distribution plan complied with the Bankruptcy Code's 
priority scheme. Nevertheless, to consider whether the settlement is “fair and 
equitable”, the court, in its discretion, can endorse a settlement that does not 
comply in some minor respects with the priority rule where the remaining 
factors weigh heavily in favour of approving a settlement. 
Similarly, in cases were the exception had 
been recognised (such as Red Mountain104), the 
bankruptcy court carried out an extensive 
factual investigation on the circumstances of 
the case and the real and tangible existence of 
these criteria. 
In the recent decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic 
Holding Corp.105 the Supreme Court, despite 
reversing the lower court decisions to approve 
a rescue plan that was not fully compliant with 
the APR, reinstated that courts have the 
discretion under §.349(b) 11 U.S.C. to make 
such orders for cause, i.e. to protect reliance 
interests.106 Other reasons include preserving 
the debtor as a going concern, to ensure that 
the disfavoured creditors are better off, to 
promote the possibility of a confirmable plan, 
or to help restore the status quo ante. 
The reliance on the APR in debtor-friendly 
                                                                    
103 Re Iridium Operating, Llc, 478 F.3d 452 (2d. Cir. 2007). 
104 Re Red Mountain Mach. Co., 448 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011), aff'd, 471 B.R. 242 (D. Ariz. 
2012). 
105 580 U.S. (2017). 
106 The Supreme Court ruled against the validity of the rescue plan as approved by the lower 
courts because it resulted in general end-of-case distributions that would be impermissible in a 
Chapter 11 plan or a Chapter 7 liquidation. The Supreme Court reasoned that the parties did not 
prove the existence of a rare case exception, which would have allowed the court to disregard 
priority in structured dismissals for “sufficient reasons”. 
CZYZEWSKI V JEVIC HOLDING CORP.  
Jevic Transportation filed for 
Chapter 11 after having been  
purchased in a leverage buyout. 
The case was dismissed under 
§.1112(b). While the dismissal 
should have restored the status 
quo ante, courts can depart from 
this rule for cause (§.349(b), 
structured dismissal).  
Jevic’s drivers have been 
awarded a judgment for 
violation of state and federal 
Worker Adjustment and 
Retraining Notification (WARN) 
Act. Part of that judgment 
counted as a priority claim. 
However, the structured 
dismissal proposed by the 
debtor and approved by the 
bankruptcy court and the 3rd 
Circuit left the drivers entirely 
out of money, while lower-
priority general unsecured 
creditors would have been paid. 
The Supreme Court reversed the 
afore-mentioned decision for 
their failure to apply the APR.  
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jurisdictions gives secured lenders - especially in single asset real estate cases - 
significant leverage to maximise recoveries. It also protects general unsecured 
creditors from pre-pack plans agreed by a portion of (usually secured and 
sophisticated) creditors and the directors of the ailing company, whenever they 
would result in reducing the return to which they would be entitled in either a 
liquidation or a formal rescue procedure. Hence, the rule is generally being 
followed. 
Nevertheless, the recent decisions on the scope and admissibility of exceptions 
to the APR, as well as the recent trends in §.363(b) sales described in sub-
section 3.2(a)(ii) represent remarkable developments. It appears, therefore that 
procedural, auction-based solutions continue to play a role primarily in those 
formal proceedings where allocative issues are primarily at stake.  
In England, parties favour negotiated solutions over proceduralist approaches 
to rescue. It seems therefore that, both in England and the U.S., courts are keen 
on approving turnaround deals which include limited exceptions to statutory 
priority rules if this appeared to be in the best interest of the stakeholders as a 
whole.   
3.2(b) Procedural Coordination in Cross-Border Insolvencies 
To overcome the territorial constraints imposed by domestic insolvency rules, 
parties developed cross-border insolvency protocols (‘CBIPs’). 
Conceived before the enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law, this ad hoc 
approach involves negotiating an agreement that must be approved by all 
courts having jurisdiction over the debtor and its assets in order to coordinate 
the concurrent cases commenced under domestic procedures. This agreement 
would also allocate some, but not all, authority over issues between the courts 
involved in the cross-border case.107 One of the first significant cases that 
successfully implemented a CBIP was the Maxwell Communications Corporation 
(‘M.C.C.’) insolvency procedure in the late Nineties.108 
                                                                    
107 TM Gaa, ‘Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law and Practice: Is It Necessary? Is It 
Possible?’ (1993) 27(4) ABA 881, 899. 
108 Re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800, 802 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
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M.C.C. was a British based and incorporated company. Its principal creditors 
were British institutional lenders, but the majority of its assets were in the 
United States, in the form of several subsidiary companies. When the company 
sought for insolvency protection, an administration was opened in England and 
a Chapter 11 procedure in the U.S.  
Because of the allocative issues raised by this case, the U.S. bankruptcy judge 
appointed an examiner (Richard Gitlin) with the duty to cooperate with the 
English administrators. 
The American examiner and the English administrators cooperated in 
accordance with a document called the ‘Protocol’. This allowed the parties to 
come up with a comprehensive distribution plan, rather than carving up assets 
for the satisfaction of local creditors. The Protocol succeeded in reducing delays 
and duplications of efforts and the distribution plan was approved by the vast 
majority of the creditors,109 despite differences in the statutory priorities 
recognized by the applicable insolvency laws. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
commentators largely praised the results of this case110 and that the scheme has 
been subsequently adopted in procedures with comparable characteristics. 
This success story seems to suggest that, at least with reference to cross-border 
cases involving mainly sophisticated creditors and allocative TCP problems, 
parties are better placed than the legislator to guide the insolvency process. 
Proceduralist solutions subject to international guidelines111 may therefore 
represent appropriate mechanisms to deal with corporate distress. 
                                                                    
109 In the U.S., the plan was approved by 99.3% in number and 99.98% in value of unsecured 
creditors, while in England holders of 99.3% in number and 99.7%in amount of the claims 
voted to accept the scheme. 
110 L Hoffman, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency: A British Perspective’ (1996) 64(6) Fordham L. Rev. 
2507; against JL Westbrook, ‘The Lesson of Maxwell Communication’ (1996) 64(6) Fordham L. 
Rev. 2531 (arguing that the choice-of-law approach adopted in the case was determined by its 
unique elements, but it should not be replicated in the future). 
111 IF Fletcher and B Wessels, Transnational Insolvency: Global Principles for Cooperation in 
International Insolvency Cases. Report to ALI (30 March 2012), edited by the American Law 
Institute and the International Insolvency Institute. 
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Additionally, this ad hoc approach is not new. 
The first of such approaches dates back to 
1302, when Pope Boniface VIII intervened to 
compel parties to an ordinary distribution of 
assets in the Ammanati affair112 (described in 
the box). 
Other cases further confirmed this 
conclusion,113 but there have also been 
significant exceptions. In the Felixstowe 
case,114 for instance, at the request of an 
English creditor, the English court refused to 
transfer the assets of the debtor to the United 
States, where a Chapter 11 procedure had 
been commenced.  
While in an academic commentary, Lord 
Hoffman tried to single out the Felixtowe case 
on the basis that no insolvency proceedings 
were opened in the secondary jurisdiction 
(England),115 in more recent times there has been no shortage of cross-border 
procedures where the ad hoc cooperation approach has proven wanting, even if 
parties were asked to deal primarily with allocative issues (see the O.W. Bunker 
affair, described in sub-sections 2.3(a) and 5.3(d)).  
                                                                    
112 For a detailed description of the case: KH Nadelman, ‘Bankruptcy Treaties’ (1944) 93 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 58, 59; E Vaccari, ‘The Ammanati Affair: Seven Centuries Old, and Not Feeling the Age’ 
(2018) 93(3) Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 831. 
113 Among others: Re Axona International Credit & Commerce Ltd, 88 BR 597 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 
1988) - the liquidation case involving the U.S. assets of Axona, which was simultaneously being 
wound up in Hong Kong -; Re Olympia & York Devs. Ltd [1993] 12 O.R.3d 500 - the world′ s 
largest privately-held real estate developer, filed for insolvency protection in Canada, the U.S. 
and England in May 1992 -; L.J. Hooker Corporation, Inc., a real estate and mortgage broker 
maintaining offices in Tampa, Orlando and Miami, Florida which filed for bankruptcy protection 
(Chapter 11) in the Southern District of New York on 8 February 1990; and the Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International case. 
114 Felixstowe Dock and Railway Co. v U.S. Lines Inc. [1989] Q.B. 360. 
115 Hence the impossibility of ensuring adequate protection to English creditors: Hoffman (n 
110) 2517. 
THE CASE OF THE AMMANATI BANK  
The insolvency of the Ammanati 
Bank of Pistoja [1302] was one of 
the most spectacular in Medieval 
time. While the seat of the bank 
was in the independent Tuscan 
Republic, its creditors and 
debtors were spread all over 
Europe. 
Upon insolvency, the branch in 
Rome was closed and local assets 
were transferred to Pistoja, 
outside the Papal territorial 
reach. 
Since the Curia was one of the 
most prominent creditors, Pope 
Boniface VIII forbid the owners  
to dispose of their properties. 
His Holiness enjoined the 
debtors  from making payments 
in the bank’s favour, offered the 
owners a safe conduct to Rome 
and used the clergy as a cross-
border collection structure. A 
sort of modern international 
Tribunal, only in the field of 
insolvency law. 
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The most notorious of these cases is Nortel Networks Ltd. In January 2009, 
following the insolvency of the parent company in Canada,116 all its subsidiaries 
filed for insolvency protection in the United States, United Kingdom and France. 
Because of the different rights recognised under commercial and insolvency law 
to some of the claimants, several issues emerged on the allocation and 
distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the insolvent estate. 
Parties in the Nortel international litigation were mainly sophisticated, 
institutional lenders.117 Because of the gridlock in court litigation, in June 2011, 
Justice Geoffrey B. Morawetz of the Ontario Superior Court and Hon. Kevin 
Gross of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of Delaware ordered parties to seek 
mediation regarding the division of Nortel’s assets.118  
The first mediation - under the supervision of Hon. Warren K. Winkler, Chief 
Justice of Ontario - lasted between April 2012 and January 2013, with no 
tangible result. Two further rounds of mediation were equally unsuccessful. 
Only on 12 October 2016 (seven years and a half after the first filing), parties 
managed to reach an agreement to divide up the $7.3 billion raised from 
liquidating the failed telecoms company, until then held in a “lockbox”. A result 
that was facilitated by the decision of the American and Canadian judge to 
authorize a cross-border trial to resolve competing claims to the same 
property.119 Duration aside, such an agreement was very costly paid: 
professional fees globally for the Nortel case have exceeded $2 billion, according 
to recent estimates.120  
                                                                    
116 Re Nortel Networks, Inc., 2009 CarswellOnt 236. While being incorporated in Canada, the 
parent company and some of its subsidiaries first filed for Chapter 11 in the United States to 
benefit from the automatic stay. They then brought an application in front of the Ontario court 
pursuant to s.18.6 of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act demanding the recognition of the 
Chapter 11 case as a "foreign proceeding". This would have given effect in Canada to the 
automatic stay of proceedings granted to Chapter 11 applicants. The application was granted on 
14 January 2009. 
117 Major claimants were U.S., Canadian and E.M.E.A. estates, U.S. bondholders, U.S. and 
Canadian unsecured creditors’ committees, U.K. pension interests and Canadian trustee. 
118 LL Peacock, ‘A Tale of Two Courts: The Novel Cross-Border Bankruptcy Trial’ (2015) 23 Am. 
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 543 (arguing that Nortel is a pioneering international precedent of 
coordinated court-to-court trials to address cross-border issues).  
119 Re Nortel Networks, Inc., No. 09-10138, 2013 WL 1385271 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 3, 2013), aff’d 
773 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2013); Re Nortel Networks Corp., 09-CL-7950, 2013 ONSC 1757 (Can. Ont. 
Sup. Ct. J. Apr. 3, 2013). 
120 Global Turnaround: October 2016, Issue 201. 
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Once again, these cases prove that, even in cross-border cases which involve 
mainly sophisticated parties and raise primarily allocative issues, the existence 
of a proceduralist system with widely accepted global principles for 
cooperation is not sufficient in itself to ensure that parties act in their collective 
best interest.  
 
3.3 NORMATIVE, EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS 
This section evaluates the desirability of proceduralist approaches in insolvency 
by testing their theoretical soundness and their compatibility with the 
pragmatic benchmarks adopted in this study.  
From a normative standpoint, major concerns have been voiced about the fact 
that proceduralist visions seem to assume that insolvency law is primarily a 
debt collection mechanism for the benefit of contractual creditors. Equally, the 
claim that creditors’ wealth maximisation is or should be the only legitimate 
goal of insolvency is contentious. Such an approach would fail to consider the 
claims of a wide variety of stakeholders impacted by the failure of the debtor121 
and which are examined below in sub-section 4.3(c). 
From a pragmatic standpoint, it is first necessary to determine the distinctive 
features of proceduralist solutions in insolvency law: 
1. Faith in the Procedure. Insolvency procedures are determined ex-ante and 
written in the law. Whenever an insolvency procedure is triggered, the 
role of the judiciary is simply to supervise the process, not to facilitate the 
achievement of a particular goal. It is up to the parties in interest to draft 
a rescue or liquidation plan on the basis of their pre-insolvency 
entitlements. Courts and other professionals with supervisory powers 
                                                                    
121 For a summary of the most controversial theoretical criticisms raised by proceduralist 
theories in general, and creditors’ wealth maximisation visions in particular: Warren (n 36); DR 
Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’ (1992) 71 Tex. 
L. Rev. 541.  In particular, Korobkin challenged these visions for their inability to recognise non-
economic value aspects such as moral, political, social and personal considerations: DR 
Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’ (1991) 91 Col. L. Rev. 717, 
762. 
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should refrain from intervening directly in the process. Their role is to 
check that the law is respected and that procedures are not abused; 
2. Contractual Rules Rule. Several proceduralist authors (Shanker, Adler, 
Jackson, Baird) argued that rules that are valid only in insolvency can 
create tension. This is because they could give parties a perverse 
incentive to push their debtors into insolvency, for instance by 
recognising a priority status or management powers that would not have 
been recognised outside insolvency. To promote the chances of 
maximising creditors’ returns, the relative value of pre-insolvency rights 
should not be affected. If the distribution hierarchy in place before the 
opening of any insolvency proceedings was changed by insolvency rules, 
‘the exchange of values that took place before the insolvency proceeding 
(e.g. the interest rate charged by the lender for the loan) would lose its 
foundation’.122 The creditor would be forced to renounce to the agreed 
benefit (e.g. priority or securitization of assets) without compensation for 
the reduced return on his investment; 
3. Collectivity and Compulsory Nature of Insolvency. The enforcement of a 
collectivist approach is the pre-emptive condition for parties to agree on 
freezing or postponing their individual collection rights. According to the 
Cork Report, any proceedings are collective whenever parties cannot rely 
on individual remedies to enforce their claims.123 The proceduralist 
understanding of the concept of collectivity may prove difficult in its 
application in rescue proceedings, where the main concern is to ensure 
that the interests of the general body of creditors take precedence over 
the individual rights of some of the claimants.124  
The compulsory nature of insolvency law is a natural consequence of its 
collective attitude, since ‘to allow a debtor to contract with a creditor to 
                                                                    
122 P von Wilmowsky, ‘Insolvency Law: Its Roles and Principles’ in A Cordes and MS Beerbühl 
(eds), Dealing with Economic Failure. Between Norm and Practice (15th to 21st Century) (Peter 
Lang Editions: Bern, 2016) 256. 
123 K Cork, Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) Cmnd 8558, 
para 232. 
124 For an analysis of the evolution of the notion and concept of collectivity in Europe and in 
England: H Anderson, The Framework of Corporate Insolvency Law (OUP: Oxford, 2017) 3.09-
3.12. 
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avoid participating in the bankruptcy proceeding would destroy the 
advantages of a collective system’;125 
4. Efficiency as Procedural and Substantive Goal. Proceduralist remedies in 
insolvency are intrinsically procedural and substantively efficient 
because they represent the optimal mechanism to maximise creditors’ 
returns. Legislators are constantly challenged to test the efficiency of the 
existing rules; 
5. Pre-determined Exit Strategies. Before the commencement of the case, all 
contractual parties have a reasonable expectation that, in case of 
financial difficulties, a pre-determined procedure will apply and that 
their contractual rights will be preserved; 
6. Equality Among Creditors. Relationships among creditors are governed 
only by their pre-insolvency entitlements. As a result, junior creditors 
cannot possibly expect a partial or full payment of their claims if senior 
and secured creditors have not been paid in full (APR). 
In light of these characteristics, it is therefore possible to assess if procedural-
based remedies in insolvency are procedurally efficient and fair. 
When it comes to procedural efficiency, similarly to what happens for 
autonomy-based alternatives to insolvency law, there is no explicit “barrier to 
entry”. This circumstance may favour strategic filings, especially by companies 
who are saddled with tort or extra-contractual liabilities and want to rescue or 
reorganise their business. 
Mechanisms to prevent an abusive or strategic use of insolvency remedies are 
not per se incompatible with a proceduralist understanding of insolvency law. 
However, this would imply that judges are recognised discretionary and 
evaluative powers to assess the abusive or legitimate nature of the filing. This is 
likely to increase complexity, litigation and costs. Furthermore, such an 
assumption about the role of the judges is incompatible with one of the pillars 
of proceduralist theories. Hence it is likely that strategic or abusive use of 
insolvency law will not be curbed with the adoption of proceduralist stances. 
                                                                    
125 Jackson (n 1) 17. 
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With reference to the other aspect of procedural efficiency, i.e. the treatment of 
parties in insolvency, proceduralist approaches seem straightforward and clear. 
Pre-insolvency entitlements are paramount: claimants take part in the rescue 
process or share the proceeds in the distribution phase only if they are not 
completely out of cash. 
This apparently unambiguous picture is frequently ignored in practice. In 
considering the actuality and enforceability of the APR in insolvency cases, this 
thesis has proven that adherence to this paradigm can be detrimental to 
promoting the best possible return for creditors. However, parties and judges 
would be left without clear guidance on the best course of action if and when 
two of the fundamental pillars of proceduralist solutions (i.e. maximisation of 
creditors’ return and preservation of pre-insolvency entitlements) were to be in 
conflict. A case-by-case approach could not realistically be considered an 
acceptable solution to address a systemic shortcoming of this vision. 
Moving to the analysis of procedural fairness, the de-constructivist approach 
has highlighted that protection of entrepreneurialism, shareholders’ return, 
market integrity and creditors’ expectations represent paramount concerns of 
the proceduralist understanding of insolvency law. As observed in the previous 
paragraphs, real case scenarios may force stakeholders to disregard part of the 
principles upon which these visions are based on, thus questioning their 
theoretical soundness. 
In line with the premises of the proceduralist visions, the claims of vulnerable 
stakeholders are frequently ignored. However, proceduralist visions may also 
fail to achieve equality among contractual claimants, since some insiders may 
take advantage of undisclosed information and reduce their liabilities towards 
the debtor.  
Finally, when it comes to the acceptability of proceduralist solutions, the most 
significant obstacle is represented by the need to disregard or otherwise 
severely restrict one of the pillars of current insolvency practice: the promotion 
of the rescue of viable businesses. 
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While nothing in the proposed frameworks suggests that proceduralist 
remedies should not be used to rescue viable companies or businesses, these 
proceedings are ill-designed to achieve rescue outcomes. Even when the 
insolvency case is reduced to a fire-sale of the business, it may be necessary to 
recognise additional protection and consideration to certain categories of out-
of-money creditors whose participation is essential for the success of the 
turnaround efforts. Purely proceduralist mechanisms, however, would fail to 
accept the legality of these solutions, because they would be seen as infringing 
on the pillars upon which these visions of insolvency law are based. 
 
3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
It is no coincidence that in recent times some of the successful auctions 
occurred under the hat of procedural and substantive insolvency protection.  
If the above-mentioned insolvency cases were simply about swapping debt for 
equity or selling potentially profitable assets, it would be possible to concur 
with the proponents of a proceduralist approach to insolvency law. Under that 
taxonomy, insolvency law would not add anything to already viable and 
efficient private remedies and should simply determine the framework under 
which these sales should occur. 
However, the examples discussed in this chapter demonstrate that not all 
complexities can be dealt with the support of a proceduralist framework. 
Parties have deliberately chosen insolvency law to perform these “sales” 
because it would allow them to restructure not simply their books, but also 
their relations with suppliers, traders and competitors. In other words, it is 
thanks to the substantive reorganisation and the renegotiation powers 
recognized in the insolvency arena that the relevant stakeholders either 
accomplished a “fire sale” of their assets and business or agreed on the 
distribution of the insolvency proceeds.  
Finally, it is worth keeping in mind that while auctions are an efficient 
insolvency procedure capable - in themselves - of achieving ex-post efficiency, 
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they may not necessarily achieve revenue efficiency, i.e. the attempt to 
maximise the proceeds to the creditors from the insolvency procedure.126 
- 
So far, practice has proven that - despite the use of innovative mechanisms, such 
as pre-pack sales - insolvency law performs a function that cannot be 
accomplished by other branches of law. Insolvency law is not simply about 
protecting contractual rights,127 therefore it cannot be restricted to a set of 
procedural rules that minimize bureaucratic costs and maximise the allocation 
of proceeds among claimants. 
This chapter has also proven that proceduralist theories may not withstand 
comprehensive normative criticism. Furthermore, their implementation raises 
concerns with reference to procedural efficiency and fairness and their 
acceptability by society at large. 
At the same time, the value of proceduralist approaches should not be 
dismissed. Proceduralist thinking and the cases mentioned in this chapter 
highlight that markets value a system of insolvency rules capable of promoting 
an efficient management and ensuring a predictable outcome of corporate 
rescue or liquidation cases.  
The following chapter investigates if principle-informed approaches can 
address some of the criticisms highlighted in this chapter with reference to 
procedural-based remedies in insolvency, while promoting the values that 
procedural and autonomy-based theorists have advocated.  
                                                                    
126 F Cornelli and L Felli, ‘Ex-Ante Efficiency of Bankruptcy Procedures’ (1997) 41 Eur. Econ. 
Rev. 475. 
127 For instance, with reference to the U.S. Chapter 11, during the debate which led to the 
enactment of the 1978 Act, it was observed that ‘[t]he purpose of a business reorganization case, 
unlike a liquidation case, is to restructure its finances so that it may continue to operate, provide 
employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce return for its stockholders’ H.R. Rep. No. 598, 
at 607 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179. 
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CHAPTER 4 - THE LIMITS OF INSOLVENCY LAW IN PRINCIPLE-BASED 
FRAMEWORKS 
«If thou lend money to any of My people, even to the poor with thee, thou shalt not 
be to him as a creditor; neither shall ye lay upon him interest» [Exodus 22:24 
(25)] 
«Let no debt remain outstanding, except the continuing debt to love one another, 
for whoever loves others has fulfilled the law» [Romans 13:8]  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter has introduced the proceduralist conceptualisations on 
the scope and purpose of insolvency law. It maintained that the major 
contribution of these theories to the discussion on the limits of insolvency law 
has been to reinstate the centrality of legal predictability in the insolvency 
debate.  
At the same time, proceduralist theories argued for restricting the scope of 
insolvency law to the protection of contractual rights, in line with the economic 
libertarian and neo-classical1 tradition. As a result, they failed to withstand 
normative criticism2 based on the criteria of procedural efficiency and fairness. 
The idea that liquidation contributes to making the economic system more 
efficient by expelling from the market unviable businesses has never been 
seriously plausible.3  
The recognition that substantive insolvency policies could not rely only on 
procedural tenets brought some commentators to conceive principle-based 
theories. These commentators - collectively known as traditionalists or 
                                                                    
1 For a distinction between classical and neo-classical economic theories: M Mazzucato, The 
Value of Everything: Making and Taking in the Global Economy (Penguin Books: London, 2018) 
ch.2. 
2 Chapter three has argued that the theoretical underpinnings of proceduralist models fail to 
withstand a value-bereft scrutiny. 
3 F Migliorino, Mysteria Concursus. Itinerari premoderni del diritto commerciale (Giuffrè: Milano, 
1999) 128. 
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communitarians4 - argue that insolvency law should pursue an autonomous set 
of rules and principles, capable of treating with fairness and justice the honest 
but unfortunate debtors who are no longer capable of paying their debts as they 
fall due. Multi-value visions5 have been encouraged by those scholars who tried 
to incorporate communitarian approaches and distributive rationales. This 
progressive group of scholars, who played a significant influence in shaping U.S. 
corporate insolvency law,6 argue that the role of corporate insolvency law 
should be to steer away creditors from sale and distribution of assets to a “new 
bargain”.7 Their arguments gave rise to what this thesis calls “principle-based 
theories”.8  
This chapter is concerned with the de-constructing9 the main principle-based 
theories to assess the guidance that these theories can provide to determine 
when insolvency rules should replace the general law of contract to determine 
the substantive and procedural rights of claimants against companies in 
distress. 
- 
20 April 2010: U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone, Gulf of Mexico.  
On that day, the Deepwater Horizon, a 10-year-old drilling rig owned by 
Transocean and chartered to British Petroleum (‘BP’), exploded and sank. This 
major incident resulted in the loss of life of eleven people working on the drill 
and on the largest spill of oil in the history of marine oil drilling operations.10 It 
                                                                    
4 Among others: DR Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy 
Law’ (1992) 71 Tex. L. Rev. 541; K Gross, ‘Taking Community Interests into Account in 
Bankruptcy: An Essay’ (1994) 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 1031. 
5 Among others: E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (Summer 1987) 54(3) U. Chi. L. Rev. 775; DR 
Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’ (May 1991) 91(4) Col. L. Rev. 
717 in the U.S.; V Finch and D Milman, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (3rd 
edn, CUP: Cambridge, 2017) in the U.K. 
6 DA Skeel, Jr., Debt’s Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America (Princeton University 
Press: Princeton, NJ, 2001) 227. 
7 S Paterson, ‘Rethinking Corporate Bankruptcy Theory in the Twenty-First Century’ (2016) 
36(4) OJLS 697, 699. 
8 For a general definition of principle-based theories, see above section 1.2, ftn 35. 
9 See footnote 32, chapter one. 
10 For more information, see (among others): <https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/deepwater-
horizon-bp-gulf-mexico-oil-spill> accessed 17 September 2018. 
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is estimated that around 4.9 million barrels of oil flowed from the rig site over 
the 87 days that it took to cap the Macondo well (15 July 2010).11 
The Gulf of Mexico disaster affected several thousands of people and 
communities who relied on fishing, tourism and oil-related activities for their 
livelihood. It also caused health-related problems to those involved in the clean-
up efforts or living on the nearby coast. It resulted in an environmental disaster 
of biblical proportions. The investigation conducted by U.S. authorities on its 
causes found that BP was the ultimate even if not the only entity responsible for 
the explosion and oil spill. BP was therefore forced to contribute to the clean-up 
costs and to compensate all those parties who suffered damages from this 
tragedy.  
BP first created a $20 billion trust fund known as “Gulf Coast Claims Facility” 
(‘GCCF’) which was later replaced by a court supervised settlement-programme 
(‘CSSP’). According to the latest available figures released by the company,12 the 
overall cost paid by BP in relation to the Deepwater Horizon disaster should top 
$65 billion.13  
The company managed to pay this disbursement, thanks in part to the rise in 
the crude price of oil per barrel. However, what would have happened if the 
company failed on one or more of these payments? Could the price of the 
disaster be imposed on the company’s pre-2010 creditors on the basis of some 
moral valuations such as the prominence of environmental and health 
considerations over contractually or statutory-based rights and interests?  
Principle-based theorists argue that insolvency law should not be immune from 
social, environmental and health considerations. Accordingly, the principle-
based legal literature produced a great variety of principles, due to the diversity 
of theoretical positions on the purpose of this area of law (as evidenced in 
                                                                    
11 U.S. Coast Guard and National Response Team, On Scene Coordinator Report: Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard, 2011) 
<https://lccn.loc.gov/2012427375> accessed 17 September 2018. 
12 <https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/media/press-releases/deepwater-horizon-
claims-facility-approaches-closure.html> accessed 17 September 2018. 
13 A Vaughan, ‘BP’s Deepwater Horizon bill tops $65bn’ The Guardian (London, 16 January 
2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/16/bps-deepwater-horizon-bill-
tops-65bn> accessed 17 September 2018. 
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section 4.2).  Similar to chapters two and three, this section does not provide a 
full assessment of principle-based theories as it is concerned with highlighting 
the features of these conceptualisations that are relevant for the debate on the 
limits of insolvency law. 
This chapter addresses the problem of weighting principles, i.e. the issue of 
recognising prominence to one principle over another in case of conflict 
(section 4.3). It demonstrates that whenever we “weight” a principle, we are in 
reality assessing the preponderance of the controlling interests, which that 
principle purports to promote. By referring to corporate governance theories, it 
also suggests that principles should protect and promote the interests of 
residual-risk takers, a notion employed to describe a wide category of 
stakeholders with conflicting expectations.  
It therefore contends that the main benefit of principle-based theories does not 
lie in the definition of contentious legal principles. It does lie in shifting the 
focus of the normative debate to the recognition of rights (section 4.4).  
Principle-based and corporate governance theorists recognise that a wide array 
of stakeholders has controlling rights over the distressed corporation. Any 
sound statutory system of insolvency rules should be based upon these 
premises and consider that the decision on when to file for insolvency should 
respect or at least acknowledge the prevailing controlling interests at the time 
of the filing.   
 
4.2 PRINCIPLE-BASED SOLUTIONS IN INSOLVENCY LAW 
Elizabeth Warren is one of the leading experts of principle-based theorists. A 
couple of decades ago, she asked: ‘Why have a bankruptcy system? What function 
is it designed to serve? To argue whether it is costly, whether it is failing, or 
whether it should be reshaped, amended or scrapped, some joinder over what the 
system is designed to do is essential’.14  
                                                                    
14 E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World’ (Nov. 1993) 92(2) Mich. L. Rev. 
336, 336. 
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The current democratic senator justified its existence by reason of its purposes: 
enhancing and distributing value, internalizing the costs of failure to the parties 
dealing with the debtor and creating reliance on private monitoring. The 
theoretical delineation of these purposes follows from the criticism of 
proceduralist approaches and the identification of the “autonomous pillars” that 
supported the insolvency framework. A belief shared by many other 
communitarian and multi-value scholars. 
These academics equally criticise no-insolvency scholarship for its lack of 
persuasiveness when translated into practice.15 They contend that as we live in 
an imperfect world,16 any theory conceived in a perfect market – zero 
transaction cost (PM-ZTC)17 environment should first prove to work “in 
practice” to be acceptable.  
The author is sympathetic with these socio-legal approaches to legal research. A 
comprehensive investigation of all principle-based or principle-informed 
theories of insolvency law falls outside the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, to 
collect appropriate evidence for our de-constructivist analysis, the following 
section provides a comprehensive glance at the different standpoints that have 
been taken on the matter.  
- 
Principle-based theories can be divided in four categories: pragmatism, 
contractarianism, eclectism, and team building. 
[1] Pragmatist theories are models in which principles are employed to 
determine predictive outcomes for hard cases. Pragmatist scholars do not share 
a common theoretical background among themselves, even if the majority of 
                                                                    
15 Particularly persuasive is E Warren and JL Westbrook’s article ‘Contracting Out of 
Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention’ (2005) 118(4) Harv. L. Rev. 1197. The authors 
contended and proved that, to justify their reasoning, “contractualists” assume relatively small 
cohorts of claimants, who are able to negotiate an insolvency regime with a debtor or to adjust 
the prices or other contractual terms of their contracts to reflect the applicable bankruptcy 
regime. However, they argued that reality proves that there are many more claimants in 
insolvency cases, the vast majority of which unable to adjust their risks depending on the 
applicable procedure. Furthermore, even if they were able to do it, other inefficiencies and 
higher costs would result. 
16 Warren (n 14). 
17 LM LoPucki, ‘Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors Baird and Rosenzweig’ 
(Oct. 1992) 92(1) Mich. L. Rev. 79. 
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them seem to be influenced by the goals - albeit not necessarily the values - of 
law and economics models. In other words, these theorists evaluate insolvency 
law and corporate reorganisation in economic terms18 and propose the 
recognition and promotion of a system of principles capable of enhancing the 
(economic) efficiency of the statutory framework. 
Scholars like Bork19 and practitioners like Moss20 recognise that even if (the) 
law is not what judges say,21 the judiciary plays an all-powerful role in 
determining the outcome of hard cases.22  
Pragmatist scholars believe that an ex-ante systematisation of insolvency 
principles may help the judiciary to reach uniform decisions in similar domestic 
or cross-border disputes. For the purpose of systematising principles and 
promoting predictability, pragmatists assume that insolvency laws should aim 
at increasing the return to statutorily-recognised claimants or facilitating the 
allocation of capital in the economy to the best use.23  
Unlike law and economics theorists, these scholars do not restrict the group of 
potential claimants to contractual creditors. Nevertheless, their list of principles 
is certainly narrower than those included by the theorists described below sub 
[2] - [4]. 
At the same time, the proposed conceptualisation based on all pervasive 
principles and guiding rules promotes predictability, uniformity and 
maximisation of return. One of the most remarkable and praiseworthy aspects 
of the pragmatist conceptualisation is its intention to provide guidance in hard 
                                                                    
18 BE Adler, ‘Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation’ (1992) 77 Cornell L. Rev. 439. 
19 R Bork, Principles of Cross-Border Insolvency Law (Intersentia: Cambridge, 2017). 
20 G Moss, ‘Principles of EU Insolvency Law’ (2015) 28 Insolv. Int. 40. 
21 This is a commonly but improperly used phrase to refer to the positivist understanding of the 
law: HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, Clarendon Law Series: Oxford, 2012). 
22 The notion of “hard case” is usually employed to refer to judicial or arbitral procedures in 
which the procedural or substantive law applicable to the facts is obscure or incomplete. 
23 S Paterson, ‘Rethinking the Role of Corporate Distress in the Twenty-First Century’ LSE Law, 
Society and Economy Working Paper No. 27/2014 (2014) 3 
<https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2014-27_Paterson.pdf> accessed 17 
September 2018 (observing that this idea presents a central tenet of Thomas Jackson’s 
philosophy: TH Jackson and DA Skeel, Jr., ‘Bankruptcy and Economic Recovery: Restructuring 
Financial Infrastructure to Economic Recovery’ (Brookings Institution), U. Penn. Inst. For Law & 
Econ. Research Paper No. 13-27 (2013) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2306138&rec=1&srcabs=2375654&alg
=1&pos=2> accessed 17 September 2018.  
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cases. Its members promote and sustain convergence-seeking and 
harmonisation-building projects, such as the Asian Principle of Restructuring 
Project24 and several other European projects.25  
Principle-based analysis is used to identify correlations between laws from 
different jurisdictions, fill a legislative gap or guide the solution of conflicts of 
principles. These studies promote convergence of philosophies and approaches, 
which in turn should result in enhanced predictability in hard cases and higher 
returns to claimants. 
The main shortcoming of pragmatist theories is their inability to address some 
of the issues that they aim to overcome. Principles do not have the authority of 
hard laws. Despite their systemisation, they remain controversial: conflicts 
arise frequently and courts may apply some of these principles in a bolder or 
more conservative way.26 Harmonization generally results in soft law 
instruments, such as the proposed EC Directive on preventive restructuring 
mechanisms.27 Finally, to really succeed and become the pervasive framework 
of insolvency law, principle-based theories should be capable of determining ex-
ante the goals that the insolvency and rescue framework should pursue. Such 
commonality of views has yet to be achieved.  
                                                                    
24 This project was launched by the Asian Business Law Institute (‘ABLI’) in cooperation with 
the International Insolvency Institute (‘III’) to facilitate the convergence of insolvency laws by 
identifying common standards (i.e. principles) applicable in domestic and cross-border cases.  
25 One of the most recent is the initiative coordinated by the Conference on European 
Restructuring and Insolvency Law to improve rescue and insolvency laws in Europe. For more 
information, see: http://www.ceril.eu/.  
26 See for instance Hooley v Titaghur as opposed to HIH. In the first case (Hooley Ltd v Titaghur 
Plc, The Samnugger Jute Factory and the Victoria Jute Co. Ltd [2016] CSOH 141, [2017] SLT 58) 
as well in Singularis (Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2014] UKPC 36, [2015] 
AC 1675) the courts adopted a restrictive interpretation of the principle of modified 
universalism and did not recognise the primacy of the foreign proceeding. Opposite conclusions 
were reached in HIH (Re HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd [2008] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 WLR 
852).  
27 Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of 
restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU’ (22 
November 2016) COM(2016) 723 final, 2016/0359 (COD), as recently amended by the EU 
Parliament in a report published on 21 August 2018: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-
2018-0269+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN> accessed 17 September 2018. For a commentary on the 
proposal, see NWA Tollenaar, ‘The European Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on 
Preventive Restructuring Proceedings’ (2017) 30(5) Insolv. Int. 65. 
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[2] Contractarians alongside with eclecticists and team builders, could be 
broadly classified as representatives of the “enterprise and forum” camp,28 as 
they argue that insolvency rules should protect more than economic interests.  
The principal advocate of contractarian views has been Korobkin. In his works, 
he argues that insolvency law should address not simply the economic, but also 
the financial issues of the distressed corporation.29 More generally, 
contractarians believe that insolvency law should not be understood as a 
maximiser of economic outcomes, but as ‘a system for rendering richer, more 
informed decisions in response to financial distress’.30  
This change in perspective is justified by the idea that insolvency law 
represents the by-product of a bargain struck by all of the parties, whose 
interests might be affected by a company’s decline,31 behind a veil of 
ignorance.32 As a result, it is guided by principles that ‘prescribe limits on how 
[the] law should alter the rights, authority, and practical leverage of persons in 
financial distress’.33  
The first principle they would choose is “inclusivity”.34 This seems rather 
counter-intuitive: to enhance the chances of quick and efficient recovery or 
distribution might be preferable to consider only the interests of those who 
have proprietary rights against the debtor’s assets.35 However, in Korobkin’s 
theory the parties that are involved in the theory-building exercise do not have 
knowledge if they would be secured lenders, employees or tort claimants in the 
hypothetical case of the debtors’ failure.36  
                                                                    
28 The notion is borrowed by B Xie, Comparative Insolvency Law: The Pre-pack Approach in 
Corporate Rescue (EE Publishing: Cheltenham, 2016) 8. 
29 Korobkin (n 4). 
30 Korobkin (n 5) 787. 
31 G McCormack, Corporate Rescue Law - An Anglo-American Perspective (EE Publishing: 
Cheltenham, 2008) 28.  
32 In Korobkin’s words, these are the principles ‘that persons would agree to under conditions 
that are appropriate for choosing principles to govern relationships in that context’ (Korobkin (n 
4) 627). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid 572. 
35 This is the position contended by Baird and Jackson: DG Baird and TH Jackson, ‘Corporate 
Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate 
Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 97, 100. 
36 Korobkin (n 4) 570. 
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As a result, these parties support solutions which assure that, ‘whatever the 
position or positions they individually occupy, they [would] have the ability to 
promote the aims that are important to them’.37 In other words, the participants 
in the theory-building exercise would extend the right to join and influence the 
outcome of the insolvency procedure beyond the bearers of property rights 
against the debtor’s assets. 
The second principle is “rational planning”. Korobkin draws from Rawl’s studies 
that it is rational for an individual faced with conflicting aims to plan specifically 
for the present and delay any commitment for the future.38 In insolvency 
scenarios, parties pursue conflicting objectives. In insolvency there is, therefore, 
the need to plan strategies that promote as many aims as possible or – when it 
is not possible to achieve all of them – at least those aims that are most 
important.39 In Korobkin’s view, the principle of rational planning addresses 
‘the character of financial distress as a complex problem’.40 It encourages the 
parties to follow rational guidelines to identify the most rational long-term plan.  
In sharp contrast with pragmatists, contractarians have been subject to 
extensive criticism41 with reference to the practical implications of their 
theories. In fact, unlike pragmatists, contractarians do not seek to categorise 
principles in an effort to support the judiciary, practitioners and businesses in 
the definition of (hard) cases.42 They conceive the mentioned legal principles as 
‘an authoritative standpoint that can be used to evaluate the fundamental 
fairness of specific bankruptcy (i.e. corporate insolvency) rules or practices’,43 as 
elements capable of offering critical guidance to legislative reforms.44  
                                                                    
37 Ibid 574. 
38 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1971) 410. 
39 Korobkin (n 4) 581. 
40 Ibid 584. 
41 Finch and Milman (n 5) 34-35; Xie (n 28) 13. 
42 As Vanessa Finch observes, ‘[t]he device of the veil […] does not in itself explain, in a convincing 
fashion, important distributional issues, such as how to judge trade-offs between fairness or justice 
and wealth creation’: Finch and Milman (n 5) 35. 
43 Korobkin (n 4) 627. 
44 More in general on that point, see DR Korobkin, ‘The Role of Normative Theory in Bankruptcy 
Debates’ (1996) 82 Iowa L. Rev. 75, where the author claims that both theoretical and non-
theoretical approaches to the study of corporate insolvency law are needed to properly and 
exhaustively address insolvency questions. 
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It is intriguing to observe, however, that both contractarians and pragmatists 
share a common conjecture: corporations are not simply nexuses of contracts, 
but organisations aimed at protecting a multiplicity of interests from a variety 
of stakeholders. In particular, Korobkin observes that corporate insolvency 
practices create ‘a kind of community, consisting of all participants in the debtor’s 
financial distress, who express the diverse human values that inform their 
perspectives’.45 
The principles that guide insolvency should be coherent and promote the 
interests of those who “make” the companies. As this work points out, such 
assumption is also shared by eclectic and team builder theorists.  
[3] The focus on multiplicity rather than categorization of interests becomes 
even more marked with eclecticists.46 These thinkers, who include scholars 
like Warren and - to a lesser extent - Finch, assert that insolvency is that section 
of the law that deals with the systemic failure of the debtor.  
According to these theorists, the rationales of this area of law differ from any 
other part of the law due to the uniqueness of the problems raised by 
insolvency. In their view, the central policy justification of insolvency law is to 
cope with default in an integrated system.47 Insolvency law should be 
concerned with (re)distributing the debtor’s losses among a number of 
different actors.  
As the purpose of the theoretical debate is to identify these actors, it is hardly 
possible to provide ex-ante consistent answers to questions such as how to 
reallocate the resources and how to solve conflicts between (re)distributive 
goals.48  
To define the standards of the insolvency system, eclecticists are willing to 
consider a broader range of interests than contractarians. If Korobkin continued 
to adopt a statutory-informed approach in the identification of those who have 
legally enforceable rights towards the insolvent estate/debtor, this is no longer 
                                                                    
45 Korobkin (n 5) 787. 
46 K Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System (Yale University Press: 
New Haven and London, 1997); Warren (n 5); Warren (n 14).  
47 Warren (n 5) 778. 
48 Xie (n 28) 17. 
  185 
or not always the case for eclecticists. The latter tend to emphasize the interests 
of the community alongside those legally recognised by the law. It has been 
argued that aspects of this approach were adopted in the Cork Committee’s 
statement of aims,49 thus indirectly guiding the evolution and content of English 
insolvency law.  
Central tenets for eclecticists are the rejection of allocative efficiency as the sole 
criterion to define insolvency law policy50 and the attempt to comprehensively 
define the competing goals that underlay the system. In Warren’s words, they 
try to articulate ‘the normative goals of the system that scholars, practitioners, 
judges and legislators can share’.51 In reality, the definition of these goals has a 
wider influence, as it affects a large number of actors in the corporate field 
(including directors, shareholders, consumers, suppliers, etc.). 
Like contractarians and - as it will be shown - team builders, multiple 
value/eclecticist theories might fail to give practical guidance in a complex, real-
life corporate environment,52 as the list of policy goals is open-textured.53 
However, providing certainty in hard cases does not present their primary 
purpose. Their studies are designed to enhance the awareness of the competing, 
(re)-distributive goals of the insolvency system.54  
This should lead in their view to the retention of those insolvency proceedings 
which prioritize reorganisation and rescue over liquidation.55  
If pragmatists try to convey guidance for judicial conundrums, eclecticists try to 
list the competing goals of the insolvency system and its guiding 
principles/standards. These goals are designed to recognise and enforce the 
conflicting interests of the insolvency stakeholders. Unfortunately, their 
                                                                    
49 A Keay and P Walton, Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal (2nd edn, Jordan Publishing: 
Bristol, 2008) 27; Finch and Milman (n 5) 26-27. 
50 Warren (n 14) 338. 
51 Ibid 339. 
52 Warren (n 5) 813: ‘I readily admit that I do not offer a single rule that will resolve all disputes. 
Instead, I call attention to the difficult distributional issues in bankruptcy’. 
53 Warren (n 14) 340. 
54 Warren (n 5) 795-6. 
55 E Warren, ‘The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11’ (1992) 102(2) Yale L. J. 437. 
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categorisation lacks in determinacy because of the variety of interests they are 
willing to consider.56  
[4] Team Builders could be defined as those theorists who follow the lead and 
studies on the production theory of the corporation by Blair and Stout.57 They 
try to provide theoretical support and operational guidance on the use of the 
(re)distributive goals identified by eclecticists. In particular, they link the 
statutory enforceability of eclecticist goals to the bearers of a controlling 
interest in the distressed company. Unsurprisingly, they reject the traditional, 
neo-classical and libertarian economic view that companies are owned by and 
solely for the interests of shareholders. 
The first and most notorious scholar to apply these corporate governance 
theories to insolvency law has been LoPucki.58 He asserts that the team 
production contract conceived by Blair and Stout continues in force during 
insolvency reorganisation proceedings, ‘as team members intended that result at 
the time they contracted’.59   
The corporate governance studies upon which LoPucki’s theory is based 
provide evidence of what eclecticists and contractarians have envisaged: 
corporations are jointly controlled by and managed in the interests of all those 
who make company-specific investments, the so-called “risk bearers”.60 These 
are not necessarily the stockholders or the creditors. In the majority of cases, 
risk bearers favour the preservation of the going concern value of the distressed 
company over liquidation, hence the principles of this area of law should – 
according to this theoretical approach – yield to this goal.  
For the purpose of improving the success rate of insolvency reorganisations, 
team builders suggest shifting cases to more experienced judges, as well as 
paying more attention to the appointment of creditors’ committees and the 
                                                                    
56 Finch and Milman (n 5) 37; BS Schermer, ‘Response to Professor Gross: Taking the Interests 
of the Community into Account in Bankruptcy’ (1994) 72 Wash. U.L.Q. 1049, 1051. 
57 MM Blair and LA Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ (1999) 85 Va. L. Rev. 
247. 
58 LM LoPucki, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Reorganisation’ (2004) 557 Vand. L. 
Rev. 741. 
59 Ibid 754. 
60 This notion is further explained below in sub-section 4.3(c). 
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definition of pre-negotiated plans. They also support measures to facilitate DIP 
loans and mergers,61 while they criticise going-concern “fire” sales as they 
usually yield only a fraction of the residual value of the distressed company.62 
Finally, they condemn the complicity of some complacent courts,63 which fail to 
fulfil their obligation to check if DIPs and professional players are acting in the 
best interests of the stakeholders.64  
These views have been criticised for prioritizing non-legally enforceable 
entitlements over legally enforceable ones. Nevertheless, these concerns might 
be overstated as variations in the order of priorities occur frequently in 
practice. For instance, it has been empirically proven that deviations from the 
absolute priority rule (‘APR’) are recurrent.65 Recognising that interest holders 
have a right to a share in the reorganised company despite the absence of 
legally enforceable entitlements is a relatively small step forward. 
Other normative criticisms rely on behavioural considerations. For instance, 
LoPucki himself is sceptical about whether the theory could work in practice, as 
its success depends on the actions of the directors. Could the same directors 
that brought the company to failure be trusted to take the right decisions for the 
interests of the residual risk bearers?66  
                                                                    
61 LM LoPucki and JW Doherty, ‘Bankruptcy Survival’ (2015) 62 UCLA L. Rev. 970. 
62 LM LoPucki and JW Doherty, ‘Bankruptcy Fire Sales’ (2007) 106(1) Mich. L. Rev. 1. 
63 LM LoPucki, Courting Failures (University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 2005); T Eisenberg 
and LM LoPucki, 'Shopping for Judges' (1999) 84 Cornell L. Rev. 967; LM LoPucki and SD Kalin, 
‘The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Evidence of a “Race to 
the Bottom”’ (2001) 54(2) Vand. L. Rev. 231; LM LoPucki and JW Doherty, ‘Why Are Delaware 
and New York Bankruptcy Reorganizations Failing?’ (2002) 55(6) Vand. L. Rev. 1933.  
Similarly, McCormack argued that, while strategic manoeuvring and transaction planning is not 
necessarily a bad thing, the U.S. approach to forum shopping risks to undermine core insolvency 
and public policy principles. This may lead some countries to deny recognition to U.S. 
insolvency proceedings on grounds of public policy: G McCormack, ‘Bankruptcy Forum 
Shopping: the UK and US as Venues of Choice for Foreign Companies’ (2014) 63(4) I.C.L.Q. 815. 
Against: J Payne, ‘Cross-Border Schemes of Arrangement and Forum Shopping’ (2013) 14 EBOR 
L. Rev. 563 (arguing that in some instances forum shopping can be “good” and in the best 
interest of all stakeholders); S Block-Lieb, ‘Reaching to Restructure Across Borders (Without 
Over-reaching), Even After Brexit’ (2018) 92 Am. Bankr. L.J. 1 (discussing the implications of 
Brexit on “good forum shopping”).  
64 LoPucki and Doherty (n 62) 45. 
65 See this thesis (sub-section 3.2(a)(iii)) and LM LoPucki and WC Whitford, ‘Bargaining over 
Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganisation of Large, Publicly Held Companies’ (1990) 
139(1) U. Pa. L. Rev. 125. 
66 In LoPucki’s words, ‘The [team production] theory is based on a wholesale grant of unfettered 
power to directors. My inclination is to think that will not work. Power corrupts, and absolute 
power corrupts absolutely’: LoPucki (n 58) 778. 
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However, in the author’s view, the primary reason for concern is that this 
theory fails to prove one of its central tenets, i.e. the preference of corporate 
reorganisation over liquidation when the decision process includes a larger and 
more varied number of stakeholders. Additionally, this theory has been 
conceived only with reference to reorganisation proceedings, but fairness and 
systemic considerations call for the recognition of the same interests also in 
liquidation or fire sale procedures of distressed corporations.  
This theory tries to make a better, more faithful account of reality: distressed 
companies are no longer controlled by shareholders, but they cannot equally be 
run in the sole interest of contractual creditors. At the same time, it 
underestimates the complexities of real practice. 
Contractual creditors have different views, priorities and interests. For instance, 
an investor who puts into practice a loan-to-own or loan-to-govern strategy on 
the eve of the company’s insolvency has significantly dissimilar priorities to a 
long-established supplier.67 The former wants to squeeze what good is left for 
their own profit, the latter is interested in minimising losses and, where 
possible, retaining a profitable relationship with the reorganised company. How 
can these positions be reconciled? Similarly, the more we extend the list of 
interested parties, the more their interests diverge. 
To argue that corporate reorganisation is not a governmental imposition, but ‘a 
contract term by which creditors and shareholders agree to subordinate their 
legal rights to the preservation of the going concern’68 is to ignore that the basic 
requirement for having a contract of any kind is the intention to create legal 
relations among signatories. Such unanimity can hardly be achieved in the 
context of an insolvency procedure.    
- 
Different standpoints have been taken on the goals of corporate insolvency law, 
the legally and non-legally enforceable interests that should be protected, and 
                                                                    
67 Brady v Brady [1989] AC 755 (HL) 777-778 (arguing that the interests of creditors such as 
employees may be in conflict with the priorities and expectations of financial, short-term 
investors); S Paterson, ‘The Paradox of Alignment: Agency Problems and Debt Restructuring’ 
(2016) EBOR L. Rev. 497.  
68 LoPucki (n 58) 743. 
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consequently the principles that should govern insolvency law. Despite the 
uniqueness of the theoretical views, the theories considered in this section 
share a common pattern: the recognition of (re)distributive goals beyond 
maximisation of the procedural efficiency.  
The case for looking beyond policies uniquely designed to enhance allocative 
efficiency has been made. Insolvency law emerges as a forum, where all 
interests affected by business failure are considered, under a procedure 
governed by principles designed to protect and promote the expectations of the 
affected parties. New questions need to be answered: What interests and rights 
should be voiced? What principles should preside over insolvency law? 
Before addressing the substantive issue of the identification and definition of 
these guiding principles, the pragmatic approach of this thesis suggests the 
opportunity to check if principle-based models could work in practice. The next 
sub-paragraph is dedicated to this task. 
4.2(a) Could a Principle-Based Approach Shape Insolvency Law? 
Principle-based theories may be promising on paper, but they may fail to 
provide tangible solutions to insolvency-related issues. To determine to what 
extent (if any) principles can and should shape the content of insolvency law, it 
is appropriate to look at projects based on pragmatic ideals. One of them was 
promoted by the Conference on European Restructuring and Insolvency Law 
(‘CERIL’).69 It focused on transactions avoidance rules from various European 
jurisdictions. Its purpose was to examine and compare the existing rules on the 
basis of the underlying (domestic and European) policies and principles.70 
The CERIL study was premised on the fact that national insolvency laws 
typically contain rules on avoidance transactions. Whenever these rules come 
into consideration, the parties in a potential dispute may have conflicting views 
                                                                    
69 CERIL is an independent non-profit, non-partisan, self-supporting organisation of 
approximately 75 lawyers and insolvency practitioners, law professors and (insolvency) judges 
committed to the improvement of restructuring and insolvency laws and practices in the 
European Union and in its Member States and their operation.  
70 Reference to this study seems appropriate, as the research was conducted by “pragmatist” 
theorists, whose aim is to develop principle-based models capable of explaining the reality, 
improving the status quo and lead the evolution of the law. 
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and interests. According to the final report on the study,71 these conflicts derive 
from a contrast between two general principles.  
On the one hand, insolvency claimants demand reliance on the principle of 
equal treatment of creditors (the so called pari passu rule), which however 
operates only whenever insolvency proceedings have started. On the other 
hand, it is argued that the expectations of the parties in a commercial 
transaction should be upheld by reason of the principle of the protection of 
trust.  
The problem of transactions avoidance is also exacerbated by the lack of 
harmonisation of the insolvency laws among the European countries covered 
by this study, as similar “legitimate expectations” are protected in distinct ways. 
Generally speaking, the power of the person in charge of the insolvency 
procedure to challenge the validity of pre-insolvency transactions may depend 
on a variety of factors, such as the timing or nature72 of the transaction and the 
subjective status of the parties in the transaction. 
The report concludes that the law of preferences mirrors the underlying 
principles in most countries, but this conclusion is questionable. In fact, this 
remark has been possible by the reliance on rather elastic definitions of the 
underlying principles. Rather contradictorily, although roughly one third of the 
report (§§.17-30) is dedicated to the description of the diverging solutions 
adopted by national legislators with reference to the same issue, the authors 
impliedly suggested that roughly all the national laws on transactions avoidance 
rules are informed by the same principles.  
As noted by Wessel (who acted as CERIL’s chairperson),  
it seems promising to apply a principle-based approach to national 
insolvency laws. Carving out the fundamental commonalities instead of 
stressing the differences in details by focussing on the underlying 
                                                                    
71 R Bork, ‘Clash of Principles: Equal Treatment of Creditors vs. Protection of Trust in European 
Transactions Avoidance Laws - CERIL Report 2017/01’ (CERIL, 26 September 2017) 
<http://www.ceril.eu/uploads/files/ceril-statement-2017-1.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018. 
72 For instance, under some laws it is not possible to challenge a transaction where a creditor 
has taken performance rather than received it. The creditor performs rather than receives a 
transaction when, among others, he or she obtains partial or full satisfaction for his claim after 
an individual enforcement action. 
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principles and their reflection in national insolvency rules supports all 
efforts to understand and – eventually – harmonise insolvency laws.73  
These promising conclusions should again not be overstated.  
First, the study investigated only a narrow area of national transaction 
avoidance laws, i.e. those insolvency rules that apply to formal liquidation 
proceedings. These are the least contentious rules in the area, as a process of 
gradual approximation of existing procedures has been in place for a rather 
long period of time. It is expected that more dissimilar results would be 
observed if the investigation was extended to the treatment of transaction 
avoidance rules subject to general law.  
However, even if the investigation continued to be restricted to insolvency 
issues, more contradictory results would be observed if the analysis included 
the treatment of transactions commenced or concluded before formal rescue 
proceedings, i.e. in informal workouts or quasi-formal proceedings.  
As a result, further studies need to be undertaken to ascertain if a principle-
based approach would work in relation to the entire scope of insolvency law.  
Second, even with reference to the jurisdictions analysed in the study, the 
researchers observed that the law of preferences does not mirror the 
underlying principles in all of the countries, with notable exceptions being 
England and Wales, and Spain. They also recognised that some other principles, 
such as the principle of predictability (legal certainty) and of optimal realisation 
of the debtor’s assets, needed to be considered to explain some avoidance 
norms.74 
The authors characterise this issue as a problem of “weighting principles”.75 
They argue that it is not problematic if the substantive law does not mirror the 
strict implementation of the guiding principles in the area, as this means that 
                                                                    
73 B Wessels, ‘2017-09-doc11 1st CERIL Statement on Transaction avoidance laws’ Prof. Dr. Bob 
Wessels (27 September 2017) <http://www.bobwessels.nl/blog/2017-09-doc11-1st-ceril-
statement-on-transaction-avoidance-laws/> accessed 17 September 2018. 
74 R Bork, ‘Report on Transactions Avoidance Laws’ (CERIL, 26 September 2017) 4 
<http://www.ceril.eu/uploads/files/20170926-ceril-report-2017-1-final.pdf> accessed 17 
September 2018. 
75 RM Dworkin, ‘The Model of Rules’ (1967) 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 14, 27. 
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other, more sectorial and detailed principles prevail over more general ones. 
They introduce us to a hierarchy of principles, in the same way as we are used 
to classify our sources of law from more general and prescriptive to more 
specific and less authoritative ones. 
This explanation cannot be accepted. In particular, the adoption of such 
changeable paradigms would run counter to the achievement of the objective of 
procedural efficiency, which the thesis assumes as one of its paradigms.  
For instance, CERIL authors have no problem to admit that the principle of 
optimal realisation of debtor’s assets could modify the general insolvency rules 
dictated by the principles of equal treatment of creditors and protection of 
trust. In this case, a secondary, specific principle would trump the primary, 
more general ones. However, the same principle of optimal realisation is 
considered by the same authors as the guiding general principle when it comes 
to the definition of the rules that govern a liquidation procedure. 
This ambivalent hierarchical status of principles has no equivalent for laws. A 
secondary administrative source cannot derogate from a primary statutory 
precept, unless within the limits determined by the statute itself. Hierarchies 
cannot be turned around. Why should this be possible for principles?  
Finally, CERIL authors appear to share the implicit belief that principle-based 
theories could play a role in determining the substantive content of insolvency 
law, while they may have a less persuasive effect with reference to the 
definition of “procedural details” and “legal consequences”.76 Such a conclusion is 
particularly problematic with reference to a sector of the law which is primarily 
procedural in nature.  
4.2(b) Preliminary Findings 
What principle-based theorists have in common is an organisational - 
sometimes hierarchical - view of legal principles aimed at promoting and 
protecting a wide variety of interests.  
                                                                    
76 Bork (n 74) 3. 
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Unlike neo-libertarians,77 they do not see the company simply as a nexus of 
contracts where shareholders, as the ultimate risk-takers, have bargained with 
the managers to act in the protection of their interests. Unlike new 
institutionalists,78 they do not see the company only as a mechanism to promote 
pareto-efficiency and as an organisational alternative to the market to lower the 
costs of market transactions.  
Principle-based theorists envision the company as organisations where the 
directors must consider the power relations among all their members before 
deciding the company’s policies. They promote the introduction of mechanisms 
aimed at considering the interests of all the controlling risk-takers of the 
corporation into law.  
Insolvency law should promote and protect the multiplicity of interests of the 
controlling risk-takers of the distressed company. However, principle-based 
theories alone fail to provide clear guidance in the definition of procedural and 
substantive issues of insolvency law. 
As principles have a more marked attitude than laws, their implementation 
often falls on the company directors. What is left to be determined is how to 
weigh these principles (section 4.3) in light of the controlling claims (i.e. the 
interests) that each stakeholder has towards the company. 
 
4.3 THE PROBLEM OF WEIGHTING PRINCIPLES 
The Deepwater Horizon disaster showed the importance of considering 
conflicting interests. If the price of crude oil had fallen below $50 per barrel, the 
same disaster would have pushed parties to classify these principles in 
categories of decreasing importance in the ensuing corporate insolvency case.  
                                                                    
77 F Easterbrook and D Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard University 
Press: London, 1991); AA Alchian and H Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organisation’ (1972) AER 777; M Jensen and W Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 J. Financial Econ. 305. 
78 O Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (The Free Press: Cambridge, MA, 1985); 
AD Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope. The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Belknap Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1990); R Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937), reproduced 
in O Williamson and S Winter (eds), The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution and Development 
(OUP: Oxford, 1993).  
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How should principles be “weighted”? Who should decide if the rights of 
secured creditors should prevail over the health and environmental concerns of 
large communities? What reasons should be used to justify any restriction to 
some of the fundamental principles (sanctity of contract and right to health) 
underpinning the Anglo-American legal systems? 
One of the most prominent scholars who studied these issues is Dworkin. In his 
studies, he concluded that unlike rules, which apply in all-or-nothing scenarios 
depending upon whether the facts fit within the legal definition, principles have 
a dimension of weight or importance.79 On one hand, principles are capable of 
being aggregated when they reach the same policy/result. On the other, 
whenever there is a contrast, it is necessary for one principle to prevail over (i.e. 
outweigh) the other. However, the scholar also concluded that ‘generally we 
cannot demonstrate the authority or weight of a particular principle’.80 
Current practice in the jurisdictions considered in this study seems to confirm 
this conclusion. In sub-section 3.2(a)(iii), this thesis has observed that strict 
observance of the APR is increasingly undermined in an attempt to foster the 
rescue of viable businesses.  
Similar considerations are also valid with reference to several of the other 
pillars of insolvency law. For instance, the principle of collectivity can be 
statutorily derogated from by secured creditors.81 Under both U.S. and English 
insolvency law,82 a lien remains attached to its collateral even after the 
beginning of the insolvency procedure and it can be enforced against the 
insolvent estate even if the debtor cannot be sued for any deficiency. 
These exceptions are well known and their scope, extent and relevance have 
been extensively studied.83 In general, principle-based theorists have tried to 
justify the legitimacy of these waivers of the enforcement of general principles 
                                                                    
79 Dworkin (n 75) 27. 
80 Ibid 37 (emphasis as in the original version). 
81 For an analysis of the problems caused by an inappropriate understanding of the principle of 
“collectivity” in cross-border insolvency cases, see: E Vaccari, ‘The Ammanati Affair: Seven 
Centuries Old, and Not Feeling the Age’ (2018) 93(3) Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 831. 
82 §.362(b) 11 U.S.C. in the U.S. and s.43(2), Sch. B1 IA 1986 (administration) in England. 
83 E Vaccari, ‘OW Bunker: A Common Law Perspective on Multilateral Co-operation in 
Insolvency-Related Cases’ (2017) 7 I.C.C.L.R. 245, 247-249. 
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by demonstrating that other principles should be applied and that those - 
apparently conflicting - principles had to be preferred due to the circumstances 
of the case. 
This justification or the alternative explanation that we are dealing with 
“exceptional cases” are not entirely satisfactory. They result in making the 
outcome of the procedure dependent upon subjective valuations. A valuation 
which, moreover, is dependent upon time and territorial-restricted horizons.  
It is, however, equally conceivable that the conflict is among the rights of the 
stakeholders rather than between the procedural and substantive principles 
that underpin the law. 
To assume that such a conflict of rights and interests may occur, it is however 
necessary to recognise that insolvency law could and should serve more than 
one interest at a time. If it is assumed - as some proceduralists do - that 
insolvency law is simply designed to maximise the return to contractual 
claimants and that these claimants are a rather homogeneous group, it is hardly 
possible to make sense of the principle-based conflicts.  
The economic argument advanced by neo-classical scholars and financial 
economists maintains that once the company/debtor is solvent, decisions 
should be taken in the interests of the equity-holders, as they are the only 
parties that have contracted for a share in the net proceeds of the enterprise. 
Once the debtor is insolvent, the residual rights to its assets would pass to its 
contractual creditors. As a result, directors should act only in the creditors’ 
interests84 and avoid excessive risk-taking,85 which becomes more likely when 
                                                                    
84 Easterbrook and Fischel (n 77) 60; MM Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate 
Governance for the Twenty-First Century (The Brookings Institution: Washington D.C. 1995) 56-
61; V Jelisavcic, ‘A Safe Harbour Proposal to Define the Limits of Directors’ Fiduciary Duty to 
Creditors in the “Vicinity of Insolvency”: Credit Lyonnais v Pathe’ (1992) 18(1) J. Corp. Law 145. 
85 There is empirical evidence that this fact tends to occur (R Daniels, ‘Must Boards Go 
Overboard? An Economic Analysis of the Effects of Burgeoning Statutory Liability on the Role of 
Directors in Corporate Governance’ in JS Ziegel and SI Cantlie (eds), Current Developments in 
international and Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1994)), 
particularly for closely-held corporations where the directors are also the majority 
shareholders or owners of the company (R Mokal, ‘An Agency Cost Analysis of the Wrongful 
Trading Provisions: Redistribution, Perverse Incentives and the Creditors’ Bargain’ (2000) 
59(2) Camb. L.J. 333). See also: Adler (n 18); BE Adler, ‘A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy 
Investment Incentives’ (1995) 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 575; R de Barondes, ‘Fiduciary Duties of Officers 
and Directors of Distressed Corporations’ (1998) 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 45, 101 (arguing 
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the value of stockholders’ investment falls to zero and creditors will 
consequently bear most of the potential losses.86  
This “property conception of the corporation”87 has been supported by the 
“Chicago School” of law and economics.88 The assets of the corporation are the 
property only of its residual claimants: no legal obligation should be recognised 
under the law of contract towards any other stakeholder. This view conforms 
closely with the attitude of many proceduralist theorists. 
Principle-based theorists, however, recognise that insolvency law serves more 
than one interest, as distinct stakeholders can claim controlling rights and 
independent expectations.89 By arguing that corporations must serve a larger 
social purpose beyond maximising the return for shareholders, they recognise 
that both corporate and insolvency laws should voice the concerns (and rights) 
of other stakeholders. They fail, however, to provide a normative justification 
for the recognition of these rights.  
The next sub-sections will try to determine if the perception of principle-based 
theorists is true, what interests should be considered by this branch of the law 
and whether existing insolvency statutes protect these interests both in theory 
and in practice. The focus will be on legal rights recognised to contracting 
parties that are enforceable in insolvency procedures.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
however that distressed corporations are not characterised by a frenzy of excessive risk-taking, 
especially when their actions are restricted by financial covenants). The gambler mentality and 
the pursuance of high-risk/high-reward strategies can be observed in any company where 
equity-holders are shielded by limited liability.  
86 WW Bratton, Jr., ‘Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring’ 
(1989) Duke L.J. 92, 165 (stating that highly leveraged corporations are likely to result in 
stockholder opportunistic conduct); V Brudney, ‘Corporate Bondholders and Debtor 
Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good’ (1992) 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1821; KA Alces, ‘Strategic 
Governance’ (2008) 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 1053. Against: Paterson (n 67), maintaining that as modern 
corporations tend to be acquired by private equity firms that can create non-traditional 
directorial incentives and accountabilities, directors may not entertain in unreasonable risks in 
the twilight period. The argument is persuasive primarily for large, public corporations and in 
any case in times when there is a market for distressed equity.  
87 WT Allen, ‘Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation’ (1992) 14 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 261. 
88 Easterbrook and Fischel (n 77), who argued that shareholders have the moral and legal 
standing to be treated as owners.  
89 This position is backed by other studies of corporate lawyers, scholars and economists: PF 
Drucker, ‘Reckoning with the Pension Fund Revolution’ (1991) 69 Harv. Bus. Rev. 106 (arguing 
that corporations exist to create wealth for the society).  
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4.3(a) Personal, Proprietary and Risk bearer Interests 
In the insolvency context, it is imperative to distinguish between personal and 
proprietary interests. This is not the place for an extensive analysis of this topic. 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that only a clear perception of the fundamental 
principles of ownership and control over the insolvent company and its assets 
can provide reliable guidance when conflicts of interests arise. 
A claimant has a personal interest when he or she can claim that right or 
interest only against the other party (or parties) to the contract.90 A claimant 
who has a personal right cannot enforce it in the defendant’s insolvency and 
cannot rely on the remedy of specific performance, even if there have been 
cases where courts have enforced these rights in insolvency. 
Personal rights have been enforced in insolvency in many instances, including 
in Re Newdigate Colliery,91 where the court refused to allow the receiver to 
disregard the existing contracts for the sale of goods. Even if this decision 
prevented the receiver from selling the coal at a higher price, the court justified 
its ruling with the need to take into consideration ‘the interests of everybody 
concerned, and not to advance the interests of one of the persons concerned at the 
expense of the other’.92 
A claimant has a proprietary interest when the right or interest in relation to 
an asset is available against persons generally93 even if – depending on the 
nature of the proprietary right – there might be third parties against whom 
enforceability is precluded.  
Proprietary rights can be over land, goods or intangibles, outright or by way of 
security. They can also be obtained by agreement (e.g. retention of title clauses), 
by operation of the law or through the operation of equity,94 which means that 
                                                                    
90 R Calnan, Proprietary Rights and Insolvency (2nd edn, OUP: Oxford, 2016) 44. 
91 Re Newdigate Colliery [1912] 1 Ch 468. 
92 Ibid 478. 
93 Calnan (n 90) 44. 
94 F Oditah, ‘The Treatment of Claims in Insolvency’ (1992) 108 L.Q.R. 459, 468 ss. A creditor 
may also have a proprietary right in equity:  Re Diplock [1948] Ch. 465 (CA); Westdeutsche 
Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington Borough Council [1996] AC 669 (HL) 714. Generally, on 
proprietary interests: S Worthington, Proprietary Interests in Commercial Transactions 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1996). 
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the origin of some of them may be non-consensual. However, courts are 
reluctant to impose proprietary interests where it is “equitable” to do so, 
particularly in insolvency.95 
The distinction between personal and proprietary rights would be largely 
academic if it was not for insolvency.96 Upon insolvency, only the assets owned 
by the company are available for distribution, sale or alternative use in a rescue 
procedure. 
The owner of a proprietary interest is not affected by the principle of pari passu 
distribution,97 as established by cases that date back at least three hundred 
years.98 This is because proprietary claimants are awarded a constructive trust 
over a particular asset which, in the event of the constructive trustee’s 
insolvency, is not available for distribution among creditors.99  
This claimant could rely on the remedy of specific performance, even if 
exceptions have been introduced by the law to prevent a race to the assets 
when the debtor filed for a formal insolvency procedure.100 In other words, 
proprietary interests enable the owner to take the protected assets outside the 
scope of insolvency proceedings.101 Nevertheless, when a claimant is entitled to 
                                                                    
95 R Calnan, ‘Imposing Proprietary Rights’ (2004) 12 RLR 1, 6. See the decisions in Re Polly Peck 
Int’l Plc (in admin.) (No. 5) [1998] 3 All Er 812 (CA) - which reversed a trend emerged in early 
decisions such as Eg Binions v Evans [1972] Ch 359 (CA); and Hussey v Palmer [1972] 1 WLR 
1286 (CA) – and Re Permacell Finesse Ltd (in liq.) [2007] EWHC 3233 (Ch), [2008] BCC 208. 
96 RM Goode, Proprietary Rights and Insolvency in Sales Transactions (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell: 
London, 1989) 2. 
97 FH Lawson, Remedies of English Law (2nd edn, Butterworths: London, 1980) 149; Calnan (n 
90) 19. Exceptions apply, for instance if the insolvent company acquired goods through fraud, 
misrepresentation or other vitiating factors: Re Eastgate [1905] 1 KB 465; Tilley v Bowman Ltd 
[1910] 1 KB 745. For a list of other exceptions, see: Goode (n 96) 13. 
98 Burdett v Willett (1708) 2 Vern 638; Ex parte Dumas (1754) 1 Atk 232, 233-4. 
99 S.283(3)(a) and (5) IA 1986.  
100 The automatic stay in the U.S. and the moratorium in England suspend (but do not 
extinguish) the right of the holder of a proprietary interest to become the owner of the secured 
asset and sell it in satisfaction of his or her claim. Equally, both systems include transaction 
avoidance rules that may void the existence of property and proprietary rights. Finally, in 
England, if the proprietary interest concerned is presented by a floating charge, unsecured 
creditors may be entitled to a portion of the proceeds arising from the sale of the secured assets 
(s.176A of IA 1986 as introduced by the Insolvency Act 1986 (Prescribed Part) Order 2003). 
Floating charges can also, under certain circumstances, be voided: s.245 IA 1986. 
101 Calnan (n 90) 39. 
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a proprietary, rather than a merely personal right, it presents one of the 
‘perennial problems of the law of restitution’.102 
A proprietary interest can be secured. A security interest is a legal right granted 
by a debtor to a creditor over the debtor's property (usually referred to as the 
collateral) which enables the creditor to have recourse to the property if the 
debtor defaults in making payment or otherwise performing the secured 
obligations.  
The distinction between personal and proprietary rights does not lie in their 
nature (possession, property, alienation, etc.) but in the enforceability of the 
right against parties that have not entered into the original contract.103  
Besides that, claimants may have interests and expectations that can hardly be 
qualified as either personal or proprietary. Take for instance the case of a 
community where a polluting company continued to operate for several years. 
If the responsibility of the company had been ascertained in a court, the public 
authority (state or local community) may have personal or proprietary rights 
against the polluter.104 The local community, i.e. those who live in proximity of 
the company, may not have such rights. Additionally, the expectations of this 
community may be conflicting: while all of its members may expect that the 
                                                                    
102 Calnan (n 95) 1. 
103 Calnan (n 90) 44. The distinction may prove challenging in certain cases, such as leases of 
goods, licenses of land and charter-parties of ships, as explained in pages 49-55 of that volume. 
104 The treatment of environmental liabilities in insolvency has been the subject of few but 
comprehensive studies. For the U.K.: J Armour, ‘Who Pays When Polluters Go Bust?’ (2000) 11 
L.Q.R. 200; A Keay and P de Prez, ‘Insolvency and Environmental Principles: A Case Study in a 
Conflict of Public Interests’ (2001) 3(2) Env. L. Rev. 90; A Keay and P de Prez, ‘Should Insolvent 
Companies Pay? The Search for Environmental Principle’ (2001) 9(1) Env. Liability 11; B 
Mamutse and V Fogleman, ‘Improving the Treatment of Environmental Claims in Insolvency’ 
(2013) 5 J.B.L. 486; B Mamutse, ‘Environmental Liabilities in Insolvency: An Area Ripe for 
Reform?’ (2016) 8(3) International Journal of Law in the Built Environment 243; IL Fannon, 
‘Managing Waste: The Gap Between the EU Directives and Corporate Law in Member States – A 
Mess of Case Law Needing Clean-up’ (2016) 24(6) Env. Liability 203. The established authority 
in the country is Re Celtic Extraction Ltd (in liq.) [2001] Ch. 475 (CA) where the Court of Appeal 
held that liquidators can disclaim environmental liabilities by considering them “onerous 
property” pursuant to s.178 IA 1986. This power is not available in administration, but 
companies can couple this procedure with liquidation and disclaim the environmental liabilities 
in the latter (UK Coal Operations Ltd, 2013).  
For the U.S.: D Baker, ‘Bankruptcy – The Last Environmental Loophole?’ (1993) 34 S. Tex. L. Rev. 
379; A Lawton and L Oswald, ‘Scary Stories and the Limited Liability Polluter in Chapter 11’ 
(2008) 65(2) Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 451; K Bergmann, ‘Bankruptcy, Limited Liability and CERCLA: 
Closing the Loophole and Parting the Veil’ University of Maryland, Public Law and Legal Theory 
Accepted and Working Research Paper Series No. 2004-02 (2004). 
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company stops polluting and cleans the polluted land, some of its members may 
hope for the closure of the polluting facility while others – generally those 
whose livelihood depends on it – may wish for less draconian outcomes. With 
the sole exception of tort claims for pollution-related illnesses, absent any 
change in the regulations, the members of this community do not have any 
rights against the company, at least not as a collective body.  
This is not the only case where the law fails to give proper, discrete 
consideration and remedies to the rights of certain parties. Another example is 
represented by the position of employees. These claimants have a legal right to 
be paid their wages for the duration of the formal insolvency procedure and – to 
a more limited extent – for the period that leads to the filing. Similar protection 
is granted to their pension benefits. However, as it will be explained in sub-
section 4.3(c), the company-specific nature of their investment is rarely 
appreciated by the law. 
Finally, as evidenced in Re Newdigate Colliery,105 this thesis argues that the 
insolvency system should not feature mechanisms that have the effect of 
advancing the interests of one person at the expense of the other without the 
existence of overarching justifications for doing so. 
These considerations lead the author to suggest that for the purpose of 
determining whether the company should file for insolvency and the proper 
course of action once the procedure has opened, the law should introduce the 
new concept of risk bearer interests.  
Risk bearer interests should be understood as rights enforceable against any 
persons generally (similarly to proprietary interests) that would not, however, 
give the owner - i.e. any of the subjects listed in sub-section 4.3(c) - the power 
to take assets outside the scope of insolvency proceedings (similarly to personal 
interests). Like personal rights, risk bearer entitlements would not need 
registration, should be proven in insolvency and confer on the owner the right 
to a dividend and to affect the course of actions taken in insolvency.  
                                                                    
105 Newdigate (n 91). 
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Risk bearer interests should not be understood as rights that are created in 
insolvency. In insolvency procedures, these rights should become apparent and 
be expressly mentioned to justify the decisions taken as part of the procedure. 
Under the ordinary course of business, it is assumed that directors should 
equally consider these interests in determining the company’s policy. However, 
risk bearer right holders would not have autonomous legal remedies outside 
insolvency, as this would expand the duties of directors and might increase the 
risk of conflict among the company’s constituencies. 
In other words, the position of a holder of risk bearer rights would be similar to 
the position of a floating charge holder before crystallization or that of a 
beneficiary under a trust. In the case of a floating charge holder, it is only when 
crystallization occurs that the beneficiary has an immediate, specific and 
proprietary interest in the company’s individual assets.106 In the case of a 
beneficiary under a trust, the beneficiary’s interests over particular assets 
fasten only when the trustee’s management powers come to an end.107 Equally, 
the holders of risk bearer interests can exercise the rights connected to their 
position only after the opening of a formal or hybrid insolvency procedure. 
Additionally, their claims would not affect the position of bona fide purchasers 
because risk bearer claimants acquire only an equitable, not a proprietary 
interest over the debtor’s assets. 
As risk bearer interests would not be rights over assets, they would give to their 
owners - the risk bearers defined in sub-section 4.3(c) - the right to influence 
the timing of the filing and the outcome of the procedure in a way that best 
promotes their collective position. Risk bearer interests do not give the 
beneficiaries the power to unduly affect the rights recognised to other 
claimants, especially secured ones.  
                                                                    
106 L Gullifer and J Payne, ‘The Characterisation of Fixed and Floating Charges’ in J Getzler and J 
Payne (eds), Company Charges Spectrum and Beyond (OUP: Oxford, 2006) 55; R Parry and 
others, Transaction Avoidance in Insolvencies (3rd edn, OUP: Oxford, 2018) 49. For arguments 
that a floating charge gives rights akin to a fixed-charge holder: Worthington (n 94) ch. 4; R 
Nolan, ‘Property in a Fund’ (2004) 120 L.Q.R. 108. Because this interest is acquired only upon 
crystallization, any proprietary right arising before that event takes priority over the claim of 
the floating charge holder: Re Goldcorp [1995] 1 AC 74; G McCormack, Proprietary Claims and 
Insolvency (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 1996) 44. 
107 E McKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law (5th edn, Penguin: London, 2016) [25.06]. 
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Where insolvency filings result in a quick maximisation of the debtor’s assets, 
risk bearer interests would not affect the rights of proprietary claimants unless 
securities have been fraudulently obtained or the filings strategically designed 
to promote the interests of certain creditors at the expense of others. However, 
even in cases where insolvency procedures are designed to re-allocate capital to 
those best able to use it, the relative value of the secured creditor’s pre-
insolvency entitlement would not be affected. In these cases, enforceability of 
proprietary rights might be postponed and secured creditors might be forced to 
accept alternative collaterals or debt-for-equity swaps.  
The risk bearer concept would sit alongside personal and proprietary interests 
and would neither modify the substantive nature of proprietary and personal 
rights nor the order of priorities. Secured creditors could still expect to grab the 
secured assets and sell them for the satisfaction of their claim but, if the timing 
of the sale would conflict with the risk bearer interests of other claimants and 
these interests prevailed (in number and/or magnitude) over those of the 
secured creditor, the sale could be postponed. In jurisdictions where the 
procedure is run by independent parties such as insolvency practitioners, this 
decision to postpone the sale may not even need the preliminary approval of 
the court.  
In cases where proprietary and risk bearer interests conflicted, there would be 
a need to carry out a balance of equities exercise to assess the positions of the 
owners of these rights. To assess the position of each claimant and – as a 
consequence – the primacy of certain rights over others, this thesis suggests 
that office-holders should rely on the concept of rent introduced in sub-section 
3(c) of this chapter, ftn 219. The outcome of this decision, which could be 
validated by the panel described in sub-section 6.4(d), should not be second-
guessed by the judiciary except in cases of fraud or unconscionable decisions. 
This new categorisation might not dispel uncertainties. Nevertheless, it should 
overcome one of the most contentious issues of judicial practice in common law 
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systems, i.e. the recognition of proprietary remedies to personal claimants in 
accordance to the maxim that ‘equity deems as done what ought to be done’.108 
It is also suggested that courts should make use of a more principled approach 
than current practice to facilitate the identification of the prerogatives of the 
interest bearers. In fact, deontologically, it is possible to justify the existence of 
legally enforceable rights on moral or teleological grounds.109 In England in 
particular, the protection of rights (including, in the future, risk bearer claims) 
against mis-appropriators is justifiable less in term of moral desert and more in 
utilitarian terms.110 In other words, the claimant’s (i.e. creditor) right is 
protected to the extent that he or she can prove that the actions of the 
respondent (i.e. debtor) have undermined the owner’s patrimony. This 
represents a significant evidentiary challenge for risk bearer claimants and this 
approach should be reconsidered if the legislator agrees on the recognition of 
risk bearer interests in insolvency. 
Why should a new category of rights be introduced to the law? Whenever a 
personal concern meets a certain threshold, the legislator and the judiciary 
have always been willing to sanction its breach by means of the introduction of 
legal or equitable remedies. As sub-section 4.3(c) will demonstrate, there are 
normative reasons to argue that certain stakeholders deserve additional 
protection.  
It is first pertinent, however, to investigate if risk bearer rights are indirectly 
recognised by the law and the judiciary in near-insolvency scenarios or 
insolvency cases. This analysis will be carried out in the following sub-section.  
                                                                    
108 D Wright, ‘Proprietary Remedies and the Role of Insolvency’ (2000) 23 UNSW L.J. 143. To 
address this topic, in May 2010 the American Law Institute (‘ALI’) approved the Restatement of 
the Law (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment. For a comment and its implication for 
other common law countries, see: A Duggan, ‘Proprietary Remedies in Insolvency: A 
Comparison of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment with English and 
Commonwealth Law’ (2011) 68 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1229. Against the recognition of 
proprietary rights as a response to unjust enrichment, see: W Swadling, ‘Policy Arguments for 
Proprietary Restitution’ (2008) 28(4) Leg. Stud. 506. 
109 Rawls (n 38) 24-30; C Fried, Right and Wrong (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 
1978) 9. 
110 C Rotherham, Proprietary Remedies in Context: A Study in the Judicial Redistribution of 
Property Rights (Hart Publishing: London, 2002) 73. 
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4.3(b) What Interests Are Relevant in Corporate and Insolvency Practice? 
To determine if risk bearer rights are somehow and to what extent considered 
by those who run the companies, this sub-section investigates the duties of 
directors and office-holders under general corporate and insolvency law (and 
practice).  
On the one hand, if principle-based theories are reflected in the law (and 
practice), it is expected that consideration is given to the interest of a large 
number of stakeholders. On the other hand, if proceduralist approaches have a 
prevailing informative effect over the current legislation (and practice), a 
substantial similarity in the interests protected by company and insolvency law 
should emerge, with the shareholders’ and creditors’ interests being 
preponderant.  
4.3(b)(i) Directors’ Duties in Solvent Times 
To understand the duty of directors under English law, it is appropriate to start 
the analysis from the Companies Act 2006 (‘CA 2006’). However, the provisions 
included in this Act do not represent by any means an exhaustive list of 
directors’ duties.111  
General statutory duties are listed primarily in ss.171 to 181 CA 2006. This law 
amended the previous status quo by introducing new provisions based on the 
equitable principles relating to fiduciary duties and the common law of 
negligence.112 The purpose of this act has not only been to clarify the duties, but 
also to make the law more accessible and predictable.113  
                                                                    
111 Some scholars have also questioned the structure and content of the duties in CA 2006 
arguing that directors – and particularly those of SMEs – are ‘given an incomplete picture of the 
law, particularly in relation to remedies’: P Hood, ‘Directors’ Duties Under the Companies Act 
2006: Clarity or Confusion?’ (2013) 13(1) J. Corp. L. Stud. 1, 47. A more comprehensive 
catalogue of directors’ duties emerges after having considered other sources such as the IA 
1986, the Corporate Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (‘CDDA 1986’), the Enterprise Act 2002 
(‘EA 2002’) and the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (‘SBEEA 2015’). For a 
comprehensive analysis of the rights and duties of English directors under the general and 
corporate insolvency law, see: M Bruce, Rights and Duties of Directors 2016 (Bloomsbury 
Professional: London, 2016). 
112 The equitable nature of these duties is further proven by the fact that the remedies for 
breach of any of them are the same as would apply if the corresponding equitable principle or 
common law rule applied. These include rescission (but not voidance) of the transaction, return 
of property, equitable compensation and confiscation of the profits, even if the company has 
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Key duties include the obligation to act within powers (s.171),114 to exercise 
independent judgment (s.173), to exercise reasonable care, diligence and skill 
(s.174) and to exercise independent judgment (ss.175-177).115 A fundamental 
principle of common law reinstated in s.170(1) CA 2006 is that directors’ duties 
are owed to the company as a whole, not to individual members.116  
For the purpose of this work, a key provision is s.172(1) CA 2006, which 
introduces the duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company. This has 
often been described as a core duty for English directors.117 According to this 
norm: 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
suffered no loss from the directors’ breach of duty as the equitable remedies are designed to 
deter behaviour, rather than to compensate for damage.  
To obtain a remedy, it is not necessary to prove that a director acted dishonestly or in bad faith, 
but the court may relieve the director of liability if he/she acted honestly and reasonably 
pursuant to s.1157 CA 2006 – see Coleman Taymar Ltd v Oakes [2001] 2 BCLC 749 (Ch). 
113 As suggested by the Company Law Review Steering Group in their final report on company 
law in the UK: CLR Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final 
Report (2 vol., Department of Trade and Industry 2001). Many of the provisions of the Act 
implement CLR recommendations, according to the White Papers ‘Modernising Company Law’ 
(Cm 5553, July 2002) and ‘Company Law Reform’ (Cm 6456, March 2005). For a brief summary 
of the history and the debate behind the adoption of the CA 2006: A Keay, ‘Directors’ Duties and 
Creditors’ Interests’ (2014) L.Q.R. 443, 445-447. For an analysis of the principles that guided the 
reform, in particular the enlightened shareholder value (‘ESV’) principle: A Keay, The 
Enlightened Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate Governance (Routledge: London, 2012). 
114 Known as “proper purpose rule”, it is well established since Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol 
Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821 (PC). 
115 As stated before, many duties are imposed elsewhere in the legislation and are not covered 
in this thesis due to their specialist nature.  
116 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421 (Ch) and Peskin v Anderson [2000] BCC 1110 (Ch), 1111 
where Neuberger J (as he then was) held that ‘[t]o hold that directors have a general fiduciary 
duty to shareholders would place an unfair, unrealistic and uncertain burden on directors and 
would present them frequently with conflicting duties between the company and the shareholders’. 
Particular fiduciary duties to shareholders are dependent on establishing and proving the 
existence of a “special factual relationship” between the directors and the shareholders. For a 
case comment, see D Arsalidou, ‘Directors’ Fiduciary Duties to Shareholders: the Platt and 
Peskin Cases’ (2002) 23(2) Comp. Law. 61. 
More recently, in Sharp v Blank [2015] EWHC 3219 (Ch), [2016] 1 P. & C.R. DG16 the court 
reinstated this conclusion by holding that directors have a duty to provide information but do 
not not owe wider fiduciary duties because no special relationship exist between the directors 
and the company’s creditors and because the directors have not undertaken to act for the 
shareholders in any more extended sense. 
117 A Keay, Directors’ Duties (Jordan Publishing: Bristol 2009) [6.10]; J Lowry, ‘The Duty of 
Loyalty Under Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006: Bridging the Accountability Gap Through 
Efficient Disclosure’ (2009) 68 Camb. L.J. 607; RT Langford, ‘The Duty of Directors to Act Bona 
Fide in the Interests of the Company: A Positive Fiduciary Duty? Australia and the UK Compared’ 
(2011) 11(1) J. Corp. L. Stud. 215, 220. See also: Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi [2004] EWCA 
Civ. 1244 [41], [2005] 2 BCLC 91; British Midland Tool Ltd v Midland International Tooling Ltd 
[2003] EWHC 466 (Ch) [81], [2003] 2 BCLC 523.  
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[a] director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good 
faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for 
the benefit of its members as a whole (emphasis added). 
This section is based on the equitable fiduciary118 duty formulated - in 
combination with the duty to act within powers - by Lord Greene MR in Smith 
and Fawcett.119 The pivotal elements are substantially two: (1) the need to act 
in good faith; and (2) the promotion of the success of the company as a 
whole.120  
The legislator has focused its attention particularly on the second of these 
elements and provided an illustrative list of interests that directors should keep 
in mind to promote the long-term success of the whole company.121 These 
include the interests of the creditors,122 employees,123 shareholders,124 
HMRC,125 suppliers,126 customers and others, the community and the 
                                                                    
118 The fiduciary nature of the duty is confirmed in several judgments. See, among others: 
Regentcrest Plc (in liq.) v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80; Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v Scattergood 
[2002] EWHC 3093 (Ch), [2003] 1 BCLC 266; Re Southern Counties Fresh Foods Ltd [2008] 
EWHC 2810 (Ch), [2008] WL 4923175; Apex Global Management Ltd v FI Call Ltd [2015] EWHC 
3269 (Ch), 2015 WL 6757849 [45] – [47]. 
119 Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 (CA). 
120 The content of this duty had been encapsulated in several decisions and commentaries. See, 
among others: Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd [1925] Ch. 407 (CA); Dorchester Finance 
Co. Ltd v Stebbing [1989] BCLC 498 (Ch); V Finch, ‘Company Directors: Who Cares about Skill 
and Care?’ (1992) 55 M.L.R. 179. 
121 The specific reference to the long-term success of the company and the lack of any reference 
to the short-term perspective mark significant attempts to go beyond traditional short-termism 
views. The Parliament has been supportive of this trend by amending the government’s 
proposal – published in the White Paper ‘Company Law Reform’ (Cm 6456, 2005) – to require 
directors to consider ‘the likely consequences (short and long term) of the actions open to the 
director’. 
122 Among others: Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd [1982] AC 173 (HL); Ball v Hughes [2017] 
EWHC 3228 (Ch), [2018] 1 BCLC 58; Re Bowe Watts Clargo Ltd (in liq.) [2017] EWHC 7879 (Ch), 
[2017] WL 06326756. As it will be evidenced in the following section, the interests of the 
creditors significantly intrude in the scenario and limit the directors’ autonomy whenever the 
company approaches a distressed situation.  
123 Among others: Hutton v West Cork Railway Co. [1883] 23 Ch D 654 (CA). 
124 Among others: Allen v Hyatt [1914] 30 TLR 444; Re OS3 Distribution Ltd [2017] EWHC 2621 
(Ch), [2017] WL 04818747. 
125 Raithatha v Baig [2017] EWHC 2059 (Ch), [2017] WL 04526672, where the court held that 
the company's directors had breached their duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in failing 
to register the company for VAT and consequently to collect in VAT. 
126 Re William C Leitch Bros Ltd (No. 1) [1932] 2 Ch 71 (Ch), where the court punished the 
behaviour of the company’s directors for inducing a supplier to deliver goods while they were 
aware that the company had no or little prospect to pay for the supply. Furthermore, in R v 
Grantham (Paul Reginald) [1984] QB 675 (CA) the Court of Appeal found that an intent to 
defraud is established on proof of an intention dishonestly to prejudice the creditors in 
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environment, and even the reputation for high standards of business conduct. 
In LRH Services127 the court held that  
… the reference to the benefit of "the members as a whole" is not to cast 
the interests of members in contradistinction to those of the corporate 
entity, but to make clear that the directors must aim to provide, 
through the success of the company, benefits to all the members rather 
than any one group or class of them. This might require a balance to be 
struck if, for instance, different class rights mean that some policy 
choice might have a differential benefit as between classes.128 
Finally, s.172(3) CA 2006 clarifies that the pursuance of these interests is 
subject to any enactment or rule of law which requires the director to consider 
or act in the interests of the creditors of the company. 
It seems, therefore that directors have to take into consideration a wide array of 
interests whenever they act on behalf of the company, as this duty operates 
prescriptively and requires active performance.129 This conclusion is seemingly 
further supported by the British government proposals for reform in the area. 
The Business, Energy and Industrial Strategic Committee recently launched an 
inquiry into “corporate governance”. Following the publication of the “Third 
Report of Session 2016-17”,130 the government commented on some of the 
proposals.131 With reference to the duties listed in s.172 CA 2006, the 
government recommended the implementation of an approach designed to 
strengthen the voice of employees, customers and wider stakeholders in the 
companies’ life.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
receiving payment of their debts. Obtaining goods on credit can therefore give rise to a claim for 
fraudulent trading.  
127 LRH Services Ltd (in liq.) v Trew [2018] EWHC 6000 (Ch), [2018] WL 01412414. 
128 Ibid [29].  
129 Langford (n 117) 221. 
130 Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, ‘Corporate Governance: Third Report of 
Session 2016-17’ (HC 702, 5 April 2017) 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmbeis/702/702.pdf> accessed 
17 September 2018. 
131 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Corporate Governance Reform. 
The Government response to the green paper consultation’ (29 August 2017) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/640631/c
orporate-governance-reform-government-response.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018. 
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More recently, the government issued a consultation which aimed, inter alia, at 
exploring how directors make use of the expertise of professional advisers to 
promote the success of the company.132 The government was concerned that 
some directors may not be fully aware of their duties with regards to 
commissioning and using professional advice. 
Respondents to that consultation argued that while directors have a good 
awareness of their duties, they may benefit from more training. They also 
observed that the market for independent board evaluations should be 
reviewed to ensure minimum standards.133 Some also argued for stronger 
enforcement of directors’ duties. 
The latter observation is important because it shows the existence in the 
market of a significant number of players that would be willing to force 
directors to consider the rights, interests and expectations of a wider variety of 
claimants.  
The government seems supportive of this trend, as it recently laid down 
regulations to require all large companies in their annual reports to show how 
they have regard to the interests of employees, the consequences of their 
decisions in the long term and how they plan to improve business relationships 
with customers and suppliers.134 As these requirements will take effect from 
January 2019, the government will assess the impact of this reform before 
considering further actions.  
The position of the law and the government is therefore substantially 
supportive of extending not simply the range of interests that directors must 
consider when acting on behalf of the company, but also the availability of 
remedies should these duties be breached. However, the courts’ reluctance to 
second-guess the commercial decisions135 taken by company directors – unless 
                                                                    
132 Insolvency Service, Insolvency and Corporate Governance (London, 20 March 2018) 30-31 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_d
ata/file/691857/Condoc_-_Insolvency_and_Corporate_Governance_FINAL_.pdf> accessed 17 
September 2018. 
133 Ibid 24-25. 
134 Ibid 26. 
135 This is especially true in case of pre-packs: V Finch, ‘Pre-packaged Administration and the 
Construction of Propriety’ (2011) 11(1) J. Corp. L. Stud. 1, 18. 
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when marred by fraud – may have detrimentally affected the wide protection 
recognised under general law. 
Despite directors’ duties qualification as “fiduciary”,136 courts have rarely 
sanctioned the detrimental use of directors’ powers and prerogatives,137 in part 
due to the lack of cases on the subject and the derivative nature of the action 
against the directors.138  
Their interpretation would not in itself represent a major obstacle to the 
implementation of the legislative view on the matter, if only the notion of “the 
beneficiaries” of the statutory protection was wide and flexible enough to 
effectively safeguard those who have risk bearer interests in the company. 
Unfortunately, this long-established aversion to question managerial decisions 
has resulted in a diminished protection of the interests of all parties except for 
shareholders.  
In fact, in Style139 the Chancery Division of the High Court denied a request from 
a minority shareholder to continue a derivative claim on behalf of the company 
against four of its directors. In rejecting this request, it is submitted that the 
court did not focus on verifying if the interests of the protected parties had been 
properly considered. If that were the case, the request should have been 
approved, as the court recognised that it was not sufficiently clear for the 
purposes of s.263(2)(a) CA 2006 that no director acting in accordance with 
s.172 would seek to continue the claim and that its quantum might not be 
                                                                    
136 Common law requires directors to act in good faith in what they consider the best interest of 
the company - Smith and Fawcett (n 119) - and to use the powers conferred on them for a 
proper purpose. Alongside with this fiduciary obligation, directors are required to exercise 
whatever skill they possess and reasonable care (Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates 
Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 425 (Ch); City Equitable  (n 120). 
137 Smith and Fawcett (n 119) 306: directors must act ‘bona fide in what they consider – not what 
a court may consider – is in the interest of the company’. See also: Howard v Ampol  (n 114) 832: 
‘There is no appeal on merits from management decisions to courts of law: nor will courts of law 
assume to act as a kind of supervisory board over decisions within the powers of management 
honestly arrived at’. 
138 If duties are breached, the actions can be promoted by the board acting on behalf of the 
company (if the action is against only one of the directors) or by the shareholders (but still on 
behalf of the company). Keay observed that the introduction of public enforcement of directors’ 
duties is ‘meritorious’ as it would promote the impression that the legal system ‘takes breaches 
of company law duties and the rights of shareholders seriously’: A Keay, ‘The Public Enforcement 
of Directors’ Duties: A Normative Inquiry’ (2014) 43 C.L.W.R. 89, 118. 
139 Brannigan v Style [2016] EWHC 512 (Ch), [2016] WL 00386245. 
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insubstantial. The court’s rejection was based on different considerations, 
namely the slim chances of success and the potential costs.140  
The ruling in Style was not an isolated one but the confirmation of an 
established trend in English case law. Courts have been reluctant to trump 
shareholders’ interests in favour of creditors’ claims, especially when it has not 
been proven that the company was hopelessly insolvent. As a result, in 
Sequana141 the court held that even where a company had an estimated 
provision in respect of a long-term liability on its balance sheet, there was no 
justification for holding that the duty to protect creditors' interests under s.172 
CA 2006 applied for the whole period during which there was a risk that there 
might be insufficient assets to meet that liability. In the court’s view, if that were 
the case, the directors would have to take account of creditors' rather than 
shareholders' interests when running a business over an extended period of 
time. 
Such a conclusion is however problematic. In the author’s view, despite that the 
facts of the case might not have justified a different solution, the court did not 
pay sufficient consideration to the objective of the law, which requires the 
directors to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
as a whole.  
The same light-touch approach emerged from the decision in Hedger v 
Adams.142 In that case, the court held that a director was not in breach of his 
duties under CA 2006 when he transferred the assets of a company shortly 
before liquidation to another company that he controlled. The transfer was 
made for a deferred consideration and the second company later became 
insolvent. The court found that the directors acted while considering the 
creditors’ (but not the stakeholders’) interests.143 Yet, the court did not find any 
                                                                    
140 Asplin J at [91] observes that ‘[i]n reality, it seems to me that such a director would conclude 
that pursuing the claim to a successful outcome would be extremely difficult and might not be cost 
effective and that the PEL would be in extreme difficulty in funding those proceedings’. 
141 BTI 2014 Llc v Sequana SA [2016] EWHC 1686 (Ch); [2017] Bus. L.R. 82. 
142 Hedger v Adams [2015] EWHC 2540 (Ch), [2016] BCC 390. 
143 Ibid [38], Re HLC Environmental Projects Ltd [2013] EWHC 2876 (Ch), [2014] BCC 337 
followed. 
  211 
breach of duty because the director had acted honestly and reasonably, having 
sought advice on how to proceed. 
With reference to U.S. law, directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation 
and its shareholders.144 Fiduciary duties of directors ordinarily include the duty 
of care and the duty of loyalty.145 The “duty of care” refers to the responsibility 
of a corporate fiduciary to exercise, in the performance of his or her tasks, the 
care that a reasonably prudent person would use under similar 
circumstances.146 The “duty of loyalty” derives from the prohibition against self-
dealing that inheres in the fiduciary relationship and requires directors to act in 
the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.147 The standard to 
prove a director's breach of duty of care is “gross negligence”148 and in cases 
questioning the directors’ behaviour, courts have adopted a “reasonable man 
standard”.149  
                                                                    
144 Harff v Kerkonian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974), rev’d in part on other grounds, 347 A.2d 133 
(Del. 1975); Aronson v Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); Smith v Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 
875-73 (Del. 1985); Revlon Inc. v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986); 
Katz v Oak Industries Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986); Geyer v Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 
784 (Del. Ch. 1992); Re Amcast Indus. Corp., 365 B.R. 91 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007). See also the 
Model Business Corporation Act (2016 Revision) (9 Dec. 2017) § 8.30 according to which 
directors should carry out their duties in the interest of the corporation, i.e. ‘a frame of reference 
encompassing the shareholder body’ (at 182) 
<https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/business_law/corplaws/20
16_mbca.authcheckdam.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018. 
145 See also: United Stated v Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 141 (1972); Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986); Great Rivers Coop. v Farmland Indus, Inc., 198 F.3d 685, 
701 (8th Cir, 1999). Blair (n 84) 57. 
146 See also: Graham v Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); Gearhart Indus. Inc. 
v Smith Int’l Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 720 (5th Cir. 1984) (‘Unquestionably, under Texas law, a director 
as a fiduciary must exercise his unbiased or honest business judgment in pursuit of corporate 
interests’.); Re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
147 See, among others: Cede & Co. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); Re Verestar, 
Inc., 343 B.R. 444 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). This work does not attempt to provide a full 
explanation of these principles, since many other sources examine the complexities of directors’ 
duties in solvent times: MM Sheinfield and JH Pippit, ‘Fiduciary Duties of Directors of a 
Corporation in the Vicinity of Insolvency and After Initiation of a Bankruptcy Case’ (2004) 60(1) 
Bus. Law. 79; J Gadsden, ‘Enforcement of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of 
Insolvency’ (2005) 24(1) Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 16; RB Campbell, Jr. and CW Frost, ‘Managers’ 
Fiduciary Duties in Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos in Delaware (and Elsewhere)’ 
(2007) 32(3) J. Corp. L. 491, 495-500; DG Baird and MT Henderson, ‘Other People’s Money’ 
(2008) 60(5) Stan. L. Rev. 1309. 
148 Re BH S & B Holdings Llc, 420 B.R. 112 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff'd as modified, 807 F. Supp. 
2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
149 This standard basically assesses against the yardstick of the skill, diligence and care of a 
reasonably prudent person if the director acted in good faith and tried to reasonably pursue the 
best interest of the corporation: Blair (n 84) 57; AR Palmiter, ‘Reshaping the Corporate 
Fiduciary Model: A Director’s Duty of Independence’ (1989) 67 Tex. L. Rev. 1351. 
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Shareholders may rely on these fiduciary duties by promoting a derivative 
action against the directors and for the benefit of the corporation,150 with the 
result that recovery goes to the corporation.151  
When it comes to the analysis of the position of other stakeholders, the 
autonomy-based and economic liberalist views shared by some parts of the 
judiciary means that courts have always been reluctant to accept that directors 
have duties other than towards the corporation and its stockholders.152 
Creditors have no right to assert claims directly or derivatively against the 
directors for breach of fiduciary duties,153 not even in the zone of insolvency.154 
Their rights are defined by the terms of their contracts (voluntary claimants)155 
and by the applicable law (involuntary ones).156 The law only recognises the 
existence of an implied obligation of good faith157 alongside the established 
common law principle of fairness.158                                                                                                                                                                               
However, in the wave of corporate scandals that hit the country in the Eighties, 
many state legislators - beginning with Pennsylvania in 1983 - enacted 
provisions that forced directors to consider the interests and consequences of 
                                                                    
150 Gadsden (n 147). See also: Danielewicz v Arnold, 137 Md. App. 601, 769 A.2d 274 (2001). In 
that case, the director’s actions resulted in alleged breaches of fiduciary duties of loyalty, 
disclosure, and good faith and dilution of shareholder's majority interest in the corporation's 
stock. They also caused loss of control and general damages to the corporation. Nevertheless, an 
action for damages could be brought only in the name of the corporation itself acting through its 
directors, not by the shareholder in her individual capacity. 
151 See, among others: Re Reliance Acceptance Grp., Inc., 235 B.R. 548 (D. Del. 1999). 
152 For a comprehensive analysis of the American position on the subject of directors’ fiduciary 
duties to creditors: SL Schwarcz, ‘Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors’ (1996) 
17(3) Cardozo L. Rev. 647, 656 (stating that there is no appropriate basis, absent insolvency, to 
impose traditional fiduciary standards on what is essentially an arm’s-length commercial 
relationship). 
153 See, among others: Simons v Cogan, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988) arguing that convertible 
debenture holders lack standing top bring a claim based on a breach of fiduciary duties; Metro. 
Life Ins. Co. v RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Kham & Nate’s Shoes 
No.2, Inc. v First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990) according to which 
‘[p]arties to a contract are not each other fiduciaries; they are not bound to treat [each other] 
with the same consideration reserved for their families’; Lorenz v CSX Corp,, 1 F.3d 1406, 1417 (3d 
Cir, 1993); United States v Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir, 1996). 
154 Master-Halco, Inc. v Scillia, Dowling & Natarelli, Llc, 739 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D. Conn. 2010). 
155 Among others: Harff (n 144) 222 (Del. Ch. 1974); Katz (n 144) 879. 
156 Among others: Katz (n 144).  
157 U.C.C. §.1-203 (1994). 
158 Among others: Neuman v Pike, 591 F.2d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 1979); Katz (n 144); Kham & Nate’s 
Shoes (n 153). 
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their decisions on a wide variety of people, including employees, creditors, 
suppliers and communities in which the corporation had facilities.159 
This attitude was endorsed by the judiciary, even in states characterised by a 
strong pro-business mentality. For instance, in Delaware in Paramount160 the 
court approved the decision of the directors of Time to go ahead with a merger 
even if shareholders would have been better off with a sale to a takeover bidder 
willing to pay a significant premium over the stock market price.  
The decision in Paramount consolidated established case law. For instance, in 
Unocal161 the Supreme Court of Delaware held that  
[t]hough board of directors continued to owe due care and loyalty to a 
stockholder making a hostile tender offer for company's stock, in face 
of destructive threat which tender offer was perceived to pose, board 
had a supervening duty to protect the corporate enterprise, which 
included other shareholders, from threatened harm.162 
Nevertheless, in order to establish a breach of fiduciary duties by a corporate 
director, plaintiffs must consider the “business judgment rule”.163 This rule 
provides that, in making business decisions, the directors of a corporation 
presumptively act on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief 
that the action taken is in the best interests of the corporation. To overturn this 
presumption represents a near-Herculean task164 as courts will not interfere 
with directors’ decisions unless in case of fraud, bad faith, gross over-reaching 
or abuse of discretion.165  
                                                                    
159 As correctly observed by Mayson, French and Ryan, Company Law (34th edn OUP, Oxford 
2017) 486, provisions of this kind, usually known as “other constituencies statutes”, where 
designed and implemented to create a barrier or an obstacle to hostile takeover bids, but their 
relevance goes beyond these cases. 
160 Paramount Communications, Inc. v Time, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. Ch. 1990). 
161 Unolocal Corp. v Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
162 Ibid 948. 
163 Aronson v Lewis (n 144). 
164 BH S & B Holdings (n 148). For instance, in Re Midway Games Inc., 428 B.R. 303 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2010), on reconsideration in part (19 March 2010) the Bankruptcy Court of Delaware held that 
directors did not breach their duties of loyalty and good faith by sustained or systematic failure 
of oversight. 
165 Among others: Treadway Co. v Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); Resolution Trust 
Corp., 830 F. Supp. 356 (Tex. 1989). 
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To sum up, while the law – more in England than in the U.S. – embraces the 
interests of a range of players that goes beyond the holders of personal and 
proprietary rights against the company, the light touch approach of the 
judiciary has strengthened the rights of shareholders and “traditional” creditors 
at the expense of risk bearer claimants. 
4.3(b)(ii) Office-Holders’ Duties in Insolvent and Near-Insolvent Times 
Do office-holders’ duties shift in insolvency, or in the proximity or likelihood of 
this event?166 If so, to what extent? 
- 
In the English tradition,167 s.172(3) CA 2006 holds that the duty to promote 
the success of the company is subject to limits, particularly ‘any enactment or 
rule of law requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the 
interests of the creditors of the company’ (emphasis added).  
As insolvency is one of these circumstances, it seems that the law promotes a 
shift in favour of a certain category of stakeholders (namely, the contractual 
claimants) in the proximity of insolvency,168 thus impliedly rejecting the claims 
of principle-based theorists.169  
In formal insolvency cases, the general duties established in CA 2006 are 
complemented with specific provisions in IA 1986170 and CDDA 1986 that 
punish the behaviour of those directors and office-holders that have put 
                                                                    
166 Proximity, vicinity of insolvency or twilight zone are all terms used to describe the situation 
‘when the company is in financial distress and may well be moving from solvency towards and even 
into insolvency’ (A Keay, ‘The Shifting of Directors’ Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency’ (2015) 
24 Int. Insol. Rev. 140, 141). UNCITRAL has defined it as the period ‘in which there is a 
deterioration of the company’s financial stability to the extent that insolvency has become 
imminent’ (UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, ‘Part four: Directors’ Obligations in 
the Period Approaching Insolvency’ Working Group V, 43rd session (New York, 15-19 April 2013 
at para 22) <https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Leg-Guide-Insol-Part4-
ebook-E.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018).  
167 See generally: Finch and Milman (n 5) ch. 16 ‘Directors in Troubled Times’; IF Fletcher, The 
Law of Insolvency (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2017), ch. 27 ‘Liability of Directors and 
Others’.  
168 D Milman, ‘Strategies for Regulating Managerial Performance in the Twilight Zone’ (2004) J. 
Bus. Law 493; Finch and Milman (n 5) 584. 
169 The debate over the autonomous or derivative nature of this duty falls outside the scope of 
this work. On this issue, see: Finch and Milman (n 5) 585-587. 
170 The majority of these provisions are included in Chapter X (s.206 to 229 and s.238 to 246), 
while s.246ZA and S.246ZB extend the scope of these provisions from winding-up to 
administration procedures. 
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personal concerns or those of selected (groups 
of) creditors over those of general claimants. 
At any rate, directors do not owe a duty 
individually to each creditor but collectively to 
the company or the creditors as a whole.171 
In the majority of these provisions, the 
legislator focused on protecting the interests 
of a specific group of stakeholders, namely the 
contractual claimants. Accordingly, s.207(2) IA 
1986 states that a person is not guilty of the 
offence of fraud if he or she can prove that the 
transaction has not defrauded the company’s 
creditors. S.211 IA 1986 punishes with a fine 
or imprisonment (or both) those directors that 
have made false representations to creditors 
for the purpose of obtaining their consent to 
an agreement with reference to the company’s 
affairs or to the winding up. Similarly, the 
protection of creditors is paramount to the 
punishment of fraudulent (s.213 IA 1986) and 
wrongful (s.214 IA 1986) trading. Other rules (s.423 to 425 IA 1986) clarify that 
directors face criminal and civil liabilities whenever transactions are made at an 
undervalue and for the purpose of putting assets beyond the reach of creditors. 
It seems therefore that in writing these rules, the English legislature assumed 
that the interest of the distressed company matched those of its contractual 
creditors. No space was reserved in the law for the claims of other stakeholders, 
even if specific protections and obligations apply to some categories of 
suppliers (ss.233 and 233A IA 1986).  
                                                                    
171 Yukong Lines Ltd of Korea v Rendsburg Investment Corp. of Liberia (The Rialto) [1998] BCC 
870 (QB) 884 holding that the director ‘does not owe a fiduciary duty towards an individual 
creditor nor is an individual creditor entitled to sue for breach of the fiduciary duty owed by the 
director of the company’. 
THE KINSELA CASE 
In January 1981 RK was in a 
situation of financial difficulty. 
To preserve the family business, 
directors leased the company 
premises to Mr. and Mrs. Kinsela 
for three years. The lease was on 
particularly favourable terms 
and allowed the to purchase part 
of the premises for a sum that 
was below their real market 
value. 
Once the company entered into 
liquidation, the office-holders 
tried to challenge the validity of 
the agreement. The Court found 
in their favour, as it observed 
that the real intention of the 
directors was to put company’s 
assets beyond the reach of its 
creditors. 
More importantly, the court held 
that while in a solvent company 
the proprietary interests of the 
shareholders entitle them as a 
general body to be regarded as 
the company itself when 
questions of the duty of directors 
arise, in an insolvent company 
the interests of the creditors 
intrude. 
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The judiciary has adopted an approach that substantially mirrors the statutory 
position. More to the point, it can be argued that s.172(3) CA 2006 represents 
the statutory recognition of the established common law principle that 
directors in times of distress must consider the interests of the creditors when 
making decisions in the running of the company’s affairs.172  
In Nicholson173 the court found that the interests of the company were to be 
equated with the interests of the shareholders in general except where the 
company was insolvent or of doubtful solvency or where the proposed act 
would be prejudicial to creditors. Following the influential Australian precedent 
in Kinsela,174 in Brady the Court of Appeal held that ‘the interests of the company 
are in reality the interests of existing creditors alone’.175 In West Mercia 
Safetywear the Court of Appeal held that the directors breached the duties 
imposed by the law because at a time of corporate distress they disregarded the 
interests of the general creditors of the insolvent company.176 According to 
some commentators, it was only with West Mercia Safetywear that ‘the English 
courts approved overtly of the approach taken in Australia’.177 
This approach has not been consistently applied by English courts since the late 
Eighties.178 For instance, the House of Lord distinguished the Court of Appeal’s 
position in Brady, as Lord Oliver of Aylmerton observed that “the interest of the 
                                                                    
172 Keay (n 113) 444. 
173 Nicholson v Permakraft (N.Z.) Ltd [1985] 1 NZLR 242 (CA). 
174 Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd [1986] 4 ACLC 215; [1986] 10 ACLR 395. For an analysis of 
the case, see: H Opie, ‘Kinsela and Anor v Kinsela Pty Ltd (in liq.)’ (1986) 15 Melbourne Univ. L. 
Rev. 762. 
175 Brady v Brady (n 67). 
176 Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd [1988] 4 BCC 30 (CA) 33. For a comment on 
the case, see: LS Sealy, ‘Directors’ Duties: An Unnecessary Gloss’ (1988) 47(2) Camb. L.J. 175; V 
Finch, ‘Directors’ Duties Towards Creditors’ (1989) 10(1) Comp. Law. 23 (observing that the 
decision left unanswered the question of when the shifts of duties operate); D Marks, 
‘Preference and Misfeasance: Is West Mercia an Unhelpful Guide?’ (1989) 2(1) Insol. Int. 1 
(arguing that there is no real need to hold that creditors’ interests intrude in the duties of 
directors as wrongful trading provisions already protect creditors from directors’ abuses); D 
Petkovic, ‘Directors’ Duties and the Intrusion of Creditors’ Interests’ (1989) 4(4) J.I.B.L. 166 
(arguing that while West Mercia Safetywear heralded the importation into English case law of 
the ‘shift doctrine’, the parameters of the principle’s application remain uncertain).  
177 Keay (n 166) 147. 
178 For a list of cases that support the shift of directors’ duties in the proximity of insolvency, 
see: Keay (n 166) 149 (ftn. 50). More recently, see the decision in Re Capitol Films Ltd (in 
Administration) [2010] EWHC 2240 (Ch), [2011] 2 BCLC 359 where the court held that the 
authorization of a transfer of assets without previous consideration of the interests of the 
company’s creditors can present a breach of the directors’ duties to the company.  
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company” is a phrase which refers to a variety of opposing expectations, 
including those of the employees and future creditors.179 It would be wrong, in 
Aylmerton’s view, to simply look at the infringement of creditors’ expectations 
to assess if the threshold prescribed by the law has been met. As will emerge 
from the following chapters, the author is supportive of literature that 
challenges the view that shareholders and creditors are the only residual 
owners of the corporation. 
Additionally, if the law fully embraced the creditor-oriented view, these parties 
should be given a standing to sue rogue corporate directors. However, this right 
is currently reserved primarily to insolvency office-holders. Also, the existence 
of such a shift in the directors’ duties would require an outright prohibition of 
any practice that might not result in the maximisation of the creditors’ interests. 
Many provisions – primarily those which permit a pre-orchestrated sale of 
distressed businesses to connected parties – sit at odds with the creditors’ 
maximisation assumption.  
In the U.S. tradition, outside formal insolvency procedures, fiduciary duties are 
governed by state law. However, the opening of a corporate bankruptcy 
procedure under 11 U.S. Code means that duties and potential liabilities (such 
as for wrongful or fraudulent trading) are governed by federal common law 
rather than by the applicable state law.180  
                                                                    
179 Brady v Brady (n 67) 777-778. The decision in Brady was overruled by the House of Lords, 
but on this point their Lordships acknowledges that the interests of creditors had to be taken 
into consideration.  
180 Wolf v Winstein (372) U.S. 633 (1963); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v Weintraub, 471 
U.S. 343 (1985). See also: DB Bogart, ‘Liability of Directors of Chapter 11 Debtors in Possession: 
“Don’t Look Back – Something May Be Gaining On You”’ (1994) 68 Am. Bankr. L.J. 155. 
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In insolvency situations, U.S. Bankruptcy 
Courts apply the “trust fund doctrine” 
(first introduced in Wood181) according to 
which directors of an insolvent company 
‘no longer owe a duty to stockholders who 
no longer have any economic interest in the 
entity’.182 Therefore, since a person is able 
to establish the fact of insolvency (which 
may occur before the filing), the directors 
owe fiduciary duties to the creditors of the 
company only.183  
In near-insolvency situations, i.e. when the 
company is in the proximity of insolvency, 
the situation is far less clear. On one hand, 
directors are liable towards all the 
constituencies of the company (i.e. not 
only its creditors) for wrongly prolonging 
the life of their distressed companies,184 
albeit exceptions apply.185 
                                                                    
181 Wood v Drummer 30 F.Cas. 435 (No. 17944) (C.C.D. Me. 1824). The Delaware Supreme Court 
adopted the doctrine in Bovay v H.M. Byllesby & Co. 38 A.2d 808 (Del. 1944).  
182 Jewel Recovery, L.P. v Gordon (Re Zale Corp), 196 B.R. 348 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996). See also: 
GV Varallo and JA Finkelstein, ‘Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of the Financially Troubled 
Company’ (1992) 48 Bus. Law. 239, 244.  
183 Geyer v Ingersoll (n 144), 790. For an analysis of Geyer: SR McDonnel, ‘Geyer v. Ingersoll 
Publications Co.: Insolvency Shifts Directors’ Burden from Shareholders to Creditors’ (1994) 19 
Del. J. Corp. L. 177. See also: Re Scott Acquisition Corp., 344 B.R. 283 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) 
(arguing that directors and officers of an insolvent wholly-owned subsidiary owe fiduciary 
duties to the subsidiary and its creditors); Production Resources Group, Llc v NCT Group, Inc., 863 
A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004). In the literature: Varallo and Finkelstein (n 182) (arguing that strict 
application of the trust fund doctrine operates as a substantial disincentive for directors to 
consider alternative courses of action); de Barondes (n 85) 63.  
184 This situation is known as the tort of “deepening insolvency”. The concept first originated in 
Re Investors Funding Corp, 523 F.Supp 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), while the term “deepening 
insolvency” was first used in Schacht v Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983). This principle has 
recently been re-affirmed in Quadrant Structured Products Co. v Vertin, 102 A.3d 155 (Del. Ch. 
May 4, 2015). 
185 See, for instance, Amcast  (n 144), arguing that a claim asserted on behalf of creditors against 
corporation's directors and officers for deepening insolvency, based upon fraudulent 
prolonging of corporation's life or expansion of its debt beyond insolvency in manner resulting 
in further dissipation of assets, is not valid cause of action. 
THE CREDIT LYONNAIS CASE 
In November 1990 Mr. Parretti 
acquired MGM in an LBO transaction 
but subsequently lost control of the 
company to Credit Lyonnais by 
reason of the clauses in a Corporate 
Governance Agreement signed by 
the parties. 
To retain control of MGM, Parretti 
sought to dispose quickly and at 
undervalue of key MGM divisions. 
MGM’s creditors (including Credit 
Lyonnais) would have assumed most 
of the downside risk, while MGM’s 
shareholders (who had little equity 
in the company) would have 
received most of the upside benefit. 
The chancellor found that Paretti’s 
actions breached its fiduciary duties 
as non-executive director of MGM. 
The Chancery Court of Delaware 
held that directors operating in the 
‘zone of insolvency’ owed fiduciary 
duties to the ‘corporate enterprise’, 
which meant not only to equity-
holders but also to creditors.  
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On the other, the case of Credit Lyonnais186 seemed to have introduced into 
American case law the English expansion of fiduciary duties to corporate 
creditors.187 In fact, in that ruling Chancellor Allen of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery held that ‘[a]t least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of 
insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers 
(i.e. the shareholders) but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise (i.e. primarily 
the creditors)’.188  
In Credit Lyonnais, Delaware commercial court extended the trust fund theory 
(according to which directors owe duties to creditors) from insolvency to the 
period where insolvency is close but not yet manifest.189 
While other courts have been supportive of this shift of fiduciary duties in the 
proximity of insolvency,190 this doctrine was harshly criticised by 
commentators191 and in other circuits.192 Its implementation has also proven 
                                                                    
186 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v Pathe Communications Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 
277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). For an analysis of this case: Jelisavcic (n 84) 151 ss.; JC Lipson, 
‘Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed Corporation’ 
(2003) 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1189, 1208-1212; CD Kandestin, ‘The Duty to Creditors in Near-
Insolvent Firms: Eliminating the “Near Insolvency” Distinction’ (2007) 60(4) Vand. L. Rev. 1235, 
1246-1250; JW Callison, ‘Why a Fiduciary Duty Shift to Creditors of Insolvent Business Entities 
is Incorrect as a Matter of Theory and Practice’ (2007) 1 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 431, 434-436. 
187 Prior to Credit Lyonnais there have been cases where courts suggested that insolvency 
determined a shift of the fiduciary duties from stockholders to creditors. See Davis v Woolf, 147 
F.2d 629, 633 (4th Cir. 1945); Clarkson Co. Ltd v Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981); Am. 
Nat’l Bank v Mortgage Am. Corp. (Re Mortgage Am. Corp.), 714 F.2d 436, 464 (5th Cir. 1983); and 
Re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1228 (3d Cir. 1989). 
188 Credit Lyonnais (n 186) 1155. 
189 Jelisavcic (n 84) 146-7. 
190 See also: Ed Peters Jewelry Co. v C&J Jewelry Co., 124 F.3d 252, 276 (1st Cir. 1997); Askanase v 
Fatjo, 130 F.3d 657, 666 (5th Cir. 1997). 
191 See also: L Lin, ‘Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of 
Directors’ Duty to Creditors’ (1993) 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1485 (characterizing the vicinity of 
insolvency as ‘ill-defined’); CR Morris, ‘Directors’ Duties in Nearly Insolvent Corporations: A 
Comment on Credit Lyonnais’ (1993) 19 J. Corp. L. 61; RF Hartman, ‘Situation-Specific Fiduciary 
Duties for Corporate Directors: Enforceable Obligations or Toothless Ideals?’ (1993) 50 Wash. & 
Lee L. Rev. 1761, 1766 (arguing that Credit Lyonnais leaves crucial questions unanswered while 
observing that this decision has provided the foundation for using situation-specific fiduciary 
duties to solve the problems raised by the financial model); McDonnel (n 183) 210 (stating that 
Credit Lyonnais left a myriad of questions unanswered); B Nicholson, ‘Recent Delaware Case 
Law Regarding Director’s Duties to Bondholders’ (1994) 19 Del. J. Corp. L. 573, 575 (viewing the 
vicinity of insolvency exception as ‘regrettably ambiguous in its timing and scope’); RKS Rao and 
others, ‘Fiduciary Duty à la Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective on Corporate Governance in a 
Financially-Distressed Firm’ (1996) 22 J. Corp. L. 53 (viewing the vicinity of insolvency as ‘broad 
and ambiguous’); de Barondes (n 85) (arguing that the shift of fiduciary duty harms primarily 
that set of creditors such as suppliers and non-adjusting claimants least capable of negotiating 
an alternative contractual resolution); AD Shaffer, ‘Corporate Fiduciary-Insolvent: The Fiduciary 
Relationship Your Corporate Law Professor (Should Have) Warned You About’ (2000) 8 Am. 
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problematic for the same Delaware courts193 with the result that it was 
promptly abandoned.  First, in Trenwick194 the Delaware commercial court held 
that directors’ duties do not change as the company nears insolvency or 
becomes insolvent. Then in Gheewalla195 the Delaware Supreme Court 
overruled the Credit Lyonnais approach and held that directors do not owe 
particular duties to creditors in the proximity of insolvency. It held on the 
contrary that ‘[i]t is well established that the directors owe their fiduciary 
obligations to the corporation and its shareholders’.196 
This stockholder-oriented (in the proximity of insolvency) and creditor-
oriented (in insolvency) approach is inconsistent with the conclusions of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in several bankruptcy cases. This judicial body has 
frequently observed the existence of a link between interests in the procedure 
and the residual value of the claim.197 This link and the connected fiduciary duty 
therefore should exist even when the company is not insolvent.198 
Therefore if – as the Supreme Court suggests – rights over an insolvent 
company fall on a large number of stakeholders, it is arguable that directors 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 479; CL Barnett, ‘Healthco and the “Insolvency Exception”: An Unnecessary 
Expansion of the Doctrine?’ (2000) 16 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 441 (characterizing the vicinity of 
insolvency as a ‘fuzzy concept’); Lipson (n 186); Campbell and Frost (n 147); Baird MT 
Henderson (n 147) (arguing that directors should take from court decisions the simple axiom 
that they should do what is in the best interest of the business, measured from the perspective 
of the ex-ante bargain among investors).  
Against: Kandestin (n 186) 1262-63 (arguing that directors should not be compelled to consider 
only shareholders’ interests in the proximity of insolvency and suggesting an alternative, 
discretionary approach to determine the fiduciary duties of directors in these contexts).  
192 See, for instance: Verestar (n 147) holding that under Delaware law, when managing a 
corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, directors must consider the best interests of the 
corporation, not just the interests of either creditors or shareholders alone. While this duty does 
not necessarily place creditor interests ahead of the interests of shareholders, it requires the 
board of directors to maximise the corporation's long-term wealth creating capacity. 
193 For instance, in Geyer v Ingersoll (n 144), just one year after Credit Lyonnais the Delaware 
Court of Chancery held that the fiduciary duty arises only upon ‘insolvency in fact’. 
194 Trenwick America Litigation Trust v Ernst & Young, 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006). This 
decision allowed directors to engage in appropriate, calculated risk-taking with the aim of 
adding value to their companies because they enjoy the wide protection granted by the business 
judgment rule: MS Huebner and DS Klein, ‘The Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Troubled 
Companies’ (2015) 34(2) Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 18, 19. 
195 North American Catholic Education Programming Foundation, Inc. v Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 
(Del. 2007). 
196 Ibid. 
197 See, for instance: Pepper v Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) where the Supreme Court held that 
managers have broad fiduciary duties to creditors as well as stockholders.  
198 United States v AT&T, 552 F. Supp 131, 205 (D.D.C. 1986), aff’d mem. sub nom. Maryland v 
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
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must consider a wider array of interests rather than merely those of the formal 
and former owners of the company and their creditors. When this shift occurs 
is, however, a matter of contentious debate.199 
4.3(b)(iii) Half-way Findings  
Principle-based theorists have provided evidence to argue that, under general 
law, the duties of directors are stakeholder- rather than shareholder-oriented. 
In line with these findings, this work supports the view that the qualities of 
certain claimants (such as disparities in volition, cognition and access to 
secondary market)200 and the circumstance that not all insolvency procedures 
are distributional in nature,201 suggest the opportunity to consider the interests 
and expectations of a wider variety of stakeholders than shareholders and 
contractual claimants. 
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the current laws and jurisprudence still 
support a shift towards a stronger protection of contractual creditors’ interests 
and expectations in the proximity of and particularly in insolvency, as 
evidenced in the table below.  
                                                                    
199 Jelisavcic (n 84) (suggesting a financial definition of the court’s “vicinity of insolvency” 
standard which relies on the Z-score method to predict corporate insolvency); JA Pearce II and 
IA Lipin, ‘The Duties of Directors and Officers within the Fuzzy Zone of Insolvency’ (2011) 19 
Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 361 (proffering a similar approach to determine the nature and content 
of directors’ duties in the different stages of companies’ life).  
200 Lipson (n 186). 
201 If a procedure such as a Chapter 11 reorganisation or an English administration is not 
designed to liquidate assets but to re-organise a firm and thus preserve or create new value, it 
makes little sense to determine claimants’ rights solely on the basis of their distributive 
entitlements.  
  222 
4.1  Solvent Times Near Insolvency Insolvency 
U.K. s.172(1) CA 2006: duty to 
act bona fide in the 
interest of the company – 
see Trew (2018).  
Consider: Style (2016) and 
Sequana (2016) 
s.172(3) CA 2006: 
protection of creditors. 
IA 1986 and CDDA 1986: 
duties to creditors as a 
whole.  
Supported by Brady 
(1987) and West Mercia 
Safetywear (1988).  
U.S. Fiduciary duties (state 
law) not only towards 
companies and 
stockholders – see 
Paramount (1990).  
Consider: business 
judgment rule.  
Credit Lyonnais (1991): 
protection of creditors. 
Gheewalla (2007): 
protection of companies 
and stockholders. 
Trust fund doctrine: 
protection of creditors.  
 
Where corporate and insolvency statutes adopt a more encompassing approach 
(in line with principle-based theories), the judiciary is more adherent to neo-
classical visions of the role of corporate directors and office-holders. As a result, 
the position of the courts is more aligned with the tenets of proceduralist 
theories discussed in chapter three, as courts, both in equity and outside it, have 
primarily considered qualified interests, i.e. the interests of those who have a 
contractual claim against the company.  
The lack of guidance from case law and the reported criticisms towards clear-
cut, either creditor or shareholder-oriented approaches suggest a half-way 
consideration, i.e. that there is no such thing as the creditors’ or shareholders’ 
interest, but only conflicting stakeholders’ interests.202  
The next sub-section presents some reflections to support the view of principle-
based theorists that the category of interested parties should include all those 
stakeholders who have controlling, risk bearer claims against the distressed 
company. Directors should consider the position of these stakeholders 
throughout the entire life of the company. However, in times of distress, the 
                                                                    
202 Some scholars have suggested that these and related problem could be ameliorated by the 
adoption of financial measures – such as Altman’s Z-score – to define the boundaries of 
solvency, zone of insolvency, insolvency in fact and insolvency procedure: Jelisavcic (n 84); 
Pearce and Lipin (n 199) 397. This thesis rejects this approach as predictive models assume 
that interested parties have timely access to transparent and faithful business accounts. 
Corporate scandals such as Enron and Carillion, as well as anecdotal evidence suggest that this 
assumption is un-tested and probably incorrect in a large number of cases.  
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interests of these parties may intrude to the point that directors should use 
insolvency remedies to protect their risk bearer rights. 
4.3(c) A Normative Argument to Consider the Interests of All Controlling 
Stakeholders   
It is a truism to state that broad policies, strategic plans and day-to-day 
decisions of any corporation are determined or highly influenced by a close 
group of people. These are the professional managers who sit on boards or the 
director and majority or sole shareholder in medium to small corporations. A 
hotly debated question is the benefits which should be paramount to these 
directors whenever they exercise their decision-making powers. 
Sub-section 4.3(b) explained what interests are currently protected by company 
law and the judiciary, both in solvent and insolvent times. It has discussed the 
contrasting views about corporations’ obligations to stakeholders. 
Commentators who grappled with this issue tried to understand if stakeholders 
other than stockholders are entitled to benefit from the directors’ fiduciary 
duties and at which stage of the company’s life. 
This thesis contends that this approach is incomplete. It maintains that the 
controversial issue of whether a corporation owes an obligation to stakeholders 
can only be addressed after it has been established who the company’s residual 
claimants are, in the different stages of its life.  
This is not to say that the bearers of societal or wider interests should always be 
entitled to extract value from the debtor’s insolvency or that their claims should 
prevail over contractual, secured creditors. Nevertheless, the value-only 
approach advocated by some commentators203 may prove inadequate.204 
                                                                    
203 JS Athanas and others, ‘Bankruptcy Needs to Get its Priorities Straight: A Proposal for 
Limiting the Leverage of Unsecured Creditors’ Committees when Unsecured Creditors Are Out-
Of-The-Money’ (2018) 26 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 93 (arguing that out-of-the-money unsecured 
creditors should not be allowed to extract value from secured lenders in exchange of a promise 
not to oppose the confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan). 
204 Paterson (n 23) 4-5, observing that ‘it is right to include […] a wider range of stakeholders 
than merely creditors because otherwise a series of costs are externalised (such as the cost of lost 
jobs)’.  
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To determine who the residual claimants are, it is necessary to inform this 
corporate and insolvency law debate with some findings from corporate 
governance theories.205  
This debate has been particularly exciting in the U.S., which has always viewed 
the company as a political “hot potato”, in particular after the period of 
corporate scandals and takeover frenzy of the late Seventies and Eighties. In 
England this topic has been somehow underestimated, at least until its 
centrality has been re-established in the wake of the financial crisis.  
For decades, neo-classical legal scholars and economists have argued that 
corporations are owned by shareholders and that they should therefore be 
managed in their sole interest (“finance model”).206 According to these 
commentators, managers have a legal obligation to act in their only or 
prevailing interest because they own the company and they bear the risks 
associated with the misuse or decline of the company’s value. It follows from 
this reasoning that, when the company is systemically unable to pay its debts as 
they fall due, the shareholders lose most or all of their ownership and 
controlling rights in the company. These rights accordingly are transferred to 
the next beneficiaries in line: the contractual creditors.207  
This perception has been extensively criticised in legal and economic literature 
and this work is not the first to point out that shareholders are not always or 
the only residual claimants of a corporation (especially large ones with widely 
spread share ownership).208 The assertion that stockholders are the residual 
                                                                    
205 For similar findings: SJ Lubben, ‘The Board’s Duty to Keep Its Options Open’ (2015) U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 817, 818. 
206 AA Berle, Jr. and GC Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Commerce 
Clearing House, Inc.: Washington D.C. 1932); A Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Modern Library: 
New York, 1937). Up to the 1980s, this model has proven very successful, to the extent that even 
the American Law Institute supported this view: The American Law Institute, Principles of 
Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations. Accepted Final Draft (Philadelphia, 1994) 
55. See also: DG Yosifon, ‘The Law of Corporate Purpose’ (2013) 10 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 181, 184. 
207 Paterson (n 23) 24: ‘[w]hen a company is insolvent, it is tolerably clear that directors’ duties to 
the company should represent the interests of the creditors’. 
208 See, among others: RE Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Pitman: 
Boston, 1984) 31 (arguing that stakeholders are not only those groups without whose support 
the organisation would cease to exist but the group of people and organizations to whom 
management need be responsive); Blair (n 84); LE Mitchell, ‘A Theoretical and Practical 
Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes’ (1992) 70 Tex. L. Rev. 579, 582-583; 
GT Garvey and PT Swan, ‘The Economics of Corporate Governance: Beyond the Marshallian 
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claimants does more to obscure the important issues than to illuminate them.209 
It underestimates that contractual creditors supply capital to the corporation 
and they receive repayment of the principal amount with interest.210 Similar 
considerations apply to workers and, to a more limited extent, tort claimants.  
Limited liability contradicts the observation that shareholders are the only risk 
bearers: creditors, as well as other parties in interest, bear the risk of failure of 
a solvent corporation. Consequently, if the risk of failure looms over a wider 
category of stakeholders, it does not seem appropriate to restrict the category 
of residual claimants in insolvency to contractual creditors and equity-holders.  
Additionally, the de facto separation of equity ownership from control, with the 
stock of medium and large companies frequently distributed to a significant 
number of institutional or small investors, makes the afore-mentioned neo-
classical assumption even more challenging to be endowed. 
If we adopt a legal perspective, therefore, we can observe that shareholders do 
own the company but they do not necessarily control it or take part in its active 
life211 and they may not be the only or major residual claimants. They have a 
right to a dividend if a dividend is declared, a right to vote at general meetings 
and a right to any residual surplus upon liquidation. Their interests are not the 
company’s interests, both in the U.S. and in England.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Firm’ (1994) 1 J. Corp. Fin. 139; Blair and Stout (n 57); LA Stout, ‘Bad and Not-So-Bad 
Arguments for Shareholder Primacy’ (2002) 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1189 (discussing why 
shareholders cannot be sole residual claimants); E Elhauge, ‘Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the 
Public Interest’ (2005) 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733; Baird and Henderson (n 147); L Becchetti and 
others, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholder’s Value’ (2012) 65(11) J. Bus. Res. 
1628. 
209 P Milgrom and J Roberts, Economics, Organization, and Management (Prentice Hall: Upper 
Saddle River, NJ, 1992). 
210 Callison (n 186) 431. 
211 This is the situation as today, but it may well change in the future, thanks to the use of 
technologies such as blockchain. For instance, the Spanish bank Santander has recently 
announced that it became the first company in the world to use blockchain technology to allow 
investors to vote at an annual meeting: A Mooney and N Megaw, ‘Santander Shows Potential of 
Blockchain in Company Votes’ Financial Times (London, 17 May 2018) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/c03b699e-5918-11e8-bdb7-f6677d2e1ce8> accessed 17 
September 2018. Thanks to the use of blockchain, investors do not have to cast their vote by 
proxy two weeks before the meeting and any concern of loss or manipulation of the casted vote 
is vacated. Still it is debatable whether casting a vote in an AGM is sufficient to claim that equity-
holders “control” a company. 
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For the purpose of determining if this approach is correct, the key issue is to 
clarify the meaning of “ownership”. As logic tells us, definitions are ad hoc, in 
the sense that their validity depends upon their ability and usefulness to 
analyse a problem and draw valid conclusions. If we accept that ownership, as 
commonly understood in practice, implies detaining a proprietary right over a 
portion of the company,212 only some shareholders own a company.213 
The author however assumes that selected risk bearer rights (including 
fiduciary rights) should be recognised to all those stakeholders who receive the 
“residual return” and bear the “residual risk” in a business214 by reason of their 
specialised inputs to its activity and functioning.  
Under this narrative (commonly known as “the pluralist model”), these 
stakeholders have a quasi-ownership, risk bearer claim and a residual right of 
control of the company even if according to law they do not own any assets of 
the company.215 It therefore follows that the company should be conceptualised 
as a bundle of self-interested constituencies, each with different interests and 
risk levels.216 Directors have a fiduciary duty to assess the relevance and 
prominence of the risk bearers’ interests throughout the company’s life and 
activity, as evidenced in the recently revised version of the Corporate 
Governance Code.217  
                                                                    
212 The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘ownership’ as having a “legal right of possession”: 
"ownership, n." (OED Online: OUP, March 2018), <www.oed.com/view/Entry/135518>, 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
213 Ownership rights are not recognised in some financial instruments such as shares without 
voting rights, whose holders are generally compensated for their investment/loan with higher 
interest rates or a larger portion of the profits. 
214 Blair (n 84) (arguing that in her ‘wealth maximisation model’ managers should try to 
maximise the wealth of all stakeholders. Stakeholders, who are not simply shareholders, share 
in the company’s residual gains and risks). Shareholders are traditionally considered residual 
claimants because they are remunerated only after all other contractual claimants, such as 
lenders, employees, customers and suppliers.  
215 The pluralist model has first been advocated in the U.S., where it has been translated into 
state laws from the mid-80s, even if the federal legislator has always been reluctant to endorse 
it. In England, this model has first been advocated by the Commission on Public Policy and 
British Business: Promoting Prosperity: A Business Agenda for Britain (Vintage: New York, 1997). 
Despite having been rejected by the Company Law Review Steering Group (Committee on 
Corporate Governance, Final Report (Gee, 1997), para 1.17), it seems that the CA 2006 and the 
recent proposals for reform of s.172 support the pluralist model.  
216 Kandestin (n 186) 1239. 
217 Financial Reporting Council, The UK Corporate Governance Code (July 2018) 
<https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-
Corporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.pdf > accessed 17 September 2018. 
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The category of risk bearers or risk takers, therefore, should include many 
more players than the shareholders-owners of the distressed company and 
their contractual creditors. While it is impossible to define ex-ante all the 
potential stakeholders, this list may include: 
 Employees and Shareholders with company-specific skills, a 
consideration extremely actual in economies (such as those considered 
in this study) where manual, repetitive labour is increasingly replaced 
by automation and employers compete on the job market for highly-
skilled workers.218 It might be true that outside insolvency, these parties 
have received additional consideration for their skills. At the same time, 
their decision to work for or promote the success of a particular 
enterprise may have significantly restricted their career opportunities 
in other sectors or companies, due to the highly skilled nature of their 
work or activity; 
 Suppliers whose business is highly dependent upon the orders of the 
distressed corporation where neither party can promptly find a 
competitor to supply goods and services of the same quality and at 
comparable price in a reasonable time. Examples include companies 
such as Delphi for General Motors, or Takata for the automotive industry 
in general. The dependency can be determined by asking if the collapse 
of the debtor would determine a ripple effect on its supply chain and, 
potentially on the considered sector of the economy; 
 Tort Claimants in cases where the insolvency petition was prompted by 
the desire to shield the company from damage liabilities and preserve or 
promote its viable business; 
 Pension funds in cases where the insolvency filing was prompted by the 
desire to skirt contractual liabilities or make the company more 
attractive to a potential buyer in a takeover bid; 
 Citizens and Communities, for instance in cases where the debtor is a 
polluter, or where the company is located in depressed or high-
                                                                    
218 It has been observed that ‘[t]he new model of production more closely resembles the old craft 
systems, which used less rigid manufacturing technologies but relied on more highly skilled 
workers’ - see Blair (n 84) 272. 
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unemployment regions, or when the industrial network of activities in a 
certain area is strictly connected, with the result that if one company 
went out of business, a domino effect on several other businesses is 
likely to occur. 
The pivotal issue of the insolvency theories analysed in this study is their failure 
to measure and count as wealth creation the share of the rents219 generated 
thanks to the contribution of these stakeholders. At best, they are simply 
classified as “claimants”.  
Corporate governance scholars have evidenced the need to recognise the 
centrality of these players. Principle-based theorists have confronted this 
challenge and suggested an approach that considered, protected and promoted 
their interests. Principle-based theories fail to comprehensively address the 
issue of the limits of insolvency law for the reasons evidenced in sub-section 
4.2(b). Nevertheless, as evidenced in this section, the “inclusive vision” 
promoted by these theorists is sound and deserves to be considered in 
conceptualising a novel approach to the definition of the limits of this area of 
law.  
4.3(d) Should Controlling Interests Be Relevant under Insolvency Law? A 
Theory of Wealth-Maximisation of Stakeholders’ Interests (‘WMSI’) 
Where sub-section 4.3(c) demonstrated that the claims of risk bearer right 
holders should be considered in insolvency scenarios, it provided little 
assistance in determining how their claims should be assessed against the 
holders of personal and proprietary interests. If the comparison occurred at 
face value (i.e. considering the nominal value of each party’s claims), it is likely 
that the rights of secured creditors (mainly proprietary) would hierarchically 
                                                                    
219 The notion of “rent” is used as a synonym of “economic profit” to describe returns greater 
than the minimum required to induce the firm to supply goods or services: Blair (n 84) 241; 
Mazzucato (n 1) 4-5. Rents can be generated from new wealth being created or from rent-
seeking activities that do not generate but extract or transfer rents from one group of people to 
others (e.g. collusion or monopolization of a market, the majority of financial activities and the 
pricing of certain goods such as pharmaceutical products).  
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prevail in the majority of situations. In Korobkin’s words, inclusivity would not 
lead to rational planning.220 
The question of how those who have an interest in a company ought to be 
protected (particularly in rescue cases) is a challenging one.221 To provide an 
answer, it is pertinent to imagine the parties’ interests and expectations as a pie 
chart, in which each of the stakeholders retains a share of (personal, 
proprietary or risk bearer) interests over the company. Should the company 
face financial distress, the expectations of one or more of these categories 
cannot simply be wiped out. They are re-modelled according to their nominal 
value, the residual value of the enterprise and the turnaround options available 
to the distressed company. 
For instance, imagine that company (A) files for insolvency protection. It has 
secured creditors (SC) for £20, trade creditors (C) for £40, arrears to its 
employees (E) for £20, unfunded pension obligations (P) for £25 and it faces 
environmental cleaning costs (EC) for £25, while its shareholders (S) paid £1 to 
incorporate the company. Total liabilities L are therefore £131.  
L = SC+ C + E + P + EC + S222 
The value V of its remaining assets is £80 if sold in piecemeal sales. Accordingly, 
if the only available option was liquidation, the proceeds from the assets should 
be distributed among the creditors in accordance with the order of priority 
negotiated by the parties and established by the law.  
Imagine now however that a potential bidder (B) is interested in A. B sees the 
potential for future earnings (X) due to the competitive range of products that 
the two merged companies would be able to offer on the market, the 
professionalism and productivity of A’s employees, the expertise of some of A’s 
shareholders, some of A’s facilities and B’s capital. Unfortunately, he is willing to 
offer only £70, because of the risks associated with the merger and the 
circumstance that only some of A’s employees are considered “strategic”. 
                                                                    
220 Korobkin (n 4). 
221 Paterson (n 23). 
222 The formulas in this sub-section have been autonomously conceived by the author. 
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Liq. = £80 
B = £70 +/- X 
If it is assumed, as the finance model does, that shareholders and creditors are 
the only residual claimants of the distressed debtor, it is likely that such an offer 
would be outright rejected. If, however, it is considered that the same rights 
recognised to creditors should be equally vested in all the other stakeholders in 
proportion to the controlling value of their claims, the final result might be 
reversed, as: 
SC+ C + S = £61 
E + P + EC = £70 
The stakeholders may at this point decide that, to facilitate the M&A process, 
some consideration in the newco (D) is recognised to the retained employees 
and shareholders, while lump payment to pension funds may also be agreed.  
An approach that valorises the interest of a wide array of stakeholders has been 
observed in several recent rescue and liquidation cases. In Chrysler’s case, 
shares in the newco that acquired the profitable assets of the bankrupt 
automotive corporation were given to employees and third parties despite the 
fact that more senior creditors had not been paid in full. Similarly, Sir Philip 
Green’s £363m payment to the pension fund of failed retailer BHS has given the 
scheme’s 19,000 members the chance to receive better benefits than available 
through an industry-backed lifeboat fund even if more senior creditors had not 
– once again – been paid in full.223 
                                                                    
223 In the case of BHS, Sir Green’s payment was solicited by other considerations. It has been 
observed that for the period 2004-2015 (when BHS was sold to the British businessman 
Dominic Chappel for £1), Sir Green and his family extracted from the company an estimated 
£580 million while they left a £571 million deficit in the pension fund (which was in surplus 
when Sir Green bought the company in 2004): S Butler, ‘How Philip Green’s family made 
millions as value of BHS plummeted’ The Guardian (London, 25 April 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/apr/25/bhs-philip-green-family-millions-
administration-arcadia> accessed 17 September 2018. This promoted some commentators to 
label Sir Green (and entrepreneurs acting in similar fashion) as “value-takers”: Mazzucato (n 1) 
1.  
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In other cases – such as the collapse of Carillion – the lack of consideration for 
the expectations of all company’s constituencies224 has sparked criticisms and 
consequences that are likely to go well beyond the case itself. A damning 100-
page report of the Work and Pension and the Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy committees225 suggested not only to act against Carillion’s rogue 
directors, but also against the Big Four accountancy firms that were engaged in 
checking the financial situation of the company. These accounting firms failed to 
properly scrutinise the debtor’s balance sheet and were blamed for prioritising 
their own profits ahead of good governance at the companies they are supposed 
to be putting under the microscope (they approved Carillion’s accounts despite 
its spiralling debt).  
Stakeholder-oriented solutions can also be employed to avert disaster. This is 
what happened recently when the then Transport Secretary Chris Grayling 
(Con.) decided to re-nationalise the East Coast Mainline Service from 24 June 
2018, thus terminating the East Coast franchise five years ahead of its 
contractual termination.226  
The decision,227 qualified as a bail-out by the opposition228 and some 
commentators,229 was not simply in the interest of the franchisee, a joint 
venture between Stagecoach (90%) and Virgin (10%). It was also in the interest 
of the workers, who did not lose their jobs or saw their pension schemes 
                                                                    
224 The report noted in particular the harmful consequences for certain stakeholders such as 
employees (who either lost their jobs or saw their pensions curtailed or both), small businesses, 
contractors and suppliers left fighting for survival.  
225 Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees, ‘Carillion: 
Second Joint Report from the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions 
Committees’ HC 769 (House of Commons 16 May 2018) 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmworpen/769/769.pdf> 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
226 Hansard HC vol 641 cols 285-88W (16 May 2018). 
227 S Payne, ‘East Coast collapse gives a boost to UK Rail privatisation’ Financial Times (London, 
16 May 2018) <https://www.ft.com/content/1ab4f538-5906-11e8-bdb7-f6677d2e1ce8> 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
228 J McDonnell MP (Lab) (@johnmcdonnellMP) ‘Good to see Grayling implementing first stage 
of Labour’s Manifesto promise to renationalise the railways. I think I’m right in saying that he’s 
now nationalised more railways than any Labour minister in 6 decades. Come on Chris, East 
Coast line today, the whole system tomorrow’ (16 May 2018, 1:13 PM). Tweet.  
229 C Baynes and S Calder, ‘East Coast Mainline renationalised by government after Virgin Trains 
deal terminated’ Independent (London, 16 May 2018) 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/east-coast-mainline-renationalisation> 
accessed 17 May 20118. 
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curtailed, as well as the suppliers of these companies, as they did not face the 
risk of partial or no repayment following the insolvency of the train operator. 
Finally, it was also in the interest of the passengers, who should not face 
significant disruptions as the service will be operated by an operator of last 
resort,230 as well as the citizens. The decision may have come with a significant 
cost: the Shadow Transport Secretary Andy MacDonald claimed that taxpayers 
suffered a £2 billion loss from the early termination of the franchising.231  
Consider now the case in which the nominal value of the claims of the holders of 
personal and proprietary rights far exceeded those of the holders of risk bearer 
rights. In this case, the office-holder (who might well be the debtor) might not 
be forced to pursue the interests of risk bearer claimants if they conflicted with 
the other participants in the insolvency procedure. 
However, imagine if it were possible to adopt a course of action that equally 
protected the rights of personal and proprietary claimants and those of risk 
bearers but required more time to be implemented or was surrounded by 
higher uncertainties than the course of action preferred by the majority of 
personal and proprietary claimants. In that case, the office-holder would have – 
under the WMSI theory – the obligation to consider this alternative course of 
action. The office-holder would have an obligation to pursue the alternative 
course of action only if it was proven that the risk bearer claimants had 
controlling interests in the company that exceed those of the other claimants. 
The proof of the existence, extent and relevance of these controlling interests is 
equitable in nature. 
Stakeholder-oriented solutions would not necessarily maximise the return to 
creditors, but they have the potential to maximise the wealth creation for a 
wider range of parties-in-interest. Specifically, they have the potential to 
                                                                    
230 K Smale, ‘Arup to act as DfT adviser in East Coast franchise collapse’ New Civil Engineer 
(London, 17 May 2018) <https://www.newcivilengineer.com/latest/arup-to-act-as-dft-adviser-
in-east-coast-franchise-collapse/10031128.article> accessed 17 September 2018.  
231 Hansard HC vol 641 col 288W (16 May 2018). It seems that the figure presents a loss of 
income for the government rather than an expense, as it refers to the money that the joint 
venture should have paid to the government for running the service from 2018 to 2023: C 
McGrath and N Stinson, ‘Collapse of Virgin Train East Coast deal leaves taxpayers £2BILLION 
out of pocket’ Express.co.uk (London, 17 May 2018) 
<https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/960843/virgin-east-coast-trains-main-line-
richard-branson-bailout-labour> accessed 17 September 2018. 
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allocate capital to those best able to use it. These solutions do not represent a 
breach of the principle of pari passu distribution as stakeholders are treated in 
accordance with the substantive principles underpinning this area of law, 
particularly the principle of protection of the relative value of individual rights 
against the debtor. 
This approach would better explain the reluctance with which Anglo-American 
courts implement the principles of pari passu treatment of equally-ranking 
creditors and modified universalism in cross-border cases where protection of 
local/domestic creditors is at stake.232  
Principle-based theorists are forced to admit that there might be exceptional 
circumstances in which some of the above-mentioned principles cannot be 
applied.233 The WMSI theory can more easily justify the need to weight 
principles by referring to the stakeholders’ risk bearer rights that each of the 
stakeholders has towards the insolvent estate. Principles are not excepted: they 
are simply weighted on the basis of the pre-established and recognised rights 
over the insolvent estate. Such an approach would be flexible enough to 
vindicate social and wider interests in the enterprise while not unduly affecting 
the private-ordering of corporate purpose.234 
- 
The nominal value of the claim against the insolvent debtor is only the starting 
point to determine the rights that each (category of) stakeholders have towards 
the insolvent estate. As it will be demonstrated in the following chapter, not 
only in each moment of a company’s life but also once the choice of the 
insolvency path (liquidation or rescue) has been taken, the relative power of 
                                                                    
232 For findings on U.S. attitude in the field, see: J Leong, ‘Is Chapter 15 Universalist or 
Territorialist?’ (2011) Wis. Int’l L. J. 110. For evidence on the attitude of English courts, see the 
Supreme Court decision in Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236 and related 
articles on the topic.  
233 Bork (n 19) 172 (where he conceded, with reference to the Australian case Akers v DCT, that 
‘there may be exceptional cases in which protection of local creditors is required’). 
234 DG Yosifon, ‘Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public Benefit Corporation Trivial?’ 
(2017) 41 Del. J. Corp. L. 461, 508. Against: E Sternberg, ‘The Defects of Stakeholder Theory’ 
(1997) 5(1) Corporate Governance 3, 4 (arguing that stakeholder theories are incompatible 
with business as they are both misguided and mistaken).  
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each of the considered stakeholders may and does vary as ‘the fiduciary 
construct is a function of the firm’s financial condition’.235 
While in general the opinions of contractual creditors will be kept in higher 
esteem in liquidation procedures - albeit with significant exceptions, such as in 
“liability” cases -, a majority vote based on the stakeholders’ controlling 
interests (rather than on the nominal value of their claims) might be 
considered, especially in rescue cases. Such an expedient is necessary to offset 
the generally accepted consideration that: 
… when the ability of a company to generate revenues falls to the point 
that it can pay its debts but no more, neither creditors nor shareholders 
have incentives that are consistent with the long-term health and 
survival of the firm.236 
It is not unheard of that the opinion of some stakeholders or parties-in-interest 
will matter more than others with reference to certain decisions. The key issues 
are to determine with reasonable certainty the cases in which this happens and 
to grant increased controlling power only to those stakeholders who would 
bear the consequences of the decisions.  
4.3(e) Concluding Remarks 
The apparent departure from some of the substantive principles of insolvency 
law advocated here - such as the APR and the pari passu principle of 
distribution - is inescapable, but not problematic whenever this choice is being 
taken in the interest of all the stakeholders, including those who have residual 
risk bearer interests in the company. 
APR and pari passu distribution principles continue to have general application, 
as they have been conceived to protect the rights of all stakeholders. It would be 
counter-logical, however, that the achievement of a potentially optimal result 
for the stakeholders is prevented by a strict and mechanical implementation of 
the above-mentioned principles.  
                                                                    
235 Rao (n 191) 75. 
236 Blair (n 84) 25. 
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The insolvency procedure represents the place where conflicting interests are 
weighed. As a result, in the process of weighting principles, the system in reality 
assesses the preponderance of the controlling interests which it purports to 
promote. As Blair observed in devising her corporate governance proposition, 
‘[i]f the party who controls the use of an asset also reaps the benefit of using it 
efficiently - and bears the cost of its misuse - that party has a significant incentive 
to see that the asset is used well’.237 
Principle-based theorists have demonstrated that these parties are not simply 
the shareholders (in solvent times) and the contractual creditors (in insolvency 
or in the vicinity of it). They demonstrated the existence of a governance 
problem238 in insolvency cases. They had however failed to devise uniform 
recommendations for institutional reform, due to the controversial nature of 
the notion of the “principle” which underpins their theories.  
This section has conceptualised and made a case for a WMSI theory to 
determine the course of action of corporate entities, inside and outside 
regulated “insolvency” procedures. According to this theory, in regulated 
insolvency procedures office-holders should consider and weight the interests 
of a wider variety of claimant than today, as the rights of risk bearer claimants 
intrude in the system. As a result, office holders should choose the course of 
action that appears to rationally promote the majority or most important 
interests of those who control the distressed company.  
 
4.4 FINDINGS AND OPEN PROBLEMS 
The basic premise of any principle-based approach is that principles (and rules 
based on these principles) can favour the orderly solution of insolvency cases 
and that insolvency law assumes the existence of a body of principles outside its 
                                                                    
237 Blair (n 84) 235. 
238 The notion refers to those situations in which decisions are taken and control rights are 
exercised by parties who do not bear all the possible negative consequences arising from their 
implementation. 
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framework.239 Unfortunately, principles alone appear unable to consider the 
specific complexities of many insolvency cases.  
This chapter has nevertheless demonstrated the declaratory value of principle-
based frameworks. These visions confirmed the weaknesses of proceduralist 
and autonomy-based solutions as applied to insolvency law, but they failed to 
provide an alternative, coherent conceptualisation of this area of law.  
This de-constructivist analysis has also evidenced that the group of people who 
can place a claim against the insolvent debtor is wider than that assumed by 
neo-classical economists and proceduralists. Other claimants should be granted 
protection by insolvency law because they have rights over the insolvent 
company, as they control a portion of it by reason of a risk bearer interest on its 
assets and activities. 
Principle-based theorists rightly remarked that insolvency laws should respect 
the stakeholders’ controlling rights. Accordingly, the decision on when to file for 
insolvency should take into consideration the prevailing controlling interests at 
the time of the filing. 
Company law scholars, economists and executives demonstrated that 
corporations are structured or should be structured to maximise their wealth-
creating potential for all their stakeholders, i.e. the parties that contribute 
specialised inputs to the company.240 Principle-based theorists have suggested 
that insolvency law should represent a system of laws, customs and practices 
designed to manage the affairs and distribute the collective loss of the debtor 
according to the stakeholders’ controlling rights. 
Despite this relevant breakthrough, principle-based theories are not perfect as 
they fail to provide sufficiently certain procedural solutions to TCP dilemmas 
and to properly appreciate the need to preserve – to the highest possible extent 
– the autonomy of the parties. 
                                                                    
239 G McCormack, ‘Equitable Influences and Insolvency Law’ (2014) 7(3) C.R. & I. 103, 104 
(observing –speaking of the effect of insolvency on company contracts – that ‘the 
commencement of insolvency proceedings may affect the [contractual] rights of counterparties, 
but the consequences are not fully spelled out in the insolvency legislation’).  
240 Blair (n 84) 274. 
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Coupling principle-based theories and corporate governance studies has so far 
achieved unsatisfactory results. Corporatist visions of the company have 
provided little guidance on the definition of the limits, content and objectives of 
the law. They simply offer ‘a mask behind which corporate managers exercise 
unrestrained social and economic power’.241 
The lack of satisfactory answers to these continuing concerns suggests the need 
to explore and design an alternative approach that can better balance these 
conflicting needs. Multi-value approaches may not necessarily entail the 
rejection of either proceduralist, ex-ante bargain models or no-insolvency 
propositions.242 Chapter five explores if it is possible to recognise a constitutive 
value to principle-based theories by combining them with other approaches. 
 
  
                                                                    
241 M Stokes, ‘Company Law and Legal Theory’, in W Twining (ed.), Legal Theory and Common 
Law (Blackwell: Hoboken, NJ, 1986) 180. 
242 Not all authors agree on this conclusion. Particularly critical of the bargain model and its 
compatibility with multi-value theories is RJ Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and 
Application (OUP: Oxford, 2005) 32-60. 
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CHAPTER 5 - A NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS 
«In most cases there is little or no doubt as to a company’s insolvency, but in 
marginal situations the basis of valuation and the assessment of values upon that 
basis can be crucial. Here lie the seeds of a potentially difficult problem»1 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
Chapter one introduced the notion of “insolvency law” used for the purposes of 
this thesis:  
the sector of the law that deals with the distress and restructuring 
(rectius: rescue) of ailing companies that include the discipline of any 
statutory mechanism that has the effect of giving either the debtor or 
their legal representative the power to unilaterally accept, disclaim or 
amend existing contracts to pursue the interests of the debtor’s 
‘owners’.2 
In chapters two to four, the author investigated if and to what extent the most 
commonly accepted theories of the foundations and framework of insolvency 
law restrict the use of insolvency remedies to only those cases that fall within 
the given definition. That question was answered in the negative.  
The de-constructivist analysis established that any theoretical explanation of 
the nature of this area of law shall encourage: 
1. Preservation - to the highest possible extent - of the autonomy of the 
parties [party autonomy objective]; 
2. Establishment of a system of rules and principles capable of promoting 
the efficient management and ensuring a predictable outcome of any 
insolvency case [legal predictability objective]; 
3. Recognition and protection of the legally enforceable interests of all the 
stakeholders who control the debtor [inclusivity objective]. 
                                                                    
1 RM Goode, ‘Wrongful Trading and the Balance Sheet Test of Insolvency’ (1989) 9 J. Bus. Law 
436, 438. 
2 Above sub-section 1.3(c) of this thesis. 
  242 
These theoretical findings provide some guidance in answering the second part 
of the research question of this thesis, i.e. to what extent and if at all should 
statutory insolvency rules and norms depart from the common law of contract 
as it applies to solvent companies.  
- 
Early Seventies: The United States.  
Businesses needed their small packages to be delivered within short time to any 
location in the country. This could only be achieved by means of an airfreight 
system. However, the existing providers were unreliable as they relied on 
passenger airlines and independent ground handling companies to handle the 
packages.3  
Fred Smith, the founder of Federal Express (‘FedEx’)4 revolutionised the market 
by developing a completely new concept of shipping that relied on the 
company’s own employees to collect the parcels and the company’s own 
airplanes to distribute them overnight throughout the States by means of a hub-
and-spokes network based in Memphis. 
Yet in the process of establishing this network the founder and the managing 
directors of the company faced many difficulties. While the company was 
incorporated in Delaware on 18 June 1971, it started operating only on 12 
March 1973 and the first day of operation was a colossal fiasco, with only six (!) 
parcels collected and delivered (on time).5 
For the first half of the decade the company experienced serious financial 
difficulties. FedEx was cash-flow insolvent to the extent that on several 
                                                                    
3 R Frock, Changing How the World Does Business. FedEx’s Incredible Journey to Success – The 
Inside Story (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc.: San Francisco, 2006) 11. 
4 Several books describe the events that marked the success of FedEx. Among others, it is worth 
mentioning: JC Wetherbe, The World On Time: The 11 Management Principles That Made FedEx 
an Overnight Sensation (Knowledge Exchange, 1996); MD Basch, Customer Culture: How FedEx 
and Other Great Companies Put the Customer First Every Day (Prentice Hall PTR: Upper Saddle 
River, NJ, 2003); Frock (n 3); M Birla, FedEx Delivers: How the World’s Leading Shipping 
Company Keeps Innovating and Outperforming the Competition (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: London, 
2013). 
5 Frock (n 3) ch. 14. The outcome of the first day of operation was so disappointing that the 
managers started referring to it as a “system test”, placed the packages that the company 
received in the following month on commercial flights and re-launched the service with an 
expanded network on 17 April 1973. 
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occasions employees were asked to not cash in their payroll cheques.6 The 
directors took any possible gamble to keep the company afloat, to the point that 
in a particularly desperate moment the founder used the remaining $5,000 
deposited on the company’s account at a casino in Las Vegas to get the money 
the company needed for the jet fuel payments.7 Finally, creditors were aware 
that there were not enough assets to repay their loans, to the extent that a local 
lender, ‘in a show of protecting its collateral’,8 ordered the company to ground 
the planes but agreed on checking that the fleet was “grounded” at mid-morning 
and early evening, thus de facto allowing the company to operate its midnight 
services.  
After this initial struggle, FedEx changed the way companies do business, and 
not only shipping ones. In fact, it allowed ‘established firms to expand their 
services… [and] smaller ones to look and act like corporate giants’.9 Nowadays, 
the company is successful and profitable.10 Yet are we sure that insolvency law 
should have played no role in this story? If the company had to rely on 
insolvency rules, should the application have been triggered by the 
ascertainment of the company’s cash flow insolvency? Should the stakeholders 
have relied on the alternative criteria of “risk”? Or should they had proven the 
existence of a “common pool” problem? 
This chapter addresses these questions and marks the passage to the 
operational part of this work. The author analyses the three possible 
alternatives mentioned above to determine when the provisions of this area of 
law should prevail over the general rules of the law of contract. These 
alternatives are “insolvency” (section 5.2), “risk” (section 5.3) and the 
“traditional common pool” approach (section 5.4) (collectively known as 
“standard requirements”).  
                                                                    
6 Frock (n 3) 107. 
7 Frock (n 3) 101. The gamble was successful, as Fred Smith won $27,000 and was therefore 
able to pay the $24,000 bill for the fuel.  
8 Ibid 106. 
9 Ibid 1. 
10 According to the latest available data, the company operates in more than 220 countries and 
territories, employs more than 225,000 people, deals with around 6 million packages daily, has 
a fleet of 670 aircrafts and more than 100,000 vehicles and annual revenues of $36.2 billion: 
<https://about.van.fedex.com/our-story/company-structure/express-fact-sheet/> accessed 16 
August 2018. 
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While it is submitted that no standard is perfect and that deviations from 
optimal results are to be expected, the key issue is whether the distortions and 
incentives to inefficiency and abusive or strategic behaviour are outweighed by 
opposite gains, such as enhanced legal predictability of the system, or more 
complete respect for the autonomy of the parties.  
Conclusions may vary greatly depending on the nature of the business and the 
relationship between lenders and borrowers. The mix of sophisticated and un-
sophisticated lenders, the duration and the size of the loans, the sector of the 
economy, the size and nature of the business, the existence of transaction costs 
are all factors that affect the valuation on the opportunity to rely on any of the 
above-mentioned standards. 
This chapter argues that none of the standard requirements can properly meet 
the objectives that emerged from the de-constructivist analysis of this thesis.  
This finding paves the way for investigating if an alternative eligibility 
requirement that considered risk bearer interests is better capable of 
determining the cases when distressed corporate entities ought to disregard the 
tenets of the general law of contract. 
 
5.2 “INSOLVENCY” 
5.2(a) The Idea of “Insolvency” 
A clear definition of insolvency (or, in the English version, “inability to pay 
debts”) is ‘fundamental’11 to any system of insolvency law. The FedEx case 
proves the validity of this statement. Yet, legislatures and judges have struggled 
so far to provide a flexible and sufficiently certain description of this concept.  
This section analyses the definitions of insolvency found in English and U.S. 
laws, suggested by the literature and applied by the courts to determine if the 
current understanding of this notion is consistent with the autonomy, 
predictability and inclusivity objectives suggested by the de-constructivist 
analysis of the theories that underpin these legal systems. 
                                                                    
11 Jeremy Hanley MP in the House of Commons debate on the Insolvency Act 1985: Hansard HC 
vol. 84 col. 686 (28 October 1985). 
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5.2(a)(i) The English Approach 
English law has always included a mix of specific and general circumstances 
under which creditors may petition for the opening of insolvency proceedings.12 
For instance, under the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844,13 although section IV 
described insolvency as a situation in which the company is ‘unable to meet its 
Engagements’, a creditor was entitled to petition for the debtor’s liquidation in 
other specific situations.14  
Currently, insolvency statutes do not offer a definition of insolvency, but only of 
the ‘inability to pay [the company’s] debts’.15 This condition shall exist to file for 
administration16 (other than for applications by a qualifying floating charge 
holder)17 or liquidation (other than solvent members’ voluntary liquidations). 
No legal consequences, however, attach to a debtor simply by reason of its 
inability to pay its debts.18 All consequences stem from the opening of an 
insolvency procedure.19  
The law distinguishes between “cash-flow” or “balance-sheet” insolvency. 
Nevertheless, as observed by Goode, there is ‘a remarkable dearth of English 
authority on the meaning and content of both the cash flow and the balance 
sheets tests of insolvency’.20 This pushed English judges look to other common 
                                                                    
12 For a history of the evolution of the English notion of “inability to pay debts”, see MS Wee, 
‘Misconceptions About the “unable to pay its debts” Ground of Winding Up’ (2014) L.Q.R. 648, 
650-669. 
13 An Act for facilitating the winding up of the Affairs of Joint Stock Companies unable to meet 
their pecuniary Engagements.  
14 These were the inability of the debtor to pay, secure, or compound for a judgment debt within 
14 days after notice requiring payment (s. V); the non-compliance with an order of a court of 
equity to pay a sum of money after service of order for payment on a peremptory day (s. VI); 
and where the creditor has filed a writ of summons for a debt and the debtor has not paid, 
secured or compounded the debt, or make arrangements to defend itself against the writ within 
one month from its service (s. VII).  
15 s.123 IA 1986. For the history of the development of this provision under English law, see: P 
Walton, ‘“Inability to Pay Debts”: Beyond the Point of No Return?’ (2013) 2 J. Bus. Law 212. 
16 para 11 Sch. B1 IA 1986.   
17 para 14 Sch. B1 IA 1986. 
18 V Finch and D Milman, Corporate Insolvency Law. Perspectives and Principles (3rd edn, CUP: 
Cambridge, 2017). 
19 As observed by Goode, ‘it is neither a criminal offence nor a civil wrong for a company to trade 
while insolvent’: RM Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell: 
London, 2011) 109. 
20 Ibid 113.   
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law jurisdictions to provide some guidance on the interpretation of this 
notion.21 
Under previous law, the concepts of cash-flow and balance-sheet insolvency 
were conflated.22 It was the 1986 Act which split these concepts for the first 
time. Cash-flow or commercial insolvency23 can be proven in five separate 
instances, two of which are applicable only in Northern Ireland24 and 
Scotland.25 The law facilitates the burden of proof on the creditor in two cases: 
(1) when the request for the payment of a debt exceeding £750 has been 
notified to the debtor and had not been paid for more than three weeks;26 and 
(2) if the execution procedure triggered by the court has returned even partially 
unsatisfied.27 At the same time, creditors can petition for the debtor’s 
insolvency whenever they prove to the satisfaction of the court that the 
company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due.28 While courts are generally 
reluctant to admit insolvency petitions on the basis of a single failure to pay a 
creditor,29 there have been exceptions.30  
Since the enactment of IA 1986,31 it had been contentious whether the cash-
flow inability to pay the debts should be only actual, or whether parties are 
                                                                    
21 See Briggs J (as he then was) in Re Cheyne Finance Plc (in receivership) [2007] EWHC 2402 
(Ch), [2008] All E.R. 987, [41]-[50].  
22 S.518(1)(e) of the Companies Act 1985 formerly read: ‘A company is deemed unable to pay its 
debts […] if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the company is unable to pay its debts 
and, in determining that question, the court shall take into account the company’s contingent and 
prospective liabilities’. 
23 Goode (n 19) [4-15]-[4-21]; McPherson & A Keay, The Law of Company Liquidation (4th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2018) [3-025]-[3-034]. 
24 s.123(1)(d): when a certificate of enforceability has been granted in respect of a judgment 
against a company. 
25 s.123(1)(c): when the induciae of a charge for payment on an extract decree, or an extract 
registered bond, or an extract registered protest, have expired without payment being made. 
26 s.123(1)(a) IA 1986.  
27 s.123(1)(b) IA 1986.  
28 s.123(1)(e).  
29 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc [2013] UKSC 28, [2013] 1 WLR 
1408 [25], albeit obiter.  
30 In Cornhill Insurance Plc v Improvement Services Ltd [1986] 2 B.C.C. 98 (Ch) the court refused 
to dismiss an insolvency petition against a well-known and apparently profitable company (at 
942), while in Re A Company [1950] 94 Sol. Jo. 369 the court held that delays in payment may 
engender a suspicion of financial embarrassment, even if towards a single creditor.  
31 While the Companies Act 1985, in 2.581(1)(e) (now repealed) expressly mentioned that 
inability to pay the debts could be determined by keeping into consideration contingent and 
prospective liabilities, s.123(1)(e) IA 1986 omits any reference to future liabilities.  
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entitled to rely on (contractual)32 contingent and prospective liabilities33 to 
prove the existence of a cash-flow insolvency. The current position was 
introduced by Briggs J (as he then was) in Cheyne Finance.34 After a lengthy 
analysis of the evolution of English law, of the then existing literature and of the 
case law in Australia, Briggs J concluded that: 
[C]ash flow or commercial insolvency is not to be ascertained by a 
slavish focus only on debts due at the relevant date. Such a blinkered 
review will, in some cases, fail to see that a momentary inability to pay 
is only the result of a temporary lack of liquidity soon to be remedied, 
and in other cases fail to see that due to an endemic shortage of 
working capital a company is on any commercial view insolvent […].35 
This position was approved by the U.K. Supreme Court in Eurosail.36 Eurosail, a 
special purpose entity set up by the Lehman Brothers group in the proximity of 
its collapse, issued loan notes to BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd (‘BNY’). The 
conditions attached to this transaction incorporated (with minor modifications) 
the provisions of s.123(1) and (2) IA 1986 and recognised to the noteholder 
(BNY) the power to enforce a notice and declare the notes “due and repayable” 
on the occurrence of certain specific events of default. The service of an 
enforcement notice had the effect of changing the priority among Eurosail’s 
claimants.  
After two other companies in the Lehman Brother group filed for protection 
under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Code, BNY sought the court’s direction as to 
whether the conditions of issue of the notes had occurred. In other words, the 
question concerned the interpretation and effect of s.123(1)(e) and (2) IA 1986. 
At first instance, the judge held that the conditions set out in s.123(1)(e) had 
not occurred because the assets to be valued for the cash-flow test were only 
                                                                    
32 As observed by the literature, any reliance on liabilities that might incur from the operation of 
the business would amount to speculation and should therefore be dismissed: B Parker and M 
Buckley, Buckley on the Companies Act (Butterworths: London, 1981) 535.  
33 Contingent liabilities are debts that arise whenever a certain event or condition occurs, while 
prospective liabilities are contractual debts owed at a certain time in the future.  
34 Cheyne Finance (n 21) [28]-[51]. 
35 Cheyne Finance (n 21) [51].  
36 BNY v Eurosail (n 29) 1423. 
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the present assets of the company, without considering any contingent or 
prospective liabilities.37 The Court of Appeal upheld the Chancellor’s decision.38  
The Chancellor and the Court of Appeal justified the need to consider only 
present assets and liabilities to differentiate the tests introduced with the 
Insolvency Act 1985 (‘IA 1985’) – which added the words “as they fall due” to 
s.123(1)(e) and a direct reference to the company’s future assets and liabilities 
only in the balance-sheet test of s.123(2). Yet, the Supreme Court was not 
persuaded by this material difference in the law. The Supreme judges looked at 
academic commentaries39 and the history of the passage through Parliament of 
the Insolvency Bill in 1985 to conclude that the difference of form in the revised 
provision of s.123(1)(e) made little significant change in the law apart from 
emphasizing that the cash-flow test was concerned with debts falling due in the 
near future.40 
The pre-IA 1985 insolvency test required account to be taken of contingent and 
prospective liabilities.41 Therefore, on appeal by the appellant noteholders, the 
Supreme Court held that the test in s.123(1)(e) IA 1986 ‘was concerned not 
simply with the petitioner’s own presently-due debt […] but also with debts falling 
                                                                    
37 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc [2010] EWHC 2005 (Ch), 
[2011] 1 WLR 1200. The court also concluded, after an analysis of the relevant facts of the case, 
that the company was not balance-sheet insolvent. For an analysis of the decision, see: M 
Griffiths and others, ‘BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail UK 2007-3BL and others: 
The High Court Clarifies the Balance Sheet Insolvency Test’ (2011) 8(2) Int. C.R. 152 (focusing 
on the relevance of this decision for the balance-sheet test); D Henderson, ‘Inability to Pay 
Debts: Where Are We Now?’ (2011) 24(4) Insolv. Int. 54; S Lewin, ‘Net Liabilities + Post 
Enforcement Call Option = Balance Sheet Insolvency? Lessons from Eurosail’ (2010) 3(6) C.R. & 
I. 239. 
38 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc [2011] EWCA Civ 227, [2011] 
1 WLR 2524. For an analysis of the decision, see: C Cooke, ‘Balance Sheet Insolvency: A 
Commercial Approach’ (2011) 8(3) Int. C.R. 228; S Duncan, ‘Upsetting the Balance’ (2013) 
163(7547) N.L.J. 135. 
39 In particular: Walton (n 15). 
40 BNY v Eurosail (n 29) 1424 at [37]. This conclusion clashes with Walton’s observation that, 
pursuant to the decision in European Life (Re European Life Assurance Society (1869) LR 9 Eq 
122) and the Cork Committee’s recommendations, the cash-flow test took no account of future 
or contingent liabilities, as these were relevant only for a balance-sheet test: Walton (n 15) 230. 
41 The Supreme Court considered in particular the following cases: Re Capital Annuities Ltd 
[1979] 1 WLR 170; Re A Company (No. 006794 of 1983) [1986] BCLC 261; Byblos Bank SAL v Al-
Khudhairy [1987] BCLC 232 (CA).  
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due from time to time in what was, depending on all circumstances, but especially 
the nature of the company’s business, the reasonably near future’.42 
The Eurosail approach is currently generally applied by the courts.43 As a result, 
it is nowadays possible to claim that the words “as they fall due” in s.123(1)(e) 
IA 1986 transform the cash-flow test in a flexible and fact sensitive requirement 
to which balance-sheet insolvency is not irrelevant. The analysis of cash-flow 
insolvency shall not be carried out mechanistically but in a manner that has 
regard to commercial reality.44 
The balance-sheet or absolute test of insolvency45 is described as the situation 
in which the debtor’s assets are worth less than its contingent and prospective 
liabilities.46 Simply proving that a company is cash-flow solvent does not 
authorize the exclusion of a balance-sheet test: a company may be declared 
insolvent even if it is paying its debts as they fall due because its liabilities 
(including contingent and prospective ones) exceed its assets.47 
Together with s.123(1) IA 1986, the balance-sheet test is – albeit not at face 
value – a deeming provision, i.e. ‘a section or clause of a statute, regulation or 
other legal instrument that explicitly states how something is to be treated or 
regarded’.48 In other words, the court does not need to be satisfied with the 
company actually being unable to pay its debts, but only with the conditions set 
out in the law are met.49  
                                                                    
42 BNY v Eurosail (n 29) 1424. The Supreme Court also observed that once the court had to 
move beyond the reasonably near future, any attempt to apply the cash-flow test would become 
speculative and the only sensible approach would be the balance-sheet insolvency test. For an 
analysis of the decision, see: R Fisher, ‘Eurosail and Balance Sheet Insolvency: Are We Any 
Clearer?’ (2013) 6(4) C.R. & I. 83; D Allison, ‘The Supreme Court Decision in Eurosail’ (2013) 
10(5) Int. C.R. 288; H Anderson, ‘Six of the Best: The Record of the Supreme Court in the 
Insolvency Cases Decided in its First Four Years’ (2014) J. Bus. Law 194; N Ayres, ‘The Eurosail 
Ship has Sailed… and Left Muddied Waters in its Wake’ (2014) 7(2) C.R. & I. 66. 
43 Re HLC Environmental Projects Ltd [2013] EWHC 2876 (Ch), [2014] BCC 337 [81]; Evans v 
Jones [2016] EWCA Civ 660, [2017] Ch. 1. 
44 Re Rococo Developments Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 660, [2017] Ch. 1, [24]. 
45 Goode (n 19) [4-22]-[4-39]; McPherson & Keay (n 23) [3-035]-[3-038]. 
46 s.123(2) IA 1986.  
47 Re Casa Estates (UK) Ltd (in liq.) [2014] EWCA Civ 383, [2014] BCC 269. 
48 "deeming provision, n." (Oxford Reference, OUP 2018), 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095706405#> 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
49 Walker LJ observed that s.123(1)(e) and (2) are not really deeming provisions: BNY v Eurosail 
(n 29) 1419 at [25].  
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This situation requires a deep or at least reasonable knowledge of the 
company’s affairs and financial statements. Usually, only insiders (such as 
directors and shareholders) are in possession of this piece of information. 
Alongside with the added complexity that an application for balance-sheet 
insolvency entails over a more straightforward cash-flow petition, insolvency 
orders based on this ground are comparatively less frequent.  
Perhaps to facilitate the burden of proof on the creditors in a balance-sheet 
petition, courts have clarified that the test shall include contingent and 
prospective liabilities,50 but not contingent and prospective assets,51 while the 
statutory notion of “liability”52 offered by the legislator is broader than the 
notion of “debt” (which is relevant for the cash-flow insolvency test).  
At the same time, the existence of a net liability in the company’s balance sheet 
is not in itself sufficient to determine the existence of a balance-sheet 
insolvency. In the appeal case of Eurosail, Lord Neuberger MR – borrowing from 
the findings of the Cork Report53 – held that a company could be declared 
balance sheet insolvent only when it has reached the ‘end of the road’, the ‘point 
of no return’.54 In other words, it was held that balance sheet insolvency 
occurred only whenever the company used its assets and cash to fund current 
operations in a manner that would deceive the trust of future and contingent 
creditors.55  
Walker LJ – while not reaching divergent conclusions from the lower courts on 
the Eurosail dispute56 – rightly “scaled down” this threshold, which would 
                                                                    
50 The balance-sheet test, however, remains the only applicable test once the court has to move 
beyond the near future: BNY v Eurosail (n 29) [37]; K Baird and P Sidle, ‘Cash Flow Insolvency’ 
(2008) 21 Insolv. Int. 40. 
51 Byblos Bank v Al-Khudhairy (n 41).  
52 Pursuant to r.14.1(6) Insolvency Rules 2016 (‘IR 2016’), the notion of “liability” includes ‘any 
liability under an enactment, any liability for breach of trust, any liability in contract, tort or 
bailment, and any liability arising out of an obligation to make restitution’. According to r.14.1(5) 
IR 2016, it is immaterial whether the liability is present or future, certain or contingent, fixed, 
liquidated or subject to determination.  
53 K Cork, ‘Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice’ (1982) Cmnd 8558 
para 216. 
54 BNY v Eurosail (n 38) [48]. 
55 Henderson (n 37) 56. 
56 The Supreme Court dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal and agreed – albeit for 
different reasons – with the lower courts’ judgments that Eurosail was not insolvent according 
to the meaning of s.123(1)(e) and (2) IA 1986. 
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otherwise have been hardly compatible with the purposes of the administration 
procedure as described in para 3, Sch. B1 IA 1986.57 He replaced the “point-of-
no-return” test suggested by Neuberger with the “balance of probabilities test”, 
thus making it somehow easier for applicants to prove the existence of a 
situation of balance-sheet insolvency58 (unless, as in the Eurosail case, the 
liabilities could be deferred for over 30 years).   
Nevertheless, the burden of proving the existence of balance-sheet insolvency is 
still on the petitioning party.59 This conclusion has been previously criticised by 
some commentators,60 who also suggested that court should follow the more 
“mechanic” approach introduced by James V.C.’s judgment in European Life61 to 
assess the balance-sheet solvency of a company. The European Life test shares 
some similarities with the “point-of-no-return” test advocated by Neuberger MR 
in the Eurosails appeal.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Eurosail represents the authority under 
English law to determine when a company is balance-sheet insolvent. While 
recent cases highlighted that the cash-flow and balance-sheet insolvency tests 
shall remain separate,62 they also stressed that they are linked as matters which 
affect one shall also be considered to determine the other. As some 
commentators rightly observed, elements of futurity must be considered in 
both tests, with the result that they are linked in ‘some sort of continuum from 
the immediate to the long-term future’63 and cannot be considered in isolation.64  
It still appears that courts shall ‘look at the company’s finances from a 
commercial and overall perspective and consider the facts of each case’65 to 
                                                                    
57 BNY v Eurosail (n 29).  
58 IF Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2017) 639. 
59 BNY v Eurosail (n 29) 1424 at [37].  
60 Walton (n 15) 236 (arguing that courts should give a present-day value to assets and future 
and continent liabilities to determine if a company is balance-sheet insolvent). 
61 European Life (n 40).  According to this decision, courts should not consider any liabilities, 
which is not immediately payable unless it is reasonably certain that the existing and probable 
assets will be insufficient to meet the existing liabilities. Possible liabilities or profits which may 
accrue in respect of future business are not considered. 
62 Casa Estates (n 47) and HLC (n 43). 
63 Anderson (n 42) 197. 
64 Ayres (n 42) (arguing that this approach was followed by English courts in the cases of Casa 
Estates and HLC).  
65 McPherson & Keay (n 23) 112. See also BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA [2016] EWHC 1686 (Ch), 
[2017] Bus. L.R. 82 (the court’s focus was on commercial analysis, not a strict accounting test). 
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determine if a debtor is balance sheet insolvent. This, combined with the fact 
that judges shall discount future and contingent liabilities66 and that not all 
contingent liabilities should be considered,67 results in a reduced predictability 
of the outcomes of the balance sheet test.  
5.2(a)(ii) The American Approach 
In the U.S., the U.S. Code (U.S.C.) defines “insolvency” as the: 
financial condition such that the sum of such entity’s debts is greater 
than all of such entity’s property, at a fair valuation, exclusive of— 
(i) property transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud such entity’s creditors; and 
(ii) property that may be exempted from property of the estate 
under section 522 of [11 U.S. Code].68 
Special definitions of insolvency apply to partnerships69 and municipalities.70 
It seems therefore that the U.S. system relies on a balance-sheet only definition 
of insolvency.71 However, insolvency represents an eligibility requirement only 
to file for one of the formal insolvency procedures listed in the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code, i.e. Chapter 9.72 For all other procedures, the only requirement set out in 
the law is that the entity against which the procedure is to be opened is a 
“debtor” according to the definition (and the limitations) provided by §.109(a)-
(h) 11 U.S. Code,73 even if confirmation of a plan can be denied if the plan has 
not been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by the law.74  
                                                                    
66 BNY v Eurosail (n 29) [137]. However, no guidance is given on how that would be done.  
67 Evans v Jones (n 43). 
68 11 U.S. Code, §.101(32)(A).  
69 11 U.S. Code, §.101(32)(B). 
70 11 U.S. Code, §.101(32)(C).   
71 Re Best Buy Drugs, Inc., 89 B.R. 997 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988): ‘The Bankruptcy Code definition of 
“insolvent” [is] the balance sheet definition’; Re Eddy, No. 6:12-BK-04736-CCJ, 2015 WL 1585513 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2015), at *10: ‘The Bankruptcy Code's definition of insolvency is 
essentially a balance sheet test: a debtor is insolvent when its liabilities exceed it assets based upon 
a market value and not distress value’. 
72 §.109(C)(3) 11 U.S. Code. Before the 1978 Act, a company had to be insolvent before it could 
file for bankruptcy protection.  
73 According to this section and subject to the specifications included in sub-sections (b) to (h), 
‘only a person that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United States, 
or a municipality, may be a debtor under this title’. Re Hogard, 43 B.R. 590 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
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Chapter 9 is the procedure that deals with municipalities in distress. According 
to §.101(40) 11 U.S. Code, the term “municipality” refers to any political 
subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a State. However, the notion 
of insolvency that is relevant to open a Chapter 9 procedure differs from the 
general definition reported above. Under §.101(32)(C), a municipality is 
insolvent if it is: 
(i) generally not paying its debts as they become due unless such debts 
are the subject of a bona fide dispute; or 
(ii) unable to pay its debts as they become due. 
As a result, only cash-flow insolvency is relevant in the U.S. to determine if a 
debtor can file for a formal insolvency procedure.75  
It is therefore possible to observe that U.S. law places little emphasis on the 
condition of the debtor to open a formal insolvency procedure because the 
legislator has always intended the Code as an instrument to promote trade, 
restore the confidence of the parties in the system and reinstate honest but 
unfortunate debtors to a condition where they could again contribute to the 
economic growth of the country.76  
Cash-flow and balance-sheet insolvency are the notions most frequently used 
all over the world to determine when a company can file for a formal 
insolvency procedure.  
A cash-flow test is adopted in jurisdictions such as France, where a company is 
declared insolvent (“en état de cessation des paiements”77) when it is unable to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
1984): ‘There is no requirement that Chapter 7 debtor satisfy Bankruptcy Code definition of 
“insolvent”’. For an analysis of debtor eligibility requirements, see: BA Blum, Bankruptcy and 
Debtor/Creditor (6th edn, Wolters Kluwer: London, 2014) 173-184; CJ Tabb and R Brubaker, 
Bankruptcy Law: Principles, Policies, and Practice (4th edn, LexisNexis: London, 2015) 74.  
74 §.11129(a)(3) 11 U.S. Code. 
75 Re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332 (Bkrtcy. D. Conn. 1991): ‘Determination of whether city is 
“insolvent” as required to be eligible for Chapter 9 relief relies on cash flow analysis, rather than 
budget deficiency analysis’. 
76 C Warren, Bankruptcy in the United States History (BeardBooks, 1999) 17 (describing the 
debate that brought to the inclusion of a bankruptcy clause in the U.S. Constitution and the 
approval of a federal law on the subject).  
77 Article L. 631-1 of the Code du Commerce. 
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meet its current debts out of its current assets.78 The same approach is followed 
in Italy, where companies can be admitted to liquidation if they are insolvent 
(“in uno stato d’insolvenza”).79 At the same time, the Italian insolvency law 
allows companies that are in a condition of financial distress (“stato di crisi”)80 
to petition for the opening of a formal rescue procedure and France employs 
several pre-insolvency procedures that are open to non-insolvent entities.  
Judges in Australia rely only on the cash-flow test to determine when a 
company is insolvent, even if balance-sheet considerations are sometimes taken 
into account.81 It should be observed, however, that Australian law does not 
include a balance-sheet test for insolvency.82 The same statutory and 
interpretative approach is followed in Singapore where the law prescribes that 
a company shall be actually cash-flow insolvent to be wound up83 (even if 
courts can wind up a company on just and equitable grounds).84 However, to be 
admitted to judicial management (a rescue procedure), the company can only 
prove that it is likely to become cash-flow insolvent,85 thus introducing an 
element of futurity in the cash-flow test (similar to the approach of Briggs J in 
Cheyne Finance).  
Other jurisdictions adopt both a cash-flow and a balance-sheet test. This is the 
case in Germany, where debtors can petition for the opening of a formal 
insolvency procedure if they are in one of the following three situations: (1) 
                                                                    
78 It should be noted, however, that some formal French insolvency procedures do not require 
the proof or existence of a state of cash-flow insolvency to be opened, similarly to what happens 
in the U.S. For a brief description of the main insolvency procedures available under French law, 
see E Ghio, ‘National Report for France’ in J Chuah and E Vaccari (eds), Treatment of Executory 
Contracts in Insolvency Law: A Transnational Study (EE Publishing: Cheltenham, 2019) 
Manuscript submitted for publication. 
79 Art. 5 Legge Fallimentare (Royal Decree no. 267/1942). While the Italian law adopts a purely 
cash-flow approach to determine if a debtor is insolvent, the Supreme Court clarified that this 
condition shall be structural (and not simply temporary) and that judges should consider if 
future and contingent liabilities would determine an inability to pay the debts in the near future. 
See Cass. Civ. no. 5215/2008 <http://mobile.ilcaso.it/sentenze/ultime/1970> accessed 17 
September 2018.  
80 Art. 160 Legge Fallimentare (Royal Decree no. 267/1942), as amended by Law Decree no. 
35/2005.   
81 McPherson & Keay (n 23) 99. 
82 Pursuant to s.95A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ‘(1) A person is solvent if, and only if, the 
person is able to pay all the person’s debts, as and when they become due and payable.  (2) A 
person who is not solvent is insolvent’.  
83 Art. 254(1)(e) CA 2006. 
84 Art. 254(1)(i) CA 2006. 
85 Art. 227A CA 2006.  
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insolvency (“Zahlungsunfähikeit” - cash-flow test); (2) imminent insolvency 
(“Drohende Zahlungsunfähigkeit”); and (3) over-indebtedness (“Überschuldung” 
- balance-sheet test).86 This is also the case in Canada, where debtors and 
creditors can petition for a liquidation or reorganisation procedure if they are 
insolvent on either a cash-flow or balance-sheet basis.87  
Sometimes the insolvency test is linked to further requirements, such as that 
the amount owed to the creditor exceeds a certain threshold (Canada, as well as 
Italy).88  
It is thus possible to observe that the notion of insolvency is not interpreted in a 
uniform way across jurisdictions and it is not limited to the cash-flow or 
balance-sheet approach favoured by English and American courts.  
It has therefore been correctly observed with reference to the English tradition 
(but similar valuations apply to the U.S. background) that ‘there is no simple 
objective point in corporate affairs when the law states that the company is 
insolvent’.89 As the law is more concerned in defining procedures which apply 
whenever vaguely defined events occur, a number of concerned parties (but, 
particularly, accountants)90 have the power to manipulate corporate filings. 
5.2(b) Literature Review on the “Insolvency” Standard 
This section focuses more on the English rather than the American literature, as 
in the States courts are concerned primarily in checking if the filing has been 
submitted in bona fide.   
Scholars commenting on the nature, scope and clarity of the notion of 
insolvency do not appear overly concerned with the lack of uniformity across 
jurisdictions and they rarely question the opportunity that a separate system of 
                                                                    
86 Sections 17-19 of the German Insolvency Act (“Insolvenzordnung“). For a more detailed 
analysis of the eligibility requirements under German law, see V Buttafuoco, ‘National Report 
for Germany’ in J Chuah and E Vaccari (eds), Treatment of Executory Contracts in Insolvency Law: 
A Transnational Study (EE Publishing: Cheltenham, 2019) Manuscript submitted for publication. 
87 Article 2, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.  
88 Art. 15 Legge Fallimentare (Royal Decree no. 267/1942).  
89 Finch and Milman (n 18) 122. 
90 On the role of accountants and other concerned parties in determining corporate failure: P 
Miller and M Power, ‘Calculating Corporate Failure’ in Y Dezalay and D Sugarman (eds), 
Professional Competition and Professional Power: Lawyers, Accountants and the Social 
Construction of Markets (Routledge: London, 1995). 
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rules applies only to insolvent debtors.91 On the contrary, some of them praise 
the adoption of flexible paradigms,92 especially when judicial discretion is used 
to redress substantial injustice (e.g. when the debtor tries to exploit its 
dominant position on the market to unduly postpone payments to some of its 
key suppliers or traders).  
Others praise more recent developments and their impact on the voidability of 
antecedent transactions. Particularly, they commend that the commercial 
approach now adopted by courts does not result in making life easier to those 
who might want to exploit the lack of prescriptive nature of the law. For 
instance, connected parties face an evidential challenge to defeat the 
presumption of a cash-flow insolvency.93  
The author, however, disagrees with this latter line of thinking. Specifically, 
with reference to voidable transactions, the commercial view has rendered it 
even more challenging for insolvency office-holders to determine when a 
company is insolvent (or became insolvent as a result of a transaction). 
Establishing the (in)solvency of the company is key to challenge any 
transaction.94 The little clarification provided by English courts in Re Casa95 and 
BTI 201496 applies to a very narrow number of cases: cash-flow insolvencies 
regulated by s.123(a) and (b) and transactions to connected parties.  
More in general, while discretion and flexibility are needed to achieve the 
purposes of the law, their use becomes abusive and unjustifiable when it is 
made without any connection to them. Excessive reliance on discretion, 
especially if compared with the more nuanced use of this prerogative in other 
                                                                    
91 RV Butler and SM Gilpatric, ‘A Re-Examination of the Purposes and Goals of Bankruptcy’ 
(1994) 2 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 269, arguing that mechanisms for debt collection designed for 
insolvent debtors would be too costly to apply to solvent debtors.  
92 McPherson & Keay (n 23) 101; D Shah, ‘Victory for Common Sense’ (2013) 150 Accountancy 
61. 
93 H Capani, ‘Balance Sheet Insolvency and Antecedent Transactions: A Win for Officeholders?’ 
(2016) 9(5) C.R. & I. 189. 
94 s.240(2) IA 1986. 
95 Casa Estates (n 47). 
96 BTI v Sequana (n 65). 
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contexts,97 may suggest a certain degree of unease and dissatisfaction with the 
current insolvency standard.  
The author’s position is not isolated in the academic debate. Other scholars 
observed that the analysis of whether a company is insolvent is a difficult one 
and that the decisions in Cheyne98 and Eurosail99 (which was held against a 
“closed” company with no real trade business activity) may have added a layer 
of complexity to the system.100 In other words, ‘matters are not […] quite as 
straightforward as was once thought’.101 
This is because these cases de facto introduced an element of futurity in all the 
circumstances in which courts must determine if a company is (in)solvent, 
while in the past this applied only to balance-sheet orders. Additionally, with 
reference to the balance-sheet test, Walker LJ failed to deliver any guidance on 
how to consider contingent and prospective liabilities. This controversial aspect 
may generate further litigation.102  
As a result, creditors of trading companies will rely more on s.123(1)(a) or (b) 
to obtain an insolvency order which could - even if insolvency was proven - be 
denied by the court applying a holistic, commercial approach to the evaluation 
of the “inability to pay debts” ground.  
5.2(c) The Purpose of “Insolvency” 
The previous sections have been instrumental to define the notion of 
“insolvency”. How does this help us? In other words, does the definition of 
“insolvency” promote legal predictability, party autonomy and inclusivity? 
                                                                    
97 This is particularly true for English courts, which admit the use of discretionary powers in 
business cases only when it would be unconscionable to allow the negotiated act or condition to 
take effect (‘unconscionability test’). See: Re Lundy Granite Co [1870-71] L.R. 6 Ch. App. 462, 
followed by, among others: Re MK Airlines Ltd (in liq.) [2012] EWHC 2764 (Ch), [2012] 3 All E.R. 
781; Jervis v Pillar Denton Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 180, [2015] Ch. 87. 
98 Cheyne Finance (n 21). 
99 BNY v Eurosail (n 29). 
100 Walton (n 15) 235; Ayres (n 42); Wee (n 12); MS Wee, ‘Understanding Commercial 
Insolvency and its Justifications as a Test for Winding Up’ (2015) 1 LMCLQ 62.   
101 Walton (n 15) 212 (commenting on the mainstream view in the academia that determining 
when a company is cash-flow or balance-sheet insolvent is relatively un-problematic in the 
majority of cases).  
102 D Allison, ‘The continuing search for the meaning of s 123(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986: The 
Supreme Court decision in Eurosail’ (2013) 28(8) B.J.I.B. & F.L. 492, 496. 
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Legal predictability (sometimes improperly referred as “legal certainty”) is 
often mentioned as a mechanism to promote business activity and economic 
growth103 and as a fundamental objective of insolvency practice.104 Legal 
predictability is not directly concerned with the substance of the law.105 It 
requires that similar cases are treated alike, both in the law and – more 
importantly – by the judiciary, and that this consistency is perceived by 
prospective litigants.  
Consistency in the adjudication process is therefore an essential feature of legal 
predictability.106 Predictability is often seen as competing with flexibility but in 
reality, some degree of flexibility is necessary to allow courts to apply the law in 
cases not expressly mentioned in the statutes and to avoid preposterous 
results.107 
It is clear from the way in which “insolvency” has been understood by both the 
judiciary and the jurisprudence that this concept has not been designed to 
promote flexibility rather than predictability.108 It does not come as a surprise 
that several authors argue that one of the primary drawbacks that stems from 
the use of the insolvency paradigm is its lack of finality and its vagueness.109  
Even when the creditor proves that the company is insolvent, the debtor can 
still rely on the discretion of the court not to grant the requested order.110 In 
particular, in Demaglass111 Neuberger J (as he then was) held that while unpaid 
                                                                    
103 MA Clarke and others, Commercial law: Text, Cases and Materials (5th edn, OUP: Oxford, 2017) 
10: ‘Businessmen have special needs. […] They require the decisions of the courts on commercial 
issues to be predictable so that they know where they stand’. 
104 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of 20 May 2015 of the European Parliament and the Council on 
insolvency proceedings (recast) [2015] OJ L141/19, recital 67: ‘[t]o protect legitimate 
expectations and the certainty of transactions in Member States […]’. 
105 This point was made by Masfield LJ in Vallejo v Wheeler (1774) 1 Cowp 143, 153. 
106 I MacNeil, ‘Uncertainty in Commercial Law’ (2009) 13(1) Edinburgh L. Rev. 68, 69. 
107 Goode once observed that ‘the man of affairs wishes to have his cake and eat it; to be given 
predictability on one hand and flexibility to accommodate new practices and developments on the 
other’: RM Goode, ‘The Codification of Commercial Law’ (1988) 14 Monash U.L.R. 135, 150. 
108 Cheyne Finance (n 21) per Briggs J at [56]: ‘the effect of the alterations to the insolvency test 
[…] was to replace in the commercial solvency test now in s.123(1)(e) one futurity requirement […] 
with another more flexible and fact sensitive requirement’.  
109A Keay and P Walton, Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal. (3rd edn, Jordan Publishing: 
London, 2012) 16; Finch and Milman (n 18) 119; D Milman, ‘Test of Commercial Insolvency 
Rejected’ (1983) 4 Comp. Law. 231. 
110 s.125(1) IA 1986. See Byblos Bank v Al-Khudhairy (n 41). 
111 Re Demaglass Holdings Ltd (in liq.) [2002] EWHC 3138 (Ch), [2003] 1 BCLC 412. 
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creditors usually have the right to a winding up order,112 (at least) in case of an 
opposed petition they have to establish the possibility of some benefit from the 
winding up.113 The fact that the majority in value of creditors support the 
making of a winding up order is not in itself decisive for granting the order.114 
Discretion is a double-edged sword. Where Neuberger used it to restrict the 
cases when a winding up order is made, others have used it to extend the 
situations in which formal insolvency procedures can be opened. In fact, it was 
observed that, even when the debtor proves that the company is cash-flow 
solvent, the judge can still admit an insolvency petition on the basis that the 
company is balance-sheet insolvent.115  
The discretion of the court also applies to a number of essential elements which 
are needed to determine if a company is insolvent. Courts may (or may not) 
look at contingent and prospective liabilities. If they did look at them, there is 
no guidance on the time period they will look at for future liabilities, as this 
depends on the circumstances of the case.116 With reference to contingent 
liabilities, there is equally no guidance on the degree of probability required to 
prove the future event that may determine the existence of the debt.  
Secondly, predictability is further tarnished by the fact that the perceived 
centrality of the notion of insolvency as an eligibility requirement is misleading. 
Despite Cork’s recommendation that ‘the sole ground upon which the Court may 
make an Insolvency Order in respect of a debtor, whether individual or corporate, 
will be that the debtor is unable to pay his or its debts’,117 insolvency law 
remedies can be triggered by companies that are not insolvent. This is proven 
by the statutory discipline of schemes of arrangement,118 CVAs,119 
                                                                    
112 See also Bove v The Hope Life Insurance and Guarantee Company [1865] 11 HLC. 
113 See also Re Crigglestone Coal Company Limited [1906] 2 Ch 327. 
114 Warning of the risks of ‘bad’ discretion, see Goode, who wrote that ‘discretion must be 
exercised in accordance with settled principles and there is a presumption that a creditor in 
respect of an undisputed debt is entitled to a winding up order ex debito justitiae’: Goode (n 19) 
121. 
115 Casa Estates (n 47). 
116 BNY v Eurosail (n 29) [37].  
117 Cork Report (n 53) para 535. 
118 S.895 CA 2006. 
119 Part I, IA 1986. 
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administration,120 MVLs under English law and all the bankruptcy procedures 
in the U.S. Code (with the sole exception of Chapter 9). Unsurprisingly, the 
recent proposal on preventive restructuring mechanisms drafted by the 
European Commission does not mention insolvency as an eligibility 
requirement.121 
Not only has insolvency never been the sole ground to petition for the opening 
of an insolvency case, but also the application of this concept ‘in individual cases 
can be both vexed and difficult’.122 This is because the uniform and harmonised 
understanding of other concepts essentially intertwined with the notion of 
insolvency (such as “debt” and “credit”) can prove equally troublesome.  
For instance, should the notion of “debt” include unliquidated claims or debts 
for which the creditors themselves have agreed on an extension of time to repay 
them? Should positive assets include only cash and easily realisable goods, or 
should they be extended to any good owned by the company that is liable to 
economic evaluation, and to any loans that the company/debtor may obtain in 
the near future? In case of an affirmative answer, should a time limit for the 
realisation of assets, or for obtaining new finance be considered? What should 
the treatment of leased goods, or of goods in the possession of a company under 
a ROT clause be like? What should the position of the court be when there are 
conflicting and equally reasonable views on the valuation of assets, estimation 
of liabilities and determination of the company’s (in)solvency?123 
                                                                    
120 While this paper highlighted that an applicant shall be ‘insolvent’ to be admitted to 
administration, this eligibility requirement only applies to administration orders made by the 
court, with the significant exception of applications made by the holders of a qualifying floating 
charge. The company and its directors also have the opportunity to place a company in 
administration out of court, with the result that the eligibility requirement is not preliminary 
tested by the competent judge.  
121 Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of 
restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU’ (22 
November 2016) COM(2016) 723 final, 2016/0359 (COD) art. 2 (“likelihood of insolvency”), as 
recently amended by the EU Parliament in a report published on 21 August 2018: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-
2018-0269+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN> accessed 17 September 2018. 
122 The Bell Group Ltd (in liq.) v Westpac Banking Corp (No.9) [2008] WASC 239 [1064] per Owen 
J.  
123 Goode (n 1) 439. 
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It is rather unsurprising therefore to observe that both scholars (and even 
those124 who showed a positive attitude towards the insolvency standard) and 
courts125 recognise that the insolvency standard is prone to determine a 
sizeable degree of uncertainty in the parties (and, as a consequence, in the 
business).  
The concept of party autonomy – one of the main features of commercial and 
contract law –126 generally refers to the possibility for parties to agree on the 
rules that will govern their transactions and affairs.127 As a result, party 
autonomy can be considered as an expression of the more general principle of 
freedom of contract but it may sit at odds with legal certainty. 
It is to be observed that the current Anglo-Saxon understanding of the notion of 
insolvency does not restrict any of the parties (but particularly the debtor) to 
file for the application of insolvency remedies when they see fit, or when 
otherwise contractually agreed with some of the creditors. 
Even when insolvency is the primary ground to promote the opening of an 
insolvency procedure (a circumstance which applies only to English 
procedures), this is never the only one. Not only debtors and companies can 
voluntarily file for insolvency on other grounds, for instance when the company 
is solvent.128 Creditors also have the right to rely on the just and equitable 
ground in s.122(1)(g) IA 1986 to challenge the existence of the company and 
petition for the opening of the liquidation procedure.129 
Inclusivity refers to the opportunity granted to all stakeholders to exercise 
participation rights and to the expectation that the person presiding over the 
                                                                    
124 McPherson & Keay (n 23) 107 and 116. 
125 Bacon VC Re London & Manchester Industrial Association [1875] 1 Ch. D. 466, 472.  
126 Goode (n 107) 148; SC Symeonides, ‘Party Autonomy in International Contracts and the 
Multiple Ways of Slicing the Apple’ (2014) 39(3) Brook. J. Int’l L. 1123. 
127 JL Yap, ‘Predictability, Certainty, and Party Autonomy in the Sale and Supply of Goods’ 
(2017) 46(4) C.W.L.R. 269, 270. 
128 This is the case of members’ voluntary winding up, regulated by s.89-96 IA 1986.   
129 Re Dollar Land Holdings Plc [1993] BCC 823 (Ch); Bell Group Finance (Pty) Ltd (in liq.) v Bell 
Group (UK) Holdings Ltd [1996] BCC 505 (Ch); Morrice v Brae Hotel (Shetland) Ltd [1997] BCC 
670 (Court of Session).  
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insolvency procedure represents their interest and is held accountable for the 
failure to do so.130 
The use of market-based tests means that inclusivity is not properly considered, 
as no space is given to value-driven considerations, which are essential to 
determine who the residual risk bearers are. At the same time, the 
implementation of a market-based approach to determine the (in)solvency of a 
company is also problematic for the contracting parties. This is because there is 
little guidance, in case law, on whether valuations of the debtor’s assets, debts 
and liabilities should be made on the basis of a going concern or break-up sale 
and how commodities with no established market value should be 
considered.131  
In England, the situation is further complicated by the presence of different 
insolvency tests in the law.132 Additionally, insolvency has been understood as 
predominantly a question of fact,133 that requires evidential and practical 
considerations to be determined. Judges may not be the most qualified parties 
to investigate this notion as a commercial valuation of the company’s business 
requires mastering some basic concepts of economics, finance and statistics.134  
Furthermore, the meaning of “question of fact” is in itself misleading. Does it 
mean that judges are required to investigate the financial situation of the 
debtor? This approach might be followed in civil law countries, but not in the 
market-driven jurisdictions such as the U.S. and the U.K., where judges should 
only decide the insolvency question on assumed facts.135  
                                                                    
130 S Frisby, ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) 67(2) M.L.R. 247, 
250. 
131 Finch and Milman (n 18) 120. On how to compute assets and liabilities, see Goode (n 19) [4-
32]-[4-39]. 
132 Autonomous definitions are included in the Company Directors’ Disqualification Act 1986 
(for the purposes of directorial disqualification) and the Employment Rights Act 1996 (for the 
purposes of employee rights to payment from the National Insurance Fund). 
133 McPherson & Keay (n 23) 101. See also: Cornhill  (n 30) (insolvency will be assumed if the 
company is not in fact paying its debts as they fall due); BNY v Eurosail (n 29) [34]; and Casa 
Estates (n 47), where Lewison LJ agreed on the fact-finding approach followed in Eurosail and 
Cheyne Finance (n 21) [29]. 
134 Against: McPherson & Keay (n 23), arguing that ‘the relative accuracy of modern accounting 
methods and actuarial predictions would enable courts to look in to the future with some degree of 
accuracy’ (107).  
135 Cheyne Finance (n 21) [10]. 
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In the latter case, however, we are no longer in front of an objective analysis of 
the facts, but only of a valuation of the findings disclosed by the parties in court. 
Is it appropriate to decide a “question of fact” on the basis of an evaluation of 
the parties’ submissions? 
5.2(d) Testing “Insolvency”: The Cases of Rowntree Ventures and Detroit (2004) 
To investigate if, despite the theoretical shortcomings raised in sub-section 
5.2(c), the insolvency standard does not suffer from significant inadequacies in 
daily practice, it is appropriate to look at some recent decisions. 
The first is the Rowntree Ventures case. One of the contentious aspects of the 
dispute was the existence of the statutory requirements to serve an 
administration order against the respondents, Oak Property Partners Ltd (‘OPP’) 
and Oak Forest Partnership Ltd (‘OFP’). 
OPP and OFP carried on the business of property developers. They built hotels 
and subsequently leased the hotel rooms and common parts on long leases. The 
applicants were or represented those who had acquired leases upon terms 
which entitled the leaseholders to a repurchase of the lease. The applicants 
sought the appointment of administrators. When they purchased their 
respective leasehold interests, they were given extravagant promises of a 
guaranteed return which appeared to have been more than optimistic and, 
quite possibly, reckless or wantonly misleading. 
At first instance,136 Purle J noted that:  
 On a balance of probabilities, the companies were or were likely to be 
unable to pay their debts;137 and 
 The administration order was reasonably likely to achieve the purpose 
of the administration, meaning that there must be a “realistic chance” 
                                                                    
136 Rowntree Ventures Ltd v Oak Property Partners Ltd [2016] EWHC 1523 (Ch), [2016] WL 
03564018. 
137 Ibid [15]. 
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that at least one of the alternatives set out in para 3(1) of Sched B1 IA 
1986 will be achieved.138 
Purle J was also sceptical of the respondents’ accounts and cash-flow 
projections for the incoming months. These projections relied on the 
recoverability of the debt from a company who recently entered into a CVA 
(which was itself being challenged), a valuation which assumed a rather 
optimistic 5 per cent return on investments and the availability of interim 
finance to assist cash flow.139 Additionally, there was little or no room for 
slippage. 
All these considerations should have led to the conclusion that the company 
was insolvent, both on a balance-sheet and cash-flow basis. The company was 
burning cash outside insolvency and some of the main risk bearers had no voice 
in the administration of the business. This should have led the judicial authority 
to grant the petition. 
However, Purle J in a judgment issued on 10 June 2016 held that he was not 
ready to exercise his discretion and grant the petition because he wanted to 
give the companies ‘the opportunity to endeavour to see [their] way through 
difficulties’.140 The Chancery Court judge held that he would have not exercised 
his discretion had the applicants provided ‘firm evidence, as opposed to a 
suspicion of past fraud, that those in control of the company either had in some 
way misappropriated assets or were likely to do so in some intervening 
period…’.141 
Not surprisingly, by the time (29 June 2017) the case was referred to the Court 
of Appeal,142 both respondents had filed for CVL.  
                                                                    
138 Ibid [22] for OPP (‘… for the reason that I have given concerning the avoidance of ad valorem 
charges, an administration would be reasonably likely to achieve a better result for creditors than 
a winding up, if that were the only option’) and at [32] for OFP (‘… an administration would be 
better than a winding up’). 
139 Ibid [15]–[20]. In particular, evidence of emergency financial arrangements was described as 
“shaky” as it appeared to be provided by a person who was an acting (but not yet actual) 
director and it was not yet subject to contract at the time of the filing. 
140 Ibid [32]. 
141 Ibid [33]. 
142 Rowntree Ventures Ltd v Oak Property Partners Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1944, [2017] WL 
06327206. 
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The Court of Appeal considered that the Chancery judge had attached too much 
weight to the possibility of turnaround. There was no factor pointing clearly 
against the making of an order once the statutory preconditions had been 
established. The Chancellor noted the high bar in challenging the exercise of the 
judge’s discretion but considered that in the circumstances he would have 
exercised his discretion to make the administration order. However, such an 
order was no longer possible as a result of the CVL (para 8(1)(a) Sch. B1 IA 
1986). 
The first instance case is problematic – despite the overruling by the Court of 
Appeal – not because Purle J erred in his business assessment, but because he 
disregarded the doctrine of precedent and decided to conduct a business 
assessment exercise in a circumstance where there was no need to do that.  
It is a well-established principle of English law that courts should not interfere 
in the running of a business (and in alleged breach of duties) unless the director 
took a course of action that no other reasonable person would have made.143 As 
courts are reluctant to second-guess board decisions, it is not apparent why 
they should be reluctant to grant creditors’ petitions that are based on 
reasonable grounds and are commercially sound, while the counter-arguments 
from the debtor are based on “shaky” and “optimistic” assumptions.144 
Furthermore, as his conclusions conflicted with the statutory and regulatory 
requirements to file for administration, this should have suggested a larger use 
of caution rather than discretion.  
                                                                    
143 This is known as “Wednesbury standard”, as it was first conceived in the case Associated 
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA). On that occasion, the 
Court of Appeal held that ‘[t]he court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority 
with a view to seeing whether they have taken into account matters which they ought not to take 
into account, or, conversely, have refused to take into account or neglected to take into account 
matters which they ought to take into account.’ (233, 234). Only in case of a decision so 
unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, courts have the 
discretion to interfere with it. See: P Davies and S Worthington (eds), Gower: Principles of 
Modern Company Law (10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2016); E Lim, ‘Judicial Intervention 
in Directors’ Decision-Making Process: Section 172 of the Companies Act’ (2018) 2 J. Bus. Law 
169.  
144 Rowntree v Oak (n 136) [19] and [20]. 
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It is not only the English courts, however, that defy statutory requirements and 
rely on judicial discretion to determine when a company should file for 
insolvency.  
A careful observer would recall that municipalities are subject to Chapter 9 of 
11 U.S. Code, which is the only section of the Bankruptcy Code that prescribes 
the debtor to file for statutory protection in cases of insolvency. Surely the 
existence of an established condition of insolvency should suffice to push a 
debtor under the Code’s protection. 
This apparently logical assertion has proven wrong. Take, for instance, the 
solution that in 2004 Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick adopted to cover part of the $1.7 
billion shortfall of the Detroit retirees’ pension fund.  
The city had a legal obligation to meet this shortfall. As it did not have enough 
money, the rational solution would have been to reduce its expenses and 
workforce and negotiate a financial plan with its creditors, similar to an English 
CVA. Failure to meet any or both of these conditions would have resulted in the 
city’s default and admission to Chapter 9. 
As both solutions were not very enticing for Detroit’s elected officials and their 
major creditors, these parties devised a different solution.  
Under Michigan law, cities cannot carry bonds totalling more than 10 per cent 
of the assessed value of the private properties within their remit. This meant 
that in 2004 Detroit could theoretically ask for up to $1.3 billion in bond debt. 
As the city had already issued obligations for more than $700 million, it would 
not have been possible to borrow from the market enough money to cover the 
pension deficit. 
As a result, the city decided to create two service corporations, independent but 
financially intertwined with the city government. These corporations would 
have borrowed the money ($1.44 billion) which would have covered the 
pension deficit through the use of certificates of participation.  
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Despite the city having won “The Bond Buyer’s Midwest regional Deal of the 
Year” in 2005 for this financial scheme,145 this deal was later described as ‘a 
subprime loan on steroids’.146 It is easy to agree with the latter qualification as, 
despite the existence of two bond insurers (Financial Guaranty Insurance 
Company and Syncora Holdings) who should have paid out the bondholders in 
the event of default of any of the service corporations, the city was ultimately 
responsible for the debt of these corporations (and for their failure).  
Detroit in 2004 was an insolvent city. Chapter 9 requires insolvent 
municipalities to seek statutory protection under 11 U.S. Code. Yet, no petition 
was filed.  
5.2(e) Findings 
This broad, factual understanding of the notion of insolvency has resulted in the 
approval of insolvency petitions in cases where there was no “true” (i.e. cash 
flow or balance sheet) insolvency,147 thus further affecting the certainty and 
predictability of any insolvency system based on this eligibility criterion. It has 
also resulted in the opposite outcome of the cases described under sub-section 
5.2(d), where insolvent debtors were not admitted to insolvency procedures. 
This trend is not limited to the jurisdictions considered in the study. For 
instance, the EUIR Recast now applies and grants automatic recognition 
throughout Europe to all proceedings that are based on laws relating to 
insolvency. Insolvency is no longer a requirement for a proceeding to fall under 
the scope of the EUIR Recast.148 
                                                                    
145 E Carvlin, ‘Detroit Uses COPs to Shift Pension Burden and Set a Few Records’ The Bond Buyer 
(New York, 28 December 2005) <https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/detroit-uses-cops-to-
shift-pension-burden-and-set-a-few-records> accessed 17 September 2018. 
146 N Bomey, Detroit Resurrected: To Bankruptcy and Back (W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 
2016) 22. 
147 Cases include Re Casa Estates (UK) Ltd (in liq.) [2013] EWHC 2371 (Ch) (where a company 
was declared insolvent because it used short term loans to re-finance its debt); Re Douglas 
Griggs Engineering Ltd [1963] Ch. 19 (where a company was found insolvent on the basis of the 
absence of assets on which execution could be levied); Re Lyric Club [1892] 36 Sol. Jo. 801 
(where insolvency was declared because the receivers for the debenture-holders had taken 
possession of all of the assets).  
148 Art. 1(1) holds that ‘[t]his Regulation shall apply to public collective proceedings, including 
interim proceedings, which are based on laws relating to insolvency […] where there is only a 
likelihood of insolvency’. 
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These observations, coupled with the underwhelming findings of our 
theoretical criticism of the “insolvency” standard lead the author to believe that 
it is appropriate to look at alternative eligibility requirements to determine 
whether they better promote procedurally fair and efficient outcomes. 
 
5.3 “RISK” 
Another criterion that can be used to determine if a company is in a situation of 
distress and therefore should file for insolvency is the existence of a qualified 
risk. In general terms, this notion refers to any source of uncertainty that can 
impact the smooth running of personal and corporate life. In financial terms, it 
refers to ‘the possibility of financial loss or failure as a quantifiable factor in 
evaluating the potential profit in a commercial enterprise or investment’.149  
Why is the notion of “risk” important for the purpose of this study? Because the 
commencement of a formal procedure may be based on an accepted notion of 
“risk”, which could therefore be used to distinguish situations where individual, 
self-interested behaviour is acceptable from those where it is not.  
5.3(a) The Concept of “Risk” 
What “risk” is in legal terms is a hotly contended topic. Legal scholars tend to 
adopt an internal/predictive approach to the notion of risk (and crisis). They 
argue that, if an honest and reasonably skilled manager concludes that the 
existing and prospective revenues are more likely than not to be insufficient to 
cover existing and planned liabilities, then the risk of a crisis should prompt the 
manager to “take actions”.150 These actions, however, may not necessarily entail 
an insolvency filing. 
In order to determine when risk can no longer be handled under the general 
rules of contract law, scholars refer to corporate finance and economics models. 
Corporate finance literature has identified manifold functions of risk, not all of 
                                                                    
149 "risk, n." (OED Online, OUP March 2018), <www.oed.com/view/Entry/166306> accessed 18 
May 2018. 
150 R Guidotti, ‘Emersione della Crisi e Opportunità di Risanamento’ (24 November 2016) 
IlCaso.it 3 (translated to English from Italian by the author of this thesis). 
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them relevant to the insolvency debate. Although the taxonomy of risk is 
necessarily subjective, the most widely accepted categories include credit, 
market, operational, liquidity and legal risk.151  
Some of these concepts have been integrated into insolvency prediction models 
to determine if a company is likely to file for insolvency protection.152 These 
concepts are operational, credit and liquidity risk. 
Operational risk153 summarizes the risks a company undertakes when it 
attempts to operate within a given field or industry. According to Basel II,154 an 
operational risk is: 
… the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed processes, people 
and systems, or from external events. This definition includes legal risk, 
but excludes strategic and reputational risk.155 
An operational risk is a risk not inherent in financial, systematic or market-wide 
factors. It includes risks resulting from breakdowns in internal procedures, 
people, systems or (to a more limited extent) external events. It focuses on how 
things are accomplished within an organisation. 
Operational risk events frequently hit the headlines, especially if they occur in 
large, public corporations. Examples include the Madoff investment scandal,156 
                                                                    
151 HH Panjer, Operational Risk: Modeling Analytics (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: London, 2006) 7. 
Legal risk is not considered an autonomous function of risk by R Jarrow and S Turnbull, 
Derivative Securities (2nd edn, South Western College Pub.: Nashville, 2000).  
152 Some large companies also recognise that risks are inter-related. As a result, they regularly 
run and update enterprise risk management (‘ERM’) exercises to determine their exposure to 
several functions of risk, including geopolitical and liquidity issues.  
153 P Girling, Operational Risk Management: A Complete Guide to a Successful Operational Risk 
Framework (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: London, 2013); MG Cruz and others, Fundamental Aspects 
of Operational Risk and Insurance Analytics: A Handbook of Operational Risk (John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc.: London, 2014); GW Peters and PV Schevchenko, Advances in Heavy Tailed Risk Modeling: A 
Handbook of Operational Risk (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: London, 2015).  
154 Basel II is a set of international banking regulations put forth by the Basel Committee on 
Bank Supervision, which levelled the international regulation field with uniform rules and 
guidelines. 
155 S.644, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised 
Framework (Bank for International Settlements, 2014). The Basel II definition of operational 
risk has been adopted or adapted by many businesses and is now generally accepted as the 
standard. It has been incorporated into national regulations across the globe with only minor 
adaptations and is consistently referred to by regulators and operational risk managers: Girling 
(n 153) 2. 
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the Nomura bond trader fraud157 and the UBS trading scandal.158 Not only can 
these events cause significant loss of money for the companies affected by them. 
They can also determine a situation of financial or economic distress that can 
lead to insolvency.  
To manage and measure operational risk, both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches are needed.159 Operational risk frameworks and insolvency 
prediction models come into consideration when indicators show that these 
breakdowns can cause harm to the soundness of the debtor or the industry as a 
whole.  
Credit risk160 refers to the risk that a borrower may not repay a loan and that 
the lender may lose the principal of the loan or the interest associated with it. 
Credit risk arises because borrowers expect to use future cash flows to pay 
current debts, but it is almost never possible to ensure that borrowers will 
definitely have the funds to repay their debts. Interest payments from the 
borrower or issuer of a debt obligation are a lender's or investor's reward for 
assuming credit risk. 
Credit risk is pervasive in modern, market-driven and consumer-based 
societies, such as those considered in this thesis. From utility and telephone 
bills to car loans, people expect to buy on credit. Similarly, companies have 
significantly increased their liabilities in recent times, with the result that 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
156 D Gelles and G Tett, ‘From behind bars, Madoff spins his story’ Financial Times (London, 8 
April 2011) <https://www.ft.com/content/a29d2b4a-60b7-11e0-a182-00144feab49a> 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
157 J Dye, ‘SEC accuses two ex-Nomura traders of fraud’ Financial Times (London, 15 May 2017) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/94dbc035-09e7-341e-9586-699e2d9a5bed> accessed 17 
September 2018. 
158 L Fortado, ‘Kweku Adoboli: A Rogue Trader’s Tale’ Financial Times (London, 22 October 
2015) <https://www.ft.com/content/0fa0b42a-783a-11e5-a95a-27d368e1ddf7> accessed 17 
September 2018. 
159 Panjer (n 151); RA Jarrow, ‘Operational Risk’ (2008) 32(5) JBF 870 (provides an economic 
and mathematical characterization of operational risk). 
160 F Andrew, Credit Risk Management (Butterworth Heinemann: Oxford, 2004); JB Caouette and 
others, Managing Credit Risk. The Great Challenge for the Global Financial Markets (2nd edn, John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc.: London, 2008); M Capinski and T Zastawniak, Credit Risk (CUP: Cambridge, 
2016).  
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nowadays English and North-American companies are amongst the most highly 
leveraged among OECD countries.161  
While availability and acceptability of credit facilitates modern life and 
promotes economic growth, unpaid debt obligations may cause financial 
failures of both the company financed by debt and the lender. To minimise this 
risk, corporate governance theorists and economists devised models to 
determine the proper amount of interest that should be charged to offset the 
risk of default.162 
This risk, however, has been exacerbated in recent times, due to the de-
personalisation of the borrower-lender relationship and the circumstance that 
very few lenders hang on to the loan they make. Additionally, major lending 
institutions are no longer the dominant source of credit to the global 
economy.163   
Liquidity risk164 is sometimes classified as an integral element of credit risk. 
However, despite the obvious inter-relations, it is preferable to categorize 
liquidity as an autonomous function of risk as it affects not only borrower-
lender, but also any debtor-creditor relations.  
Liquidity ‘can be viewed as the essential resource that permits a company to 
replace its liabilities, meet contractual obligations, and fund growth, all at a 
reasonable price, as and when needed’.165 This situation is commonly understood 
as the risk stemming from the lack of marketability of an asset or investment 
that cannot be bought or sold quickly enough to prevent or minimize a loss. The 
individual or company that own the asset or investment title may as a result fail 
to meet short-term debt obligations, thus affecting their lenders and creditors.  
                                                                    
161 OECD (2018), Non-Financial corporations debt to surplus ratio (indicator): 
<https://data.oecd.org/corporate/non-financial-corporations-debt-to-surplus-ratio.htm> 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
162 Some of these models are discussed in sub-section 5.3(c). 
163 Caouette (n 160) 10.  
164 A Castagna and F Fede, Measuring and managing Liquidity risk (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: 
London, 2013); E Banks, Liquidity Risk: Managing Funding and Asset Risk (Palgrave Macmillan: 
London, 2014) (distinguishing between funding or liability liquidity, asset liquidity, and joint 
liquidity, as well as liquidity mismatches and liquidity contingencies). 
165 Banks (n 164) 7. 
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Financial institutions and large, public companies are constantly monitored to 
assess their level of liquidity risk (and financial solidity). Risk measurement 
systems are devised to monitor the borrowers’ solvency, so that all parties can 
retain confidence in the financial system and the economy can expand.166 
Despite that, cases such as Carillion prove that auditors may fail to identify 
potential liquidity risks.167  
The next section investigates if insolvency prediction models built upon these 
notions provide satisfactory answers and guidance on when to use insolvency 
remedies. 
5.3(b) The Predictive Myth 
While predictive models fall outside the scope of this thesis, it is pertinent to 
explore if it is possible to rely on the taxonomy of risk to predict when a 
company should file for insolvency.  
The early literature on bankruptcy prediction models relied on pre-insolvency 
performance accounting indicators to determine if and to what extent a 
company was financially distressed.168 Examples of these indicators are 
profitability, liquidity and leverage. The focus of the analysis was the existence 
of a liquidity risk and the obvious conclusion that insolvency filings could be 
justified only when the company was cash-flow or (to a more limited extent) 
balance-sheet insolvent.  
                                                                    
166 E Allaj, ‘Risk measuring under liquidity risk’ (2017) 24(3) Applied Mathematical Finance 
246.   
167 K Griffiths, ‘Carillion auditors under fire’ The Times (London, 16 January 2018) 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/carillion-auditors-under-fire-8xpnmlnw0> accessed 17 
September 2018. 
168 WH Beaver, ‘Financial ratios as predictors of failure’ (1966) J. Account. Res. 71; EI Altman, 
‘Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy’ (1968) 
23(4) J. Finance 589; R Edmister, ‘An empirical test of financial ratio analysis for small business 
failure prediction’ (1972) 7(2) JFQA 1477; E Deakin, ‘A discriminant analysis of predictors of 
business failure’ (1972) 10(1) J. Account. Res. 167; M Blum, ‘Failing company discriminant 
analysis’ (1974) 12(1) J. Account. Res. 1; RJ Taffler and H Tisshaw, ‘Going, going, gone - four 
factors which predict’ (1977) 88(1003) Accountancy 50.  
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Criticisms relating to violations of the statistical assumptions underlying these 
multivariate discriminant analyses (‘MDA’) models led researchers to develop 
conditional probability models, the most popular being the logit.169  
More recently, researchers suggested including market variables in these 
prediction models,170 thus moving from MDA and static logit models to a 
“discrete-time hazard model”. Contingent claim models,171 that basically assume 
that shareholders have a call option (for insolvency) whenever the company is 
balance-sheet insolvent, have also been proposed.172  
Predictive models have not gone unquestioned. In particular, the author of this 
thesis believes that they feature at least four major shortcomings. 
First, empirical evidence proves that the predictive ability of each model varies 
over time.173 However, some authors suggested that predictions could be more 
accurate if the models included reference to specific characteristics of the 
business, such as firm diversification.174 Other empirical studies proved that 
artificial intelligent models175 such as neural networks perform better than 
models that rely on a set of variables chosen with criteria used in the financial 
                                                                    
169 J Ohlson, ‘Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy’ (1980) 18 J. 
Account. Res. 109; ME Zmijewski, ‘Methodological issues related to the estimation of financial 
distress prediction models’ (1984) 22 (Suppl.) J. Account. Res. 59; CV Zavgren, ‘Assessing the 
vulnerability to failure of American industrial firms: a logistic analysis’ (1985) 12(1) J. Bus 
Finance Account. 19.  
170 T Shumway, ‘Forecasting bankruptcy more accurately: a simple hazard model’ (2001) 74 J. 
Bus. 101; SA Hillegeist and others, ‘Assessing the probability of bankruptcy’ (2004) 9 Review of 
Accounting Studies 5. 
171 M Vassalou and Y Xing, ‘Default risk in equity returns’ (2004) 59(2) J. Finance 831; S Bharath 
and T Shumway, ‘Forecasting default with the Merton distance to default model’ (2008) 21(3) 
Rev. Financial Stud. 1339.  
172 For a more comprehensive literature review on the topic, see: RHG Jackson and A Wood, ‘The 
Performance of Insolvency Prediction and Credit Risk Models in the UK: A Comparative Study’ 
(2013) 45 British Accounting Rev. 183, 184-187.  
173 Y Wu and others, ‘A Comparison of Alternative Bankruptcy Prediction Models’ (2010) 6 JAE 
34, 35.  
174 D Rose, ‘Bankruptcy Risk, Firm-specific Managerial Human Capital, and Diversification’ 
(1992) 7 Review of Industrial Organisation 65; DJ Denis, ‘Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, 
and Corporate Diversification’ (1997) 53 J. Finance 135; WH Beaver and others, ‘Have Financial 
Statements Become Less Informative? Evidence from the Ability of Financial Ratios to Predict 
Bankruptcy’ (2005) 10 Review of Accounting Studies 93.  
175 Artificial intelligent models can also rely on easily interpretable white box hypothesis and 
work equally well as neural networks: L Obermann and S Waack, ‘Demonstrating Non-
Inferiority of Easily Interpretable Methods for Insolvency Prediction’ (2015) 42 Expert Syst. 
Appl. 9117. 
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literature.176 This aspect, therefore, does not cause too much alarm and would 
not prevent the use of predictive models in insolvency scenarios. 
The second criticism is much more substantial. It was argued that these models 
fail to apply to all companies and all sectors of the economy, irrespective of the 
period in which they are conceived. To overcome some of these limits, Wu and 
other scholars177 proposed the adoption of a new predictive model that 
considered a larger variety of data, econometric approaches and performance 
metrics. He also argued that the general model should in any case be integrated 
with company-specific characteristics.  
This, however, leads to the third difficulty. One of the issues of this 
conceptualisation and early models, such as the Z-Score conceived by Altman,178 
is that the predictions are dependent upon the need of large accounting data. 
For instance, Altman’s Z-Score relied on five financial ratios (profitability, 
leverage, liquidity, solvency and activity) to predict whether a company has 
high probability of being insolvent. Additionally, they still rely on the basic 
assumption that companies file for insolvency when they are insolvent, an 
assumption which was found theoretically unsatisfactory for the reasons 
evidenced in sub-section 5.2(e).  
This requirement for a constant flow of detailed, updated and accurate 
information means that the use of these models is restricted to insiders 
(directors and controlling shareholders), institutional and financial creditors 
and auditors. In troubled times, the majority of them have strong incentives to 
keep this information confidential to promote the information holder’s 
individual interests over the collective well-being. All other insolvency 
stakeholders are left in the dark, unable to monitor the performance of the 
company in a predictive way.179  
                                                                    
176 S Hsiao and T Whang, ‘A Study of Financial Insolvency Prediction Models for Life Insurers’ 
(2009) 36 Expert Syst. Appl. 6100; P du Jardin, ‘Predicting Bankruptcy Using Neural Networks 
and Other Classification Methods: The Influence of Variable Selection Techniques on Model 
Accuracy’ (2010) 73 Neurocomputing 2047.  
177 Wu (n 173). 
178 Altman (n 168). 
179 As it recently occurred in the case of the collapse of Carillion: Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees, ‘Carillion: Second Joint Report from the Business, 
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Forthly, even if this information was available, these models are by nature 
retrospective. They look at consolidated data from the previous fiscal year, 
which means that almost two years may lapse from the moment the figure (e.g. 
revenue) is produced to when the assessment is carried out. 
The only way to overcome the last two issues is to improve the flow of 
information and the ability to assess investment risks. Unsurprisingly, the 
legislature in both the U.S. and the U.K. reacted by introducing more stringent 
reporting requirements.  
In the United States reporting requirements for public companies are detailed 
in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Recently 
these acts have been amended in the wake of corporate scandals180 and the 
financial recession,181 to improve accountability and transparency of U.S. 
corporations. The system requires periodic disclosures by means of annual 
Form 10-K and quarterly Form 10-Q and companies shall also file Form 8-K on 
the occurrence of certain significant events.182 Other federal securities’ laws and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’)183 rules require disclosures of a 
variety of events affecting the company.  
The primary financial reporting framework, utilized by non-governmental 
entities in the United States, is represented by the U.S. Generally Accepted 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees’ HC 769 (House of 
Commons 16 May 2018) 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmworpen/769/769.pdf> 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
180 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, P.L. 112-106, enacted April 5, 2012. Sarbanes-Oxley Act was 
principally a reaction to Enron’s corporate and accounting scandal. However, during this same 
period, the equally dramatic actual or pending bankruptcies of WorldCom, a long-distance 
telecommunications company, and Tyco, a diversified equipment manufacturer, influenced the 
content of the legislation. 
181 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, P.L. 111-2003, enacted 21 July 
2010. 
182 JC Coffee and HA Sale, Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials (12th edn, Foundation Press 
Thomson/West, 2012); JD Cox and RW Hillman, Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials (7th 
edn, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business: Alphen aan den Rijn, NL, 2013) and JD Cox and RW 
Hillman, Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials (2017 suppl., Wolters Kluwer Law & 
Business: Alphen aan den Rijn, NL, 2017). 
183 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) is an independent agency of the United 
States federal government. The SEC holds primary responsibility for enforcing the federal 
securities laws, proposing securities rules, and regulating the securities industry, the nation's 
stock and options exchanges, and other activities and organizations, including the electronic 
securities markets in the United States. It was created by means of the Securities Exchange Act 
1934. 
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Accounting Principles (‘GAAP’) which have been established by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (‘FASB’).184 Nevertheless, companies that are 
privately owned are not required by law to disclose detailed financial and 
operating information in most instances, even if a requirement for an audit may 
be specified by third parties such as lenders or other stakeholders. 
In the United Kingdom, all private limited and public companies must file their 
accounts to the Companies House, but small companies and micro-entities may 
prepare a less detailed abridged version which may omit reference to certain 
balance-sheet items. S.394 CA 2006 establishes the duty to prepare individual 
accounts, whilst in accordance with s.395 such individual accounts may be 
either “Companies Act individual accounts”185 or “IAS individual accounts”.186 
Private companies choose their own accounting reference dates and submit 
their financial information and annual return annually to the Companies House. 
Private companies are not generally required to have an audit of their financial 
statements, unless they are regulated by certain bodies such as the Solicitors 
Regulation Authority (‘SRA’) or the Financial Conduit Authority (‘FCA’).  
Accounting standards and corporate managements have been reformed in 
recent years.  In the wake of the Enron, Tyco International and WorldCom 
corporate and accounting scandals, more disclosure requirements were 
introduced by means of the Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community 
Enterprise) Act 2004. Reporting requirements had also been reinforced through 
the enactment of s.417 CA 2006.187 This section puts a strong emphasis on 
                                                                    
184 The Financial Accounting Standards Board (‘FASB’) is a seven-member independent board 
consisting of accounting professionals, who establish and communicate standards of financial 
accounting and reporting in the United States. FASB standards, known as generally accepted 
accounting principles (‘GAAP’), govern the preparation of corporate financial reports and are 
recognized as authoritative by the SEC. 
185 Prepared in accordance with the accounting and disclosure requirements of company law 
and with the Financial Reporting Standards (‘FRSs’) published by the Financial Reporting 
Council (‘FRC’) (‘UK and Irish GAAP’). 
186 Prepared in accordance with the International FRSs published by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (‘IASB’), as adopted by the European Union. The IAS Regulation 
(Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002) restricts the use of IASB to public companies listed on a 
regulated EU market, such as the London Stock Exchange.  
187 For a study of s.417 in operation, see O Aiyegbayo and C Villiers, ‘The Enhanced Business 
Review: Has it Made Corporate Governance More Effective?’ (2011) J. Bus. Law 699. See also: J 
Lowry, ‘The Duty of Loyalty Under Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006: Bridging the 
Accountability Gap Through Efficient Disclosure’ (2009) 68 Camb. L.J. 607 (highlighting the 
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managing and controlling risk. In fact, unless the company is subject to the 
small companies’ regime, its directors have to inform the company’s 
shareholders and creditors by means of a “business review” within the 
directors’ report on how they have performed their duties and what actions 
they have undertaken to promote the success of the company (pursuant to 
s.172 of the same Act).188  
These regulatory innovations, both in the U.S. and England, demonstrate an 
increased attention to risk-based approaches and risk-centred strategies for 
corporate management.189 It has been contended, however, that the most 
successful applications of these innovations have been made in private practice 
by financial creditors.  
However, financial creditors have embraced these new approaches through 
their intensive care units not to foster a wider, more-collective approach to 
corporate distress, but to either extract further, individual benefits from the 
ailing company, or to relocate debt-collection activities from the formal to the 
turnaround stage.190  
Additionally, as these innovations tend to affect primarily regulated companies, 
they may also prove untimely. In fact, with increasing opportunities to decouple 
creditors from borrowers, financial borrowers may have little incentives to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
benefit for long-term wealth generation that can be triggered by a meaningful implementation 
of the business review requirement). 
188 This section was repealed by Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors' Report) 
Regulations 2013/1970 Pt 2 reg.5 (1st October 2013: repeal had effect in respect of financial 
years ending on or after 30 September 2013). It was replaced by the requirement for companies 
(other than those subject to the small companies’ regime) to prepare a stand-alone strategic 
report in accordance with sections 414A to 414D of the Companies Act 2006. 
189 Finch and Milman (n 18) 217; J Black, ‘The Emergence of Risk Based Regulation and the New 
Public Risk Management in the UK’ (2005) PL 512; HM Treasury, ‘Reducing Administrative 
Burdens: Effective Inspection and Enforcement’ (Final Report) (March 2005) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/bud05hampton_150305_640.pdf> accessed 
17 September 2018. 
190 Finch and Milman (n 18) 222-223. On the banks’ tendencies to better their own positions 
during rescue processes, see also J Franks and O Sussman, ‘The Cycle of Corporate Distress, 
Rescue and Dissolution: A Study of Small and Medium Size UK Companies’ (19 April 2000) 
<http://facultyresearch.london.edu/docs/306.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018; J Armour and 
R Mokal, ‘Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The Enterprise Act 2002’ (ESRC 
Centre for Business Research Working Paper No. 288, 2004) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=567306> accessed 17 September 2018; 
K Pond, ‘Banks and Insolvent Corporate Customers: Experience of the Rescue Culture’ in S 
Geberl and others (eds), Aktuelle Entwicklungen im Finanzdienstleistungsbereich (Springer: New 
York, 2004).  
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carry out extensive and expensive monitoring activities when they could rely on 
instruments such as financial derivatives to spread insolvency risks across the 
market.   
In conclusion, despite the above-mentioned efforts to improve accountability 
and to manage insolvency risk in a more open and preventive manner, 
reporting requirements appear to have a predictive nature only with reference 
to public companies. However, it is questionable, even with reference to these 
players, if annual or quarterly reports can timely disclose operational risks 
(credit and liquidity risks should be easier to monitor, in the absence of 
fraudulent behaviour).  
The following sub-section looks at whether the shortcomings are intrinsic to the 
predictive models, or extrinsic on their reliance on the insolvency paradigm. If 
the latter was the case, prediction models could be satisfactorily used to 
determine the limits of insolvency law.  
5.3(c) The Purpose of “Risk” and Prediction Models 
Can and should “risk” and prediction models be used to determine when 
insolvency rules should depart from the common law of contract? 
A cursory look at risk models may lead the reader to believe that their reliance 
on economic and financial indicators can promote legal predictability in the 
application phase. The author has already demonstrated why this impression is 
fallacious. So far there is no single approach to the systematization of methods 
for insolvency risk prediction. This means that there is no objective view on the 
tools that can and should be used to monitor the risk of insolvency.  
Additionally, the proposed predictive tools are ill-positioned to determine when 
a company should file for insolvency for their reliance on accounting and largely 
outdated data that are usually only in possession of managers, close advisors 
and a restricted list of financial investors.  
Finally, even when successful, their risk analysis is only capable of determining 
when a company will face unsustainable levels of risk. If these models are used 
to assess the insolvency risk, they are only capable of determining when a 
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company will be insolvent on a balance-sheet or cash-flow basis. Section 5.2 has 
already commented on the appropriateness of an eligibility requirement based 
on the notion of insolvency. A more objective and neutral approach to the 
definition of insolvency provides little guidance in answering the research 
question of this thesis.  
Depending on the way in which the legislature has introduced an eligibility test 
based on a predictive insolvency model, party autonomy may or may not be 
preserved.   
As explained in chapter two, autonomy-driven insolvency scholars understand 
“autonomy” as the principle according to which contracting parties can 
determine the consequences arising from the opening of an insolvency 
procedure.  
Predictive models could be compatible if they were used to determine when a 
company has to rely on statutory remedies. On the contrary, they would fail to 
meet the autonomy criterion if the nature of the risk also determined the 
content of the procedure.  
Take the case of a company that has liquidity problems (i.e. credit risk) but a 
sound business (i.e. no operational risk). The use of predictive models based on 
liquidity ratios might suggest that the company must file for a formal insolvency 
procedure. This in itself is restriction on the autonomy of the parties, as they 
might still be willing to negotiate and possibly agree on an out-of-court 
settlement. However, society as a whole may be willing to accept a restriction to 
their freedom and autonomy for public policy considerations if it is 
demonstrated that the majority of companies that face those liquidity risks fail 
to both turn around their business and operate for the benefit of their creditors 
and stakeholders. 
The predictive models, however, could be employed to assess what procedure is 
better suited to address the problems of the company. Their use might suggest 
that in cases of liquidity but no operational concerns, rescue represented a 
better option than liquidation. If these models were used in this manner, they 
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would unduly restrict the autonomy and freedom of the interested 
stakeholders. 
Finally, with reference to the inclusivity objective, the literature on prediction 
models has evidenced that their focus is primarily on contractual relations. In 
theory, external factors could be and are sometimes included in prediction 
models, as they impact on the solvency of the ailing debtor.  
A model that relies primarily on performance accounting indicators fails to 
provide guidance for situations that arise from either non-contractual relation 
(such as tort liabilities) or non-foreseeable contractual events (e.g. punitive 
damages or sudden depreciation of corporate assets).  
For instance, take the case of a company that faces tort liabilities capable of 
threatening its survival. If prediction models were the only criterion to 
determine eligibility to file for insolvency, the company could not avail itself of 
insolvency remedies until one or more of the following events occurred. These 
are the imposition of substantial and final civil awards for damages, the 
significant reduction of its stock value (for public companies), a major decline in 
its business caused by the negative consequences stemming from the tort 
dispute or a combination of them. Waiting for the occurrence of one or more of 
these events may be against the interests of the company’s stakeholders, as 
early filing yield more value to interested parties. 
5.3(d) Testing Predictive Models: The Cases of Cambridge Analytica and O.W. 
Bunker 
How do predictive models hold-up in real life? For the purpose of assessing 
their predictive value, this sub-section considers recent insolvency cases of 
public companies, as it has been claimed under sub-section 5.3(b) that these are 
the most likely candidates to prove if these instruments work. 
Take the case of Cambridge Analytica, a political-consulting firm that operated 
both in the U.S. and the U.K. The company found itself at the centre of a data-
collection and privacy scandal. It purchased the data of 87 million Facebook 
users from the creator of an app named “This Is Your Digital Life” but used them 
for purposes beyond what was initially agreed and consented. It is alleged that 
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this data was leveraged as a campaigning tool in recent consultations, such as 
the U.K. referendum on the withdrawal from the European Union (23 June 
2016) and the last U.S. presidential elections (8 November 2016). 
On 2 May 2018 Cambridge Analytica directors, blaming the adverse publicity 
triggered by the company’s alleged involvement in these illegal practices but 
still denying any wrongdoing,191 ceased all company’s operations and filed for 
insolvency protection in the England.192 On 17 May 2018 they filed a voluntary 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in New York.193  
In a financial statement, the company – whose parent SCL Elections has also 
shut down – said that it was no longer viable to continue operating the business 
which was now in a “precarious financial condition”. At the same time, it 
pledged to meet all the obligations towards its employees.  
However, some commentators observed that the company was not known to 
hold significant debts.194 Therefore, it was argued that the decision to file for 
insolvency protection was determined by other factors.195 These included the 
need to start afresh with a similar business196 but under a different name (as 
the business itself proved highly profitable) and to shield the company from 
civil197 and tort liabilities.  
The case of Cambridge Analytica is primarily a case of operational 
mismanagement. No credit or liability risk is apparent. Predictive models based 
                                                                    
191 The company also launched a website to explain its versions of the facts: 
<https://www.cambridgefacts.com/> accessed 18 May 2018. Their narrative does not 
correspond to the version of other commentators. See, among others: S Meredith, ‘Facebook-
Cambridge Analytica: A timeline of the data hijacking scandal’ CNBC (New York, 10 April 2018) 
<https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/10/facebook-cambridge-analytica-a-timeline-of-the-data-
hijacking-scandal.html> accessed 18 May 2018. 
192 A Rogers, ‘Cambridge Analytica shuts down following Facebook data scandal’ City A.M. 
(London, 2 May 2018) <http://www.cityam.com/285177/breaking-cambridge-analytica-shuts-
down-following-facebook> accessed 18 May 2018; A Ram and H Kuckler, ‘Cambridge Analytica 
shuts down and blames ‘media siege’’ Financial Times (London, 2 May 2018) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/a0345598-4e37-11e8-a7a9-37318e776bab> accessed 17 
September 2018. 
193 Cambridge Analytica Llc No. 18-11500 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2018). 
194 Unnamed, ‘Directors put Cambridge Analytica into administration’ Company Rescue (London, 
8 May 2018) <https://www.companyrescue.co.uk/guides-knowledge/news/directors-put-
cambridge-analytica-into-administration-4118/> accessed 17 September 2018. 
195 Ibid.  
196 Ram and Kuckler (n 192). 
197 The company could have been fined for up to £500,000 only in the U.K. for breaching privacy 
rules: Ram and Kuckler (n 192). 
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on operational risk might have justified the consideration of remedial actions 
from the moment in which it became apparent to the board that the data 
purchased by the company had been used beyond the consented use.  
However, filing for (which is a significant step beyond considering) insolvency 
protection would have been justified only if the board concluded that the 
company would not have survived a scandal based on the alleged misuse of this 
data. This would have rendered the test completely speculative. Probably for 
this company that threshold had never been reached, and breached.  
Additionally, Cambridge Analytica is a case where the informed parties had an 
adverse incentive to disclose the existence of this scandal, even if any delay 
caused by a breach of directors’ duties may not be inconsequential.198 In the 
case of Cambridge Analytica, disclosure occurred with an article jointly 
published in The Guardian and The New York Times on 17 March 2018.199 
Following the publication of that article, the risk of imminent failure of 
Cambridge Analytica was apparent to the business community and a predictive 
model based on operational risk would have been of little or no avail at that 
instance.  
Cambridge Analytica is no isolated case and not the first one to show the failure, 
inaccuracy and lack of predictive value of risk-based models. Not only do they 
fail to predict strategic filings – which commentators200 and this thesis have 
                                                                    
198 See above sub-section 4.3(b) of this thesis. 
199 C Cadwalladr and E Graham-Harrison, ‘Revealed: 50 million Facebook profiles harvested for 
Cambridge Analytica in major data breach’ The Guardian (London, 17 March 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-
influence-us-election> accessed 17 September 2018; M Rosenberg and others, ‘How Trump 
Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions’ The New York Times (New York, 17 March 
2018) <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-
campaign.html#click=https://t.co/UAg1Q5t1BG> accessed 17 September 2018. It was initially 
reported that 50 million Facebook profiles were harvested for Cambridge Analytica in a major 
data scandal. This number was later revised to as many as 87 million Facebook profiles. 
200 KJ Delaney, Strategic Bankruptcy: How Corporations and Creditors Use Chapter 11 to their 
Advantage (2nd edn University of California Press, Los Angeles 1992), covering the emblematic 
cases of Continental, Texaco and Manville; DM Flynn and M Farid, ‘The Intentional Use of 
Chapter XI: Lingering versus Immediate Filing’ (1991) 12 SMJ 63; WN Moulton and H Thomas, 
‘Bankruptcy as a Deliberate Strategy: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence’ 
(1993) 14 SMJ 125; DV Orr, 'Strategic Bankruptcy and Private Pension Default' (1998) 32(3) J. 
Econ. Issues 669; LC Moerman and S van der Laan, 'Silencing the Noise: Asbestos Liabilities, 
Accounting and Strategic Bankruptcy' (2015) 27 Critic. Perspect. Account. 118; SD James, 
'Strategic Bankruptcy: A Stakeholder Management Perspective' (2016) 69 J. Bus. Res. 492. 
For a list of strategic filings, see ftn 18, chapter one of this thesis. 
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proven to occur in practice and with alarming frequency – but they may also fail 
to predict “normal” corporate failures. 
This might be the case of the collapse of O.W. Bunker.201 Before filing for 
insolvency, the company was the leading global independent marine fuel 
(bunker) company. Founded in Denmark in 1980, it had operations in twenty-
nine countries. It acted as a physical distributor and reseller of marine fuel. It 
also provided risk-management solutions to control costs, minimise risk, and 
protect against market fluctuations. At the end of 2013, O.W. Bunker was the 
second largest listed company in Denmark after Maersk. 
O.W. Bunker sourced fuel bunkers from maritime operators by a chain of 
contracts with subsidiaries and independent suppliers. Each contract contained 
a retention of title (‘ROT’) clause in favour of the supplier and a provision that 
payment was due a fixed number of days after delivery. Some of these suppliers, 
depending on the law governing their contracts, were also believed to have a 
maritime lien on the vessel for the provision of necessaries. 
Each supplier gave permission for the ship owner to consume the bunkers 
while payment was pending as the vessel went about its business, thus 
impliedly accepting that all or substantially all fuel bunkers may be consumed 
before payment became due. 
On 7 November 2014, the holding company of the O.W. Bunker group filed for 
bankruptcy in a Danish court, following an alleged fraud in its Singapore 
subsidiary and substantial losses relating to unsupervised over-the-counter 
trading. Shortly afterwards, on 12 November, PwC was appointed as receiver 
for the security agreement. On 13 November, the U.S. entities of the group (O.W. 
Bunker U.S.A., O.W. Bunker North America Inc., O.W. Bunker Holding USA and 
North America) filed a Chapter 11 petition in the Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Connecticut.202 
                                                                    
201 For more information about this case and its implications for U.S. and English courts, see: E 
Vaccari, ‘OW Bunker: A Common Law Perspective on Multilateral Co-operation in Insolvency-
related Cases’ (2017) 7 I.C.C.L.R. 245; E Vaccari, ‘The Ammanati Affair: Seven Centuries Old, and 
Not Feeling the Age’ (2018) 93(3) Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 831, 847-857. 
202 Re O.W. Bunker Holding N. Am., Inc., No. 14-51720, 2014 WL 7669372, at *1 (Bankr. D. Conn. 
Dec. 8, 2014). 
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A cursory ex-post analysis of the circumstances of the failure may reasonably 
lead the observer to conclude that the O.W. Bunker collapse was due to the 
behaviour of a rogue employee. This would also be the ex-ante conclusion of a 
predictive model, as otherwise it would not be possible to explain why ING 
Bank, which acted as a syndicate of lenders to the O.W. Bunker group, failed to 
identify any sign of imminent failure before the eleventh hour. 
Nevertheless, as explained by several commentators,203 the collapse of the 
Danish multi-national enterprise was primarily due to operational reasons. The 
company operated in a low-profit, highly competitive market that had been 
badly affected by the aftermath of the financial crisis. The company had a long-
established approach to business and a cost structure that was no longer 
competitive. If it was not for the accounting scandal, it is likely that the company 
would have been forced to file for insolvency protection in the following 
months. Yet, it seemed that ING Bank failed to take any meaningful action to 
deal with these operational issues, probably under the assumption that its claim 
was fully secured.  
It is not possible to know at this stage if ING predicted the operational crisis of 
O.W. Bunker. What is apparent is that the bank did not take proactive steps to 
avert the crisis. It might be argued that the failure was not to be attributed to 
the predictive model, but to the fact that the beneficiary of the information and 
the debtor had aligned interests, which drew their attention away from the 
corporate issues. The question still stands: what is the practical value of a model 
that may predict a condition for filing (operational risk) but fails to pass this 
information to the stakeholders, which could act on its base? 
5.3(e) Findings 
The inextricable reliance on the notion of insolvency affects the adoption of any 
of these predictive models as the demarcation line between contract and 
insolvency law remedies. In other words, these models may predict with 
sufficient accuracy when and if a company is cash-flow or balance-sheet 
                                                                    
203 L Gullifer, ‘“Sales” on Retention of Title Terms: Is the English Law Analysis Broken?’ (2017) 
133(Apr) L.Q.R. 244, 255; Vaccari (n 201) 246; KFK Low and KCF Loi, ‘Bunkers in Wonderland: 
A Tale of How the Growth of Romalpa Clauses Shrank the English Law of Sales’ (2018) 3 J. Bus. 
Law 229, 241. 
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insolvent, but not when a company should and does file for insolvency 
protection. 
Despite their name, these instruments provide little help to assess when a 
company does, should and ought to petition for the application of insolvency 
remedies. This is due to a variety of reasons, the most significant being their 
focus on financial indicators (such as profit, loss, balance-sheet and cash-flow 
insolvency) and their reliance on accurate and timely information, thus raising 
issues of asymmetry between stakeholders and cost of the monitoring system.  
 
5.4 THE “TRADITIONAL COMMON POOL DILEMMA” 
5.4(a) To Be or Not to Be a “Problem” 
Insolvency is a black-or-white eligibility requirement: only if a company is 
insolvent it may file for insolvency remedies. The TCP narrative adds a layer of 
complexity: if a company experiences a TCP-type situation, it may not mean that 
insolvency remedies should apply. 
With reference to risk, it was argued that only qualified risks justify filings. 
Similarly, only qualified TCP-type situations should lead to filings. In other 
words, if the company and its stakeholders experience a TCP dilemma, the list of 
available remedies should be restricted to those provided by contract law. It is 
only when this dilemma deteriorates to a problem that insolvency remedies 
should the trump contractual rules. 
Companies are best understood as common-pool resources to which a large 
number of the people have access. The conflicting expectations of these people 
may lead to a sub-optimal use of the resource, thus creating a TCP dilemma. 
This situation was first described by Hardin204 in an entirely different context, 
i.e. the over-use of renewable205 or non-renewable (yet limited) resources such 
                                                                    
204 G Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243. This is one of the most 
often-cited scientific papers of the second half of the twentieth century, but pessimism on the 
sustainable management of common-pool resources was expressed by authors such as 
Aristotle, the French naturalist Marcet and Lloyd: T Dietz and others, ‘The Drama of the 
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as fish and potable water which may lead to problems of overuse and affect the 
long-term sustainability of the affected eco-system. Common-pool systems also 
face free-rider problems, i.e. the cost associated with devising a monitoring and 
joint-administration system of the commons206 and with forcing users to 
contribute to maintain the system in equilibrium or to exclude free riders. 
Hardin also described the situation as a “tragedy of the commons”,207 thus 
paving the way to neo-classical economists who argued for the importance of 
unitary ownership (private or governmental) to address TCP issues.208 
This narrative has not proven entirely persuasive209 and Hardin’s theories have 
not been received without criticism. Some scholars argued that Hardin confused 
the concept of common property with a situation in which people have free 
access to use a commons.210 Later commentators211 evidenced that the conflict 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Commons’ in National Research Council (eds), The Drama of the Commons (National Academy 
Press: Washington D.C. 2002) 8. 
205 Money in insolvency cases can be described as a “renewable” resource as long as the amount 
of it appropriated by each of the claimants does not exceed the regeneration rate triggered by 
the rescue procedure. Nevertheless, in the majority of insolvency cases, money is an exhaustible 
resource. Ostrom argued that many of the conclusions of her studies applied to both renewable 
and exhaustible resources: E Ostrom and others, Rules, Games, & Common-Pool Resources 
(University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 1994) 8. 
206 In line with the scientific literature in the field, the word “commons” is used in this text as a 
synonym of “common-pool resource” to describe ‘a diversity of resources or facilities as well as to 
property institutions that involve some aspect of joint ownership or access’ - Dietz (n 204) 18 -. A 
common-pool resource is not necessarily a common property: it may not be owned by a 
multiplicity of players. As evidenced by Thomas Dietz, the terms “commons” and “common-pol 
resource” refer to ‘the characteristics of the resource rather than on the human arrangements 
used to manage it’ - Dietz (n 204) 17 -. 
207 He argued that ‘freedom in a commons brings ruin to all’: Hardin (n 204) 1244. 
208 TD Crocker, ‘The Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems’ in E Wolozin (ed.), 
The Economics of Air pollution (Norton: New York, 1966); J Dales, Pollution, Property, and Prices. 
An Essay in Policy-Making and Economics (Toronto University Press: Toronto, 1968); HS Gordon, 
‘The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The fishery’ (1954) 62 J. Political Econ. 
124; DW Montgomery, ‘Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs’ (1972) 5 J. 
Econ. Theory 395. 
209 In particular, against the need to privatize the goods and promote autonomy-based solutions 
for common dilemmas see: T Tietenberg, ‘The Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting the 
Commons: What Have We Learned?’ in National Research Council (eds), The Drama of the 
Commons (National Academy Press: Washington D.C. 2002); CM Rose, ‘Common Property, 
Regulatory Property, and Environmental Protection: Comparing Community-Based 
Management to Tradable Environmental Allowances’ in National Research Council (eds), The 
Drama of the Commons (National Academy Press: Washington D.C. 2002). 
210 SV Ciriacy-Wantrup and RC Bishop, ‘Common Property as a Concept in Natural Resources 
Policy’ (1975) 15(4) Natural Resources Journal 713, 715. 
211 Among others: CM Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory, and Rhetoric 
of Ownership (Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1994) arguing that the common-pool 
dilemma may give rise to a “comedy”: a drama for certain, but one with a happy ending; BJ 
McCay, ‘Common and Private Concerns’ (1995) 4 Advances in Human Ecology 89. 
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‘could be averted by mechanisms that cause individuals to act in the interest of the 
collective good rather than with narrow self-interest’.212  
These are very technical comments that fall outside the scope of the thesis. 
Despite the criticisms, the author agrees with Hardin that there are significant 
obstacles to identify the critical factors that can promote a successful 
governance of the commons (in our case, the agreement on a restructuring plan, 
for instance) without the privatization of the company’s assets (i.e. their sale or 
assignment to secured creditors) or the definition of state-imposed regulation 
(i.e. insolvency law).213 These obstacles are magnified in large commons and 
international arenas, where consensual governance is less likely to be 
achieved.214 
Nevertheless, TCP dramas can be diverted if debtors and creditors act according 
to the interests of a wider group of stakeholders and not only to fulfil their 
personal interests.215 The problem faced by people in a TCP drama is one of 
organization: how to change a situation in which each party acts as an 
independent appropriator of limited goods to one in which all stakeholders take 
or accept decisions that are designed to maximise their wealth.216 
                                                                    
212 Dietz (n 204) 4.  
213 RW Wade, 1994 Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India 
(ICS Press: San Francisco, 1988); E Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of 
Institutions for Collective Action (CUP: Cambridge, 1990); J Baland and J Platteau, Halting 
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Oxford, 1996); A Agrawal, ‘Common Resources and Institutional Sustainability’ in National 
Research Council (eds), The Drama of the Commons (National Academy Press, Washington D.C. 
2002), 53-55. 
214 D Vogel, National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United 
States (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY, 1986); RE Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New 
Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1991); RB 
Mitchell, ‘Heterogeneities at two levels: States, non-state actors and international oil pollution’ 
in R Keohane and E Ostrom (eds), Local Commons and Global Interdependence; Heterogeneity 
and Cooperation in Two Domains (Sage: London, 1995). 
215 This view of the human being as rational and capable of group-oriented and multi-time 
interactions was first conceived by VA Vayda and RA Rappaport, ‘Ecology, cultural and 
noncultural’ in JA Cliffton, Introduction to Cultural Anthropology (Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 
1968) 477; RA Rappaport, Pigs for the Ancestors: Ritual in the Ecology of a New Guinea People 
(Yale University Press: New Haven, 1984).   
216 Ostrom (n 213) 39. The author also observed that in common pool situations the key issue is 
represented by devising strategies to allocate limited resources in an efficient manner, i.e. 
avoiding rent dissipations, reducing uncertainty and preventing conflict over the assignment of 
rights (at 48). 
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Hardin’s theory is based on the prisoner’s dilemma narrative,217 in which 
predictions are inferred from the behaviour of two perfectly informed people 
under a one-shot condition and with no communication. Not only is this not 
necessarily a truthful picture of how things occur in reality, but the perfect 
market-zero transaction cost (‘PM-ZTC’) approach also prevents the author 
from exploring alternative solutions based on practical experience.  
People do play the same game repeatedly (as they use the commons more than 
on one occasion) and communication between them is possible218 (although 
asymmetries of position and information may affect the outcome).219 Other 
authors, such as Ostrom, challenged Hardin’s assumptions on the basis of how 
people behave in practice.  
Ostrom conducted a series of studies on TCP situations in the use of communal 
tenure in high mountain meadows and forests; the use of groundwater basins in 
the Los Angeles area; and fisheries in Turkey, Sri Lanka and Nova Scotia.220  
These were all TCP dilemmas, similar to those faced by a distressed 
corporation. However, she concluded that it is not always the case that 
individuals jointly using common pool resources behave as to produce TCP 
problems, which is what Hardin defined as “the tragedy of the commons”.221 
                                                                    
217 W Poundstone, Prisoner’s Dilemma: John von Neumann, Game Theory, and the Puzzle of the 
Bomb (Anchor Books: New York, 1992); A Rapoport and A Chammah, Prisoner’s Dilemma (3rd 
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Management in Large-Scale Multivariate Research’ in National Research Council (eds), The 
Drama of the Commons (National Academy Press: Washington D.C. 2002) conducting an 
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resources without the need of governmental intervention. See also: S Kopelman and others, 
‘Factors Influencing Cooperation in Common Dilemmas: A Review of Experimental 
Psychological Research’ in National Research Council (eds), The Drama of the Commons 
(National Academy Press: Washington D.C. 2002). 
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221 For similar findings, see: PM Blaikie and H Brookfield, Land Degradation and Society 
(Methuen: London, 1987); F Berkes, Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based 
Sustainable Development (Belhaven: London, 1989); Ostrom (n 213); N Sengupta, Managing 
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Dividing the Waters: Governing Groundwater in Southern California (Institute for Contemporary 
Studies: San Francisco, 1992); DW Bromley, Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and 
Policy (Institute for Contemporary Studies: San Francisco, 1992). 
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TCP dilemmas – which, in the insolvency context, are both allocative and 
(re)distributive in nature222 – may not deteriorate into TCP problems. 
TCP problems are qualified TCP-type situations where the parties who have 
legally enforceable rights against the debtor (including risk bearers) cannot 
agree on a consensual and value-maximising course of action. Is the TCP 
problem the proper notion to determine when statutory insolvency rules and 
norms ought to depart from the common law of contract as it applies to solvent 
companies? 
5.4(b) What Makes a TCP Problem “Problematic”? 
One of the dominant theories regarding the nature of insolvency law and what it 
should accomplish is the creditors’ bargain theory.223 It argues that ‘[c]orporate 
reorganization is essentially an attempt to maximize asset value in the face of a 
collective action problem coupled with a private information problem’.224 The 
proponents of this theory suggested that insolvency law should be designed as a 
set of rules to overcome TCP problems.225 
According to these commentators, a TCP problem usually arises whenever a 
company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due or when it appears from the 
company’s books that it is hopelessly insolvent.226  
These commentators maintain that the TCP problem is simply a multi-party 
version of the “prisoner’s dilemma”.227 Parties recognise that self-interested 
                                                                    
222 See above sub-section 1.3(a) of this thesis. 
223 The theory has been mainly developed by the American scholars Jackson and Baird. See 
section 3.2 of this work. 
224 AJ Casey, ‘Auction Design for Claims Trading’ (2014) 22 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 133, 137. 
225 Later versions of this theory replaced the common pool narrative with a new framework that 
incorporated a common disaster component to business failure. The purpose of this change was 
to explain some of the various (re)distributional effects that commonly take place in insolvency 
law: TH Jackson and RE Scott, ‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing 
and the Creditors’ Bargain’ (1989) 75(2) Va. L. Rev. 155. 
226 See, among others: TH Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law’ (2nd edn, Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, MA, 2001); JL Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational 
Default’ (2000) 98(7) Mich. L. Rev. 2276. 
227 RC Picker, ‘Security Interests, Misbehaviour, and Common Pools’ (1992) 59(2) U. Chi. L. Rev. 
645, 648. For a literature on the prisoner’s dilemma: M Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation 
(CUP: Cambridge, 1987); Rapoport and Chammah (n 217); LA Fennel, ‘Commons, Anticommons, 
Semicommons’ in K Ayotte and HE Smith (eds), Research Handbook on the Economics of Property 
Law (EE Publishing: Cheltenham, 2011); R Hardin, ‘Collective Action as an Agreeable n-
Prisoner’s Dilemma’ (1971) 16 Behav. Sci. 472; RH McAdams, ‘Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma; 
Coordination, Game Theory and the Law’ (2009) 82(2) S. Cal. L. Rev. 209 
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actions fail to achieve a socially optimal result228 but, nevertheless, they are 
pushed to betray the common good for a (potentially) individual larger gain. 
When a TCP problem arises, there is an overlapping distribution of rights 
among the unsecured creditors of the failing debtor. As no creditor has the right 
to impose a dominant strategy over the others, each of them has an interest in 
defeating the rateable principle of distribution that applies in insolvency law.229  
These scholars230 compared insolvent debtors to a jointly owned pool of fish 
and creditors to self-interested fishermen. Overfishing would be against their 
ultimate interests, yet self-interested creditors have strong incentives to behave 
irrationally.  
This situation is the equivalent to Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons”. 
Whenever TCP problems come to the fore, insolvency statutes should apply to 
lead to the most economically efficient outcomes that parties would not 
otherwise achieve absent this statutory incentive.  
Not all commentators (including the author of this thesis) agree that this TCP-
type situation is “problematic”.231 Another contentious aspect is the 
identification of who is affected by a TCP problem.   
It has already been observed in this thesis232 that (re)distributive theorists 
maintain that equality – and deliberate deviations from equality – should be the 
focus of any insolvency policy.233 Accordingly, existing bankruptcy systems 
should shrink ‘the collection rights of the most powerful creditors in order to 
                                                                    
228 Jackson (n 226) 12-14. 
229 Picker (n 227), arguing that insolvency remedies are not needed to solve the common pool 
problem, as negotiated secured credit arrangements can more efficiently deal with allocation 
issues.  
230 DG Baird and TH Jackson, Bankruptcy. Cases, Problems and Materials (4th edn, Foundation 
Press: Cambridge, MA, 2007); TH Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the 
Creditors’ Bargain’ (1982) 91 Yale L.J. 857; Jackson and Scott (n 225). 
231 See Ostrom studies, reported in sub-section 5.4(a). 
232 Chapter four. 
233 Against, see FH Easterbrook, ‘Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?’ (1990) 27 J. Financial Econ. 
411, 414. The author demonstrated that if junior, unsecured creditors are treated more harshly 
in reorganisation rather than in liquidation/auction procedures (but the reasoning would 
remain valid even if the opposite was true), it would not follow that auctions have a potential 
(re)distributive effect. These considerations affect the efficiency of each of the considered 
procedures, not their effects. 
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achieve somewhat greater distribution among all those who have a stake in the 
debtor’.234  
The case for a (re)distributive explanation of some insolvency statutes has 
some impressive foundations. For example, in the U.S. the legislature235 seems 
to have adopted such a view. However, this position is countered by those 
commentators who argue that ‘[t]he rights which bankruptcy legislation grants 
and takes away […] are mostly modifications of expectations which arise from 
market exchanges’.236 
The judiciary usually refrains itself from equitably extending the scope of 
statutory (re)distributive protection. For instance, in the U.S., in Canada S. Ry. V. 
Gebhard237, the Supreme Court clarified that ‘[e]very member of a political 
community must necessarily part with some of the rights which, as an individual, 
not affected by his relation to others, he might have retained’.238  
As a matter of fact, (re)distributive policies are currently pursued by both 
English and American insolvency laws (see, for instance, the preferential 
treatment recognised to employees). Consequently, we are left in the dark in the 
determination of what is a problematic TCP problem. This observation seriously 
questions the desirability of using the TCP standard as the criterion to 
determine the dividing line between corporate and insolvency rules.  
  
                                                                    
234 E Warren and JL Westbrook, ‘Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention’ 
(2005) 118(4) Harv. L. Rev. 1197, 1201. In a similar vein: S Block-Lieb, ‘The Logic and Limits of 
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reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5796. 
236 JW Bowers, ‘Rehabilitation, Redistribution or Dissipation: The Evidence for Choosing Among 
Bankruptcy Hypotheses’ (1994) 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 955, 965. For the analysis of procedural-based 
theories, see chapter three of this thesis. See, in particular, Jackson (n 226) 17 (ftn 22). 
237 109 U.S. 527, 536 (1883). 
238 Ibid. 
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5.4(c) Literature Review on the TCP Standard 
The existence of a TCP has been questioned239 for several reasons, including for 
its lack of persuasiveness and proper consideration of anti-common 
behaviours.240  
The theory of anti-commons originated in the 
context of property law, where it was first 
introduced by Michelman241 and then 
extensively investigated by Heller.242 Anti-
common behaviour has been described by 
insolvency scholars243 and it has been 
frequently and well documented in practice. 
For instance, in the case of the Chapter 9 
procedure involving the city of Detroit, the city 
bonds’ insurers argued that the turnaround 
plan was discriminatory as financial creditors 
were paid no more than 10 cents for the 
dollar, while unsecured pensioners received 
compensation for roughly 60 per cent of their 
unfunded claims.244 This was despite the state 
of a near unanimity of other claimants in regards to the proposal, which 
represented the best possible compromise between the interests of all parties 
affected by Detroit’s collapse and the best bet to ensure a viable future for the 
                                                                    
239 K Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System (Yale University Press: 
New Haven, 1999); DG Carlson, ‘Philosophy in Bankruptcy’ (1987) 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1341; MJ 
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THE BANKRUPTCY OF DETROIT 
The city of Detroit was the 
largest municipality by 
population and debt to file for 
Chapter 9 in the U.S. history. 
Detroit filed for bankruptcy on 
18 July 2013, after Michigan’s 
governor Rick Snyder appointed 
Kevyn Orr as the city emergency 
manager in March 2013. The 
filing was triggered by the 
inability to reach a consensual 
agreement on a debt cut with the 
city’s main creditors. 
The final plan of adjustment was 
confirmed on 7 November 2014. 
Creditors received between 14 
and 75 cents on the dollar for 
their original claims. 
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municipality.245 Conflicts among different classes of creditors are the norm 
rather than the exception in insolvency cases.246 
While it is true that insolvency rules should acknowledge the existence of anti-
common problems and provide appropriate remedies to remove any such 
blockage caused by them, such a debate focuses again on the content, rather 
than the limits of insolvency law.247 
On a side note, in some circumstances common and anti-common issues can be 
hard to distinguish. The institutional lenders’ opposition to a rescue plan that 
results in a lower return to creditors may be interpreted as an anti-common 
practice by those workers who lose their jobs and by the local communities. At 
the same time, the closure of a failing business may result in a less competitive 
(hence more profitable) market, in higher returns for creditors, in lower 
procedural and social costs, and in more secure job opportunities for the 
redundant workers (who are, nevertheless, usually treated as preferential 
creditors). As a result, the question arises whether the potential institutional 
lenders’ veto power is a common or an anti-common type of situation? 
Anti-common theories may prove that the proceduralist vision of insolvency 
law is too narrow-focused to be persuasive to determine the content of the law. 
However, they do not prove that there is no TCP deadlock for contracting 
creditors and legally recognised claimants in the period before an insolvency 
procedure is commenced.  
Other authors, on the other hand, have questioned the existence of such a 
problem only with reference to limited sectors of the economy.248 More 
                                                                    
245 Ibid.  
246 S Paterson, ‘The Paradox of Alignment: Agency Problems and Debt Restructuring’ (2016) 
EBOR L. Rev. 497. 
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generally,249 there is a large portion of insolvency scholars who claim that 
common pool and collectivist approaches fail to recognise the interests of non-
contractual creditors,250 focus on non-efficiency objectives251 and assist 
corporations to stay in business.  
Despite these contrasting views, as a matter of fact, it is possible to observe that 
if each creditor is free to pursue his own agenda, this would reduce the 
likelihood to (efficiently and quickly) agree on a reorganisation plan. While this 
observation does not prove that a TCP issue exists, it is nevertheless possible to 
conclude that, left alone, creditors on the whole are unable to ex-post maximise 
their return from an insolvent or otherwise financially distressed debtor. 
5.4(d) The Purpose of the TCP Standard 
The literature review mentioned in sub-section 5.4(c) has challenged the 
existence of a TCP problem, but it has provided no final answer on the 
opportunity to use this criterion as a demarcation line between corporate and 
insolvency remedies. Accordingly, this section investigates if an insolvency 
system that revolves around the TCP notion is able to deliver outcomes that are 
consistent with the autonomy, predictability and inclusivity objectives adopted 
in this study. 
In general terms, it is impossible not to observe that the TCP criterion draws 
heavily on the notion of insolvency. Sub-section 5.2(a) has already hinted that 
the alleged simplicity and straightforwardness of the insolvency notion can be 
more apparent than real, as the way in which this concept has been understood 
by both the judiciary and the jurisprudence has resulted in a flexible 
understanding of its content and characteristics. 
                                                                    
249 Finch and Milman (n 18) 30. 
250 These critiques are numerous and voluminous: E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 U. 
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The reliance on the insolvency concept is unwarranted. Both in its allocative 
and its (re)distributive understanding, the TCP dilemma refers to a condition 
among the creditors, who are no longer able to rely on their legal or contractual 
rights to satisfy their claims in the ordinary course of business. Insolvency, on 
the other hand, is a condition that affects the debtor.  
While insolvency almost invariably leads to the emergence of a TCP dilemma 
among the debtor’s creditors, the latter problem may pre-date the existence of 
an insolvency situation. Nevertheless, Jackson and other law and economics 
scholars have used the creditors’ bargain model to suggest that insolvency 
remedies should be granted (and cases commenced) whenever there are 
multiple creditors and a reasonable prospect of insolvency.252 Insolvency 
remedies would be triggered whenever there was the potential that the joint 
actions of the self-interested owners would lead to non-efficient outcomes253.  
Autonomy of the parties would be preserved (as contractual securities and 
covenants would not be affected by the insolvency filing). The enhanced legal 
predictability in the system would result in lower cost of credit and a 
substantially fair treatment of the creditors.  
This conclusion is however acceptable only in a perfect market, zero transaction 
cost (PM-ZTC)254 environment. Reality may be strikingly different. 
Take, for instance, the existing business environment in the U.K. Small and 
medium sized enterprises (i.e. businesses that employ less than 250 people) 
represent 99.9% of businesses in the country, with micro companies (i.e. those 
with less than employees) accounting for 96% of the market.255  
Empirical research in the field proves that MSMEs rely primarily on loans to 
fund their activity. These loans are usually provided by banks or hire purchase 
                                                                    
252 Jackson (n 226) 201.  
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lenders.256 Additionally, micro-companies use venture capital, hire-purchase 
leasing and factoring less frequently than larger corporations.257  
Unlike other voluntary and involuntary financers of MSMEs activities (“non-
adjusting lenders”) such as small trade creditors, tort claimants, employees and 
suppliers, institutional lenders are well placed to assess the vitality and 
economic prospects of the borrower. If monitoring costs are excessive and their 
claims are fully secured, they may decide not to do so and rely on financial 
instruments to reduce the risk of default. However, these institutional lenders 
will never find themselves in the situation of non-adjusting lenders, who ‘are 
like ships’ officers who can calculate the expected size of a hull fracture but not 
whether it will be above or below the waterline’.258  
This asymmetry of information and powers means that institutional lenders 
have a strong incentive not to manifest the existence of a TCP conundrum. Their 
pursuance of individual maximisation policies would prejudice the interests of 
non-involved third parties (for instance, by means of the request of new 
securities for new loans). In other words, they have an incentive to keep the 
company afloat until it is hopelessly insolvent and at that point they are those 
who will recover the most from the company’s liquidation. 
As a result, while in theory the TCP standard could provide legal predictability 
and respect the autonomy of the contracting parties, in practice the same 
parties have strong incentives not to manifest the existence of this condition.  
The legislature could introduce mechanisms to reduce the asymmetries of 
powers and information between the parties and to ensure a higher level of 
protection to non-adjusting lenders in the ensuing insolvency procedure. 
Technology could also promote a wider and inexpensive means to share 
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financial and operational information to the debtor’s contractual claimants if 
transactions took place on a de-centralised and public ledger such as 
blockchain.259  
This, however, looks to be an uphill battle. Not only the structure of the market 
suggests that these statutory corrections are needed for the vast majority of 
cases. They should also be introduced against the foreseeable strong opposition 
of institutional lenders who - historically - have always had a strong lobbying 
group both in the U.S. and in the U.K.’s legislative bodies. 
With reference to the last objective of this study (i.e. inclusivity), the previous 
sections have demonstrated that while TCP dilemmas (and problems) affect a 
variety of stakeholders, the mainstream allocative insolvency theories and 
practices tend to consider, protect and promote primarily the interests of 
contractual claimants who hold a legally enforceable, usually proprietary 
interest against the debtor. In other words, the notion of the TCP problem 
revolves around the concept of legally and equitably enforceable rights, with 
the result that any other claimant is automatically not included in the 
insolvency procedure.  
Additionally, the difference in powers and relative positions among the 
traditional claimants means that some of them are more likely to use insolvency 
remedies to prejudice the interests of non-adjusting parties. In Finch’s words, 
‘[t]he collectivism advocated by Jackson is treated as neutral but it begs 
distributional questions’.260 
Inclusivity, therefore, seems to be only partially achieved. Additionally, respect 
for claimants’ rights appears primarily and purely formal. In other words, the 
use of a TCP standard can lead to substantial prejudice against certain 
categories of creditors.  
  
                                                                    
259 Blockchain is a trust-less, public ledger that operates by means of the web. It is characterised 
by co-ordination, irrevocability and record keeping at the level of each of the nodes of the 
system, i.e. the computers that validate and relay blockchain transactions. 
260 Finch and Milman (n 18) 32. 
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5.4(e) Testing the TCP Standard: The Cases of Carillion and Tesla 
Would a common pool standard triggered by parties who have legally 
enforceable (proprietary and personal) rights against the debtor work in 
practice? If so, to what extent? To try to give an answer to these queries, this 
work refers to two recent and controversial 
corporate cases: Carillion and Tesla.  
Carillion Plc (‘Carillion’) rise and spectacular 
fall has been described as ‘a story of 
recklessness, hubris and greed’,261 ‘a failure of a 
system of corporate accountability which too 
often leaves those responsible at the top – and 
the ever-present firms that surround them – as 
winners, while everyone else loses out’.262 
Carillion was a major strategic supplier to the 
British public sector which employed 43,000 
people, 19,000 of which were located in the 
U.K. alone. The company won several building 
contracts with local and central authorities 
and it provided school meals and defence 
accommodation. The company’s 2016 
accounts, published on 1 March 2017, 
described a company in financial health: revenues were up 14 per cent over the 
previous fiscal year to £5.2 billion, while profits before taxation registered a fall 
of 5 per cent over the previous year to a still healthy £146.7 million figure.263 On 
the basis of these results, the company agreed to pay a record dividend of £79 
million, out of which £55 million were distributed on 9 June 2017, just one 
month before the July 2017 profit warning.264 
                                                                    
261 BEIS and Work and Pensions Committees, ‘Carillion: Second Joint Report’ (n 179) 3. 
262 Ibid 68. 
263 Carillion, Making tomorrow a better place: Annual Report and Accounts 2016 (London, 1 
March 2017) 
<http://www.annualreports.co.uk/HostedData/AnnualReports/PDF/LSE_CLLN_2016.pdf> 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
264 BEIS and Work and Pensions Committees, ‘Carillion: Second Joint Report’ (n 179) 17. 
THE CARILLION CASE 
Prior to its ongoing liquidation, 
Carillion was a British multi-
national company active in the 
construction and service 
industry. Its headquarters were 
located in Wolverhampton. 
Carillion was created in July 
1999 following a demerger from 
Tarmac. In the following years, it 
expanded its business by 
incorporating competitors and 
winning public procurement and 
building contracts in other states 
such as the UAE and Canada. 
Following two profit warnings 
issued in the course of 2017 and 
the discovery of aggressive 
auditing practices that 
systemically over-valued the 
business, the company was 
forced to file for insolvency 
protection at the beginning of 
2018. 
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The 10 July 2017 profit warning was followed by a second one in September 
2017 in which Carillion reduced the value of its contracts by more than £1 
billion the value of its contracts. On 12 January 2018 the company paid £6.4 
million to a series of advisors and lawyers,265 while three days later it presented 
a petition for compulsory winding up to the court.266 The company declared 
liabilities of nearly £7 billion and just £29 million in cash. Investigations from 
the Parliament, FCA, FRC and the appointed liquidators are underway to 
establish the existence and nature of any wrongdoing from past directors and 
the accounting audits. 
Carillion left a pension liability of £2.6 billion. It also owed around £2 billion to 
its 30,000 suppliers.267 It is expected that both the Pension Protection Fund and 
these suppliers will get little out of the liquidation. 
The preliminary report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (‘BEIS’) 
and Pensions Committee268 concluded that the system of internal checks and 
balances supposed to prevent board failures of the magnitude of Carillion failed 
spectacularly. Non-executive directors did not monitor, challenge and properly 
scrutinise the activity of executive directors, who acted with the connivance of 
the accounting firm charged to oversee the veracity and accuracy of the 
company’s accounts. The company showed a chronic lack of accountability and 
professionalism,269 while the deterrent effect of s.172 CA 2006 proved 
insufficient to affect the behaviour of the directors of the company270 to the 
extent that the Joint Committee recommended that the Insolvency Service 
investigated potential breaches of these duties. 
The business model was one that has been described as “dash for cash”.271 Its 
acquisition strategy lacked any coherent strategy but to remove competitors 
                                                                    
265 BEIS and Work and Pensions Committees, ‘Carillion: Second Joint Report’ (n 179) 55. 
266 High Court of Justice, In the matter of Carillion plc and in the matter of the IA 1986 (15 
January 2018), not published. 
267 BEIS and Work and Pensions Committees, ‘Carillion: Second Joint Report’ (n 179) 7. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Ibid 27. 
270 Ibid 67. 
271 This means that the company relied on the cash generated by new contracts to cover the 
losses accumulated in running and managing existing contracts.  
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from the market and the company funded its spending spree through debt.272 
The company became reckless in the pursuit of growth and had scant regard for 
long-term sustainability and the impact of its decisions on its constituencies.  
Would the outcome have been different if the parties who had legally 
enforceable rights against Carillion relied on the TCP standard? 
The question should probably be answered in the negative. Carillion’s collapse 
was sudden and from a publicly-stated position of strength.273 Before July 2017 
Carillion showed no manifest sign of crisis and all the parties who could have 
affected the situation of corporate distress of the company were involved in the 
scheme, failed to check the veracity and accuracy of the figures provided by the 
board or acted in their own personal best interest.274  
While shareholders were concerned with the company’s net debt and the 
pension deficit, they preferred to divest rather than to attempt to modify the 
culture of the company. The government report also observed that while major 
investors failed to exercise sufficient influence on the board, this was primarily 
due to the lack of trustworthy information from the board and auditors.275 
Third parties such as employees and, more importantly, suppliers and 
competitors had no possibility of raising the private concerns that they might 
have nurtured against the business model of the company.276  
These observations are in line with one of the preliminary findings of the 
report. While the economic system is predicated on strong investor 
engagement, the mechanisms and incentives to support engagement are weak. 
In other words: in the case of Carillion parties were driven into a TCP problem, 
                                                                    
272 BEIS and Work and Pensions Committees, ‘Carillion: Second Joint Report’ (n 179) 14. 
273 BEIS and Work and Pensions Committees, ‘Carillion: Second Joint Report’ (n 179) 7. 
274 For instance, in early 2015 UBS claimed that total debt was higher than Carillion were 
publicly stating. This did not prompt an investigation from non-executive directors and 
accounting auditors, but only an increase in investors short selling against Carillion’s shares. 
See: BEIS and Work and Pensions Committees, ‘Carillion: Second Joint Report’ (n 179) 14. 
275Ibid 50. 
276 It might be argued that suppliers and creditors could have voiced their concerns about the 
financial stability of the company. In fact Carillion, despite being a signatory of the 
Government’s Prompt Payment Code since 2013, usually paid for supplies after 120 days from 
delivery (unless the supplier accepted a reduction in the price originally agreed by the parties 
through the use of an early payment facility option): BEIS and Work and Pensions Committees, 
‘Carillion: Second Joint Report’ (n 179) 24-26. It is to be investigated however, if Carillion’s 
practices represented a unicum in the industry.  
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but this has promoted neither a timely filing for corporate distress remedies 
nor a balanced consideration of residual-risk takers interests by the parties who 
had the powers to act. 
The course of action suggested by the report is rather unimaginative: to 
strengthen the regulators’ investigative and sanctioning powers.277 The 
beginning of this section has however proven that regulations and regulators 
may not be the appropriate solution to all issues. 
This thesis submits that it might be preferable to empower those who are closer 
to the company (in the case of Carillion, long-term shareholders, pension 
trustees and regulator, suppliers, employees and competitors) to raise issues 
about the manner in which the company is run before the only course of action 
left is liquidation. The TCP standard based on proprietary and personal rights 
does not address the corporate governance, representation and power 
imbalance issues evidenced in the Carillion case. It looks mainly like an 
insolvency standard in disguise and it does 
not promote the early emersion of 
potentially irreversible crises (which is the 
underlying objective of the Anglo-American 
insolvency system).  
In the U.S., Tesla, Inc. (‘Tesla’) is not (yet) an 
insolvency story.  
In May 2018, Tesla – a niche battery electric 
car maker who has launched on the market 
luxury vehicles such as the Model S sedan 
and the Model X crossover – was valued on 
the NY Stock Exchange approximately $48 
billion. The market value of Tesla was 
approximately the same as General Motors, 
a company that in the 2017 fiscal year sold 
                                                                    
277 BEIS and Work and Pensions Committees, ‘Carillion: Second Joint Report’ (n 179) 87-96. 
TESLA  
Tesla is an American, multi-
national public company based 
in Palo Alto, California. Its 
business ranges from battery 
electric vehicles to energy 
storage solutions and solar panel 
manufacturing (through the 
subsidiary company SolarCity). 
The company was founded in 
2003 and its CEO is South-
African born Elon Musk. Its main 
production and assembly plant 
(‘Gigafactory 1’) is located in 
Reno (Nevada) while its main 
manufacturing facility is in 
Fremont (California). The latter 
is built on the site previously 
occupied by a car manufacturing 
plant jointly owned until 2010 
by General Motors and Toyota.  
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9.6 million vehicles and generated some $146 billion in revenue (compared to 
some 102,862 and $11.8 billion respectively at Tesla).278 
Tesla is not a profitable company. In all financial years since 2008 the company 
has registered a loss, which peaked to almost $2 billion dollars in 2017279 in the 
company’s attempt to ramp up the production of its first, “affordable” mass-
produced electric vehicle, the Model 3.  
In an attempt to goad financial critics who had been warning about the risk of 
insolvency, on 1st April 2018 Elon Musk, the co-founder. CEO and product 
architect of Tesla, Inc. tweeted:  
Tesla Goes Bankrupt. Palo Alto, California, April 1, 2018 -- Despite 
intense efforts to raise money, including a last-ditch mass sale of Easter 
Eggs, we are sad to report that Tesla has gone completely and totally 
bankrupt. So bankrupt, you can't believe it.280 
The joke was not well received by the market, with Tesla stock losing 6% of 
their value in the aftermath of this announcement amid other safety concerns 
linked to the disclosure of the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board that it 
was investigating the crash of one of Tesla’s Model X.281 In May 2018, the 
company shares also suffered another setback when the company’s CEO in a 
conference call with the analysts refused to answer some pressing questions 
about the poor financial performance of the automaker and the need to raise 
new capital.282 On May 18, 2018 Tesla shares closed at $276.82 per share, down 
from more than $380.00 in mid-September 2018. 
                                                                    
278 Source for General Motors: Statista website 
<https://www.statista.com/topics/2480/general-motors/> accessed 17 September 2018. 
Source for Tesla: <http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-
4CW8X0/6271535935x0x970775/34923C55-6853-4223-ADDA-
CB3CDC1B919F/TSLA_Update_Letter_2017-4Q.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018. 
279 Source: Statista website <https://www.statista.com/statistics/272130/net-loss-of-tesla/> 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
280 Elon Musk (@elonmusk) (1 April 2018, 3:02 PM). Tweet. 
281 P Kwan Yuk, ‘Tesla shares sink following disclosures about fatal crash’ Financial Times (New 
York, 2 April 2018) <https://www.ft.com/content/96d927ac-366e-11e8-8eee-e06bde01c544> 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
282 R Water and N Bullock, ‘Tesla stock slides 6% after Elon Musk’s ‘bonhead’ analyst call’ 
Financial Times (San Francisco and New York, 3 May 2018) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/9ac8b1f2-4ef1-11e8-a7a9-37318e776bab> accessed 17 
September 2018. 
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Tesla is not a cash-flow “insolvent” company: according to the “First Quarter 
2018 Update”283 the company had a cash balance of $2.7 billion at the end of the 
first quarter of 2018. Furthermore, it seems that investors are still willing to 
lend money to the company and raise further capital should the need to do so 
arise. 
Therefore, there is no TCP problem among those who can claim proprietary and 
personal rights against the company and no risk of imminent filing. In the 
author’s view, this is problematic, as Tesla should not be allowed to remain on 
the market. 
It is a truism to say that the exuberant and unconventional attitude of Elon Musk 
has massively contributed to the promotion of the electric technology for 
vehicles as an alternative to combustion or hybrid-electric engines. In the wake 
of the 2016 Volkswagen diesel scandal and in an effort to reduce CO2 and NOX 
emissions (which are responsible for pollution, global warming and respiratory 
diseases), several countries have launched or are exploring plans to promote 
the use of electric vehicles and to abandon diesel-burning engines. 
Companies like Tesla have contributed to spreading the perception in the public 
opinion and governments that battery-powered electric vehicles are readily 
available on the market, they do not contribute to pollution and that this 
technology can be used by the general population. All these perceptions are 
false.  
Take for instance the first statement that battery-powered electric vehicles can 
replace combustion cars in the short term. According to JATO,284 while sales of 
battery electric cars increased 78% in 2017 to 668.000 units worldwide 
(compared to a global market increase of little more than 2 per cent), they still 
represented a fraction (0.77%) of global car sales and they are concentrated in 
                                                                    
283 <http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-
4CW8X0/6271535935x0x979026/44C49236-1FC2-4FD9-80B1-
495ED74E4194/TSLA_Update_Letter_2018-1Q.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018. 
284 JATO Press Release, ‘Global car sales up by 2.4% in 2017 due to soaring demand in Europe, 
Asia-Pacific and Latin America’ (20 February 2018) <http://www.jato.com/global-car-sales-2-
4-2017-due-soaring-demand-europe-asia-pacific-latin-america/> accessed 17 September 2018. 
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markets (such as China, the U.S. and Scandinavian countries) where the sales of 
these models are heavily incentivised by governments.  
It is also untrue that the production of battery electric car vehicles is harmless 
for the environment. In the U.K., legislation dictates that 95 per cent of a car has 
to be recycled285 but this cannot apply to battery electric vehicles, as nobody has 
yet devised a strategy to recycle the batteries themselves. Also, the process of 
manufacturing a car is energy intensive and if this energy is not produced from 
renewable resources, the electric manufacturer contributes to global pollution. 
Furthermore, the main metals that are used in the production of battery 
vehicles (lead-acid, nickel, lithium and zinc) are rare and exhaustible. 
Lastly, electric vehicles cost significantly more than comparably sized and 
equipped combustion cars while their depreciation is significantly faster, as 
batteries lose a significant part of their duration in the first few years. Anybody 
who has a cell-phone for more than one year can witness the sharp decrease of 
the duration of each charge since it was new. As car batteries use the same 
technology of cell-phones (only on a larger scale), the same issues are 
experienced after their prolonged use.  
The race to produce battery electric vehicles has forced other automakers to 
introduce these models in their portfolio. However, no electric vehicle is 
profitable for the automaker that produces it. It is estimated that General Motors 
loses $9,000 for each Chevrolet Bolt it produces, while Fiat Chrysler Automobiles 
suffers a staggering $20,000-dollar loss for each sub-compact electric Fiat 500 
the company sells.286  
Allowing a company like Tesla to operate on the market launches a series of 
wrong signals to the public: battery-powered electric cars are cool and 
affordable, they can be mass-produced and they are the solution to pollution 
                                                                    
285 J Finnerty, ‘Car recycling: how much of your old car is reused’ Auto Express (London, 14 April 
2016) <http://www.autoexpress.co.uk/car-news/95207/car-recycling-how-much-of-your-old-
car-is-reused> accessed 17 September 2018. 
286 G Coppola, ‘How to lease a $50,000 BMW for $54 a month’ Bloomberg News (New York, 17 
May 2018) <https://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/2018/05/17/carmakers-
offer-big-incentives-electric-vehicles/34992385/> accessed 17 September 2018. 
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issues. Tesla has a disrupting effect on the automotive industry and market and 
it should not be allowed to operate. 
It is submitted that the company could not be subject to compulsory liquidation 
for grounds of public interest pursuant to the procedure and conditions outlined 
in s.124A IA 1986. This is not simply because the company is incorporated in 
the United States.287 
In submitting a petition under s.124A IA 1986, the Secretary of State for BEIS 
should act in the public interest.288 Such a power is needed because it would be 
inappropriate to rely only on creditors and contributories to prevent 
behaviours that may harm the general good.289 It is mainly designed to identify 
companies’ illegal practices,290 but petitions have been allowed to remove 
companies from the market that were trading in an unsatisfactory although not 
necessarily unlawful manner.291 Insolvency is not necessarily a requirement or 
a ground needed to justify the government’s intervention,292 as it is not the 
allegation of illegal activity.293 
However, s.124A IA 1986 presents a last resort mechanism. Courts are rightly 
reluctant to admit any such petition only on grounds of unsatisfactory trading 
                                                                    
287 The Secretary of State can submit a petition under s.124A IA 1986 against a company 
incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction, but only if the company has its principal place of business 
in England: Re A Company (No. 007946 of 1993) [1994] Ch. 198; Re Normandy Marketing Ltd 
[1993] BCC 879. 
288 Re Millennium Advanced Technology Ltd [2004] EWHC 711 (Ch), [2004] 1 WLR 2177 [33]. 
289 McPherson & Keay (n 23) 278. 
290 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Bell Davies Trading Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1066, 
[2005] BCC 564. 
291 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Driscoll Management Facilities Ltd [2001] WL 
949826. The companies were controlled by or closely associated with an undischarged 
bankrupt, had been used as part of this bankrupt debt management business, failed to maintain 
adequate records and conducted the business in a highly unsatisfactory manner. Similarly, in Re 
Corvin Construction Ltd (unreported) the Chancery Division (Companies Court) held that it was 
just and equitable and in the public interest to wind up six linked construction companies 
where there was cogent evidence demonstrating that they lacked commercial probity, failed to 
file full and true accounts, allowed an undischarged bankrupt to operate as a de facto director 
and failed to cooperate with an Insolvency Service investigation.  
For a list of cases in which petitions on ground of public interest have been allowed, see: 
McPherson & Keay (n 23) 279. 
292 Re SHV Senator Hanseatische Verwaltungs Gesellschaft mbH [1997] BCC 112 (CA); Re Marann 
Brooks CSV Ltd [2003] BCC 239; Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform v Art IT Plc [2008] EWHC 258 (Ch), [2009] 1 BCLC 262. 
293 SHV Senator (n 292). However, Park J in Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Travel 
Time (UK) Ltd [2000] BCC 792 held that it was desirable, if not essential, that the petition 
alleged intentional and dishonest deceit of the public. 
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and require proof of intentionally deceitful behaviour.294 The public interest test 
has a high threshold and usually the court shall be satisfied that the petitioner is 
acting in the interest of the society as a whole and the respondent has breached 
minimum standards of commercial behaviour295 or the code of ethics296 before 
granting the order. This is particularly true if the petition is against a public 
company which still retains the confidence of the stock market and the financial 
community, as is the case in regards to Tesla. The company is selling a genuine 
product (even if at a loss), it has not made disreputable claims in its advertising 
and customers’ funds are no more at risk than in any other business enterprise 
which requires payment upon order.297  
All these circumstances make it extremely unlikely that a court would even 
consider a petition against a company like the Californian manufacturer. While 
it might be argued that public interest petitions aim at removing companies 
from the market that have a disruptive effect on the economy (and it is 
submitted that Tesla fits that description), the Secretary of State and courts’ 
powers are limited to cases where companies have at least breached accepted 
and minimum standards of behaviour. This is not the case with Tesla.  
Tesla does not face a TCP problem; hence no action can be taken to protect the 
interests of its residual risk-takers (including the society as a whole). The use of 
a TCP standard would do nothing to address the issues associated with the 
production and commercialization of Tesla’s vehicles evidenced in this sub-
section.  
5.4(f) Findings 
Section 5.4 reported the existing literature on the drama of the commons. The 
author has explained the reasons that support the recognition that TCP 
dilemmas occur in several contexts, including the economic and financial crisis 
of a corporation. 
                                                                    
294 Ibid.  
295 Re Walter L Jacob [1989] 5 BCC 244. 
296 Re Drivertime Recruitment Ltd [2004] EWHC 1637 (Ch), [2005] 1 BCLC 411. 
297 Re Forrester & Lamego Ltd [1997] 2 BCLC 155. 
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When assessed against the autonomy, legal predictability and inclusivity 
objectives, TCP theories based on legally enforceable (proprietary and 
personal) rights seemed more promising than the other eligibility standards 
mentioned in this study. However, they are far from perfect. 
If a TCP standard operated in the context of creditors having legally enforceable 
rights against the debtor, it would produce sub-optimal results. It would allow 
informed creditors to exploit their informational advantages over no or less-
adjusting ones. It would be also incapable of considering, protecting and 
promoting the interests of residual-risk takers. This is a major shortfall, as 
section 4.3 and principle-based theorists have argued that an insolvency system 
should aim to consider, protect and promote the expectations of all risk bearers.  
The main problem with the “traditional” common pool narrative described in 
this section is that its application has been restricted only to those parties who 
can claim ownership rights against the debtor. To overcome this limit, the 
author is committed to conceptualise a theoretical framework that maximises 
the wealth of those who claim risk bearer (as opposed to ownership) rights 
against the debtor. A task that will be undertaken in the next chapter of this 
work.  
 
5.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Rather than identifying the limits (in the sense of boundaries) of insolvency law, 
this chapter has evidenced the limits (in the sense of shortcomings) of the most 
frequently used and cited eligibility standards. Insolvency, risk and TCP 
problem among contractual claimants leave the door open to criticism when 
assessed against the party autonomy, legal predictability and inclusivity 
criteria.  
At the same time, section 5.4 has evidenced that common pool dilemmas exist. 
New approaches need to be explored to avoid that when these dilemmas 
escalate to common pool problems, the law fails to provide adequate guidance 
to the affected stakeholders (such as in the cases of Carillion and Tesla).  
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It therefore appears appropriate to investigate if standards, that are not based 
only on economic indicators or that do not consider only the contractual and 
legal rights of selected stakeholders, may result in a more procedurally efficient 
and fair use of the resources, while being consistent with the fundamental 
pillars of the Anglo-American insolvency framework. The next chapter is 
dedicated to conceptualising and testing the theory of WMSI theory to 
determine if an innovative eligibility criterion may provide better answers to 
the theoretical and practical shortcomings of the approaches de-constructed in 
chapter five. 
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CHAPTER 6 - THE “REVISED COMMON POOL” STANDARD: A GATEWAY TO 
CORPORATE DISTRESS REMEDIES 
«In developing corporate insolvency law, there [should be] an awareness of 
implications on the ground and of impact on the resilience of enterprises as well 
as on credit and employment relationships»1 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter argued that it is not possible to state in general terms 
whether the standards traditionally employed to determine the use of 
insolvency remedies promote predictability, party autonomy and inclusivity. It 
also suggested that an eligibility criterion triggered by the existence of an 
otherwise unsolvable TCP dilemma may be the most promising among those 
analysed insofar.  
It has been observed that the conceptual and practical shortcomings attributed 
to the TCP explanation are primarily due to the decision to restrict its narrative 
to the owners of proprietary and personal rights against the debtor.  
This chapter therefore offers the conceptualisation of a new theoretical 
framework (hereinafter called “wealth maximisation of stakeholders’ interests” 
or ‘WMSI’) to determine when companies should file for corporate distress 
remedies.  
Section 2 describes the issues that arise when “revised common pool” (‘RCP’)2 
situations go unnoticed and the consequences associated with that approach by 
referring to the Chapter 11 procedure of Continental.  
Section 3 introduces an alternative eligibility criterion (the RCP standard) 
which extends the analysis of the common pool dilemma to those who have 
                                                                    
1 Vanessa Finch, speaking of the challenges that has to be faced by insolvency law if it is to 
develop in a manner that contributes to the (business) life of the nation: V Finch and D Milman, 
Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (3rd edn, CUP: Cambridge 2017) 25. 
2 For the definition of ‘revised common pool’ issues, see sub-section 1.3(a) and below in this 
chapter. 
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vested interests in the company, i.e. those stakeholders who control it without 
necessarily having ownership, proprietary or personal rights against its assets.  
In line with the approach employed in chapter five, this section questions the 
assumptions upon which the RCP standard and the WMSI theory are based.  
The validity and desirability of an alternative approach to the definition of the 
limits of corporate distress law is best illustrated – from a methodological point 
of view – by examples. Sub-section 3(d) therefore explores the implications 
arising from the introduction of the new RCP standard by analysing the same 
cases where the TCP standard had proven inadequate: Tesla and Carillion. It 
also discusses the impact of the RCP standard on cases where companies have 
not been administered in the interest of all stakeholders, as the corporate 
failure of Millennium Labs demonstrates.  
Section 4 investigates the procedural requirements needed to make the 
proposed standard into living law. It also suggests how a recent case in the 
airline industry (the 2017 failure of Alitalia) would have been decided under 
the operation of the RCP standard. Section 5 critically assesses the proposed 
WMSI theory against other proposals that investigate the relationship between 
contract and corporate distress law and explains the reasons for preferring the 
taxonomy proposed in this work. 
By drawing on behavioural studies, section 6 explores some of the possible 
reasons why – regardless of the benefits potentially associated with the RCP 
standard – English and U.S. insolvency laws still rely (albeit to the very limited 
extent described in sub-section 5.2(a)) on the “insolvency” test as the eligibility 
criterion for insolvency filings. In particular, sub-section 6(a) highlights the 
biases that affect the decision-making process that need to be addressed and 
overcome to align statutory choices with welfare-increasing solutions. At the 
same time, as the author recognises that the offered conceptualisation is not 
immune from criticism, sub-section 6(b) warns about the limits of this research. 
Section 7 concludes by summarising the arguments in support of this new 
conceptualisation and the steps that need to be taken to transform it into living 
law and by acknowledging the limits of the research.  
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6.2 “REVISED COMMON POOL” PROBLEMS 
The current Anglo-American legislative framework does not offer appropriate 
guidance to determine when a company should file for insolvency and it lacks 
proper remedies to prevent a strategic or abusive use of corporate distress 
remedies. 
At the same time, common pool dilemmas exist. If these dilemmas escalate to 
common pool problems, a law based on a proprietary understanding of the 
common pool drama may fail to provide adequate remedies for the 
stakeholders, as the cases of Carillion and Tesla demonstrate.  
This section observes the consequences and discusses the implication of the 
Continental Chapter 11 procedure. In this case, the risk bearer interests of the 
company’s stakeholders were neglected to prioritize the claims of those who 
had personal and proprietary rights against the American airline. 
By drawing on this experience, this section clarifies what the RCP dilemma is 
and it envisions how the RCP eligibility standard would influence corporate 
filings when assessed against the free-for-all approach currently favoured in the 
Anglo-American tradition.  
6.2(a) Continental (1983) RCP Problem 
«If the Wright brothers were alive today, Wilbur would have to fire Orville to 
reduce costs»3 
Innovations in IT and products (i.e. planes) as well as liberalization of the once 
regulated aviation market (at regional and global level) have “shrunk” our 
world. This has given an increasing number of people the opportunity to fly, 
either for business or pleasure.4 At the same time, these events have promoted 
                                                                    
3 Herb Kelleher, founder of Southwest Airlines. Citation reported, among others, in: S Holloway, 
Straight and Level: Practical Airline Economics (3rd edn, Ashgate: Hampshire, 2008) 539. 
4 According to the U.K. Civil Aviation Authority, in the last quarter of 2017, U.K. airports handled 
sixty-five million terminal passengers, representing 2.9 per cent growth against the same 
quarter in the previous year and a new high in terms of the number of passengers flown in Q4 of 
any previous year. On a rolling year basis, terminal passengers also hit a new record (288 
million), surpassing the previous rolling twelve-month high set in the third quarter of 2017. 
Civil Aviation Authority, ‘Aviation Trends. Quarter 4 2017’ (London, 2017) 3 
<https://www.caa.co.uk/uploadedFiles/CAA/Content/Standard_Content/Data_and_analysis/A
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competition, which not only resulted in over-capacity but also in increasing 
pressure on prices. To remain competitive5 in an industry which requires 
significant capital to engender growth but offers thin margins, airlines have to 
reduce costs.  
Labour cost is an example of (quasi-)fixed cost.6 Fixed costs do not change with 
an increase or decrease in the amount of goods or services produced or sold by 
the company as they are expenses that have to be paid, independent of any 
business activity and output. Quasi-fixed costs are more variable than fixed 
ones. Some labour expenses (such as training and recruiting costs) are anti-
cyclical and tend not to change in the short term, unless the business is subject 
to an intensive overhaul. However, these costs are marginal in the long run and 
part of the labour expenses are variable as they depend on the number of hours 
worked by the employees. This explains the quasi-fixed nature of labour costs.  
If the directors of a company believe that their entity is under-performing in the 
industry due to higher labour cost than the competition, they may and should 
explore strategies to address this issue.  
The same directors may conclude that restructuring is not possible under 
general law. This may be due to a variety of reasons: inability to unilaterally 
terminate or modify contracts, to reach an agreement with all creditors, 
excessive delays caused by negotiations and adverse publicity caused by 
industrial actions and business reports.  
In 1983, Continental Airlines Corp. (‘Continental’) – shortly after a merger with 
Texas International (31 October 1982)7 – used insolvency law remedies to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
nalysis_reports/Aviation_trends/AviationTrends_2017_Q4(1).pdf> accessed 17 September 
2018. 
5 TJ Hannigan and others, ‘Competition and competitiveness in the US airline industry’ (2015) 
25(2) Competitiveness Review 134. 
6 The discipline of labour economics has accepted for quite a long period of time that labour is a 
quasi-fixed factor of production. See, among others: JM Clark, Studies in the Economics of 
Overhead Costs (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1923); WY Oi, ‘The Fixed Employment 
Costs of Specialised Labor’ in JE Triplett (ed.), The Measurement of Labor Cost (University of 
Chicago Press: Chicago, 1983); WY Oi, ‘Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor’ (1962) 70(6) J. Political 
Econ. 538. 
7 For an insight on Texas Air’s attempt to take over Continental, the complexity of takeover 
battles in the U.S. airline industry of the Eighties and the takeover defences raised by the 
management (search for a ‘white knight’) and employees (creation of an Employee Stock 
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unilaterally amend its labour contracts. Upon filing (24 September 1983), the 
company and some of its affiliates8 suspended all flights and resumed their 
operations only when they were able to hire non-unionized workers.9 Three 
days after the filing, Continental resumed half of the pre-bankruptcy flights 
using only one-third of its former employees.  
Because the “founding employees” of the “new Continental”10 were non-
unionised, the company could afford to disregard the original collective 
bargaining agreements and offer them half of the wages originally given to 
unionised workers. This also allowed Continental to launch an aggressive 
pricing strategy, with tickets as low as $49 for all non-stop flights within the U.S. 
for one week, followed by a $79 fare for two more weeks.11 
The Chapter 11 procedure which resulted from that filing lasted until 30 June 
1986. This procedure has been harshly criticised in literature as an example of 
strategic use of insolvency remedies for the benefit of a small category of 
stakeholders.12  
It has been argued that the filing was motivated only by the need to reduce 
labour costs. There are several elements that militate in favour of this 
conclusion. First, when the company entered into Chapter 11 it was neither 
insolvent nor short of cash.13 However, prior to the filing, Continental 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Ownership Plan – ‘ESOP’) of Continental: ME Murphy, The Airline That Pride Almost Bought: The 
Struggle to Take Over Continental Airlines (F. Watts: London, 1986). 
8 Continental Air Lines, Inc.; Texas International Airlines, Inc.; and TXIA Holdings Corp. 
9 LM LoPucki and WC Whitford, ‘Corporate Governance in the Reorganization of Large, Publicly 
Held Companies’ (Jan. 1993) 141(3) U. Pa. L. Rev. 669, 672.  
10 These were the terms used by Frank Lorenzo, president and chief executive officer of 
Continental, to describe the company and those hired to run it after the filing in the company’s 
Annual Report of 1983: KJ Delaney, Strategic Bankruptcy: How Corporations and Creditors Use 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy to their Advantage (2nd edn, University of California Press: Oakland, 
1998) 96. 
11 Ibid 82-125. 
12 WN Moulton and H Thomas, ‘Bankruptcy as a Deliberate Strategy: Theoretical Considerations 
and Empirical Evidence’ (1993) 14 SMJ 125. For a conflicting view: DM Flynn and M Farid, ‘The 
Intentional Use of Chapter XI: Lingering versus Immediate Filing’ (1991) 12 SMJ 63, arguing that 
‘Chapter XI can be used as a strategic alternative to realign the organization with its strategic 
competencies with a higher probability of re-emerging from bankruptcy as a revitalized 
organization’ (73). 
13 According to Delaney (n 10), upon filing the company had $59 million in cash and marketable 
securities, $186 million in general accounts receivable and $44 million in accounts receivable 
from Continental affiliates (97). On top of that, Continental managed in the first days of the 
procedure to persuade the bankruptcy court to free up $40 million in restricted cash and to 
substitute new receivables as collateral. 
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deliberately moved assets to its holding-company Texas Air (which was not 
involved in the rescue procedure) to worsen the appearance of its accounting 
books. As a result, the bankruptcy court allowed the filing.14 Additionally, the 
company made little efforts to reduce fuel, equipment and capital (interest rates 
on loan) costs before and during the insolvency procedure.  
The behaviour of the company’s management also raised extensive criticism. On 
one hand, as the key figures retained their jobs throughout the procedure, they 
were not held accountable for previous managerial missteps, including the 
failure to build an automated reservation system. On the other, they seemed to 
give the impression on more than one occasion that they used the law for 
strategic rather than operational purposes.  
It is reported that, during a board meeting in June 1983, Richard Adams 
(Continental’s senior vice-president for flight operations) said: ‘I don’t believe 
we can get these concessions [from labour unions] on a voluntary, persuasive 
basis. We must get [an] awfully big stick. […] Most effective stick might be Chapter 
11’.15 Additionally, two days after the filing, Frank Lorenzo (the company’s 
president and CEO) was quoted in a New York Times article saying: ‘It wasn’t a 
problem of [insufficient] cash. […] Our sole problem was labour’.16 
Continental was able to retain its management, resume operations within a 
week from the filing and increase its assets by 37 percent during 
reorganisation.17 The company emerged from bankruptcy with improved asset 
and cash flow positions and a more competitive route structure. Despite that, 
the company filed again for Chapter 11 protection in 1990.  
                                                                    
14 Re Continental Airlines 38 B.R. 67 (U.S. Bankr. S.D. Texas 1983), where Judge R.F. Wheless Jr. 
rejected the debtors’ unions requests to dismiss the proceedings on ground that they were 
allegedly filed in bad faith and for the purpose of rejecting collective bargaining agreements. 
According to the court, the record established that debtors filed this proceeding only when 
management felt it had no acceptable alternative if it were to have a chance to keep the airline 
flying and neither the sole nor primary purpose of the filing was to reject the aforesaid 
executory contracts. 
15 Court testimony, Re Continental Airlines, 3 Bankr. L. Rep. [CCH] (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984], as 
reported by Murphy (n 7) 223. 
16 Delaney (n 10) 95. 
17 Moulton and Thomas (n 12) 130. 
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As suggested by some authors,18 one of the possible explanations for this failed 
attempt to reorganise the company is that Continental suffered from several 
other financial and organisational problems that were not properly addressed 
in the insolvency procedure.19 In 1986, the airline was still facing significant 
challenges with consistently low reliability rankings and a high level of 
customer complaints compared to its competitors.  
Nevertheless, the legality and legitimacy of the filing has never been questioned. 
Neither should it be, as Continental met the eligibility requirements prescribed 
by the law to file for Chapter 11. Despite that, its filing had proven controversial 
even in the Eighties. In fact, almost in the same period as Continental’s filing, a 
Supreme Court ruling challenged the ease with which companies could protect 
themselves from labour contracts while undergoing the Chapter 11 
procedure.20  
The Supreme Court decision in Bildisco represented a significant departure 
from earlier case law. It held that collective bargaining agreements could only 
be rejected during an insolvency procedure if rejection was necessary to 
prevent collapse21 and the balances of the equities favoured rejection.22 
Previously rejection was only possible in case of an imminent failure of the 
                                                                    
18 Ibid 130. 
19 As a result of acquisitions made during the Chapter 11 procedure, Continental merged with 
People Express, Frontier, New York Air and several other commuter carriers on 1 February 1987 
to create the third-largest U.S. airline: E Schmitt, ‘People Express Flights End on a Note of 
Regret’ The New York Times (New York, 1 February 1987) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/01/nyregion/people-express-flights-end-on-a-note-of-
regret.html> accessed 17 September 2018.  
20 NLRB v Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984). The Supreme Court held that while the 
language "executory contract" in §.365(a) of the Code includes collective bargaining agreements 
subject to the National Labour Relations Act, the Bankruptcy Court should permit rejection of 
such an agreement under §.365(a) if the debtor can show that the agreement burdens the estate 
and that the equities balance in favour of rejection. For an analysis of this decision, see, among 
others: DL Gregory, ‘Labor Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy: The Supreme Court’s Attack on 
Labor in NLRB v. Bildisco’ (1984) 25 B.C.L. Rev. 539; RW Kilroy, ‘“In Re Bildisco”: New Hurdles 
for the Rejection of a Collective Bargaining Agreement in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 35(6) Labor L.J. 
368; G Browning, ‘Using Bankruptcy to Reject Labor Contracts’ (1984) 70(2) ABA 60. 
21 Brotherhood of Railway Employees v REA Express, Inc. 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), 423 U.S. 1017 
(1975).  
22 The latter element was first established as the only test in Shopmen’s Local Union No. 455 v 
Kevin Steel Products, 519 F.2d 707 (2d. Cir. 1975). This test was then replaced by the more 
stringent standard in REA Express and then combined with the REA Express standard in Re Alan 
Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1978). 
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company. With the Supreme Court’s ruling the balance of equities shifted in 
favour of rejecting the contract.  
Bildisco facilitated Continental’s filing, as the Supreme Court held that certain 
bankruptcy law goals (namely, to broaden relief to keep viable businesses 
afloat) may prevail over conflicting ones, even if the purpose of the latter was to 
protect the less powerful and unsophisticated party.  
On a side note, Bildisco prompted Congress reaction. The Bankruptcy 
Amendment Act of 1984 limited the right of companies to terminate labour 
contracts by adding §.1113 to 11 U.S. Code. Under the new section, proposals to 
alter or reject a collective bargaining agreement can be approved by a court 
only if they are necessary to permit the reorganisation of the debtor and they 
assure that all creditors, the debtor and all of the 
 affected parties are treated fairly and equitably.23 The application can be 
approved only if the authorized representative of the employees has refused to 
accept the proposal without good cause and the balance of equities favours 
alteration or rejection.24 
6.2(b) Continental’s Practical Implications 
Continental’s filing might be criticised for not being the optimal solution in the 
given circumstances. Some authors have adopted historical and comparative 
methods to discuss strategies alternative to the use of insolvency remedies that 
can improve the performance of airline companies and reduce labour costs.25 
More recently, large companies such as British Airways26 and Air France27 have 
                                                                    
23 §.1113(b)(1)(A) 11 U.S. Code. For an analysis of the substantive amendments introduced to 
the treatment of labour contracts by the Bankruptcy Amendment Act of 1984, see, among 
others: L McDaniel, ‘Title III of the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984: The Substantive 
Changes’ (1984) 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 719, 736-738; MS Pulliam, ‘The Collision of Labor 
and Bankruptcy Law: “Bildisco” and the Legislative Response’ (1985) 36(7) Labor L.J. 390; MS 
West, ‘Life After Bildisco: Section 1113 and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith’ (1986) 47 Ohio St. 
L.J. 65. 
24 §.1113(c)(2)-(3) 11 U.S. Code. 
25 GJ Bamber and others, Up in the Air: How Airlines Can Improve Performance by Engaging with 
Their Employees (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 2009); JH Gittel and GJ Bamber, ‘High- and 
Low-road Strategies for Competing on Costs and Their Implications for Employment Relations: 
International Studies in the Airline Industry’ (2010) 21(2) Int. J. Hum. Resour. Man. 165. 
26 M Odell and N Rovnick, ‘BA Agrees Deal with Union to Close Final Salary Pension Scheme’ 
Financial Times (London, 8 December 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/86a8717a-dc38-
11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482> accessed 17 September 2018.  
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undertaken negotiations with the unions representing their employees to 
reduce pension and labour costs, although with mixed outcomes. This literature 
and these cases prove that it is possible to reduce quasi-fixed costs using 
general law remedies, even if the company operates in a highly competitive 
market. 
The 1983 filing is better explained if it is considered as having disregarded the 
risk bearer interests of some of its stakeholders, namely its salaried workers. As 
explained in professional literature,28 the problems that old Continental was 
facing in 1983 were manifold and intricate. The staff might have been a 
contributor to the inefficiencies of the company but were also a residual risk 
bearer. They had the right to be part of the reorganisation of the company and 
to influence the outcome with the persuasive voting powers that arose from 
their controlling stake.  
In the case of Continental, workers were not the only risk bearers to be ignored. 
Similarly, commercial, unsecured traders and pre-paying passengers had vested 
interests in the company that went by and large unnoticed.  
This RCP dilemma had largely been ignored by the management, who simply 
addressed the TCP conundrum. Coupled with other factors,29 these 
circumstances have contributed to devise a rescue plan that failed to ensure the 
long-term profitability of the company. 
If the RCP standard became one of the gateways to corporate distress remedies, 
the admission to the corporate distress procedure would be subject exactly to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
27 S Calder, ‘France: Travel Chaos Hits Post-Easter Rush’ Independent (London, 2nd April 2018) 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/air-france-sncf-trains-planes-
strike-easter-travel-chaos-a8285266.html> accessed 17 September 2018.  
28 GM Bethune and S Huler, From Worst to First: Behind the Scenes of Continental’s Remarkable 
Comeback (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: London, 1998); JT Bertrand, A Collision with Collusion: The 
Pilots of Continental Airlines and Continental Airlines at the Brink (Morris Publishing: Kearney, 
NE, 2000). 
29 Recent empirical studies have proven that the possession of intangible assets and assets that 
can be efficiently sold in an insolvency procedure as well as the existence of unfavourable 
executory contracts with primary stakeholders (such as workers) can positively influence the 
likelihood that a corporation will file for Chapter 11: SD James, ‘Strategic Bankruptcy: A 
Stakeholder Management Perspective’ (2016) 69(2) J. Bus. Res. 492. Other authors, especially in 
the U.S., have argued that businesses can gain benefits from intentional insolvency filing: 
Delaney (n 10); Flynn and Farid (n 12); DA Skeel, Jr., ‘Rethinking the Line Between Corporate 
Law and Corporate Bankruptcy’ (1993) 72 Texas L. Rev. 471; Moulton and Thomas (n 12). 
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this test: is the decision to file inevitable and in the best interest of those who 
have personal, proprietary and risk bearer interests in the company? 
If this standard was used as the eligibility criterion to file for corporate distress 
remedies, companies like A.H. Robins, Manville30 and Continental may well have 
filed for these remedies, but their corporate governance structure and the 
nature of the procedure would have been significantly different from those 
observed in practice.31  
Insolvency cases suggest the use of eligibility criteria that considers the risk 
bearer implications of filing for corporate distress protection. The next section 
investigates how the RCP test should be codified in the law. It explores if an 
alternative procedure may lead to more optimal filings, i.e. to the use of 
corporate distress remedies to protect also those risk bearers who have 
expectations in the company. 
 
6.3 THE “REVISED COMMON POOL” STANDARD 
This section proposes a new conceptualisation of the law of corporate 
distress.32 It argues that the common pool narrative should not be restricted to 
those who have contractual claims and rights against the debtor. It should 
include all the stakeholders who have risk bearer interests and expectations 
against the debtor because, as it was demonstrated in sub-sections 4.3 (c)-(e), 
these are the residual risk bearers of any company. 
RCP situations have a dual nature: they are “legal”,33 because they deal with 
parties who have personal, proprietary and risk bearer interests34 on the 
                                                                    
30 For a detailed analysis of the case: FR Kennedy, ‘Creative Bankruptcy? Use and Abuse of the 
Bankruptcy Law – Reflection on Some Recent Cases’ (1985) 71 Iowa L. Rev. 199. 
31 For instance, in an empirical study that covered the period 1980-1999, James concluded that 
strategic filings can implement sustainable performance improvements, increase shareholder 
value, preserve more value for all primary stakeholders, stem performance declines and foster 
more value-enhancing relationships with key stakeholders such as customers, suppliers and 
other trading partners: James (n 29) 498. 
32 From now onwards, the author uses the word “corporate distress” to differentiate the 
proposed framework from the existing “insolvency” law which – as the name implies – requires 
(at least in theory) that the debtor faces a condition of financial or economic distress to justify 
the derogation from general rules. 
33 Despite these rights also having an equitable nature.  
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debtor, and they are “common”, because the inability to meet the expectations 
of some of the company’s stakeholders affects the ability to meet the 
expectations of the others.  
Whenever RCP situations arise, the managers and directors of the debtor should 
not act solely in the best interest of those who own the company. Sometimes 
RCP situations can be addressed with the use of ordinary, i.e. non-insolvency 
remedies. If, however, this is either not done or not possible, then companies 
develop RCP problems that justify the use of corporate distress remedies.  
The RCP standard (an eligibility criterion based on the proposed RCP notion) is 
not primarily concerned with creditors’ co-ordination problems,35 secured 
creditors control practices36 or liquidity problems.37 It does not ignore their 
existence, but it focuses more generally on governance issues which include all 
the above-mentioned issues and more of them. As a result, it can provide a new, 
normative foundation of the law of corporate distress. Many provisions of the 
Anglo-American insolvency framework can be justified on the basis that they 
solve corporate governance problems, not simply liquidity or efficiency ones. 
The RCP standard is an eligibility criterion that can be invoked by any applicant, 
either alone or in conjunction with the insolvency test, to justify the admission 
to any corporate distress procedure.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
34 The author’s understanding of these concepts and the difference among them was offered in 
sub-section 4.3(a). As a reminder, it is worth observing that risk bearer interests should: 
 Not affect neither the nature of the rights entrusted upon other claimants nor their 
priority in distribution unless where specifically authorized by the (corporate distress) 
law; 
 Alongside with the other interests recognised by the law, guide the choice of action, not 
necessarily its content; 
 Be considered not only in times of corporate distress, but throughout the life of the 
company.  
The possibility not only to voice, but also enforce these interests is subject to a corresponding 
reduction in the rights of the claimants who do not have risk bearer interests in the company. 
Whenever the latter retain the majority of rents and controlling interests in the company (as it 
is usually the case in profitable periods), the law could and should only grant limited rights and 
remedies to the holders of risk bearer interests. These more limited remedies should always 
include the right not to be unfairly discriminated against stakeholders of the same group or in 
similar situations. 
35 This is the view of those scholars who adhere to the creditors’ wealth maximisation theory, as 
outlined in chapter two of this thesis. 
36 JA Kirshner, ‘Design Flaws in the Bankruptcy Regime: Lessons from the U.K. for Preventing a 
Resurgent Creditors’ Race in the U.S.’ (2015) 17 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 527.  
37 K Ayotte and DA Skeel, Jr., ‘Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider’ (Fall 2013) 80(4) U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 1557. 
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The soundness of the proposal to juxtapose the traditional insolvency test with 
the RCP standard is based on two considerations:  
a) Directors should always act in the interest of the residual risk bearers. 
Shareholders and contractual creditors are not the only risk bearers in a 
company;38 
b) The implementation of measures that derogate from general law is 
subject to proof that the company is facing a situation of corporate 
distress.  
This section discusses the soundness of these assumptions. It also evaluates if 
the RCP eligibility criterion provides more satisfactory answers than the 
standards analysed in chapter five when assessed against the inclusivity, party 
autonomy and legal predictability criteria.  
6.3(a) Corporations are NOT Controlled by Either Shareholders or Creditors 
(Only) 
Corporate distress proceedings have been described as a fight for control of the 
last profitable assets between the opposing instances of creditors and 
shareholders.39 Sometimes shareholders prevail (as in the case of Continental40 
and A.H. Robins41), while other times creditors (particularly sophisticated ones) 
have the upper hand. The prevalence of creditors’ interests has been clearly 
observed in one of the cases mentioned in this thesis, i.e. the bankruptcy of 
Manville, where the reorganisation plan left the old shareholders with only 
nominal interests in the newco while unsecured lenders were paid in full.42  
In reality, corporate distress proceedings can be much more than mechanisms 
to overcome TCP issues.43 They can be the instruments used by stakeholders to 
overhaul the controlling rights over the company and re-allocate them to the 
                                                                    
38 Residual risk bearers, sometimes known as “residual owners”, are those who stand to gain 
from profits and suffer from losses: LoPucki and Whitford (n 9) 771. 
39 For a literature on the topic, see: LoPucki and Whitford (n 9) ftn 8 and 9. 
40 See above sub-section 6.2(a). 
41 See above sub-section 1.1(a). 
42 LoPucki and Whitford (n 9) 672. 
43 As understood by the general literature on the topic. This thesis adopts a revised notion of 
common pool situations that is wide enough to encompass anti-commons and semi-commons-
type cases. 
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company’s risk bearers. This section draws on legal as well as corporate 
governance studies to determine the factors that should guide this re-allocative 
exercise. In line with the overall goal of this thesis, this section tries to offer a 
practically implementable conceptualisation of corporate governance duties in 
times of distress.   
- 
Proprietary vs. Controlling Rights 
It has been argued that: 
Property rights lie at the foundation of market society. Their 
importance derives from the ways they constitute and shape the 
economy. Property rights affect economic behaviour by structuring 
incentives and disincentives. They determine who bears the risks and 
rewards of economic action. […] Market activity consists chiefly of the 
exploitation and exchange of property rights.44 
In sub-sections 4.3(b)(i) and (ii) it has been observed that directors and 
practitioners in the Anglo-American tradition have a statutory and common law 
duty to pursue the interests of the company. In chapter four it has also been 
highlighted that these players also have an obligation to consider, protect and 
promote the expectations of those who have risk bearer interests in the 
company whenever these parties (“risk bearers”) receive the “residual return” 
and bear the “residual risk” in a business.45 It is therefore first of all appropriate 
to conceptualise and clarify who has risk bearer interests in the company.  
Risk bearer interest means less in legal terms than a proprietary right does.46 
While the latter gives the beneficiary the right to own, i.e. possess or dispose of 
                                                                    
44 BG Carruthers and TC Halliday, Rescuing Businesses. The Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Law 
in England and the United States (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1998) 16. See also: GD Libecap, 
Contracting for Property Rights (CUP: Cambridge, 1989); GD Libecap, ‘Property Rights in 
Economic History’ (1986) 23 Exploitations in Economic History 227. 
45 This conclusion is in line with Baird and Jackson studies: DG Baird and TH Jackson, 
‘Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule’ (1988) 55 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 738, 765 and 775. Where under Baird and Jackson’s narrative, creditors would be the 
collapsed residual owners of the enterprise, this thesis offers an alternative explanation based 
on the corporate governance notion of “rent”. 
46 For a categorization of property rights: Carruthers and Halliday (n 44) 18-20 (who 
distinguished them in usufruct, exclusivity, heritability and alienability); J Christman, 
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an asset,47 against third parties, the former affects the way in which the 
beneficiary can control a property, and to what extent.  
If we look at an insolvent company the day before filing for Chapter 7 or 
liquidation, the owners of the company are still the shareholders. Yet, the 
owners cannot dispose freely of the assets of the company, as the law provides 
remedies (i.e. transaction avoidance actions) against those acts performed in 
gross disrespect of the legal rights of third parties.  
Risk bearer interests and expectations (henceforth used as synonyms) are not 
the same as proprietary rights. As evidenced in sub-section 4.3(d), selected 
stakeholders (also known as “risk bearers”) can - under limited circumstances - 
control the company, even against the will of its owners.  
This thesis, however, falls short of arguing that risk bearers48 should be granted 
proprietary rights in the assets of the company simply by reason of their 
interest in corporate performance. At the same time, in contrast with the 
theories envisioned by neo-classical liberal economists and scholars, it provides 
an alternative explanation for why shareholders and controlling creditors do 
not and should not be entrusted with an absolute right to control all corporate 
distress procedures. 
- 
Controlling Powers in Times of Distress 
‘Ownership of private property is the central mechanism by which incentives are 
created for the efficient use of resources in a free market economy’.49 The quote 
refers to a situation in which a stakeholder has the right to possess or dispose of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
‘Distributive Justice and the Complex Structure of Ownership’ (1994) 23 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 225.  
47 Several authors observed that property rights are nuanced and complex, as different persons 
may simultaneously have different and sometimes overlapping rights over the same assets (e.g. 
security right granted to two creditors). For an analysis of the complexities in the ownership 
structure: RW Gordon, ‘Paradoxical Property’ in J Brewer and S Staves (eds.), Early Modern 
Conceptions of Property (Routledge: London, 1995). 
48 For a definition of “risk bearer”, see sub-sections 4.3(c)-(e) of this thesis. 
49 MM Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First 
Century (The Brookings Institution: Washington D.C. 1995) 4. 
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a company’s assets, to receive benefits from it and to be responsible for the 
risks associated with misuse or decline in value.50 
Some scholars such as Milgrom and Roberts51 have argued that in the corporate 
context, ownership means to have the residual right to control an asset. As this 
conclusion is quite contentious, this thesis adopts a different strategy to 
determine if non-owners may have a right to control a company.  
However, this thesis shares Milgrom and Roberts’ assumption that shareholders 
are not the only residual claimants of the company, as limited liability shields 
them from the full array of (negative) consequences that normally follow from 
ownership.52 Another element that refutes the shareholder-centred narrative is 
the extensive use of share buy-backs by public companies in the U.S. and U.K. 
Share buy-backs are a way of transferring money from a corporation to 
shareholders. Both managers and controlling shareholders have a perverse 
incentive to make use of this practice: share buy-backs are not subject to 
penalty taxes, favour only those shareholders that are willing to sell and boost 
earnings per share, which is one of the key measures of corporate success and 
managers’ pay. It has been observed that between 2003 and 2012, 449 
companies listed in the U.S. S&P 500 index deployed $2.4 trillion in buy-backs, a 
sum which represents 54 per cent of their collective earnings.53 Considering 
that an additional 37 per cent of earnings was used for dividends, this leaves 9 
per cent of profits to capital investment and re-payment of claimants in times of 
corporate distress.54  
                                                                    
50 Ibid 4-5. 
51 P Milgrom and J Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management (Prentice Hall: Upper 
Saddle River, NJ, 1992) 289. 
52 Other scholars, however, argued that reorganising companies should be managed for the 
benefit of their shareholders: MA Gerber, ‘The Election of Directors and Chapter 11 – The 
Second Circuit Tells Stockholders to Walk Softly and Carry a Big Lever’ (1987) 53 Brook. L. Rev. 
295, 343-44; ME Budnitz, ‘Chapter 11 Business Reorganizations and Shareholder Meetings: Will 
the Meeting Please Come to Order, Or Should the Meeting Be Canceled Altogether?’ (1990) 58 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1214, 1233-34. 
53 W Lazonick, ‘Profits Without Prosperity: How Stock Buybacks Manipulate the Market, and 
Leave Most Americans Worse Off’ (April 2014) 
<https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/LAZONICK_William_Profits-without-
Prosperity-20140406.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018. 
54 M Mazzucato, The Value of Everything: Making and Taking in the Global Economy (Penguin 
Books: London, 2018) 163. 
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This behaviour has been labelled as ‘an active choice not to invest to create long-
term value’55 capable of jeopardizing the company’s ability to generate long-
term returns.56 Indirectly, it also results in shielding (controlling) shareholders 
and managers from the consequences of corporate distress. 
If therefore the negative consequences arising from failure are distributed 
among a wider number of stakeholders, these stakeholders are risk bearers and 
should be allowed – under certain circumstances – to control or at least 
influence the company’s policy and behaviour.  
Can private corporations be run with the interest of a wide variety of 
stakeholders in mind? According to Ostrom,57 the answer should be in the 
affirmative. Her studies evidenced that in certain circumstances, when 
communities face RCP situations created by the lack of resources, they are able 
to conceive, enforce and monitor the application of rules that ensure the long-
term sustainability of communal properties for the benefit of all stakeholders.  
Limiting the freedom to dispose of an asset in light of the interests of a wider 
number of stakeholders58 corresponds to recognising that these stakeholders 
have a set of legally enforceable expectations59 of the performance of the 
company.  
This thesis borrows from corporate governance studies of distressed 
companies60 to argue that it is preferable to rely on the notion of “rent”61 to 
                                                                    
55 Ibid 164. 
56 L Flink (CEO of Blackrock), ‘Letter to the CEOs of S&P 500’ (March 2014) 
<http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/LDF_letter_to_corporates_2014_public.p
df> accessed 17 September 2018. 
57 E Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Actions (CUP: 
Cambridge, 1990). 
58 Against: DG Baird and TH Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse 
Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ 
(Winter 1984) 51(1) U. Chi. L. Rev. 97, 101 for whom there is no problem of ‘diverse ownership’ 
and the failure of a company should not give new powers to those who have cognizable 
ownership interests in the business outside insolvency law. As a result, if these interests existed, 
they were immanent for insolvency policy. 
59 This thesis assumes that legally enforceable interests should be recognised not only to those 
who have personal and proprietary interests in the company, but also to those who have risk 
bearer rights.  
60 These are the studies that investigate the legal, cultural and institutional arrangements that 
affect corporate behaviour. See, among others: Blair (n 49); LoPucki and Whitford (n 9); BE 
Adler, ‘Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy’ (Jan. 1993) 45(2) 
Stan. L. Rev. 311; CM Daily and DR Dalton, ‘Corporate Governance and the Bankrupt Firm: An 
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determine how control should be apportioned among residual claimants 
(including the holders of risk bearer interests).  
Consider the case in which the total rent generated by the enterprise declines to 
the point where fixed costs exceed or absorbed all the rent. The shareholders 
(i.e. the repositories of the proprietary rights) would barely have any interest 
left in the company. Creditors (who are next-in-line in the proprietary-right 
hierarchy according to the finance model suggested by Berle and Means62) 
would have a strong incentive to sell the company and its assets to maximise 
their return. However, such a sale or liquidation may be premature as the 
enterprise may still be viable (i.e. may still be generating substantial rents or 
quasi rents) for some of the other stakeholders identified in chapter four, such 
as the employees or the local community.  
As a result, corporate distress law should allow the latter to voice their 
expectations. In limited circumstances, the rents of these risk bearers may 
exceed those of the creditors who are running the company, or for the benefit of 
whom the company is run.63 In these cases, the law of corporate distress should 
ensure that the voice of employees and local communities affects the outcome 
of the proceedings.  
In case of conflict when it is not clear where the interest of the majority of risk 
bearers lies, priority should be given to those risk bearers that generate value64 
over rent-seekers.65 In those cases it will be necessary to go beyond the face, 
nominal value of the constituents’ claims in order to assess the controlling 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Empirical Assessment’ (0ct. 1994) 15(8) SMJ 643; DA Skeel, Jr., ‘Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New 
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11’ (Dec. 2003) 152(2) U. Pa. L. Rev. 917; KM Ayotte and ER 
Morrison, ‘Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11’ (July 2009) 1(2) J, Legal Analysis 511. 
61 See above sub-section 4.3(c), ftn 219. 
62 AA Berle, Jr. and GC Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Commerce Clearing 
House, Inc. 1932); AA Berle, Jr., ‘For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note’ (1932) 45 
Harv. L. Rev. 1365. 
63 As evidenced in sub-section 4.3(d). 
64 For a distinction between value-creation and value-extraction activities, see Mazzucato (n 54) 
6-8. 
65 The debate about where to draw the distinction between productive and rent-seeking 
activities is a controversial one. It is likely that the boundary will shift from time to time: the 
2008 financial crisis resulted in numerous calls to boost the “makers” in the industry against the 
“takers” in the finance. This thesis does not offer final views on this matter. However, some 
commentators observed that ‘[t]he point is not to blame some as takers and to label others as 
makers. The activities of people outside the boundary may be needed to facilitate production…’ 
Mazzucato (n 54) 10. 
  326 
rights of each participant in the corporate distress procedure. This is for 
instance what happened in the bankruptcy of Detroit,66 where the claims of 
pension funds were given priority over those of short-term investors and 
bondholders because a portion of those pensioners continued to live in the city, 
thus contributing to the past, present and future functioning of the municipality 
with their taxes.  
A word of caution is, however, needed. In order not to unduly affect 
contractually negotiated rights, this argument could only be used in limited 
circumstances. These would arise only when the approach described in sub-
section 4.3(d) would lead to sub-optimal results, i.e. results that would not 
promote the maximisation of wealth of those who have interests in the debtor.  
An exhaustive list of the expectations that each of the parties67 who have RCP 
interests in the company is unnecessary. In the ordinary course of business, 
managers and directors recognise that stakeholders have different and 
sometimes conflicting expectations and contractual rights. They use their 
powers to administer the company for their benefit. The same could and should 
happen when a corporate distress procedure is under way. 
It follows from these premises that while shareholders may be the actors who 
own the company,68 they might not necessarily control it. As a result, directors 
could not always invest the capital ‘in risky projects designed only to further 
shareholder interests’.69 In the life cycle of a company, there are always other 
players that can claim the existence of a “controlling interest” in the company.  
                                                                    
66 See above sub-section 5.4(c). 
67 Throughout this thesis “parties” are sometimes referred to as “‘categories” such as 
shareholders, creditors, employees. This is done to facilitate the narrative and the 
understanding of this text. However, the author is by no means suggesting that these 
“categories” of players have uniform expectations. The expectations of a long-term controlling 
investor will always differ, both in solvent and insolvent times, by those of a minority hedge-
fund shareholder.  
68 Against, among others: EI Altman and E Hotchkiss, Corporate Financial Distress and 
Bankruptcy: Predict and Avoid Bankruptcy, Analyse and Invest in Distress Debt (3rd edn, John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc.: London, 2006) 220 arguing – in line with the neo-classical finance model – 
that in solvent times managers and directors have fiduciary duties only to the corporations and 
its shareholders, as creditors are entitled to protection only as provided in the terms of their 
original contracts.  
69 S Paterson, ‘Rethinking the Role of the Law of Corporate Distress in the Twenty-First Century’ 
LSE Law, Society and Economic Working Papers 27/2014 (2014) 5 
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- 
Sub-section 6.3(a) has argued for the existence of a host of stakeholders. Some 
of them may have risk bearer interests and expectations (albeit not rights) 
against the debtor. The author has suggested to rely on the corporate 
governance notion of “rent” to identify the corporate distress mechanisms 
better suited to promote their interests.  
Stakeholders are not on equal footing. If they do not have proprietary rights on 
the debtor’s assets, they are not owners of the company.70 Nevertheless, 
directors should look at who generates the most rents and run the company in 
their best interest. In case of uncertantly, priority should be given to the 
interests of those risk bearers that generate value over rent-seekers. 
It follows that according to the WMSI conceptualisation, corporate distress law 
should give the debtors (or the person acting on their behalf) the discretion to 
consider and valorise the interests of both the owners and the risk bearer 
stakeholders of the company. Derogation from established rules (such as the 
pari passu principle) should be authorised only in limited, exceptional 
circumstances.71 Nevertheless, courts should refrain from second-guessing the 
commercial judgment of these people to those cases of gross mismanagement of 
fraudulent behaviour.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60583/1/WPS2014-27_Paterson.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018. 
See also: LoPucki and Whitford (n 9) 768. 
70 Partially distinguished by Blair (n 49) 27 (arguing that being an owner means having the 
residual claim and residual control rights). 
Sometimes people may have proprietary rights, but only on assets rather than on the whole 
company. This may be the case of minority shareholders or equity owners. They are better 
understood as investors rather than owners. While they can hardly affect the company’s policy, 
the movement of their shares (and of their market prices) provides a message to the directors 
of the company, who should therefore consider their expectations in running the business. 
71 BL Betker, ‘Management’s Incentives, Equity’s Bargaining Power, and Deviations from 
Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies’ (Apr. 1995) 68(2) J. Bus. 161 (who empirically 
analysed the incentives needed to deviate from the APR). Against, see: SD Longhofer, ‘Absolute 
Priority Rule Violations, Credit Rationing, and Efficiency’ (July 1997) 6(3) JFI 249 (arguing that 
APR violations create an impediment to efficient financial contracting); LA Bebchuk, ‘Ex Ante 
Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy’ (Feb. 2002) J57(1) J. Finance 445 (arguing 
that ex-post deviations from the APR have negative effects on ex-ante decisions taken by 
shareholders). 
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6.3(b) The “Corporate Distress” Threshold 
The use of the RCP standard implies that companies should be able to file for 
statutory remedies whenever the directors can no longer run the company for 
the benefit of its stakeholders. This may be caused by a situation of insolvency, 
but the possibility that the RCP problem emerges at an earlier stage should not 
be dismissed. 
For this reason, this thesis supports the effort made by some scholars to re-
conceptualise insolvency law as the law of corporate distress.72 Under this 
revised approach, the central role of the law of corporate distress should be to 
facilitate the allocation of the capital in the economy and encourage early 
restructuring so that capital is allocated to those best able to use it.73 As a 
consequence, this law should be made of two halves: liquidation mechanisms 
(including sale of assets)74 designed to maximise creditors’ returns on the one 
hand, and rescue remedies on the other.  
While the arguments of these commentators are persuasive, they do not go far 
enough. These scholars continue to conceive the law of corporate distress as a 
fight between contractual claimants. They continue to see these creditors as 
                                                                    
72 The phrase of “law of corporate distress”’ is used to refer to those statutory remedies 
designed to cover the sale of the business and its assets (“insolvency/liquidation law”) and the 
reorganisation procedures among some or all the company’s stakeholders (“restructuring law” 
in Paterson’s narrative, “rescue law” according to this thesis): Paterson (n 69). 
The notion of corporate distress has been subject to extensive investigations from legal 
academics and economics scientists. A plethora of failure prediction models have been 
proposed and their predictive value tested: MM Mousavi and J Ouenniche, ‘Multi-Criteria 
Ranking of Corporate Distress Prediction Models: Empirical Evaluations and Methodological 
Contributions’ (2018) Annals of Operation Research 1; J Sun and others, ‘Predicting Financial 
Distress and Corporate Failure: A Review from the State-of-the-Art Definitions, Modeling, 
Sampling, and Featuring Approaches’ (2014) 57 Knowledge-Based Systems 41. These models 
are particularly valuable in the decision-making process, for instance when informed, 
institutional investors are planning strategic investments in their portfolios. They are of limited 
value in the context of this thesis: beside insolvency-based filings, corporate distress is defined 
in negative terms, as the situation in which the directors are not able to pursue the interests of 
the company’s owners. The definition relies on legal and corporate governance notions; it is not 
linked with the predictive economic performance of the debtor. 
73 Theory advocated, among others, by: Paterson (n 69) 3. See also: G Triantis, ‘The interplay 
Between Liquidation and Reorganisation in Bankruptcy: The Role of Screens, Gatekeepers, and 
Guillotines’ (1996) 16 Int’l Rev. Law & Econ. 101; TH Jackson and DA Skeel, Jr., ‘Bankruptcy and 
Economic Recovery: Restructuring Financial Infrastructure to Economic Recovery’ (Brookings 
Institution), U. Penn, Inst. For Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 13-27 (2013) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2306138&rec=1&srcabs=2375654&alg
=1&pos=2> accessed 17 September 2018; Ayotte and Skeel (n 37).  
74 This even if the sale occurred by means of a procedure that should prioritise rescue over 
liquidation, such as Chapter 11 in the U.S. or administration in England and Wales. 
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victims of the prisoners’ dilemma: creditors realise that liquidation or 
divestment from the debtor (facilitated by a dispersed creditor economy)75 is 
not value-maximising, but they are unable to agree on a different, optimal and 
value maximising rescue strategy.  
These scholars observe that under certain circumstances, selected stakeholders 
reach agreements potentially capable of maximising the return for themselves 
to the detriment of other stakeholders.76 Rarely if ever, these commentators 
(and stakeholders on their own) adopt a corporate distress (rescue or 
liquidation) strategy that is in the primary interest of the residual risk bearers 
of the company.   
This thesis tries to overcome these limits by advocating for a different strategy. 
Should the RCP standard be introduced into law, RCP-related considerations 
should be employed alongside traditional, insolvency-based evaluations to 
determine not only when a company should file for corporate distress remedies, 
but also the procedure for which it should apply. 
On the one hand, there should be “asset-maximising” remedies triggered 
primarily by insolvency-led filings and designed to maximise creditors’ returns. 
Following the creditor’s maximisation approach first conceptualised by Jackson, 
the priority of the law should be to reduce the incentive for individual 
enforcement and to maximise the interest of the owners of the company. The 
law should introduce a rebuttable presumption in favour of liquidation or fire-
sale procedures as the preferred mechanisms to deal with the debtor’s inability 
to pay its debt. 
On the other hand, the law should introduce “capital-maximising” remedies 
triggered primarily by RCP-influenced filings and designed to maximise 
                                                                    
75 S Paterson, ‘The Adaptive Capacity of Markets and Convergence in Law: UK High Yield Issuers, 
US Investors and Insolvency Law’ (2015) 78(3) Modern L. Rev. 431, arguing that UK issuers of 
high yield bonds are having increasing access to U.S. investors despite differences in the 
approach to valuation of the issuer in financial distress between the two countries, and the 
expected return on default. 
76 K Ayotte and others, ‘Bankruptcy on the Side’ (2017-2018) 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 255. They 
described the nature and mechanics of ‘side agreement’ between selected creditors designed to 
maximise the return to these parties in an insolvency proceeding. They also developed a 
proposal that limited negative externalities and opportunities to extract value from non-parties 
or to the detriment of other, existing stakeholders.  
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stakeholders’ expectations. As the reason for filing is the inability of the 
directors to pursue the true interests of the company’s risk bearers, the law 
should provide the applicant (or the independent party appointed by the panel, 
see below sub-section 6.4(d)), with sufficient powers to overcome the RCP 
deadlock.  
Conversely to the “insolvency” filing, the “capital-maximising” section of the law 
should include a rebuttable presumption in favour of rescue remedies. These 
remedies may well take the form of fire-sales or liquidation of significant 
portions of the company.  
In general, there is no need to restrict the remedies available to the applicant 
upon filing, as the law of corporate distress is not about preventing creditors 
from enforcing their rights.77  
- 
Whenever there is a RCP problem, the company’s owners have an interest in 
restricting rather than enlarging the number of people sitting at the bargaining 
table. The WMSI theory is based on the opposite assumption.78 Corporate 
distress remedies will promote the transiction of insolvency practice to a 
‘market for corporate control’.79  
The next sub-section tests the desirability of this solution against the autonomy, 
predictability and inclusivity objectives that have emerged from the de-
constructivist analysis of market, proceduralist and principle-based theories.  
                                                                    
77 American scholars have frequently looked at attempts to extend the purposes of (bankruptcy) 
law beyond the goal of maximisation of creditors’ return as an attempt to unilaterally restrict 
the rights of contractual claimants. Among others: JS Rogers, ‘The Impairment of Secured 
Creditors’ Rights in Reorganisation: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment 
and the Bankruptcy Clause’ (Mar. 1983) 96(5) Harv. L. Rev. 973 (arguing that it is the 
bankruptcy clause itself and not the Constitution to restrict government’s powers to unilaterally 
amend the rights of the creditors); Baird and Jackson (n 58); Kennedy (n 30) 214 (commenting 
on the Manville case and concluding that the protection granted by the system to secured 
creditors and – in a more limited extent – existing stockholders was justified, and that 
bankruptcy courts are still the best forum for resolving conflicts in mass tort claim, labour and 
environmental bankruptcy cases).  
78 L Ponoroff, ‘Enlarging the Bargaining Table: Some Implications of the Corporate Stakeholder 
Model for Federal Bankruptcy Proceedings’ (1994) 23(2) Cap. U. L. Rev. 441. 
79 Skeel (n 60) 918. 
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6.3(c) A Normative Criticism of the Revised Common Pool Standard 
The use of the RCP standard is likely to promote the early and timely 
application of corporate distress remedies, in particular in the interests of those 
who have risk bearer interests in an ailing company. Statistics demonstrate that 
nowadays the use of corporate distress remedies is not triggered whenever the 
company is likely to become insolvent, but when it is on the brink of failure. 
This explains the preponderance of liquidation procedures as the preferred 
corporate distress mechanism.80  
However, corporate distress remedies are designed to apply not only when 
companies are “broken”, but also whenever they are no longer able to meet the 
expectations of their stakeholders. Preventive restructuring mechanisms 
valorise the expectations of a wide array of stakeholders. Introducing a new 
gateway (the RCP standard) and grouping all corporate distress remedies under 
a new label (law of corporate distress) should therefore promote inclusivity 
over existing standards, as stakeholders will have more opportunities to have 
their position considered and their voice heard. 
The RCP standard has the potential to promote a more proactive attitude 
towards dealing with situations of crisis because it addresses the cognitive 
biases that managers may have when their company faces a moment of 
difficulty in the market. It has the potential to promote wider societal interests, 
the protection of which has been argued is the general purpose of insolvency 
law.81 There is, however, the risk that wider participation results in longer (and 
more expensive) procedures and in the inability to agree on a preferred course 
of action. 
                                                                    
80 For instance, in England, according to the most recent statistics published by the Insolvency 
Service, in the first quarter of 2018 creditors’ voluntary liquidations represented 72% of all 
insolvencies, compulsory liquidations 17.5% and all other insolvencies 11.5%. The number and 
proportion of the latter has been on a steady downward trend for the best part of the last 
decade. Insolvency Service, Insolvency Statistics – January to March 2018 (Q1 2018) (London, 27 
April 2018) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_d
ata/file/703180/Insolvency_Statistics_Commentary-_Q1_2018_v3.pdf > accessed 17 September 
2018. 
81 This is the conclusion reached by H Anderson in a recent paper, where he observed that the 
proliferation of special regimes under English law is designed to do something more than 
simply offering a collective forum by and for the benefit of the creditors: H Anderson, ‘What is 
the Purpose of Insolvency Proceedings?’ (2016) 8 J. Bus. Law 670. 
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With reference to the autonomy of the parties, the degree of intrusion and 
derogation to agreed contracts depends on the nature of the procedure 
triggered by the applicants. However, if business experts are called to assess the 
opportunity to file for corporate distress remedies (as suggested in sub-section 
6.4(d)), the risk of unduly or unilaterally amending contractual provisions is 
reduced. More in general, statutory deviations from contract law tenets in the 
law of corporate distress are kept to a minimum. This is to avoid that some 
parties have a perverse interest to file for a formal procedure, thus frustrating 
any out-of-court workout and precipitating RCP dilemmas into problems. 
Directors would be replaced only whenever it appears unlikely that the existing 
management protects stakeholders’ expectations. Existing contracts are 
unilaterally terminated or amended only as a result of decisions that take the 
expectation of all parties (and not simply the distressed debtor) and the 
purpose of the procedure into proper consideration. 
External regulation comes into consideration to prevent an abusive use of 
corporate distress remedies. With the purpose of further promoting inclusivity 
and autonomy, sub-section 6.6(a) discusses the conditions that could encourage 
the community-based approach advocated in this study. 
With reference to the legal predictability criterion, there is no denying that, if 
the proposed regulatory reforms are introduced into law, implementation may 
initially result in higher uncertainty. This conclusion is neither surprising nor 
problematic.  
The last systemic reforms in the field of corporate distress law date back to 
1978 in the United States and 2002 in England. Courts had plenty of time (and 
cases) to develop consistent case law and governments had manifold 
opportunities to address the shortcomings of the law. However, as short-
termism has been blamed as one of the issues of contemporary corporate 
practice,82 our evaluation should consider a longer time-frame.  
                                                                    
82 J Grinyer and others, ‘Evidence of Managerial Short-Termism in the UK’ (1998) 9(1) Br. J. 
Manag. 13; E Segelod, ‘A Comparison of Managers’ Perceptions of Short-Termism in Sweden and 
the US’ (2000) 32(4) Int. J. Prod. Econ. 243; C Helms, ‘Corporate Short-Termism: Causes and 
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The proposed standard does not affect the established business culture. On the 
contrary - by assuming that parties act in the best interests of the majority of 
stakeholders because they perceive that this course of action is in their best 
interest - the recommended reforms reduce the level of involvement of the 
judiciary in administrative and procedural tasks and the associated risks that 
business-sound decisions are reversed by procedural or exogenous 
considerations. 
Additionally, strategies could be put into place to reduce the uncertainty 
initially arising from regulatory reforms. These strategies can draw from the 
positive experience of soft law mechanisms such as the UNCITRAL Guide and 
SIPs. Despite their soft law nature, their authoritativeness should not be 
dismissed, as it has been argued that sometimes the division between hard and 
soft law is less rigid in the real world than it appears in the books.83 
A final disclaimer is needed. The theory requires the cooperation, active 
involvement and monitoring of several stakeholders. If each of the parties acts 
in ignorance of the other parties’ position, and as if he or she is conducting a 
one-off game, the outcome would be similar to the Nash equilibrium in a 
prisoner’s dilemma game. This outcome would be pareto-inefficient.  
To allow the parties to escape this trap, the legislator should design a corporate 
distress framework that favours trust and communication among all 
stakeholders. This outcome might appear challenging and to a certain extent 
naïve in the majority of insolvency procedures. Therefore, section 6.6 suggests 
strategies that may promote trust and communication on the basis of empirical 
and behavioural studies.    
If stakeholders, especially key-players such as directors, auditors and 
institutional creditors, are allowed to pursue the maximisation of their own 
interests, the system would under-perform and society as a whole would 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Remedies’ (2012) 23(2) I.C.C.L.R. 45; MJ Roe, ‘Corporate Short-Termism – In the Boardroom and 
in the Courtroom’ (2013) 68(4) Bus. Law. 977.  
83 I Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (OUP: 
Oxford, 2018) 167. 
  334 
suffer.84 The legislation should lay down the conditions for rational, self-
interested individuals not to act in their sole personal interest.85 The eligibility 
panel (discussed below at 6.4(d)) might represent one of the instruments that 
could be used to achieve this purpose.  
6.3(d) Testing the Theory of “Wealth Maximisation of Stakeholders’ Interests” 
It has been demonstrated that people can and did invoke legal remedies to 
achieve goals that have never been predicated by the system or envisaged by 
the legislature.86 In the corporate distress field, certain large organisations and 
repetitive players used insolvency rules in a similar fashion.87 Nowadays, not 
only large corporations but also SMEs use corporate distress remedies in a 
strategic manner.88 Has the RCP standard got the potential to address these 
risks? 
In order to answer this question, one has to look back to the case of Carillion. In 
theory, the existence in the law of a RCP standard might have suggested the 
pursuance of different business practices to the company’s directors and a 
higher, more scrupulous supervision by the company’s non-executive directors 
and auditors. However, what if directors and auditors have in fact ignored their 
duties? 
It has been evidenced that until the first profit warning was issued (10 July 
2017), employees, suppliers, several investors and the public had little notice of 
the dire financial conditions of the company. However, the list of Carillion’s 
stakeholders certainly included pension trustees. These trustees invest the 
assets of a pension scheme for the benefit of their members and negotiate the 
                                                                    
84 Take for instances cases like General Motors, Chrysler, Carillion or Monarch, where the 
government has to put taxpayers’ money to avoid the collapse or promote the orderly 
liquidation of these companies. 
85 This conclusion was famously rebutted by M Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods 
and the Theory of Groups (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1965) who stated that 
‘unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special 
device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will 
not act to achieve their common or group interests’ (2).  
86 LH Mayhew, ‘Institutions of Representation: Civil Justice and the Public’ (1975) 9 L. and Soc’y 
Rev. 401; FK Zemans, ‘Framework for Analysis of Legal mobilization: Decision-making Model’ 
(1982) 4 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 989; FK Zemans, ‘Legal mobilization: The 
Neglected Role of the Law in the Political System’ (1983) 77(3) Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 690. 
87 Delaney (n 10) 160. 
88 See the debate on “phoenixism” in sub-section 3.2(a)(i). 
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contributions that the employer has to ensure that the scheme is properly 
financed.  
Pension trustees can rely (and did rely in this specific case) on advice from the 
Pension Regulator. Since 2008, they complained that the scheme was 
inadequately funded but they agreed to compromise on their requests because 
they were ‘outgunned in negotiations with directors’.89 
It is submitted that had the RCP standard been the eligibility requirement for 
corporate distress remedies, this would have redressed the power imbalance 
between the parties. As a result, the company might have been forced to agree 
on higher contributions to the pension scheme or to enforce formal corporate 
distress remedies at an earlier stage.  
It may be that the directors would not have changed their business strategies. 
However, even if the company would have equally ended up in liquidation, the 
employees would have suffered less draconian cuts to their pensions and the 
company would have probably filed for insolvency at an earlier stage. 
Additionally, the directors would have had less money available to cover their 
“dash for cash” strategy. In other words, the RCP standard would have favoured 
a timely intervention of those risk bearers who have both the information and 
interest to act. 
Let us now turn to Tesla. Nowadays, if a person agrees on the analysis of the 
problems raised by battery-powered electric vehicles (and, in particular, by a 
company like Tesla), this person would have little or no remedy under the law. 
This person might pressure the local parliamentary representative to raise the 
issue in the legislative assembly and adopt consequential actions. Alternatively, 
he or she might start advertising campaigns to raise awareness among the 
public, but this would leave them running out of further options.   
Legislative consciousness was raised in Singapore which adopts a system of car 
taxation that considers not only the emissions of the vehicle at the level of the 
                                                                    
89 Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees, ‘Carillion: 
Second Joint Report from the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions 
Committees’ HC 769 (House of Commons 16 May 2018) 57 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmworpen/769/769.pdf> 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
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exhaust pipe (which, in the case of all Tesla cars, is none), but also the pollution 
that the vehicle generates throughout its life cycle.90 This means that to 
establish the annual car tax, the government considers if the automaker uses 
renewable sources to produce the electricity in its manufacturing plant, its 
transport facilities as well as the proportion of the vehicle that can be recycled 
once it is dismantled. As a result, Tesla vehicles are heavily taxed in that 
country.91 
If RCP becomes the eligibility standard for corporate distress remedies, any 
corporation, financial investor or group of individuals who is affected by Tesla’s 
practices (think, for instance, to diesel owners who see their chance to freely 
circulate in European streets increasingly curtailed) could act in defence of their 
rights.  
This may cause an increase in litigation, as well as damages to the affected 
companies (especially those listed on the stock exchange) for the adverse 
publicity arising from a speculative yet unfounded corporate distress filing.  
At the same time, the threshold to obtain the admission to the procedure is 
higher than a filing based on the insolvency standard. This may help to 
distinguish Tesla’s position (a company that has almost always been 
unprofitable since its incorporation) from those of other automakers who 
invest in the electric technology and still lose money on their research 
programmes but not at company or group’s level. Sanctions against speculative 
filings could also discourage a strategic use of the RCP eligibility standard. 
Therefore, even in the case of Tesla the RCP standard looks more promising 
than the current status quo.  
Finally, it is appropriate to look at the impact of the RCP standard on 
restructuring plans where the corporate management does not act in the 
interest of all stakeholders in “solvent times” and the company later files for 
                                                                    
90 <https://www.lta.gov.sg/content/ltaweb/en/roads-and-motoring/owning-a-vehicle/costs-
of-owning-a-vehicle/tax-structure-for-cars.html> accessed 22 May 2018. 
91 M Jith, ‘Goodbye Tesla, This. Is. Singapore.’ OneShift.com (Singapore, 31 January 2018) 
<http://www.oneshift.com/features/11304/goodbye-tesla-this.-is.-singapore.> accessed 17 
September 2018. 
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insolvency (rectius, corporate distress) remedies. This is precisely what 
happened to Millennium Labs Llc.  
Back in 2013, Millennium Labs was a successful and profitable company that 
offered laboratory-based diagnostic testing, including urine drug testing. The 
company was owned by its founder James Slattery and the private equity 
company TA Associates. 
The company built its success on billing state authorities for medical testing. It 
appeared that some of this testing was unnecessary, as an investigation from 
the U.S. Department of Justice (‘DoJ’) later found that the company billed 
“Medicare” for exams on 59 dead people and offered expensive gifts to the 
medical office staff that prescribed these exams.92 
In April 2014, when the investigation was still confidential and in its initial 
stage, the company decided to borrow $1.825 billion from the market.93 The 
loan was used primarily ($1.297 billion) to fund a special dividend to its 
owners. It was syndicated by JP Morgan and the collateral was made primarily 
by the company’s balance sheet, where millions in revenue were generated by 
urine drug screens.94  
On 20 May 2015, the company, the DoJ and certain U.S. states reached a 
settlement to resolve the investigative and administrative matters related to the 
investigation. The company promised to pay $256 million to the counterparties 
but, after having paid $50 million, its managers realised that the company’s 
ability to service its debt had diminished to the point of endangering its future 
viability.  
As an out-of-court restructuring proposal failed to reach sufficient support, the 
company filed for Chapter 11 in the Bankruptcy Court of Delaware on 10 
                                                                    
92 P Beall, ‘’The Big Wink:’ How $1.8 billion loan boosted company’s founder’ Palm Beach Post 
(Palm Beach, 12 January 2016) <https://www.mypalmbeachpost.com/news/crime--law/the-
big-wink-how-billion-loan-boosted-company-founder/FDY1qPKCTsnjqYOvOLUj7M/> accessed 
17 September 2018. 
93 This is the figure that emerges from the documents filed in the Bankruptcy Court of Delaware. 
Other sources quantify the loan to $1.775 billion: Mazzucato (n 54) 146; W Richter, ‘The 
‘leveraged loan’ time bomb just exploded’ Business Insider (New York 19 July 2015) 
<http://www.businessinsider.com/the-leveraged-loan-time-bomb-just-exploded-2015-
7?IR=T> accessed 17 September 2018. 
94 Beall (n 92). 
  338 
November 2015. The pre-packaged plan provided for an infusion of $325 
million from the old equity holders into the company’s coffers to pay (among 
others) the remaining part of the settlement agreement. Equity of the 
reorganised debtor was offered to the 2014 lenders. A condition of the plan, 
which was approved by the creditors and confirmed by the court on 11 
December 2015, was the release of third parties from further liabilities. These 
third parties included the previous owners.  
Some creditors appealed against the third-party releases.95 They argued that 
they were given blatantly false representations about Millennium Labs affairs 
and that information was withheld from them regarding the governmental 
investigation. As a result, they faced a 50% cut of their original investment, 
while the previous owners had profited extensively from the business in the 
years leading to the filing.96 
After having been dismissed by the Court of Appeal, the appeal was docketed in 
the District Court which remanded the matter to the Bankruptcy Court 
questioning whether the latter had the constitutional power to confirm a plan 
which, because it contained non-consensual third-party release, would prevent 
non-debtor third parties from pursuing state law claims.97 The Bankruptcy 
Court concluded that it had this power,98 thus leaving the lenders (in this case, 
risk bearers) without further legal remedies. 
As Millennium Labs was not insolvent, it is assumed that the company would 
have justified its corporate distress application on the basis of a RCP problem. 
The eligibility panel would have likely admitted the company to the procedure 
and approved the plan in the same way as the Delaware Court did.99 At the same 
time, the need to consider the stakeholders’ best interest would have probably 
induced the competent court to assess on the merits if the equity holders’ 
                                                                    
95 Re Millennium Lab Holdings II, Llc, 543 B.R. 703 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016). 
96 P Brickley, ‘Voya Sues Over Millennium Health $1.8 Billion Financing’ The Wall Street Journal 
(New York, 10 December 2015) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/voya-sues-over-millennium-
health-1-8-billion-financing-1449791185> accessed 17 September 2018. 
97 Re Millennium Lab Holdings II, Llc, 242 F. Supp. 3d 322 (D. Del. 2017), as amended (Mar. 20, 
2017). 
98 Re Millennium Lab Holdings II, Llc, 575 B.R. 252 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017). 
99 The pre-pack deal needed to be approved expeditiously for the company to continue to retain 
its accreditation and continue to operate in the business.   
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contribution was sufficient or if the 2014 loan presented a reprehensible 
example of asset-stripping. The RCP standard would therefore have offered 
substantive remedies to some of the controlling parties while the current law 
offers no protection. 
6.3(e) Findings 
A new conceptualisation that revolves around the RCP standard is more likely 
to achieve higher levels of predictability, inclusivity and preservation of party 
autonomy than the standards currently used in the Anglo-American systems. It 
should also enhance the overall value of an enterprise and promote growth and 
employment, in line with the ideas that underpin the Anglo-American system.100 
The next section suggests the procedures that could be introduced into the 
statutes to promote the use of an eligibility standard based on RCP 
considerations.  
 
6.4 “WEALTH MAXIMISATION OF SHAREHOLDERS’ INTERESTS”: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 
While the previous sections have made the case for the adoption of a test based 
on the existence of a RCP problem to determine when a company should file for 
corporate distress remedies, this section outlines the changes that should be 
introduced into the Anglo-American statutes to unleash the full potential of this 
test.  
The suggested regulatory changes would support a new, favourable attitude in 
the business community towards the use of corporate distress remedies, in line 
with recommendations for the promotion of a corporate rescue culture and de-
stigmatizing “insolvency law”.  
This section also looks at how the RCP standard would work in practice by 
referring to a case in the aviation industry that presents remarkable similarities 
with Continental’s filing in 1983: the case of Alitalia (2017).  
                                                                    
100 G McCormack, ‘Business Restructuring Law in Europe: Making a Fresh Start’ (2017) 17(1) J. 
Corp. L. Stud. 167, 200 (examining the new European approach to business failure in light of the 
core principles of U.S. Chapter 11 procedure). 
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6.4(a) Application from the Debtor 
Admission to a corporate distress procedure may be demanded by the 
distressed company itself, by either its majority shareholders or its managers 
and directors. The filing of the petition instantly affords protection from 
executive and other individual actions against the company, in the form of an 
automatic stay or moratorium. The rights of secured creditors would not be 
different from the current law.  
The motion could be based on two grounds. The first (and less contentious) is 
“insolvency or quasi-insolvency”, that is either the inability to pay existing or 
prospective debts as they fall due or the existence of a liquidity crisis 
(hereinafter, “insolvency standard”). The debtor can demonstrate to be 
insolvent on a cash-flow or balance-sheet basis. If the motion is based on the 
insolvency standard, there is a rebuttable presumption for the use of certain 
corporate distress procedures, i.e. liquidation and sale of the company (or its 
branches) or the business. Due to the insolvent condition of the debtor, it is 
argued that these procedures should in theory be capable of better allocating 
the remaining capital for the best interest of the company’s stakeholders than 
rescue devices. 
The second ground ought to be based on the existence of a “revised common 
pool” problem, i.e. the inability to run the company in line with the expectations 
of those who have a controlling interest in it. If the motion is based on this latter 
ground (“the RCP standard”), there should a presumption in favour of rescue-
oriented mechanisms as these are capital-maximising remedies designed to 
maximise stakeholders’ expectations and allocate capital to those best able to 
use it. 
Together with the reasons for filing, the applicants should identify their 
preferred procedure, the name of the proposed corporate distress 
practitioner101 (if the assistance of such professional is required by the law) and 
the request for first-day orders.  
                                                                    
101 These are the insolvency practitioners in England and the trustees in the U.S.  
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The written motion should be decided by a panel of up to three independent 
experts (the “eligibility panel”) which should not sit in a court. For filings from 
medium and large enterprises with the request of first-day orders, one of the 
experts should have a judicial qualification (due to the immediate, legal 
implications arising from the approval or rejection of these requests). The panel 
could accept the motion, reject it or suggest the opening of an alternative 
procedure. The judicial member of the panel should have sole authority to 
approve, reject or amend the request for first-day orders.  
In all cases – and particularly those in which one of the parties invoke the use of 
a RCP criterion – the panels’ valuation to admit or reject the petition to open a 
corporate distress procedure should be subject to the “balance of equities” 
standard. Where a “business judgment” test would subject the corporate 
distress order to the existence of a benefit for the debtor, the “balance of 
equities” test is more rigorous. In the latter, the panel has the power to reject or 
amend the petition whenever it appears that: (1) the suggested corporate 
distress strategy does not address all or substantially all of the issues that 
determined the company’s collapse; and (2) the proprietary rights of the 
affected parties would be unconscionably restricted by the petitioned course of 
action. The goal of this test is to prevent the use of corporate distress remedies 
to accomplish limited organizational objectives, such as reducing labour costs 
as in the case of Continental.   
If the motion is rejected or the debtor discards the suggested, alternative 
procedure, the automatic stay terminates and the company goes back to the 
original, pre-application condition. If the motion is approved or the company 
accepts the alternative procedure suggested by the experts, the panel prepares 
a “Corporate Distress Notice” (‘CDN’) which shall be served on all creditors 
within 7 days.  
6.4(b) Application from a Stakeholder 
The motion to commence a corporate distress procedure may be submitted by a 
creditor or another party who has a legally enforceable interest in the company 
(including local communities and associations of workers, among others). 
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Only creditors should be able to rely on the “insolvency standard” to submit a 
corporate distress petition. Alongside with recognised creditors, interested 
parties who are not contractual claimants under the law could rely on the RCP 
standard to submit a corporate distress petition.  
The burden of proving the existence of a RCP problem ought to be higher than 
demonstrating the existence of a failure to meet contractual obligations. This 
burden should fall entirely on the applicant. Limiting the possibility for non-
contractual claimants to file a petition only on RCP grounds should not unduly 
restrict their rights, but it should avert the risk of strategic or abusive requests 
to the detriment of the debtor. 
To avoid the opening of a corporate distress procedure, the company or other 
interested parties shall demonstrate that it is solvent and (if the application was 
based on the RCP standard) be capable of ensuring the expectations of those 
who have controlling interests in it.  
The eligibility panel should retain the power to confirm the petition, reject it or 
authorize the opening of a different procedure than the one suggested by the 
applicant. The latter power should be exercised with caution. It should be 
limited to cases in which the creditor or third-party’s application has been 
opposed by the debtor or – absent any defence – where it would be 
unconscionable to open the suggested procedure and reject the petition 
altogether. 
The decision of the eligibility panel is formalised in a CDN and then served on all 
creditors within 7 days. 
6.4(c) Right to Appeal 
The eligibility panel should always retain the option to amend its initial decision 
when it appears that it was influenced by the fraud of one of the parties. Once 
the procedure has been opened, the debtor, the corporate distress practitioner, 
the office-holder and a qualified majority of claimants could ask the panel to 
admit the debtor to a different procedure when it no longer appears possible to 
achieve the purpose of the original corporate distress procedure.  
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Creditors should have the right to appeal the panel’s decision (authorisation to 
file for corporate distress and the choice of the remedies) against the same 
panel (albeit with a different composition) within the date specified in the CDN 
(between 30 and 60 days from the date of the order). Appeals are possible by 
the debtor when the petition has been rejected or amended by the panel. 
Interested parties and debtors could appeal the approval of the creditor or 
third-party’s petition both on the ground of illegitimacy of the order and on the 
choice of the procedure.  
Generally, appeals should also be possible for any interested party (including 
those on whom the CDN has not been served) until the decision becomes 
binding. Whenever it appears that the decision to open a corporate distress 
procedure may affect a wider audience than contractual claimants (for instance, 
if the filing is motivated by tort liabilities, as in the case of A.H. Robins), the 
eligibility panel can order the publication of the corporate distress order on 
selected websites and newspapers. 
To challenge a RCP-based order, appellants should demonstrate that it is 
possible to address the causes of the crisis without the use of exceptional 
corporate distress remedies. They could also question the suitability of the 
chosen procedure as the best means to ensure the protection and maximisation 
of the proprietary interests of the interested parties.  
The decision would become final once the deadline has expired and no appeal 
has been filed. After that, any interested parties could commence proceedings 
against the applicants in front of the (insolvency) court where it appears that 
the decision has been influenced by the fraudulent or dishonest behaviour of 
the applicant or a third party acting in agreement with the applicant.  
If the fraudulent behaviour is proven, the court can adopt the remedies that 
appear equitable in the circumstances of the case (including disqualification of 
the directors, personal liability and lifting the corporate veil). The companies 
and its assets cannot be sold before the decision is final without leave from the 
court (and not the eligibility panel). Regulators should refrain from introducing 
new grounds to challenge the panel’s decision, as it is crucial for the success of 
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any corporate distress procedure that timely decisions are taken and dissenters 
are brought into line. 
Some might argue that courts should retain the power to dismiss a corporate 
distress petition for “cause”, as it is currently the case in the U.S.102 In principle, 
the author is not against the recognition of this power in the law. However, 
there is a risk that the introduction of this ground for dismissal might 
encourage speculative applications to the court, where the intent of the 
applicant is simply to gain a better deal from the corporate distress practitioner 
or debtor in charge of the procedure. This safeguard might therefore be 
introduced sometime after the introduction of the changes advocated in this 
thesis and only if evidence is provided that a significant number of companies 
are abusing the system. In any case, the right to submit such petition to dismiss 
the procedure for cause should be subject to penalties (such as the order to 
refund the defendant’s legal costs) if they are rejected.  
First-day orders can immediately be appealed in front of the court, which has 
jurisdiction for the corporate distress case. This is the local bankruptcy court in 
the U.S. and the High Court in England.  
6.4(d) The Eligibility Panel  
Judges are ill positioned to assess and second-guess the soundness of 
commercial, entrepreneurial decisions because they conduct an ex-post 
assessment with full knowledge of facts and consequences of decisions taken by 
parties with limited knowledge and within the course of business. They 
therefore may be ill-suited to opine if the company is facing a period of 
temporary distress, in a situation of structural insolvency or if its directors no 
longer have the ability and time to turn the business around in the interests of 
those who control it without the help of third parties (such as corporate 
distress practitioners) or derogations from the general law of contract.  
It is therefore expected that empowering a pool of experts of the responsibility 
to decide if a company could and should benefit from corporate distress 
remedies is preferable to leaving this decision to the courts. Irrespective of 
                                                                    
102 11 U.S. Code §.1112(b). 
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whether the filing is based on the insolvency or RCP standard. These experts 
should be selected among representatives of the corporate distress profession, 
creditor groups and other interested bodies. 
The main goal of the eligibility panel is to determine if the decision to file and 
the admission to the proposed procedure was influenced by organisational 
powers. In other words, the panel should check whether corporate distress 
remedies were requested to promote the interests of some stakeholders at the 
expense of other parties who have legitimate interests in the debtor.  
Is an eligibility panel needed? This question may be answered in the negative if 
we consider that one of the goals of corporate distress law is to promote early 
filings and avoid “zombie company” problems. It has been argued that the 
market may work out a proper balance,103 while a minimum requirement could 
be the proof that absent restructuring the company would inevitably fail.104 Any 
additional test or check may delay the commencement of a procedure and 
impose additional costs on the debtor. 
However, the author believes that a market-only solution would not work. As 
stakeholders have little or competing interests to file for corporate distress 
remedies,105 incentives (for instance, tax waivers) are needed to promote early 
filings in a market-only approach. If incentives are too generous, the risk is that 
companies would make use of corporate distress remedies in a strategic way, to 
gain an unfair competitive advantage. No independent authority could be able 
to challenge the filing. As judicial solutions are perceived as ineffective, costly 
and lengthy,106 this thesis recommends a solution which retains the flexibility of 
the market approach and the independence and rigour of judicial supervision. 
                                                                    
103 Paterson (n 69) 18. 
104 Ibid.  
105 J Armour and S Deakin, ‘Norms in Private Insolvency Procedures: The “London Approach” To 
the Resolution of Financial Distress’ (2001) J. Corp. L. Stud. 21, 38: it is ‘rational […] for a 
creditor to refrain from enforcing if it thinks that the returns to renegotiation will be higher than 
its likely return in insolvency’; D Baird and R Rasmussen, ‘Private Debt and the Missing Lever of 
Corporate Governance’ (2006) 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209; Paterson (n 69) 16-17 (highlighting why 
individual categories of creditors are not incentivised to file for insolvency).  
106 ER Morrison, ‘Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical Study of Continuation Bias in 
Small-Business Bankruptcies’ (2007) 50 J.L. & Econ. 381 (arguing that judges may not have the 
expertise to deal with complex battles between stakeholders); JC Lipson, ‘The Shadow 
Bankruptcy System’ (2009) 89 B.U. L. Rev. 1609 (raising the problem of costs). 
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The proposed eligibility panel bears some similarities with the “Pre-Pack 
Pool”.107 The system should be largely automated and the panel members 
should be appointed on a rota basis. Ideally, the system should be able to 
determine the outcome of the application within two business days from its 
submission.  
However, the eligibility panel should also have some peculiarities over its 
English “godfather”. In fact, unlike the experts in the Pre-Pack Pool, it is 
suggested that the persons appointed to the eligibility panel should cover this 
position on a permanent basis due to the high number of expected applications. 
Additionally, application fees (currently £800 plus VAT) should be significantly 
lowered so that they do not present an obstacle to filing for coporate distress. A 
one-panellist session should be the norm and the panel should sit in a session of 
three experts in more complex cases (e.g. competing petitions).   
In the majority of cases, the panel should reach a decision based on the 
documents submitted by the applicant. If the circumstances require a deeper 
analysis of the case, the panel may adopt preliminary measures and postpone 
the final decision after a meeting with the interested parties or after having 
received a report from a panel-appointed, independent expert on the viability of 
the company.  
The most significant advantage of the eligibility panel over alternative bodies 
appointed by the government or the judiciary is that the management of the 
corporate distress filing is dealt with by professionals, who share the same 
background and expertise as the parties. They are part of the same community. 
As a result, they are more likely to spot strategic but not necessarily abusive 
behaviour and to adopt flexible solutions to meet the issues raised by corporate 
distress practice. Courts and regulatory bodies would retain a monitoring and 
                                                                    
107 The Pre-Pack Pool is an independent body of experienced business people who provide an 
opinion on the purchase of a business and/or its assets by connected parties to a company 
where a pre-pack sale is proposed. It has been established following a key recommendation in 
the Graham’s Report: T Graham CBE, Graham Review into Pre-Pack Administration: Report to The 
Rt Hon Vince Cable MP (The Insolvency Service, 16 June 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/graham-review-into-pre-pack-
administration> accessed 17 September 2018. For a preliminary assessment of the usefulness 
of this instrument: S Jones, ‘The Pre Pack Pool: Is It Working?’ (2017) 4 C.R. & I. 138; E Vaccari, 
‘Pre-Pack Pool: Is It Worth it?’ (2018) I.C.C.L.R. Article submitted for publication. 
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supervising role, to ensure that parties have the right incentives to behave in 
the common interest.  
The eligibility panel is akin to a self-regulation mechanism and the opportunity 
to rely on industry-led measures might not be apparent. In fact, several scholars 
have argued that whenever there is a TCP issue, the parties affected by this 
problem suffer from a perverse incentive to over-use the goods and internalise 
any profit (free-riding). This incentive prevails over any opposite inclination to 
conserve the goods or limit their exploitation for the common interest.108  
Traditional scholarship has therefore suggested that, in these cases, the most 
appropriate solution is ‘to have an external body impose a management structure 
over the resource’.109 This is what happens nowadays in the majority of formal 
and hybrid corporate distress procedures, as parties are required to follow a 
detailed statutory procedure and their actions are supervised by external 
authorities, such as judges and corporate distress practitioners.  
The eligibility panel challenges this approach. Even in cases of RCP problems, 
political scientists have proven that under certain conditions communities of 
resource users can develop rules that avoid the tragedy of commons without 
external intervention.110 State-imposed measures are not always necessary: 
what is needed is a system that inspires the confidence and trust in the players. 
Pursuant to this line of thinking, this thesis recommends the adoption of a 
decentralised approach to assess the eligibility for and the content of the 
corporate distress procedure. The eligibility panel is one manifestation of this 
novel approach.  
6.4(e) Alitalia (2017) Recast 
The implications of the RCP standard are best illustrated by referring to recent 
cases. In particular, this section looks at the issues that surrounded the recent 
failures of Alitalia and Air Berlin because, like Continental, these companies 
                                                                    
108 G Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243.  
109 M Pennington, ‘Elinor Ostrom, Common-Pool Resources and the Classical Liberal Tradition’ 
in E. Ostrom and others (eds), The Future of the Commons. Beyond Market Failure and 
Government Regulation (The Institute of Economic Affairs: London, 2012) 23. 
110 Ostrom (n 57); Pennington (n 109) 24. 
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operated in the aviation industry and the cases may provide good lessons for 
Anglo-American companies.  
If the RCP standard was applied as the eligibility criterion to file for corporate 
distress remedies, it is expected that the majority of cases would not be decided 
in a manner significantly dissimilar to the existing status quo. Therefore, the 
majority of decisions in front of the eligibility panel would be dealt with in a 
quick, mainly administrative manner.  
However, the potential of the suggested proposal lies in the ability to address 
the shortcomings of the existing system, as evidenced throughout this thesis. 
These inadequacies become apparent when the system overlooks the existence 
of RCP dilemmas and eventually RCP problems. This might have been the case 
in the recent filing for the extraordinary administration procedure of Alitalia 
(May 2017).  
Investigation of this situation is appropriate because Alitalia represents a 
significant case, due to the number of people affected by its failure, the 
relevance of the company for the national economy and the political 
implications arising from its dismissal. It concludes that it is likely that Alitalia 
directors faced a RCP problem when they filed for the extraordinary 
administration procedure in 2017.  
- 
Alitalia, the once state-owned Italian airline operator, was struggling to 
compete in the market since the progressive liberalization of the European 
aviation industry.111 It did not post a net profit since 1999 as it had faced 
competition from low-cost carriers, lacked a growth strategy, suffered from 
continuous strikes and proved unable to cut its costs.  
                                                                    
111 For a description of the causes of the crisis, see: E Bergamini and others, ‘Restructuring the 
Alitalia Business Model’ (2010) 16(1) Journal of Air Transport Management 16; P Beria and 
others, ‘Alitalia: The Failure of a National Carrier’ (2011) 17(4) Journal of Air Transport 
Management 215; C Valentini and S Romenti, ‘The Press and Alitalia’s 2008 Crisis: Issues, Tones, 
and Frames’ (2011) 37(4) Public Relations Rev. 360. 
  349 
After several attempts to restructure, rescue and sell the company, Alitalia first 
filed for insolvency protection on 29 August 2008112 to be eventually sold to a 
consortium of Italian investors (CAI – Compagnia Aerea Italiana S.p.a.) later that 
year.113 In 2014, due to a new liquidity crisis, 49 per cent of the shares of 
Alitalia were sold to Etihad Airways,114 while the Italian consortium remained 
the owner of the residual shares.   
Despite the support of a strong, international partner, Alitalia failed in its 
turnaround efforts. In spring 2017, the company’s staff rejected an agreement 
signed by management and trade unions that would have slashed jobs and 
salaries as a condition for shareholders to inject fresh funds through a capital 
increase of up to 2 billion euros.115 Alitalia was then admitted to an 
extraordinary administration procedure by the government on 2 May 2017.116 
This thesis focuses its analysis on the 2017 filing. 
While the company was no longer the leading air carrier in Italy,117 it still 
operated from important Italian hubs and in a growing yet competitive market. 
In May 2017, filing for corporate distress protection was no longer avoidable as 
the company’s negative cash flow would have brought Alitalia to breach the 
                                                                    
112 D Babington, ‘Alitalia seeks bankruptcy protection, rescuers ready’ Reuters (London, 29 
August 2008) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alitalia-bankruptcy/alitalia-seeks-
bankruptcy-protection-rescuers-ready-idUSMAT00853220080829> accessed 17 September 
2018. 
113 D Babington and G Vagnoni, ‘UPDATE 3- Italy agrees sale of Alitalia to CAI consortium’ 
Reuters (London, 19 November 2008) <https://www.reuters.com/article/alitalia/update-3-
italy-agrees-sale-of-alitalia-to-cai-consortium-idUSLJ63192820081119> accessed 17 
September 2018. A minority share of the company was given to the airline carrier Air 
France/KLM: 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20141023063139/http://corporate.alitalia.it/it/governance/a
zionariato/index.html> accessed 17 September 2018. 
114 <http://www.etihad.com/en-gb/about-us/etihad-news/archive/2014/alitalia-and-etihad-
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115 A Ciancio, ‘Alitalia risks crash landing before new takeoff’’ La Stampa (Torino, 2 May 2017) 
<http://www.lastampa.it/2017/05/02/esteri/lastampa-in-english/alitalia-risks-crash-landing-
before-new-takeoff-YmR00x7UwUjVI7rGzXdXUK/pagina.html> accessed 17 September 2018. 
116 L Alderman, ‘Alitalia Files for Bankruptcy, but Italy Balks at a Third Bailout’ The New York 
Times (New York, 2 May 2017) <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/business/italy-
alitalia-airline-bankruptcy.html> accessed 17 September 2018. The decision of the government 
is available here: <http://www.fallcoweb.it/home/pdf/alitalia/decreto.pdf> (It) accessed 17 
September 2019. The Civitavecchia Bankruptcy Court certified that the company was insolvent 
on 11 May 2017: <http://www.fallcoweb.it/home/pdf/alitalia/sentenza.pdf> (It) accessed 17 
September 2018. 
117 Anna.Aero Staff, ‘Would Alitalia be missed in Italy? Only has 9% of international seats this 
summer; EasyJet, Ryanair and Vueling could take up domestic slack’ Anna.Aero (10 May 2017) 
<http://www.anna.aero/2017/05/10/alitalia-possible-collapse-analysed/> accessed 17 
September 2018. 
  350 
minimum capital requirements to operate as an air-carrier and no lender was 
willing to grant further finance at market conditions.  
The opening of this procedure allowed the government to appoint three 
commissioners and grant the company a loan of 600 million euros118 (later 
increased to 900 million)119 to cover the expenses for the duration of the 
procedure. It was envisioned that what was left of the company should have 
been sold to the highest and most promising bidder within six months of the 
filing.  
Due to uncertainties following the general political elections in March 2018, at 
the time of this thesis the company is still under insolvency protection. While 
the previous Italian government ruled out the possibility that the company be 
re-nationalised,120 this seems to be the preferred plan of the current 
government.121  
The existence of the RCP gateway in corporate distress law would have 
significantly affected the way in which the 2017 crisis was handled. It is likely 
that the shareholders would have filed a liquidation petition on the basis that 
the company was insolvent. However, the directors would have submitted a 
petition to sell the business (or a portion of it) by means of a corporate distress 
procedure, on the basis that the company faced a RCP problem.  
In this case, the presence of a RCP problem suggests the need to sell the 
company with urgency to avoid a prolonged management of the company in an 
insolvency context that has resulted in further deferral of investments and the 
definition of a viable commercial strategy, as well as in further reductions of the 
                                                                    
118 A Sisto and A Glak, ‘Alitalia kicks off bankruptcy proceedings, government grants loan’ 
Reuters (London, 2 May 2017) <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-alitalia-
restructuring/alitalia-kicks-off-bankruptcy-proceedings-government-grants-loan-
idUKKBN17Y1AF> accessed 17 September 2018. 
119 G Pogliotti, ‘Alitalia, la dote del prestito lievita di 300 milioni e il rimborso slitta a settembre’ 
Il Sole 24 Ore (Milano, 13 October 2017) <http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2017-10-
13/alitalia-prorogato-rimborso-prestito-ponte-140706.shtml?uuid=AEA5GpmC&refresh_ce=1> 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
120 Reuters Staff, ‘Italy kicks off Alitalia sale process’ Reuters (London, 18 May 2017) 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alitalia-m-a-process/italy-kicks-off-alitalia-sale-process-
idUSKCN18D2YI> accessed 17 September 2018. 
121 Unnamed, ‘Italian Government Wants to Renationalize Alitalia Airline’ (The Local, 19 July 
2018) <https://www.thelocal.it/20180719/italian-government-wants-to-renationalize-alitalia-
airline> accessed 17 September 2018. 
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return (rectius, increase of losses) for some of the risk bearers (i.e. Alitalia staff 
and Italian citizens). 
Had the RCP standard been enforceable on that occasion, the eligibility panel 
would have appointed one or more corporate distress practitioners, who would 
have sought a quick sale of the remaining profitable assets to one or more 
competitors. The outcome would have been similar to the almost contemporary 
failure of Air Berlin, whose assets were sold to Easyjet,122, Lufthansa123 and at an 
auction,124 with part of the staff partially retained by the new owners.125  
In the Alitalia crisis, the voice of some interested parties was neglected. This 
was the voice of Italian taxpayers, who subsidised the company for several 
years. Before the last loan of 900 million euros, data by Mediobanca showed 
that the Italian government pumped some 7.4 billion euros into the company 
from 1974 to 2014.126 If back in May 2017 Alitalia directors had to consider the 
interests of all controlling stakeholders, they would not have filed for a 
procedure that resulted in further, meaningful losses for one of the controllers 
of the company, without this resulting in any significant benefit for any of the 
other parties who had a legally enforceable interest in the company. 
Taxpayers are by far the most significant stakeholders in Alitalia. According to 
the most recent available data in the “Relazione Illustrativa ex art. 2446/2447 
                                                                    
122 R Sembhy, ‘Easyjet confirms acquisition of Air Berlin assets’ The Independent (London, 18 
December 2017) <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/easyjet-air-berlin-
deal-buy-tegel-airport-opeations-flying-crew-landing-slots-bankrupt-airline-a8116046.html> 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
123 R Toplensky, ‘Brussels approves Lufthansa-Air berlin merger’ The Financial Times (London, 
21 December 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/e453d592-e662-11e7-97e2-916d4fbac0da> 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
124 J Newton, ‘Aeroplane seats for £1,333 and branded chocolates for £195: Air Berlin is selling 
off its entire stock after going bankrupt with £700million of debt’ Daily Mail (London, 17 
January 2018) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/travel/travel_news/article-5279125/Bankrupt-
airline-Air-Berlin-selling-entire-stock.html> accessed 17 September 2018. 
125 A Key, ‘EasyJet agrees employment terms to save 1,000 Air Berlin jobs’ City A.M. (London, 3 
November 2017) <http://www.cityam.com/275123/easyjet-agrees-employment-terms-save-
1000-air-berlin-jobs> accessed 8 April 2018. 
126 G Andrea, ‘Who killed Alitalia? A long history of failures’ The World of Aviation (28 January 
2017) <https://theworldofaviationblog.wordpress.com/2017/01/28/who-killed-alitalia-a-
long-history-of-failures/> accessed 17 September 2018. 
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C.C.”,127 the company has debts of 3.215 billion euros. The main creditors of the 
company are: 
 Commercial creditors who are owed 819 million euros,128 out of which 
624 million euros are owed to “suppliers” and almost 118 to other 
airline operators; 
 Financial investors, who are owed 604 million euros in bonds and other 
obligations,129 and 59 million for financial derivatives;130 
 Banks and other financial institutions for up to 386 million euros in 
loans,131 out of which 100 million euros are owed to Etihad Airways; 
 Leaseholders (mainly for the aircrafts) for 133 million euros;132  
 Employees and the state for unpaid taxes for 58.5 million euros.133 
Almost all of these creditors – with the significant exception of employees and 
the state – would prefer a procedure that prolongs the comatose state of the 
company backed by further financial support from the government. This is 
particularly valid for the financial investors, who hold unsecured obligations 
from the company, and for unsecured suppliers, who are granted a timely and 
preferential payment for their goods and services provided during the 
corporate distress procedure. Secured creditors and leaseholders are on 
balance unaffected by the decision to opt for a longer, administrative procedure 
instead of a quick, efficient sale of the company (or part of it).  
Nevertheless, the course of action undertaken to rescue and sell Alitalia is 
against the risk bearer interests of a significant portion of stakeholders. These 
include the same workers who voted against the company-union agreement 
knowing that a rejection of the proposal would have resulted in liquidation of 
the company. Their voice was equally not considered in the eve of the filing.  
                                                                    
127 Available at: 
<http://www.fallcoweb.it/home/pdf/alitalia/situazione_patrimoniale_aggiornata.pdf> 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
128 Ibid 4.24. 
129 Ibid 4.18. 
130 Ibid 4.20. 
131 Ibid 4.17. 
132 Ibid 4.18 and 4.19. 
133 Ibid 4.21, 4.22. 
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The existence of an eligibility requirement based on the RCP standard would 
have allowed the panel of experts to consider their position and suggest a 
course of action, which would have been more in line with the governance 
structure of Alitalia.  
Finally, it might also be contended that similar considerations apply to other 
cases involving the turnaround of companies operating in the transport 
industry. For instance, the RCP criterion would have been useful in the 
egregious case of Eastern Airlines, which filed for Chapter 11 (and eventually 
sold its remaining assets) at a time when ‘it was clear to just about everyone that 
Eastern should be sold.’134  
- 
According to one of the hoariest chestnuts of the law, ‘hard cases make bad law’. 
Should we therefore infer the need for regulatory changes from arguably 
exceptional cases? This question should evidently be answered in the negative. 
However, it is submitted that the cases described in the previous section are not 
exceptional. The cases that hit the headlines represent the pinnacle of a trend 
that affects the whole industry (Bildisco, for instance, was a company with less 
than 100 employees).  
It therefore makes sense to call for regulatory changes in the eligibility 
requirements for the enforcement of corporate distress remedies. These 
improvements – primarily the introduction of a “RCP eligibility test” – are 
needed to valorise the expectations of the parties who have controlling 
interests against a distressed debtor.  
The suggested regulatory changes are substantial and not simply procedural. 
They promote transparency, as the proposed procedure should apply for the 
opening of all but an informal turnaround procedure. They may also promote 
efficiency if the submission procedure is automated and based on standard 
forms. Nevertheless, they should not affect the nature of the majority of the 
                                                                    
134 Skeel (n 60) 921. For a different view on this case: Altman and Hotchkiss (n 68) 220-221 
arguing that Eastern managers rightly chose to file for Chapter 11 in a last bid to ensure the 
wider interest of all stakeholders.  
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existing petitions, which could still be submitted by relying on the 
complementary “insolvency standard”. 
In the next section the author investigates whether the theory proposed in this 
study is to be preferred over alternative approaches to the interaction between 
contract and corporate distress law. 
 
6.5 “WEALTH MAXIMISATION OF STAKEHOLDERS’ INTERESTS”: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
How does the WMSI theory proposed in this thesis compare to other proposals 
that deal with finding the dividing line between contract law and insolvency 
(rectius: corporate distress) remedies? 
Schillig (2014)135 argues that financial innovation and the increasing 
complexities of capital structures recommend a recalibration and 
reconsideration of the dividing line between contract and insolvency law. He 
therefore suggests a “waiver contractual approach” pursuant to which the 
existence of certain circumstances would allow parties who ex-ante (i.e. before 
the commencement of any formal procedure) decided to opt-out of mandatory 
insolvency (rectius: corporate distress) remedies to enforce their agreement.  
Schillig contends that this switch from mandatory to contractual explains much 
of current practice, including pre-pack administrations, the treatment of ipso 
facto clauses and the English jurisprudence on the anti-deprivation principle. 
He observes – in line with the findings of this thesis – that whenever market-
driven realignment successfully operates, mandatory law should ‘retreat to 
providing the structural rules necessary to facilitate private ordering’.136 
Alternatively, the risk that mandatory laws aggravate the problems they were 
meant to address increases.137 
In the author’s opinion, Schillig’s theory suffers from three limitations. The first 
is its scope: while the theory is persuasive for financial transactions and in 
liquid markets, it may prove inadequate whenever these assumptions are not 
                                                                    
135 M Schillig, ‘Corporate Insolvency Law in the Twenty-First Century: State Imposed or Market 
Based?’ (2014) 14 J. Corp. L. Stud. 1. 
136 Ibid 38. 
137 Ibid 14. 
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met.138 Secondly, Schillig based its theory on the conventional assumption that 
parties can contractually negotiate their rights and waivers. It has already been 
observed here139 and elsewhere140 that the validity of this point is open to 
criticism. 
Finally, in Schillig’s theory the separation between contract and corporate 
distressed remedies is extremely blurred. Mandatory remedies always remain 
in the background and can be invoked whenever parties fail to agree on private 
solutions, with the potential of affecting the predictability of the legal system.141 
  
                                                                    
138 Schillig in fact argued that financial innovations allowed ‘debt and trading investors as well as 
directors and executives’ to promote market-driven realignments: Schillig (n 135) 10. 
139 See above section 2.2 of this thesis. 
140 Look at the same section for the literature on the topic. 
141 The author recognises that the ‘new optimal balance between mandatory provisions and 
default rules […] may change over time with the development of new lending practices and 
financial products’: Schillig (n 135) 14. 
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Paterson (2014-2016)142 
suggests to rethink 
corporate insolvency 
theory in the light of the 
developments in the 
financial market. She 
argues that corporate 
distress law has two 
primary purposes: (i) to 
facilitate the reallocation 
of capital whenever 
financial debtors wanted 
to retrench their liabilities or call in credits against distressed debtors 
(“insolvency law”);143 (ii) to encourage early restructuring so that capital is 
allocated to companies best able to use it (“restructuring law”).144 While the 
focus in insolvency procedures is on maximising the amount of capital that can 
be re-deployed in the economy, in restructuring procedures the law should help 
parties to resolve holdouts problems.145 
Paterson argues that an efficient market mechanism could be used to 
distinguish between viable companies with the wrong capital structure that 
deserve to be rescued and those with more profound problems that should 
therefore be liquidated.146 The mechanism, however, operates only with 
reference to large and larger mid-cap companies and it only distinguishes the 
roles of corporate distress law (rescue or liquidation) without providing 
guidance on the contract/corporate distress divide. 
The WMSI theory allows for further conclusions, as it offers two criteria 
(insolvency and RCP) to distinguish contract law from corporate distress-
                                                                    
142 Paterson (n 69); S Paterson, ‘Rethinking Corporate Bankruptcy Theory in the Twenty-First 
Century’ (2016) 36(4) OJLS 697. 
143 Paterson (n 69) 18. 
144 Ibid. Paterson uses the word of “restructuring” as a synonym of “rescue” while this thesis 
adopts a different meaning for each of these terms. 
145 Ibid 4 and 16. 
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governed cases147 and is potentially capable of dealing with a wider array of 
companies.148 
Balz (2017)149 contends that the distinction between insolvency and 
preventive restructuring frameworks rests in the ability of the debtor to stop 
negotiations and exit proceedings. His taxonomy has been criticised because 
rescue would not be recognised as ‘something peculiar that deserves a special 
treatment’.150 
The author disagrees on this criticism: not recognising rescue as an 
autonomous value of corporate distress law does not mean to not recognise that 
corporate distress procedure can achieve that goal. Under the theory proposed 
in this thesis, one of the primary outcomes of corporate distress procedures 
should be to maximise the prevailing interests of the affected stakeholders. 
Whether this occurs by means of rescue or liquidation practices is of little 
concern. 
Where Balz’s theory is unpersuasive is in using insolvency as the main criterion 
to differentiate contract from corporate distress procedures. Chapter five and 
particularly section 5.2 evidenced the reasons that suggest not to rely solely on 
that concept as an eligibility criterion.   
Eidenmüller (2016-2018)151 argues that insolvency proceedings are only 
those that address the creditors’ TCP problems.152 The collective nature should 
be reserved to those proceedings governed by corporate distress rules. As 
observed by Madaus,153 this conclusion is inaccurate: restructuring proceedings 
                                                                    
147 Paterson did not specifically address in her papers the trouble of distinguishing corporate 
distress procedures from contract law workouts. She suggested that ‘the market may impose its 
own solution to this challenge’: Paterson (n 69) 18. 
148 Paterson’s theories are based on a study of Anglo-American large corporations affected by 
changes in the finance market. 
149 M Balz, ‘Insolvency Proceedings and Preventive Frameworks’ in WF Ebke and others (eds), 
Unternehmensrestrukturierung im Umbruch?! (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2017) 
150 S Madaus, ‘Leaving the Shadows of US Bankruptcy Law: A Proposal to Divide the Realms of 
Insolvency and Restructuring Law’ (2018) 6 EBOR L. Rev. 18. 
151 H Eidenmüller, ‘What is an Insolvency Proceeding?’ ECGI Working Paper No. 335/2016 
(2016) <http://www.ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/SSRN-
id2712628.pdf> accessed 17 September 2018; H Eidenmüller, ‘What is an Insolvency 
Proceeding’ (2018) 92 Am. Bankr. L.J. 53. 
152 Eidenmüller (n 151) 71. For a distinction between common pool problems and anti-
commons, see below ftn 156 and, more generally, sub-section 1.3(a).  
153 Madaus (n 150). 
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can be collective even if governed by contract law tenets. Additionally, as 
explained below, the assumption that insolvency proceedings address only TCP 
problems (as generally understood in the literature) is questionable.  
It is also to be observed that the purpose of Eidenmüller papers was not to offer 
a new conceptualisation of corporate insolvency law. His goal was to determine 
the features that cross-border insolvency proceedings should have to merit 
immediate and universal recognition. This may help explaining why his theory 
looks unconvincing to the author of this thesis.  
More recently, Madaus (2018) proposed a doctrinal approach that offered a 
“clear” distinction between insolvency and restructuring law.154 Madaus argues 
that while insolvency and restructuring law share a common economic function 
(debt-cancellation for non-performing loans), ‘there is a clear line of distinction 
between insolvency and restructuring procedures’.155  
  
                                                                    
154 Ibid. Madaus’ understanding of the notion of restructuring as encompassing only measures 
that allow the legal entity of the debtor to survive or avoid an insolvency process (ftn 2) is 
consistent with the definition adopted in this work in sub-section 1.3(b). 
155 Madaus (n 150) 3. 
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Under Madaus’ proposal, 
where insolvency 
proceedings are designed to 
address TCP problems, 
restructuring workouts 
address only the anti-
common side of the 
equation.156 Insolvency 
proceedings are governed 
by insolvency rules while 
restructuring workouts by 
restructuring (contract) law and are carried out under judicial assistance. The 
dividing line between restructuring workouts and insolvency proceedings is the 
existence of a situation of insolvency. 
The author agrees with Madaus’ claims that restructuring law should be 
governed by contract law principles and rules and should have no collective 
effect unless where otherwise allowed by the law. However, this work does not 
find the need to use a new taxonomy (“restructuring law”) to define what is 
essentially contract law. 
More importantly, the author disagrees on two important aspects: (i) the 
dividing line between restructuring and insolvency law; and (ii) the content of 
what Madaus calls insolvency law and this thesis defines as corporate distress 
law. The second aspect has been addressed in sub-section 6.3(b) and below in 
this section, while the criticism now focuses on the first point.  
Madaus argues that, because the dividing line between restructuring and 
insolvency law should be the existence of a situation of insolvency, the 
                                                                    
156 In line with the literature in the field, Madaus argues that common pool problems arise 
whenever parties face a problem of overusing the assets (e.g. there are not enough fish in the 
pond to satisfy the needs of all fishermen), while anti-commons emerge whenever parties are 
underusing the assets (e.g. one party can prevent access to the pond to all fishermen, despite the 
existence of enough fish to satisfy the needs of each of them). On this distinction: MA Heller, 
‘The Tragedy of Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets’ (1998) 111 
Harv. L. Rev. 621; LA Fennell, ‘Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons’ University of Chicago 
Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 261/2009 (2009) 
<https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065&context=public_law
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problems addressed by these laws would not overlap unless in marginal, 
exceptional cases. In line with traditional law and economics theories, he argues 
that the insolvency of the debtor creates TCP problems.157 Both conclusions are 
fallacious for the considerations expressed below. 
In “restructuring” cases, parties may need to address TCP problems. Companies 
usually undertake turnaround processes if they face a situation of crisis that 
may lead to financial and economic distress. TCP problems may not be actual as 
the debtor is still meeting its obligations as they fall due but are usually real and 
looming above any restructuring process. If the parties agree on a restructuring 
plan, the content of this plan is influenced not only by the need to overcome 
holdout problems (generally known in the literature as anti-common issues), 
but also future potential insolvency problems (generally known in the literature 
as TCP issues). 
Equally, in “insolvency” cases, debtors and creditors may face anti-common 
problems (while, according to Madaus, they should not). For instance, in the 
case of a liquidation of a real estate business, over-secured creditors may have 
an incentive to sell the assets as soon as possible, even if the market is 
depressed and the property is seriously under-valued (as during the recent 
financial crisis). On the contrary, under-secured or unsecured claimants may 
put into practice delaying practices in the hope of a recovery of the market that 
covered the additional costs associated with delaying the procedure. This is 
clearly an anti-common-type situation.  
English courts held that the obligations of a receiver do not extend to postpone 
a power of sale.158 However, on other occasions the same courts ruled that 
office-holders shall consider anti-common issues in insolvency procedures, 
even when conducted in the main interest of one creditor and liquidation-
oriented.159 
                                                                    
157 Madaus (n 150). 6. 
158 Silven Properties and another v The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2003] EWCA Civ 1409, [2003] 
BCC 1002; Purewal v Countrywide Residential Lettings Ltd [2015] EWCA (Civ) 1122, [2016] 4 
WLR 31; Alpstream AGv PK Airfinance Sarl [2015] EWCA Civ 1318, [2016] 1 CLC 135. For an 
analysis of these cases: Finch and Milman (n 1) 281. 
159 Medforth v Blake [2000] Ch. 86 (CA). This was a case where a receiver continued to carry the 
debtor’s business but failed to obtain bulk discounts for the purchaser of pig feed. The Court of 
  361 
The WMSI theory represents a more comprehensive, even if not necessarily 
simpler attempt to address the shortcomings of the above-mentioned theories.  
Under the proposed conceptualisation, corporate distress law should be 
designed to recognise the risk bearers’ power to influence those liquidation or 
rescue decisions that have the potential to maximise the wealth of all 
stakeholders. Corporate 
distress remedies oriented 
towards the maximisation of 
company’s assets or the best 
allocation of capital to those 
who could make a better use of 
it should operate whenever 
parties face RCP or solvency 
problems. Contract law rules 
should apply whenever parties 
can still find contractual 
solutions to their RCP dilemmas or solvency issues.  
The theory, therefore, is not based on a distinction between common and anti-
common problems: the RCP notion used in this work is wide enough to 
encompass common, anti-common and semi-common situations.160 Equally, it is 
not based on a distinction between solvent and insolvent entities. The dividing 
line between contract and corporate distress remedies is not determined by the 
nature of the issue addressed by the law. 
Finally, it is not based on the assumption that creditors act to maximise the 
value of the debtor’s assets.161 As risk bearer rights are difficult to define and 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Appeal held that the receiver failed in his duties to carry the business profitably, properly and 
with due diligence. For an analysis, see: S Frisby, ‘Making a Silk Purse Out of a Pig’s Ear’ (2000) 
63(3) M.L.R. 413; L Ife, ‘Liability of Receivers and Banks in Selling and Managing Property’ 
(2000) 13(8) Insolv. Int. 61. 
160 Above sub-section 1.3(a). 
161 TH Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law’ (2nd edn, Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, MA, 2001); DG Baird and RK Rasmussen, ‘Antibankruptcy’ (2010) 120 Yale L.J. 648, 
654. 
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change over time,162 the WMSI theory suggests that the only objective 
stakeholders could agree on is the overall maximisation of stakeholders’ wealth.  
Therefore, the dividing line between contract and mandatory remedies is 
determined by the magnitude of the issue (either a dilemma or a problem) faced 
by the stakeholders and by their ability to reach a wealth maximisation 
agreement without deviating from contract law principles. Accordingly, the 
WMSI theory does not face the same shortcomings evidenced with reference to 
Madaus’ taxonomy.  
It might be argued that the theory proposed in this study could lead to 
nonsensical results. If corporate distress law empowers the majority of 
stakeholders to unilaterally amend contracts and bind dissenting parties, the 
emergence of RCP dilemmas would lead inevitably to the opening of a corporate 
distress procedure. Nobody would have any incentive to negotiate a 
restructuring agreement in the realm of contract law.  
This thesis acknowledges this problematic aspect and therefore suggests two 
solutions. First, at corporate distress level, it recommends the introduction of a 
deviation from contract law rights (by means of priorities, preferential 
treatments, set-offs, etc.) only whenever it appears necessary to preserve 
confidence in the market.163 Secondly, at contract level, it recommends the 
relaxation of certain principles. For instance, despite the principle of freedom of 
contract, parties might be allowed to renegotiate contract terms in case of 
significant and unexpected changes of circumstance and, should the 
negotiations fail, authorize the panel to resolve the dispute by determining the 
new content of the contract.164 
                                                                    
162 Think, for instance, at the effect that an environmental disaster may have on the value of the 
company, the claims of third parties (including tort claimants and the state) and the interest of 
the society. 
163 This was the argument originally used to justify the enforcement of ipso facto clauses in 
certain financial contracts: see sub-section 2.2(a)(i).  
164 A similar provision is included in s.313 of the German Civil Code, where such power is 
bestowed on judges. The introduction of such provision, however, may prove problematic in the 
U.S., where the Constitution prohibits federal states from using their contract law powers to 
pass laws that would relieve a party of their obligation to pay under a contract. See the ‘Contract 
Clause’ in art. 1, s.10, cl.1: ‘No State shall […] pass any […] Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts […]’.  
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These considerations suggest that the WMSI theory is preferable over the other 
competing taxonomies that analyse the interaction between contract and 
corporate distress law. Insofar, however, the Anglo-American legislators have 
not moved towards adopting the approach suggested in this work primarily 
because of a lack of comprehensive studies on the consequences arising from 
this alternative taxonomy.  
In the next section the author investigates the factors that promote the 
introduction of the RCP standard into law and those factors which limit the 
findings of this study. 
 
6.6 “WEALTH MAXIMISATION OF STAKEHOLDERS’ INTERESTS”: IMPACT AND LIMITS 
So far, this thesis has recommended an approach to the definition of the limits 
of corporate distress law that recognises significant leeway to the parties 
involved in the procedure. The introduction of the RCP eligibility criterion is 
expected to facilitate the submission of petitions from both the company and its 
managers, as well as from any other interested party. The assessment of the 
financial and operational conditions of the debtor and the decision on the 
corporate distress application is attributed to an eligibility panel made of 
people familiar with these procedures.  
Supervision and control from regulatory entities or independent parties is 
reduced to a minimum. Courts and regulatory bodies retain a monitoring role, 
but they are allowed to exercise their powers only in case of abuse or fraud. 
Such a de-regulatory or de minimis approach is in line with an established legal 
and business Anglo-American culture, even if the creation of a new 
infrastructure of panels of experts may require some initial commitment from 
the governments.  
It has been observed that these countries ‘have a great tradition of private rule-
making to facilitate groups of persons reaching a common end.’165 The debate in 
                                                                    
165 P Booth, ‘Foreword’ in E Ostrom and others (eds), The Future of the Commons. Beyond Market 
Failure and Government Regulation (The Institute of Economic Affairs: London, 2012) 12. 
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chapter two of this thesis has supported this view and the suggested approach 
fits into this tradition.  
De-regulation without control can lead to a strategic use of corporate distress 
remedies. By now it should be clear that the author is not supportive of this line 
of thinking according to which policies and rules should simply promote a level 
playing field for businesses. Policies need to establish a direction: the 
maximisation of wealth of those who have legally enforceable interests in the 
debtor, in particular if this leads to value-creation for society as a whole. This 
should reduce the risk of strategic filings. 
This section discusses the factors that are more likely to promote or thwart the 
adoption of this model from both the legislator and the industry.  
6.6(a) Promoting Success: Addressing Behavioural Biases in the Decision-
Making Process 
Insofar, this chapter has suggested that the RCP eligibility criterion that worked 
alongside the traditional, insolvency test should be introduced into the Anglo-
American statutory framework to determine the enforceability of corporate 
distress provisions. Such a standard would fit well within the current statutory 
framework, as it would promote the procedural efficiency and fairness goals 
that underpin the Anglo-American tradition and the principles that support the 
dominant corporate distress law heuristics discussed in chapters two to four. 
The analysis of the cases of Continental166 and Alitalia167 have also implied that 
the RCP standard could work in practice.  
Shifting insolvency to the proposed corporate distress system based on the RCP 
standard is admittedly a dramatic step, however promising it may appear on 
paper. So why has this standard not yet been proposed, discussed and 
introduced into the law? Could such a proposal ever be approved by either 
Parliament or the Congress? 
Part of the answer may lie in the limits, limitations and delimitations of this 
study, which will be discussed in the next sub-section. However, another part of 
                                                                    
166 See above sub-section 6.2(a). 
167 See above sub-section 6.4(e). 
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the answer may lie in the existence of behavioural biases in the decision-making 
process.  
Behavioural biases168 are those attitudes that affect the decision-making 
process and that may push a person (in this case, the legislator) to deviate from 
optimal practices to pursue sub-optimal ones. By drawing on behavioural 
studies, this section discusses the biases that may affect the introduction of the 
RCP eligibility criterion into the law of the RCP eligibility criterion [sub-section 
6.6(a)(i)] and suggests strategies to overcome them [sub-section 6.6(a)(ii)]. The 
focus is on decision-making and the choices adopted at the institutional, 
legislative level.169   
6.6(a)(i) Biases in Real-World Decision-Making170 
Behavioural scholarship brings together insights from different disciplines such 
as economics,171 psychology,172 political science,173 law174 and sociology to 
                                                                    
168 Behavioural studies have been subject to extensive criticism for their inability to explain 
some of their findings with reference to specific circumstances and case studies: see generally E 
Zamir, ‘Loss Aversion and the Law’ (2012) 65 Vand. L. Rev. 829, 841-42. Nevertheless, this 
thesis supports the majority view that people’s preferences, choices and judgments do generally 
depend on the biases analysed in sub-section 6.6(a)(i). 
169 This is usually described as the “macro” level, as opposed to the “micro” level that looks at 
the actions, attitudes and decisions of creditors, corporations and other stakeholders. “Micro” 
level parties should have the primary interest to promote their welfare and well-being over any 
opposite consideration. They are not expected to look at the long-term implications of their 
behaviour. Legislatures, on the contrary, should be motivated by the need to promote the long-
term welfare of the country. Hence it is their behaviour and not the one of micro players that is 
considered in this section. See Mevorach (n 83) 49. 
170 For this portion of the thesis, the author is heavily indebted to Mevorach studies as reported 
in chapter 2 of The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency. Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps (OUP: 
Oxford, 2018). 
171 See generally: D Kahneman, ‘New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption’ (March 1994) 
JITE 18; C Jolls, ‘Behavioural Law and Economics’ National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) Working Paper 12879/2007 (2007) <http://www.nber.org/papers/w12879.pdf> 
accessed 17 September 2018; JD Wright and DH Ginsburg, ‘Behavioural Law and Economics: Its 
Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty’ (2012) 106(3) Nw. Univ. L. Rev. 1033; JC 
Cooper and WE Kovacici, ‘Behavioural Economics: Implications for Regulatory Behavior’ (2012) 
J. Regul. Econ. 41. 
172 LR Beach and T Connolly, The Psychology of Decision Making. People in Organizations (2nd 
edn, SAGE Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA, 2005); E Zamir, Law, Psychology, and Morality 
(OUP: Oxford, 2015). See also: M Rabin, ‘Psychology and Economics’ (March 1998) 36 J. Econ. 
Lit. 11; D Kahneman, ‘A Psychological Perspective on Economics’ (May 2003) 93(2) Am. Econ. 
Rev. 162; D Kahneman, ‘Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics’ 
(Dec. 2003) 93(5) Am. Econ. Rev. 1449. 
173 CR Sunstein, Why Nudge? The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism (New Haven Publishing: 
London, 2014); A Alemanno and A Sibony, Nudge and the Law: A European Perspective (Hart 
Publishing: London, 2015). See also: CR Sunstein and RH Thaler, ‘Libertarian Paternalism Is Not 
an Oxymoron’ (Autumn 2003) 70(4) U. Chi. L. Rev. 1159; MJ Rizzo and DG Witman, ‘The 
Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism’ (2009) 4 BYU L. Rev. 905. 
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study and predict the human behaviour under specific circumstances. As ‘legal 
thinking largely follows common sense morality’,175 it is contended that the 
conclusions of behavioural scholarship studies on the general population can be 
applied – with minimal yet relevant distinctions – to decision makers. 
The efficacy of law and of policy recommendations often depends on its 
accounting for relevant patterns of human behaviour.176 A more informed 
understanding of legislature’s attitudes and biases may increase the well-being 
of society, provided that the recommendations are designed to promote value-
enhancing and welfare-increasing solutions, as it is the case submitted in this 
thesis. 
To discuss de-biasing strategies,177 it is necessary to identify the biases and 
reasons that induce the legislators to deviate from welfare-increasing 
behaviour. 
- 
The notion of heuristics178 and biases in judgment and decision-making was 
first introduced in the Seventies179 to account for deviations in real-life choices 
from optimal, value-maximising solutions. The literature that followed180 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
174 E Zamir and D Teichman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Behavioural Economics and the Law 
(OUP: Oxford, 2014). See also: RB Korobkin and TS Ulen, ‘Law and Behavioural Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics’ (2000) 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1051; P 
Hacker, ‘The Behavioral Divide. A Critique of the Differential Implementation of Behavioral Law 
and Economics in the US and the EU’ (2015) 11(4) ERCL 299; GM Lucas, Jr. and S Tasic, 
‘Behavioral Public Choice and the Law’ (2015-2016) 188 W. Va. L. Rev. 199. 
175 Zamir (n 168) 833. 
176 A Tor, ‘The Methodology of the Behavioural Analysis of Law’ (2008) 4 Haifa L. Rev. 237. 
177 On the need for the law to have a ‘de-biasing’ attitude, see generally: CF Camerer and others, 
‘Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioural Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric 
Paternalism”’ (2003) 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211 (arguing that the state should help individuals to 
make decisions that promote their wellbeing); C Jolls and CR Sunstein, ‘Debiasing Through Law’ 
(2006) 35 J. Legal Stud. 199; RB Korobkin, ‘Libertarian Welfarism’ (Dec. 2009) 97(6) Cal. L. Rev. 
1651; A van Aaken, ‘Behavioral International Law and Economics’ (2014) 55(2) Harv. Int’l L.J. 
421 (arguing that insights from behavioural economics can help design better international law 
as a fundamental de-biasing mechanism). 
178 Rules of thumb or mental shortcuts relied upon by people in making judgments or choices. 
179 A Tversky and D Kahneman, ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristic and Biases’ (1974) 185 
Science 1124; D Kahneman and A Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions under 
Risk’ (1979) 47 Econometrica 263 (arguing that the rational choice theory predominant in 
economics and influential in law according to which people chose to act in a way that maximise 
their expected utility is flawed).  
180 See generally the papers on prisoner’s dilemma, loss aversion, endowment effect, status quo 
bias and bounded willpower mentioned in this thesis. In 1992 Tversky and Kahneman 
presented a modified version of their original, prospect theory: A Tversky and D Kahneman, 
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reinstated the view that people’s choices was dependent upon the way in which 
they framed the alternatives in front of them. However, behavioural scholars 
also demonstrated that deviations from optimal behaviour can be predicted,181 
as they are determined by a mix of the following biases. 
The first is the existence of a situation that has been described as the 
“prisoner’s dilemma”, i.e. where the parties recognise that self-interested 
actions would fail to achieve a socially optimal result but, nevertheless, they are 
bound to betray the common good for a (potential) individual larger gain.182  
In the context of this study, decision makers may prefer an un-regulated 
approach to the definition of the requirements to file for corporate distress 
remedies even if they realise that this would result in strategic filings and 
practices of dubious legitimacy, such as “phoenix” filings.183 They may adopt 
what have been described as sub-optimal solutions in the hope that a larger 
number of companies from other jurisdictions would make use of their 
statutory framework to turn around their business.  
This less restrictive approach promotes the expertise of the judiciary and the 
domestic legal economy of interested parties, such as lawyers and corporate 
distress practitioners. Unilateral changes may be perceived as giving 
competitive advantages to other jurisdictions which – such as Singapore and 
Dubai – are competing for the market of the same legal services.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
‘Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty’ (1992) 5 J. Risk & 
Uncertainty 297. In 2002 Daniel Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in economics primarily for his 
contribution, together with Amos Tversky (who passed away in 1996), to formulating the 
prospect theory. 
181 See, among others: B De Martino and others, ‘Frame, Biases, and Rational Decision-Making in 
the Human Brain’ (2006) 313 Science 515. 
182 See detailed discussion in sub-section 5.4(a) and literature in ftn 218, chapter five of this 
thesis. 
183 In a typical “phoenix syndrome” scenario, an entrepreneur who controls the financially 
distressed Company A registers Company B, to which the assets of Company A are transferred 
in what appears to be fraudulent conveyance against the creditors of company A. Finch and 
Milman (n 1) 377-380 (discussing the nature, fairness and frequency of phoenix trading). See 
also: R Tomasic, ‘Phoenix Companies and Corporate Regulatory Challenges’ (1996) 6 Australian 
J. Corp. L. 461; Y Rotem, ‘Small Business Financial Distress and the “Phoenix Syndrome”: A Re-
evaluation’ (2013) 22 Int’l Insol. Rev. 1. 
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Another element to be considered is people’s loss aversion attitude.184 This 
term describes people’s inclination to perceive outcomes not in terms of final 
states of wealth and welfare, but in terms of losses and gains (“prospect 
theory”).185 Numerous psychological studies have proven that people are more 
influenced by the potential losses arising from their choices rather than the 
probability and magnitude of potential gains186 in relation to a common 
baseline or reference point.187  
While people can have different loss aversion attitudes, governments as a rule 
of thumb are generally less risk-seeking than the general population, especially 
if they promote a conservative manifesto. As a result, the law (including 
corporate distress remedies) tends more readily and effectively to rectify 
unjustified losses than help people recover gains that they failed to obtain.188 In 
other words, it provides more instruments to maximise the return of 
contractual creditors rather than to promote the best use of capital.  
Additionally, risk-averse attitudes may be magnified by the fact that more 
radical reforms tend to be approved at the beginning of the legislature, when 
the government is still enjoying popularity from the recent elections. In this 
period, governments want to promote and approve reforms that affect the 
general population, in the hope that the negative externalities arising from their 
enactments have been forgotten in time for the next general election.  
                                                                    
184 Loss aversion as a concept emerged from the studies of Daniel Bernoulli: D Bernoulli, 
‘Exposition of a New theory on the Measurement of Risk’ (1738), reprinted in (1954) 22 
Econometrica 23 (Louise Sommer trans.). Other publications include: J von Neumann and O 
Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 
1944); D Kahneman and A Tversky, ‘Choices, Values and Frames’ (1984) (39)4 American 
Psychologist 341; D Kahneman and others, ‘Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, 
and Status Quo Bias’ (1991) 5 J. Econ. Persp. 193, 199-203; S Benartzi and RH Thaler, ‘Myopic 
Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle’ (1995) 110 Q.J. Econ. 73 (explaining investors’ 
preference for bonds in times where the gap with returns on stock was rather significant); 
Zamir (n 168) (arguing that the notions of reference points and loss aversion permeate the law 
and illuminate fundamental characteristics of the legal system itself). 
185 See Tversky and Kahneman (n 180) 298. 
186 See generally: Zamir (n 168). According to Mevorach, the subjective impact of losses is 
roughly twice that of gains: Mevorach (n 83) 56. This however appears to be a gross 
generalisation, especially when applied to the action of complex bodies such as governmental 
entities. The estimate is based on Tversky and Kahneman evidentiary conclusion that monetary 
losses loom larger than gains by a factor of 2.25: Tversky and Kahneman (n 180) 311. 
187 Y Feldman and others, ‘Reference Points and Contractual Choices: An Experimental 
Examination’ (Sept. 2013) 10(3) J. Empirical Legal Stud. 512. 
188 Zamir (n 168) 832. 
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Due to the strong lobbying activity of corporate and professional bodies, 
reforms that affect the interest of businesses and groups numerously 
represented in the Congress or Parliament are usually postponed to the end of 
the legislature, where the reforming impetus of the government usually gives 
way to other, more contingent political considerations (i.e. not falling out with 
potentially rich and influential electoral supporters). Ambiguity and lack of 
statistical probabilities,189 as well as failed attempts in the past190 also have the 
potential to influence the loss aversion attitude of decision makers. 
In the context of this study, loss aversion attitudes explain governments’ 
unwillingness to introduce significant changes into the law without the support 
of large, influential portions of the affected stakeholders or hard evidence of the 
expected benefits. Similarly, known biases that contribute to explain not the 
aversion, but why significant statutory reforms are few and far between, are the 
status quo bias191 and the endowment effect,192 as first described by U.S. 
Supreme Court Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1897.193  
The first concept refers to people’s preference not to change their state of 
affairs. The second undermines the Coasean assumption that items have equal 
worth whether gained or lost,194 as it describes the situation whereby 
                                                                    
189 D Ellesberg, ‘Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms’ (1961) 75(4) Q.J. Econ. 643; HJ Einhorn 
and RM Hogarth, ‘Decision Making under Ambiguity’ (1986) 59(4) J. Bus. 225; A Tversky and CR 
Fox, ‘Ambiguity, Aversion and Comparative Ignorance’ (1995) 110(3) Q.J. Econ. 585. 
190 D Kahneman, ‘A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality’ (2003) 
58 Am. Psychol. 673. 
191 Kahneman and Tversky (n 184) 348 (describing an experiment in which the majority of the 
surveyed subjects preferred to stay in their imaginary job despite of the alternative offer); W 
Samuelson and R Zeckhauser, ‘Status Quo Bias in Decision Making’ (1988) 1 J. Risk & 
Uncertainty 7; Kahneman (n 184) 197-199; RB Korobkin, ‘The Status Quo Bias and Contract 
Default Rules’ (1998) 83 Cornell L. Rev. 608. 
192 RH Thaler, ‘Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice’ (1980) 1 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 
39; JL Knetsch and JA Sinden, ‘Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental 
Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value’ (1984) 99 Q.J. Econ. 507; DW 
Harless, ‘More Laboratory Evidence on the Disparity Between Willingness to Pay and 
Compensation Demanded’ (1989) 11 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 358; JL Knetsch, ‘The Endowment 
Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves’ (1989) 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 1277; 
Kahneman (n 184) 194-197. 
193 ‘It is in the nature of a man's mind. A thing which you enjoyed and used as your own for a long 
time, whether property or opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without your 
resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it. The law can ask no better 
justification than the deepest instincts of man’: Kahneman (n 184) 204. 
194 Mevorach (n 83) 57. See also: R Korobkin, ‘Wrestling with the Endowment Effect, or How to 
Do Law and Economics without the Coase Theorem’ in E. Zamil and D. Teichman (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Behavioural Economics and the Law (OUP: Oxford, 2014); D Kahneman and 
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individuals value things that they already own more than those which they do 
not own yet.195 These concepts are analysed together because their effect on 
behavioural choices is similar.  
These aspects (and particularly the status quo bias) explain the tendency (of 
people and decision makers alike) not to opt out of default arrangements,196 as 
the perceived disadvantages introduced by a new situation loom larger than the 
advantages.197 As a result, these biases may result in postponement of 
normative changes, as the decision makers do not objectively assess the 
positives and negatives arising from a regulatory change.198  
The endowment effect narrative has been criticised by some economists, who 
reported that discrepancies between one’s willingness to pay (‘WTP’) and 
willingness to accept (‘WTA’) a price diminishes with experience and in a 
market setting.199 It is also not true that people always fail to take actions or 
prefer to remain inactive. However, when they act, it is not always the case that 
rational considerations prevail over other elements. Studies in cognitive 
psychology have proven that under certain circumstances, people act against 
their own long-term interest.200  
This last bias has been labelled as “bounded willpower” and the situation is 
best illustrated by the example of people who continue to smoke or abuse 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
others, ‘Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem’ (1990) 98 J. Pol. 
Econ. 1325.  
195 It is hardly surprising to observe that Coase theories do not work in corporate distress cases. 
As Skeel observed, ‘[b]ankruptcy isn’t exactly a place one expects to see the Coase theorem in 
action’ due to the fact that it is an area of law full of intricate regulation and judicial 
intervention: Skeel (n 60) 949. 
196 Mevorach (n 83) 81 (arguing that the transformation of modified universalism into 
customary international law (‘CIL’) would favour its adoption and consistency of interpretation 
throughout the world as CIL operates as a default, opt-out rule). See also: BC Madrian and DF 
Shea, ‘The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior’ (2001) 
116 Q.J. Econ. 1149; Zamir (n 168) 839. 
197 Samuelson and Zeckhauser (n 191). 
198 RB Korobkin, ‘The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis’ (2003) Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227; RB 
Korobkin and C Guthrie, ‘Heuristic and Biases at the Bargaining Table’ (2004) 87 Marq. L. Rev. 
795.  
199 P Knez and others, ‘Individual Rationality, Market Rationality, and Value Estimation’ (1985) 
75 Am. Econ. Rev. 397; DL Coursey and others, ‘The Disparity Between Willingness to Accept 
and Willingness to Pay Measures of Value’ (1987) 102 Q.J. Econ. 679. In reply to their 
observations, Kahneman, Knetsh and Thaler conducted a new series of experiments to 
determine if the endowment effect applied in market contexts: Kahneman (n 194). 
200 C Jolls and others, ’A Behavioural Approach to Law and Economics’ (1998) 50 Stan. L. Rev. 
1471, 1479. 
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alcohol despite being aware of the negative consequences arising from their 
behaviour. Similarly, common knowledge and experimental studies show that 
people are more sensitive to changes when they benefit from direct, self-
advantages rather than when they act in the interest of third parties (a bias 
known as “bounded self-interest”).  
6.6(a)(ii) Addressing Behavioural Biases 
Where sub-section 6.6(a)(i) has evidenced the biases that influence Anglo-
American decision makers, it is now time to suggest strategies to overcome 
them. 
First and foremost, it looms the problem of how to counteract the prisoner’s 
dilemma bias. If people perceive that their actions, despite being directed to 
promote the common good, will be exploited by other participants for their own 
benefit and to the detriment of the game-changer, then the change is unlikely to 
occur in first place. However, it might be possible to minimize the negative 
woes associated with change if it is shown to decision makers that any 
regulatory change would lead to a domino-effect of similar changes around the 
world.  
This peer effect201 is not unheard of in the legal field, particularly with reference 
to corporate distress practice. The history on the adoption and implementation 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law and its Guide202 is illustrative of this peer effect 
tendency.  
The UNCITRAL Model Law represents a soft-law instrument that deals with the 
recognition of foreign proceedings and co-operation with foreign authorities in 
                                                                    
201 I Ayres and others, ‘Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments that Peer Comparison 
Feedback Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage’ National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
Working Paper 15386/2009 (2009) <http://www.nber.org/papers/w15386.pdf> accessed 17 
September 2018. See also: E Asch, ‘Effects on Group Pressure upon the Modification and 
Distortion of Judgments’ in H Guetzkow (ed), Groups, Leadership and Men; Research in Human 
Relations (Carnegie Press: Lancaster, 1951). 
202 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with 
Guide to Enactment and Interpretation’, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2 (2014), 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013-Guide-
Enactment-e.pdf> [https://perma.cc/T9Y3-NR8B]> accessed 17 September 2018. 
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cross-border corporate distress cases. Despite the criticisms,203 it offers a 
template of a law that the states can implement in their own legal systems with 
as few modifications as possible. 
When enacted in 1997, it represented a significant step forward even when 
compared to the then most advanced laws in the field.204 The immediate result 
of the implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law in domestic jurisdictions is 
a loss of sovereignty on cross-border corporate distress matters by states and 
the judiciary (if the main proceedings were located in a different country). 
Decision makers may therefore have feared – and probably did fear – that the 
adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law would have resulted in competitive 
advantages for other countries. 
However, the take-up rate of signatories has significantly and rapidly increased 
since the United States (2005) and the United Kingdom (2006) implemented 
the UNCITRAL Model Law in their systems.205 Before 2006, only eight 
jurisdictions had adopted a legislation based on the Model Law. Nowadays, the 
Model Law has been implemented in forty-six jurisdictions,206 including 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore. This suggests that the United 
States and the United Kingdom played a leading role in determining the best 
policies and practices in the area of corporate distress. Countries from all over 
the world look at the changes in the law of these leading countries and – to a 
large extent – adopt the Anglo-American innovations into their statutes. Why 
should it be different if the U.S. and England introduced a new eligibility 
criterion based on the RCP standard? 
To ensure uniformity and to strengthen the peer-effect, influential international 
institutions should back the Anglo-American regulatory agenda. This has been 
the case for the UNCITRAL Model Law. Its implementation into national law has 
                                                                    
203 The UNCITRAL Model Law has been described as ‘an exercise in realism and the art of 
possible’: IF Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (2nd edn, OUP: Oxford, 2005) 453.  
204 Mevorach (n 83) 40. 
205 For a positive view of the adoption of the Model Law, see Mevorach (n 83) 75. For a more 
pessimist analysis, see SC Mohan, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency Problems: Is the UNCITRAL Model 
Law the Answer?’ (2012) 21(3) Int’l Insol. Rev. 199. 
206 <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html> 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
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was made a condition for the supply of financial support by the International 
Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) to several countries.207  
Additionally, the Financial Stability Board (‘FSB’), in cooperation with the IMF, 
has developed international standards – this draws on the lines of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law – for the resolution of cross-border insolvencies of 
systemically important financial institutions.208 More recently, a Judicial 
Insolvency Network (‘JIN’) from several jurisdictions has actively promoted 
communication and co-operation among courts in cross-border corporate 
distress cases, along the lines of the recommendations included in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and Guide.  
Finally, political science literature on public choice seems to assume that law 
replicates the strengths of interest groups: ‘what goes in the process is precisely 
what comes out, once it is suitably mixed in the legislative blender’.209 However, 
decisions and roles of single personalities (or, as in this case, states) sometimes 
may play a rather relevant, but always unnoticed role. 
Moving to the analysis of the strategies to counter-act loss-aversion biases, it 
has been observed that loss-averse bodies more frequently choose risky options 
(such as to introduce far-reaching reforms) when they are required to adopt a 
positive action to prevent the realisation of net losses.210  
The loss-aversion inclination could be limited if bills were framed on the work 
of commissions of experts, who are better placed to rigorously evaluate 
evidence from the industry and determine the impacts of recommended 
                                                                    
207 This appears to have been the case for Greece, Japan and South Korea: Mohan (n 205) 207-
08. 
208 Financial Stability Board, ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial 
Institutions’ (2011), rev’d in Financial Stability Board, ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution 
Regimes for Financial Institutions’ (2014) <http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/policy-
development/effective-resolution-regimes-and-policies/key-attributes-of-effective-resolution-
regimes-for-financial-institutions/> accessed 17 September 2018. 
209 DA Skeel, Jr., Debt’s Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America (Princeton University 
Press: Princeton, 2001) 117. 
210 ND Wright and others, ‘Approaching Avoidance Processes Contribute to Dissociable Impacts 
of Risk and Loss on Choice’ (2012) 32(20) J. Neuroscience 7009; ND Wright and others, 
‘Manipulating the Contribution of Approach-Avoidance to the Perturbation of Economic Choice 
by Valence’ (2013) 7 Frontiers in Neuroscience 1. 
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reforms. The IA 1986, which built on the Cork Report (1982),211 and the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978,212 are examples of how ambiguity can be 
diminished and loss-averse tensions mitigated by exhaustive, preliminary 
works. Loss-aversion attitudes could therefore be counteracted if the 
conceptualisation proposed in this thesis was subject to open consultation 
before being translated into a bill.  
It is also possible to address the negative externalities arising from the status 
quo bias and endowment effect. Status quo is not an objective concept: what 
matters the most is how interested parties (in this case, decision makers) 
perceive reality.213 It is submitted that two strategies are possible to overcome 
these biases.  
The first strategy, which has already been suggested in the past,214 is to present 
the suggested reforms as options that could increase gains rather than avoid 
losses. Alternatively, they could also be presented as the continuation of an 
established policy in the area, rather than a significant departure from previous 
strategy. This may aptly apply to the proposed regulatory changes, as they 
would not affect the pillars and fundamental goals of the Anglo-American 
corporate distress framework.  
It has been demonstrated in the past215 that people tend to adopt strategies that 
they perceive as conformed to the existing status quo as possible. The first 
strategy would not address this attitude, while the second approach could – 
admittedly, in a surreptitious way – present regulatory changes not only as 
gains, but also as a continuation or minor departures from the existing status 
quo. 
With reference to bounded willpower and self-interest, studies have 
demonstrated that an improvement in the flow of information and the 
                                                                    
211 K Cork, ‘Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee’ (Cmnd 8558) (HMSO, 
London 1982). 
212 The Act culminated seven years of work by the Congress, Lawyers and the Commission on 
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States (created by Congress on 24 July 1970).  
213 Mevorach (n 83) 58. 
214 Ibid 58. 
215 Samuelson and Zeckhauser (n 191), showing that when participants were asked to choose 
the colour of their new car, the opted for one that was arbitrarily framed as the status quo. 
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establishment of clear sanctions for lack of co-operation can result - in TCP 
scenarios - in the reduction of excess appropriation of resources and greater 
contribution to the public good.216 This suggests and reiterates the importance 
of establishing mechanisms that ensure the highest possible level of trust 
among the participants in the regulatory reform process and the public opinion.  
- 
Sub-section 6.6(a) has shown the important normative implications that have to 
be considered before designing a strategy aimed at reframing current corporate 
distress perceptions. A hearing in front of the Department for Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy (‘BEIS’) or an article in an influential law journal would 
probably not be able, in themselves, to attract not only sufficient, but also the 
right attention to promote the proposals included in this study. The way in 
which this project is presented to the legal community can significantly affect its 
chances of being implemented.217 
The nature of the proposal and the need to overcome established decision-
making biases suggest an approach that promotes a debate and the 
achievement of a wide consensus on a reform proposal first at the level of the 
academic community, and secondly within the body of practitioners. If the 
Anglo-American corporate distress community supported this call for a change, 
there could be legitimate expectations to overcome the biases evidenced above. 
6.6(b) Avoiding Failure: Limits, Limitations and Delimitations of this Study 
«The power of a theory is directly proportional to the diversity of situations it can 
explain. All theories, however, have limits»218 
6.6(b)(i) Limits 
This research is limited by certain factors.  
                                                                    
216 A Falk and others, ‘Appropriating the Commons: A Theoretical Explanation’ in E. Ostrom and 
others (eds), The Drama of the Commons (The National Academies Press, 2002). 
217 Among others: A Tversky and D Kahneman, ‘The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice’ (1981) 211 Science 453 (describing the different intake of a medical treatment 
depending on whether the data was presented in terms of expected death or survival). 
218 E Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (3rd edn, 
CUP: Cambridge, 2017) 24. 
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First and foremost, few studies have been conducted on the topic and their 
focus has primarily been on preventing strategic filings or suggesting regulatory 
reforms. The papers that have discussed the normative underpinning of the 
Anglo-American corporate insolvency law and its interaction with contract law 
are few and far between. 
From a methodological point of view, even if this study adopts a normative 
approach, it analyses a series of corporate distress cases. Relevant cases have 
been selected on the basis of the availability of data, their relevance for the 
topics debated in those chapters of this work and their role for the evolution of 
the corporate distress practice.  
The proposed WMSI theory should apply across the whole corporate spectrum 
and, particularly, to MSME procedures because it is primarily in cases involving 
relatively small debtors that shareholders and employees are the real risk 
bearers of the company.  
The dynamics of the filings affecting small and medium companies have been 
investigated elsewhere, as reported throughout this thesis. Large filings provide 
richer and more easily accessible information about the issues at play in 
corporate insolvency procedures. This reliance on large procedures for 
evidentiary purposes, while not being in itself representative of the whole 
industry, should nevertheless be capable of providing conclusions that go 
beyond the considered cases.  
Finally, this thesis covers literature and case law published before 1 September 
2018. 
6.6(b)(ii) Limitations 
This study also suffers from some additional limitations, i.e. potential 
weaknesses that could not be addressed by the author throughout the research 
and that may potentially affect its conclusions. 
Leaving aside the bias determined by the researcher’s background, the primary 
limitation of this paper is the adoption of a legal perspective to corporate 
distress despite the need to make use of concepts conceived in other disciplines. 
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Purely economic, sociological or behavioural approaches are not considered for 
the purposes of this study. However, some of the conclusions of these studies - 
especially behavioural219 and corporate governance220 ones – have been 
considered to investigate the attitude and influence that certain stakeholders 
play in the corporate distress market.221 
While this thesis elaborates on these notions, it is not the purpose of this study 
to question the validity of commonly accepted conclusions in the disciplines 
mentioned above. In general, where possible and appropriate, this paper has 
privileged legal over alternative explanations of its key concepts. 
Furthermore, it is possible that some of the conclusions of this paper may not 
find favourable application in civil law countries. This may primarily be 
ascribed to the lesser degree of discretion that civil law judiciaries enjoy, 
especially when compared to the wider latitude exercised by their common law 
colleagues. The dynamics of cross-border cases should also be subject to 
additional research in order to determine the adjustments (if any) that are 
needed to implement the WMSI theory in an international environment. 
Lastly, the WMSI theory relies on the activism of stakeholders, especially 
communities, tort claimants and business competitors who have insofar played 
a marginal or no role in corporate distress procedures. To address this issue, 
Anglo-American policymakers  
should promote policy choices that encourage fairness in the allocation 
of benefits from the commons; grant autonomy to users for crafting, 
implementing and enforcing institutional arrangements […]; 
institutionalize low-cost mechanisms for the adjudication of disputes; 
[and] promote accountability.222  
As a result, the factors that influence cooperation in RCP dilemmas have to be 
investigated and described in plain terms to allow the governments of these 
                                                                    
219 J De Coninck, ‘Behavioural Economics and Legal Research’ in M Van Hoecke (ed.) 
Methodologies of Legal Research (Hart Publishing: London, 2013). 
220 Section 6.4 of this work. 
221 See, among others: A Mechele Dickerson, ‘A Behavioural Approach to Analyzing Corporate 
Failures’ (2003) 38(1) Wake For. L. Rev. 1. 
222 Agrawal (n 213) 71. 
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countries to tune their laws to promote their involvement in corporate distress 
procedures.223  
6.6(b)(iii) Delimitations 
This paper is also limited by its scope. While acknowledging that the subject of 
the “foundations” of corporate distress law is significantly more complex, this 
thesis focused primarily on the analysis of the “limits” of this area of law. This 
has resulted in additional, consequential decisions. 
The first ramification affects the methodology of this work and, in particular, its 
reliance on theoretical and doctrinal methods. This applied doctrinal 
methodology,224 rather than socio/legal interdisciplinary approach, is, however, 
justified by the nature of the research questions and it is in line with the 
expected contribution that this work makes. 
The second ramification deals with the subject of this research. This thesis is 
concerned with the analysis of corporate cases only. Personal bankruptcies are 
not included in its scope, while reference to municipalities is only incidental. 
Despite the existence of “systemic” individual cases (and their increasing 
number and relevance for the corporate distress community),225 this would 
have excessively broadened the scope of this research, thus affecting the 
validity and soundness of its conclusions. 
The third ramification is that this work, despite recognizing the potential 
implications that other disciplines (e.g. tax issues226 and employment law) have 
                                                                    
223 Scholars in the field of psychology have already conducted similar studies: among others, see 
Kopelman (n 218). 
224 See above section 1.5 of this thesis. 
225 See, for instance, Curtis Jackson, aka ’50 Cents’, who filed for bankruptcy in 2015. The 
rapper’s appearance in U.S. bankruptcy courts triggered a lot of criticism (and extensive debate 
in the public opinion) over the laxity of filing requirements, the underlying reasons of this 
choice (i.e. to avoid the execution of a civil judgment against him) and the life style paraded by 
the allegedly bankrupt debtor during and after the proceeding. It also appeared that the rapper, 
who rose to prominence in 2003 with his debut studio album “Get Rich or Die Tryin’”, filed for 
bankruptcy to avoid an award for punitive damages in a trial against Ms. Leviston: DJ Cohen, ’50 
Cent: You Love Him in a Bentley, But Would You Love Him on a Bus? 50’s Creditors Have 21 
Questions, and They’re All About U.S. Bankruptcy Law’ Weil Bankruptcy Blog (2 February 2016) 
<https://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/chapter-11-plans/50-cent-you-love-him-in-
a-bentley-but-would-you-love-him-on-a-bus-50s-creditors-have-21-questions-and-theyre-all-
about-u-s-bankruptcy-law/> accessed 17 September 2018. 
226 For an analysis of the tax issues in turnaround cases arising from formal rescue and informal 
restructuring procedures in England and the U.S.: P Ridgway and others, ‘Tax Issues in 
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on corporate distress practice, does not address these concerns. This is because 
the author believes that the effects of these rules on corporate distress cases 
should depend on the considerations which determine the scope and limits of 
corporate distress law and not the other way around.    
While this paper considered judicial decisions from different jurisdictions, it did 
not adopt a comparative approach. This research focused on Anglo-American 
laws and issues. Foreign cases, laws and approaches were considered only if 
they informed the development of this area of law in the considered countries.  
The decision to concentrate the research on the case law and statutes from 
England and the U.S. has been taken after careful consideration. These 
jurisdictions are characterised by lenient and flexible eligibility requirements 
for the enforcement of corporate distress rules and their courts are willing to 
rule on cases which only have a limited connection with these jurisdictions.227 
They also provide a voluminous amount of easily accessible data, primarily with 
reference to in-court judicial rescue and liquidation procedures.  
The decisions in all these cases tend to influence the evolution of a multitude of 
systems of laws.228 This also promotes the establishment of a customary 
international law229 or approach to corporate distress cases, since it has been 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Restructuring’ in Christopher Mallon and others (eds), The Law and Practice of Restructuring in 
the UK and US (2nd edn, OUP: Oxford, 2017).  
227 For instance, In the U.S. in Re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd 251 B.R. (Bankr. D. Del. 2000), the 
court held that it was sufficient to establish jurisdiction under s.1098(1) 11 U.S. Code the 
circumstance that a debtor had a small deposit in a U.S. bank account. However, in Re McTague, 
198 B.R. 428 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996) it was held that placing property in the U.S. for the sole 
purpose of becoming eligible to file for insolvency may be treated as evidence of “bad faith” thus 
justifying a dismissal of a filing on that basis. 
In England in Re DTEK Finance BV [2015] EWHC 1164 (Ch), [2015] WL 1839043 the Chancery 
Division of the High Court considered that the change in the governing law to English law 
created “sufficient connection” with the country to give an English court the authority to 
approve a scheme of arrangement. The scheme was proposed by a Dutch company which was 
part of a group that carried on an energy business in Ukraine, and which sought to renegotiate 
the value and maturity of loan notes governed by New York law. 
228 G McCormack, Corporate Rescue Law - An Anglo-American Perspective (EE Publishing: 
Cheltenham, 2008); SE Schick, ‘Globalization, Bankruptcy and the Myth of the Broken Bench’ 
(2006) 80(2) Am. Bankr. L.J. 219, 219. 
229 K Wolfke, Custom in Present International Law (2nd edn, Springer Netherlands: Dordrecht, 
1993); BD Lepard (ed), Reexamining Customary International Law (CUP: Cambridge, 2017); RM 
Scoville, ‘Finding Customary International Law’ (2016) 101(5) Iowa L. Rev. 1893; RB Baker, 
‘Customary International Law: A Reconceptualization’ (2016) 41(2) Brook. J. Int’l L. 439. 
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observed that to shape the evolution of international law, not all states are 
created equal.230 
Finally, England and the United States are two countries separated out by a 
common law,231 with the result that each jurisdiction has developed a discrete 
but connected system of law and cases. English and American courts do not 
adopt the same approach to statutory interpretation and have a different 
understanding of the notion and relevance of the doctrine of precedent. For 
historical and constitutional reasons (i.e. lack of a federal system, powers of the 
Supreme Court, etc.), English judges adopt a stricter approach than their 
American colleagues, in general and in corporate distress cases as well. Yet, 
dialogue is constant, as the recent cases of Lehman and Nortel prove. 
Lastly, it shall be observed that to conceptually design a system of laws and 
principles that meets the autonomy, legal predictability and inclusivity 
objectives, it would be necessary to carry out an extensive analysis of all the 
existing laws and provisions. This very same approach has been successfully 
adopted in recent times by Vanessa Finch (and David Milman),232 who 
challenged the adequacy of some of the existing corporate distress provisions 
and practices on the basis of four criteria: accountability, expertise, efficiency 
and fairness.  
Due to the magnitude of work that such a research would require, the author 
reserves for himself the possibility of conducting at a later stage a theoretical 
analysis of whether existing laws meet the eligibility criteria mentioned above. 
Such an analysis would follow the structure of a similar research carried out by 
the author with reference to the treatment of executory contracts in English 
insolvency law.233 
                                                                    
230 P Malanczuk, Akehurt’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edn, Routledge: 
London, 1997).  
231 G Moss and others, ‘Giving Effect to Debt Compromise Arrangements – Binding the Minority 
or Out of the Money Classes of Creditors’ in Christopher Mallon and others (eds), The Law and 
Practice of Restructuring in the U.K. and U.S. (2nd edn, OUP: Oxford, 2017) 151. The authors 
relate their witticism to George Bernard Shaw’s quip: ‘England and America, two countries 
separated by common language’. 
232 Finch and Milman (n 1). 
233 J Chuah and E Vaccari (eds), Treatment of Executory Contracts in Insolvency Law: A 
Transnational Study (EE Publishing: Cheltenham, 2019) Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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6.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The idea of corporate distress law being a safety net is based on a pivotal 
underpinning, shared by this text: markets are far from perfect,234 especially in 
downwards trends or in periods of financial crisis. As a result, corporate 
distress law (which is otherwise procedural in nature) should act as a “safety 
net”, that is should prevent (secured) ‘creditors in a weak economy from 
collectively precipitating a downward spiral leading to a total economic 
collapse.’235  
This chapter tested the validity of this claim by proposing and testing the 
introduction of a new eligibility criterion based on the RCP concept and by 
critically evaluating the WMSI theory against alternative taxonomies. Currently, 
neither in the U.S. nor in England admissibility to a corporate distress 
procedure is subject to an eligibility test that considers the effect of the decision 
to file on the controlling stakeholders. The risk bearer interests of some 
stakeholders affected by the decision and the relative relevance of their claims 
are generally neglected.  
The RCP standard represents an attempt to introduce such evaluation and the 
de-constructivist analysis carried out in this chapter shows that the standard 
has the potential to improve the existing normative framework. 
The promising results of this de-constructivist analysis suggest that the RCP 
standard should become one of the two criteria (alongside insolvency) which 
determine the enforceability of corporate distress remedies. This is because, 
overall, it performs in a more satisfactory manner than the criteria discussed in 
chapter five. In other words, the RCP standard has the potential to determine 
when general law remedies should give way to corporate distress ones. This 
could only be possible, however, within a new corporate framework which 
                                                                    
234 Against: JW Bowers, according to whom ‘markets seem to be the only available devices which 
really do solve the problems of financial distress. […] [M]arkets are efficient and bankruptcy 
procedures are not. That is the […] implication of the only scientific empirical evidence’ 
[‘Rehabilitation, Redistribution or Dissipation: The Evidence for Choosing Among Bankruptcy 
Hypotheses’ (1994) 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 955, 976]. 
235 SL Bufford, ‘What is Right About Bankruptcy Law and Wrong About its Critics’ (1994) 72 
Wash. U. L.Q. 829, 838. 
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CHAPTER 7 - THE WAY FORWARD: CONTRIBUTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
«All models are flawed. In trying to capture merely the essence of a problem 
rather than the problem’s complexity, models suffer from incompleteness. But 
depending on the assumptions made in simplifying a complex reality, a model 
need not be inaccurate. A good model can stand a relaxation of its premises»1 
 
Stakeholders and scholars disagree on what constitutes the “proper function” of 
the corporate distress system: is it to promote the maximisation of creditors’ 
return, the autonomy of the parties or some overarching principles such as 
fairness and equality? The WMSI theory suggested in this thesis, coupled with 
the RCP and insolvency eligibility standards, allows the players to take any of 
these courses of action on the basis of the circumstances of the case, without 
preliminarily committing to a specific conceptual framework. This theory also 
addresses the major public policy concern that has justified this thesis, i.e. the 
lack of proper, statutory protection for those risk bearers who control 
distressed companies. 
More importantly, this theory provides a more informed and refined approach 
to determine when, to what extent and if at all corporate distress rules, 
principles and judicial and business practices should depart from the common 
law of contract. 
This thesis suggests that enforceability of corporate distress remedies and 
adoption of a particular course of action (i.e. assets’ or capital maximisation) 
should be dependent upon: a) the nature and characteristics of the dilemma 
faced by the debtor and its creditors (rather than on the need to promote 
specific policy goals); and b) the inability of the parties to reach an agreement 
on how to address solvency issues. 
It is therefore argued that whenever parties face RCP or solvency dilemmas but 
are able to negotiate an agreement that pursues the best interest of all 
stakeholders (by means of consensual winding-ups, informal workouts or other 
                                                                    
1 S Block-Lieb, ‘Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy as Applied to the 
Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case’ (1992-93) 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 337, 430. 
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restructuring procedures), there should be no derogation from general contract 
law standards.  
In hybrid procedures (such as pre-packs, schemes of arrangement or CVAs), 
statutory intervention and derogation from the general law of contracts should 
be kept to a minimum. In any case, when parties are incapable of reaching an 
agreement in the best interest of all stakeholders (RCP or solvency problems), 
the theory proposed in this thesis justifies the adoption and statutory 
enforcement of corporate distress remedies that derogate from the general law 
of contract. 
This thesis does not adopt a “panacea” approach. It does not suggest that there 
is a correct, best or optimal way to address RCP and solvency situations. At the 
same time, it proposes some innovative solutions and a new conceptualisation 
of the law of corporate distress to ponder, protect and promote the interests of 
all stakeholders during hard times.  
This study therefore argues and demonstrates that unitary, all-embracing 
models of the law of corporate distress (such as those discussed in chapters two 
to four) should be – where possible – avoided. It criticises current eligibility 
standards, suggests an alternative criterion and observes that to pursue the 
social goals that the parties expect from the corporate distress procedure self-
imposed, bottom-up solutions may work better than state-imposed ones 
(chapters five and six). The inclusive, bottom-up RCP approach should ensure 
that the “service paradox”2 is avoided, especially in cases where the definition of 
the social goals of the procedure is problematic.  
Reference to a revised rather than traditional common pool notion is justified 
upon the fact that the use of the traditional standard in existing insolvency 
procedures can produce sub-optimal results. It may allow informed creditors to 
                                                                    
2 The “service paradox” has been defined as the condition in which the optimal solution is the 
less satisfactory for those who are supposed to be the beneficiary of the procedure: PD Aligica 
and PJ Boettke, Challenging Institutional Analysis and Development: The Bloomington School 
(Routledge: London, 2009) 33. In the case of corporate distress law, this thesis has clarified the 
need to consider the social goals of all those who have a controlling interest in the debtor. We 
would experience a “service paradox” situation whenever the law incentivises the use of 
procedures, which promote the interests of the debtor alone or those of a small category of 
claimants strictly linked with the debtor. 
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exploit their informational advantages over no or less-adjusting ones. It may be 
also incapable of considering, protecting and promoting the interests of 
residual-risk takers.  
A basic governance principle highlighted by law and economics theorists (such 
as Baird and Jackson) is that those who profit from a transaction should also 
bear the consequences in case of failure. This thesis has demonstrated that the 
current Anglo-American corporate distress systems are not designed to achieve 
this objective. 
These legal systems do not define clearly the conditions that shall exist for a 
company to file for corporate distress remedies. This situation prompts the 
adoption of sub-optimal and procedurally inefficient decisions from the people 
in charge of turnaround, rescue or liquidation procedures, as the cases 
discussed in this thesis demonstrate. In the period before the filing, decisions 
are taken by people (directors and shareholders) who are frequently out-of-
money and have no residual interest in the company. This promotes the 
assumption of risky choices (such as gambling for the resurrection of the 
company),3 that are frequently detrimental to the interests of those who really 
control the company at that time. In the period following the filing, decisions are 
primarily taken for the benefit of in-money contractual creditors, thus ignoring 
the interests of other stakeholders.  
In other words, the current system favours the externalisation of risk onto third 
parties. As these third parties have not yet been capable of acting in a concerted 
and co-ordinated way to lobby their interests in front of the legislator, there is a 
strong tendency in favour of maintaining the status quo despite its sub-optimal 
outcomes. 
The judiciary tends to support this marginalization of key players. For instance, 
in the recent case of Epic System v Lewis,4 the Supreme Court held that when 
                                                                    
3 In 1973, FedEx founder Frederick Smith was so desperate and short of cash to rely on 
gambling in Las Vegas to fund his company. He managed to turn the remaining $5,000 in the 
company’s account to $27,000, thus allowing the company to buy enough time to find a solution 
with its creditors. By 1976, FedEx produced its first profit of $3.6 million. For a summary of 
these events, see: R Frock, Changing How the World Does Business: FedEx’s Incredible Journey to 
Success – The Inside Story (Berrett-Koehler: San Francisco, 2006).  
4 Epic System Corp. v Lewis, No. 16-285, 2018 WL 2292444 (U.S. May 21, 2018). 
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contrasting the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act (which allows employers to bar 
collective legal actions by employees if the latter sign employment agreements 
to arbitrate) and the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (which protects the 
rights of workers to act together against illegal actions from their employers), 
the former prevails.  
The decision, by a 5-4 vote, has been vigorously criticised by left-wing 
politicians.5 It means that corporations can block workers from suing in a class 
suit for major violations of their rights, as workers are unlikely to take 
individual actions against large employers such as Ernest & Young LLP, Epic 
Systems Corp. and Murphy Oil USA, Inc. (the parties in the dispute) for a variety 
of reasons (cost, imbalance of power, lack of information, etc.). It also shows a 
lack of consideration for the voice and contributions that could come from these 
stakeholders, who are all but incentivised to actively exercise their controlling 
interests in the corporation. 
Building on the literature that suggested a re-conceptualisation of insolvency as 
the law of corporate distress,6 this thesis argues for relying on corporate 
governance and principle-based theories to identify the controlling 
stakeholders of distressed corporations. Corporate distress law should not be 
considered as a liquidation or rescue tool, but as a problem-solving procedure 
aimed at achieving the optimally efficient and fair result for the benefit of the 
true controllers of the corporation facing RCP or solvency problems. 
This work also argues for the opportunity to develop strategies to evaluate the 
portion of the rents created by risk bearers, as rights in corporate distress 
situations should not always be determined on the basis of the nominal value of 
the claim.  
                                                                    
5 E Warren (Dem) (@SenWarren) ‘In a decision written by Justice Gorsuch, the Supreme Court 
has ruled that corporations can block workers from suing together over major violations of 
their rights, like sexual harassment, discrimination, & wage theft. Congress should act to reverse 
this terrible decision’ (22 May 2018, 9:58 PM). Tweet. 
6 S Paterson, ‘Rethinking the Role of Corporate Distress in the Twenty-First Century’ LSE Law, 
Society and Economy Working Paper No. 27/2014 (2014) 
<https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2014-27_Paterson.pdf> accessed 17 
September 2018. 
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There is a wide range of literature that suggests that stakeholders rather than 
shareholders are the residual “owners” of the company.7 However, for the 
purposes of this thesis there is no need to push the boundaries that far. 
Corporate distress law should not re-define who the owners of the company 
are. These are corporate governance issues that – if re-considered in corporate 
distress cases only – may result in partial and unsatisfactory outcomes, as well 
as in the creation of an incentive to file and behave strategically. 
Corporate distress law should simply recognise the existence of residual risk 
bearers as the group who can claim legally enforceable (including risk bearer) 
expectations against the distressed company.  
The law should also acknowledge that risk bearers are not a homogeneous 
group. The decisions of the people responsible for the corporate distress 
procedure should not necessarily correspond with the interests of the majority 
(in number or share) of risk bearers. These people should carefully consider the 
balance of interests of all the parties involved and the law should sanction any 
behaviour that grossly or fraudulently disregards the collective interest of the 
debtor.8  
As risk bearers are not on equal footing, decisions should weight their 
controlling rights. It might therefore be possible that the preferred course of 
action favours a minority (in number) of stakeholders if these decisions are in 
line with the goals of the procedure and the directions issued by the eligibility 
panel upon admission. If properly considered, these decisions should allocate 
the risk of future losses to those who will gain the most from potential profits.9 
For instance, a shareholder who owns the controlling stake in a small company 
and who is also a director or an employee of the same company is arguably 
                                                                    
7 Blair argues that the limited liability principle contradicts the assumption that shareholders 
are the only residual claimant of a company: MM Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking 
Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century (The Brookings Institution: Washington D.C. 
1995) 27.  
8 Such is reality, as empirically observed by LoPucki and Whitford: LM LoPucki and WC 
Whitford, ‘Corporate Governance in the Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies’ (Jan. 
1993) 141(3) U. Pa. L. Rev. 669, 673 (who demonstrated – albeit admittedly in a study only on 
forty-three large, public companies that filed and completed a Chapter 11 reorganisation 
between 1979 and 1988 – that in Chapter 11 neither assumption of shareholder control nor 
that of creditor control is correct).   
9 This is the same pillar of the normative solution suggested by LoPucki and Whitford (n 8) 787. 
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among those who will suffer the most from the failure of the business. Similarly, 
the interests of employees who made company-specific investments and who 
developed highly-specialised skills with limited appeal from other companies or 
competitors should rank higher than commodity suppliers. The protection of 
their expectations may justify deviations from principles such as APR or 
rateable distribution of assets. 
Ancillary to these considerations is the question of whether directors have a 
duty under the law (and not simply a moral obligation) to consider the interests 
and expectations of quasi-owners of the company. While common sense would 
lead to an affirmative answer, law should not be based on common sense only. 
However, as shown in section 4.3 of this thesis, other commentators10 and the 
judiciary11 have proven the existence of a general duty to consider the effects of 
directors’ decisions on the company’s risk bearers whenever the company faces 
corporate distress problems.  
Finally, this thesis rejects the mainstream narrative according to which, in order 
to assess the limits of corporate distress law, it is necessary to determine those 
cases where contractual tenets prevail over corporate distress ones and vice 
versa. The same situation can be handled either with or without resort to 
corporate distress remedies. The ontological difference between corporate and 
corporate distress law is that, while the first deals only occasionally with RCP or 
solvency dilemmas, the latter is primarily designed to provide a forum and rules 
to address RCP and solvency problems. 
In the author’s view, there is no need to press for radical changes to the law or 
to the management of corporate distress procedures, or to develop a new 
business or legal culture.  
The proposed measures are expected to enhance inclusivity in corporate 
distress procedures (by giving a right of audience to stakeholders who would 
                                                                    
10 SJ Lubben, ‘The Board’s Duty to Keep Its Options Open’ (2015) 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 817. 
11 This duty exists even outside corporate distress cases: see Omnicare, Inc. v Laborers Dist. 
Council Const. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 191 L. Ed. 2d 253 (2015) where the Supreme 
Court held that Congress adopted § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, concerning registration 
statements for public offerings of securities, to ensure that issuers tell the whole truth to 
investors. For that reason, literal accuracy is not enough: an issuer must as well desist from 
misleading investors by saying one thing and holding back another.  
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otherwise have been ignored) and the autonomy of the parties (by considering 
statutory remedies as a last resort solution to RCP dilemmas). It is also 
submitted that the implementation of a problem-informed approach to 
corporate distress would result in the long-run in higher levels of predictability 
in the legal and commercial communities, as well as in a reduction of time and 
complexities of existing procedures.  
As the World Bank and the economic literature on the subject prove, these 
changes should result in higher return rates for creditors, as well as in lenders 
being more willing to lend. If this is the case, this thesis would have produced 
meaningful changes and impact on the lives of many people in the jurisdictions 
of this study and – subject to further research – of a potentially larger audience.  
Instead of offering a single solution (the WMSI theory) to a single problem (RCP 
issues in corporate distress cases), this thesis offers a new conceptualisation of 
the approach to corporate distress and it suggests new mechanisms by which 
stakeholders may extricate themselves from RCP and solvency problems.  
 
7.1 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are some aspects linked to the core subject of this research that would 
benefit from further research.  
One of them is the concept of risk bearer interest. The author has suggested that 
such interest should be codified at least with reference to corporate distress 
situations, in order to give proper guidance to the parties affected by the 
company’s distress and the corporate distress procedure. Whether and to what 
extent these rights should be recognised outside of corporate distress cases and 
influence corporate decisions is a matter that has not been addressed in this 
thesis as it fell outside its scope.   
Another aspect is the study of mechanisms to promote trust among 
stakeholders. It has been proven that successful solutions devised by 
“appropriators” (alias controlling stakeholders) in TCP or RCP situations shared 
some common characteristics. In these successful cases, the majority of the 
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participants had similar information and the person or group of people in 
charge to develop a strategy had a good reputation and was interested in 
maintaining that record.12 This finding suggests that there is no need to rely on 
or promote the use of statutory remedies if the stakeholders can address RCP 
dilemmas on a contractual basis. The participants in the corporate distress 
framework should promote contractual over regulatory approaches by building 
communication and trust among the participants.  
Linked to this point, it is suggested that further research should be undertaken 
to investigate means that promote cooperation and timely actions among 
stakeholders, including artificial intelligence. It is a truism to say that organizing 
stakeholders so that they would act in a collective manner is an uncertain and 
complex effort. This is especially true when the parties face a RCP dilemma and 
a selfish stakeholder may realize that by acting first he or she might receive a 
higher return. Selfish, opportunistic behaviour is also promoted by the fact that 
individuals attribute less value to higher benefits that they expect to receive in 
the distant future compared to lower but certain benefits that they expect to 
receive in the immediate future.13  
Any system that wished to maximise the wealth of those stakeholders who have 
legally enforceable interests against the debtor shall consider that individuals’ 
actions are affected by at least four variables: expected benefits, expected costs, 
internal norms and discount rates. The preferred solution should be tested 
against these factual findings, as it should prove not theoretically “optimal” but 
empirically successful. On the basis of some behavioural studies conducted by 
Ostrom, it is submitted that such system should incentivize the participation of 
all affected stakeholders, include monitoring systems (and sanctions for those 
who breach the rules) preferably administered by the participants themselves, 
and feature conflict-resolution mechanisms.14  
                                                                    
12 E Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (3rd edn, 
CUP: Cambridge, 2017) 88. 
13 Ibid 34. 
14 Ibid 90. 
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